Orient BlackSwan

THE FALL AND RISE OF TELANGANA

GAUTAM PINGLE

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Orient BlackSwan

To

My Son

Jagan Mohan Venkatram Narasimha Pingle

Contents

	List of Tables and Map	ix
	Acknowledgements	xiii
	List of Abbreviations	xv
	Introduction	1
one	State on the Edge	6
two	Telangana and the Republic	10
three	Hyderabad: Then and Now	25
four	The Linguistic States: Nehru and States' Reorganisation	52
five	The Electoral Situation in the Two States	64
six	Caste Politics and the Merger	75
seven	The Telangana Tragedy	82
eight	Caste War, Naxalism and the Telangana Vote Bank	91
nine	The Ongoing Movement and the Promises Made	100
ten	The Rayalaseema Region	110
eleven	Tribal Land Rights and Demand for a Separate State	118
twelve	The One Man Girglani Commission	132

thirteen	Muslims and Telangana: A Roundabout Journey	144
fourteen	Irrigation in Telangana: The Rise and Fall of Tanks	159
fifteen	A Summary Submission to the Srikrishna Commission	184
sixteen	The Findings of the Srikrishna Commission	191
seventeen	The Srikrishna Commission: The Truth about Its Secret Chapter	199
eighteen	The Srikrishna Commision Report: The Judgment	238
nineteen	Polling the Impossible	248
twenty	Telangana's Cousins: In India and Abroad	254
twenty-one	Trifurcation and a New Governance Model	267
	Postscript: The Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill, 2013	288
	References	296
	Index	307

Tables and Map

Tables

3.1:	Population Break-up of Hyderabad City, 1901	30
3.2:	Total Migrant Influx into Hyderabad by Source, 1951–61	30
3.3:	Population Increase in Hyderabad Urban Authority	31
3.4:	District-wise Distribution of Non-Telugu-Speaking Population, 1991	32
3.5:	Distribution of Population by Religion in Hyderabad Town Group	41
3.6:	1951–61: In-migrants to the Hyderabad Town Group	42
3.7:	AP Infrastructure and Real-estate Company's Share Closing Prices on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)	48
5.1:	Telangana and Seemandhra Legislative Assembly Members	67
5.2:	Population in the Regions of Andhra Pradesh	67
5.3:	Telangana and Seemandhra Members of Lok Sabha	68
8.1:	Casualties of Left-wing Extremist Violence in Andhra Pradesh	93
14.1:	AP Irrigated Area (Hectares)	161
14.2:	Telangana Irrigated Area (Hectares)	161
14.3:	AP Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)	163
14.4:	Telangana Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)	165

14.5:	Eight-year Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)	165
14.6:	Telangana Districts: Annual Normal Rainfall in Millimetres and Percentage Deviations from Normal	167
14.7:	AP Canal Irrigated Area (Hectares)	168
14. 8:	Eight-year Canal Irrigated Area (Hectares)	169
14.9:	AP Well Irrigated Area (Hectares)	172
14.10:	Telangana Well Irrigation (Hectares)	173
14.11:	Eight-year Well Irrigated Area (Hectares)	174
14.12:	Power for Well Irrigation in Telangana	174
20.1:	Total Sectoral Backlog, as of 1 April 1994	259
21.1:	Financial Viability of Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana	267
21.2:	Balance between Revenue and Expenditure (Rs in Crores)	269
21.3:	Total Number of Professional Colleges in Hyderabad	283

Map

0.1:	Map of Andhra Pradesh depiciting the Telangana Region	xi

MAP 0.1 Map of Andhra Pradesh depicting the Telangana Region

Source: Drawn by Sangam Books, Pvt. Ltd.

Acknowledgements

I had never *really* intended to write a book on Telangana. However, many readers of the journals and newspapers that had published my articles on the region suggested that were I to bring the separate pieces together, a valuable book could emerge from this extended effort. When the Telangana movement came to a boil, I handed over all that I had written on the subject to Ms Sarah Mathews to edit and produce a first draft. Ms Mathews has succeeded beyond my wildest hopes and it is to her principally that my acknowledgement is directed. She has made the book consistent and allowed my words to flow effortlessly.

I wish to convey my admiration for the people of Telangana for their steadfastness during the long years of suffering due to the 'fall' of the region and to those of previous generations that laid the foundation for its 'rise'. To them and to the present generation of young people, I would like to express my gratitude, for without them this story would never have existed.

My special thanks are due to the editors of *Economic and Political Weekly* and *Journal of Indian School of Political Economy* for publishing my articles in their respective journals. Thanks are also due to the editors of *Deccan Chronicle*, *New Indian Express*, *Hans India*, *Sunday Guardian*, *Indian Express*, *Hindu Business Line*, *Asian Age*, *Business Standard*, *Tehelka*, *Deccan Post* and *Hard News* for giving me space to voice my opinion in their op-ed pages. A part of the book was based on my inaugural lecture at the national seminar on 'History, Region and Identity: A Study of Telangana' organised by the History Department of Osmania University.

My thanks are also due to Dr Nandini Rao and her team at Orient BlackSwan.

Finally, much credit and many thanks go to my wife, Rina, for putting up with the late night writing sessions and other distractions that went with this exercise.

List of Abbreviations

AI-MIM	All-India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen
APIIC	Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation
APCC	Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee
APGenco	Andhra Pradesh Generation Company
APSRTC	Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRGF	Backward Region's Grant Fund
BSE	Bombay Stock Exchange
BSP	Bahujan Samaj Party
CLP	Congress Legislature Party
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI-M	Communist Party of India-Marxist
CSDS	Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
CWC	Congress Working Committee
DA	dearness allowance
DGP	Director General of Police
DISCOMs	distribution companies
GHMA	Greater Hyderabad Metropolitan Area
GoAP	Government of Andhra Pradesh
GoM	Group of Ministers
HoD	Head of Department
HRA	House Rent Allowance
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IPC	Indian Penal Code
KLP	Krishikar Lok Party
KPCC	Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LTC	Leave Travel Concession
MIM	Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen
MRPS	Madiga Reservation Porata Samiti
NCAER	National Council of Applied Economic Research
NCP	Nationalist Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NIC	National Integration Council
OMC	One Man Commission
PDF	People's Democratic Front
PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid e Azam Group)
PPAs	Power Purchase Agreements
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PRP	Praja Rajyam Party
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PWG	People's War Group
PWP	Peasants and Workers Party
RJD	Rashtriya Janata Dal
RLD	Rashtriya Lok Dal
RRS	Rayalaseema Rashtra Samiti
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
RTI	Right to Information
SC	Scheduled Caste
SCCL	Singareni Collieries Company Limited
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SIT	Special Investigation Team
SMS	Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti
SOMA	Saurashtra Oil Millers' Association
SONS	State of the Nation Survey
SOTR	State's Own Tax Revenue
SP	Samajwadi Party
SPF	Six-point Fomula
SRC	State's Re-organization Commission
ST	Scheduled Tribe
TDP	Telugu Desam Party
TNCC	Tamil Nadu Congress Committee

TPF	Telangana Praja Front
TPS	Telangana Praja Samiti
TRC	Telangana Regional Council
TRS	Telangana Rashtra Samiti
UCF	United Congress Fund
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
VAT	Value-added Tax
VHP	Viswa Hindu Parishad

Introduction

The trajectory of the Telangana movement for separate statehood is a long and tragic one. It has drawn the attention not only of scholars and politicians but also of much of the middle class of Telangana. Over time it has grown into a mass movement, perhaps unprecedented in the history of the region,[1] spearheaded largely by the youth belonging to economically backward sections. The movement continues to go through many trials and tribulations, carving out a place for itself in the political landscape of the nation.

The entire body of work that has been put together in this volume was written in phases over a period of three years and was meant for publication in several newspapers and journals. The immediate impetus to publish my views was the aftermath of the event of 9 December 2009, when the Government of India announced its intention of forming the Telangana state. When the same government put its decision in suspended animation less than a fortnight later and proceeded to stonewall the considered decision it had announced in all solemnity to both Houses of Parliament, I felt it was time to bring together this volume.

The process of writing on this subject started with five major submissions to the Srikrishna Committee (SKC) appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI, to investigate and draw up a report on the issue. As will be seen in this book, with the recommendation decided prior to the start of the investigation, this was an obvious delaying tactic by the Government of India. But to the credit of the Telangana movement, the committee was treated with the seriousness which, to my mind, it did not then deserve. Its denouement is

also dealt with along with the analysis of its report in chapters 16, 17 and 18 of this volume. The whole year of 2010 was consumed in this exercise and, when the truth came out about the report's secret chapter 8 (for further discussion, see chapters 17 and 18), the credibility, integrity and culpability of the 'distinguished' members as well as that of the Government of India fell to its nadir in Telangana. After that, a scepticism amounting to mistrust in New Delhi's machinations entered the minds of the people of Telangana. Never has the lack of wisdom in public policy been so exposed.

This book is an account of the way public policy of Telangana has been formed over the years. It attempts to cover almost the entire history of the region since the country's independence, going back even further for a greater historical perspective. It does not claim to be a study of the archives and private correspondence of the principal actors; I have relied primarily on published material and there are significant gaps that need access to archives in order to be addressed. Yet, the basic outline seems to be apparent and the reader will be able to assess the validity of the arguments offered here.

The volume tries to maintain a balance in as much as it examines facts with a view to enabling the reader to come to a conclusion. Yet, I must confess to a clear bias. It is a book written from the vantage point of a person whose family has lived in Telangana, and has shared many of the joys and sorrows that have come to the region since 1947.

An attempt has been made to inform the readers—the volume has been penned for the people of the region—about the events that constitute the history of the 'fall and rise' of the region. Much of and probably the best part of the story—as for all stories—remains in the future. What the people, leaders and government of the new state will make of it is dependent on having trained minds making sensible policies across all sectors and implementing them fairly and honestly. This may, for the moment, seem like a tall order, but that indeed is the requirement. For more efficient and fair governance, statehood for Telangana is a necessity; but unfortunately that is not all. It needs honest and clear-thinking leaders who can carry its people along through good times and bad.

A Brief Historical Outline

After the Kakatiya Kingdom (1083–1324) was invaded by the Delhi Sultanate, the political autonomy of the region came to an end. In the course of the next two centuries, it became a province of the Bahmani Sultanate between 1347 and 1518. When the hegemony of the Bahmani Sultanate ended, the Telangana region became part of the Golconda Sultanate (1518–1687).

Even during the period of the resurgent Vijayanagara Empire (1336–1646), the Hindu warring state that matched the four Muslim Deccan Sultanates and blocked the southward thrust of Muslim power, Telangana remained the main region of the Golconda Sultanate. With the collapse of Golconda in the face of the invasion of Aurangzeb, the region became a Mughal province and, with the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, formed the Nizamate of Hyderabad. This continued from 1720 till 1950 during which period the region saw various shifts in status—first formally subsidiary to the Mughal emperor, but actually to the Maratha Empire,[2] later allied with the French, and then with the English East India Company. Eventually the Nizam acknowledged the British sovereign as Empress of India and, thereby, as his overlord.

When the paramountcy of the British sovereign lapsed with the Indian Independence Act of 1947, all the Indian princely states resumed their independence. From 15 August 1947 till 17 September 1948, Hyderabad was an independent state. When that independence ended with Indian invasion and annexation, Hyderabad state continued to exist till 1950 with the Nizam conferring authority first on the military government and then on the civil administrator selected by New Delhi and appointed by him. His puppet role lasted till 19 November 1949 when the Nizam accepted the Constitution of India as the Constitution of Hyderabad state. From 26 January 1950, he was *Rajpramukh* (an administrative title) of Hyderabad state, which was given the status of a Part B state in the Union and Republic of India. The Nizam officiated as Rajpramukh through the first general election of 1952 and finally gave up his nominal role in 1956 when Hyderabad state was dismembered and the Telangana

region annexed to Andhra state. This story really begins around the period before independence and proceeds to describe the developments thereafter.

The story of Telangana within the Republic of India is a complex one. It is only after a great deal of reading that we begin to see the emergence of even an outline of the events that played a role in influencing the history of its people. Much more research in the archives needs to be done to unravel the many mysteries of what happened during critical phases of this history, and the wisdom of many decisions may only be guessed from outcomes that are still in the future. Yet, the question *Cui bono* (Who benefits?) can only be answered by saying, 'the Telangana people least of all'. A true reading would have to admit that over the course of the next six decades, the Telangana people have emerged once again into the history of India as a resolute and patient people determined to regain the independence that the region had lost in 1324. From the collapse of the Kakatiya Kingdom in 1324 to the annexation of Hyderabad by India in 1948, Telangana's predominantly Hindu population were subjects of Muslim dynasties. The four-year period between the first general election in 1952 and the merger with Andhra in 1956 was the only period during which the people of Telangana could identify themselves with their rulers. They are no longer willing to be subjects, but want to be full citizens of the republic, for which statehood is essential. It has been a long time coming, the sacrifices many, the humiliation endless and there is much to regain. Today, the achievement does not belong to conquering dynasties or charismatic political leaders but to the people who have stayed constant to the idea of a self-governing Telangana state.

After a long period of delay and confusion, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) decided on 30 July 2013 to request the Government of India to create the state of Telangana. Despite agitation in Seemandhra (as Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra are now known) and opposition from that region, elected officials including the chief minister, all his ministerial colleagues and members of Parliament MPs and the legislative assembly, the union cabinet from Seemandhra approved the formation of the state on 3 October 2013.

The book will hopefully serve to detail the series of events and processes culminating in the formation of the state. The final act is not over yet; which will happen when the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill is enacted by Parliament.

Notes

1. In princely Hyderabad and its Telangana region, there was no independence movement at all—unlike in the British-ruled provinces. For Telangana, this really is the mass movement, and its tenure has been long and arduous.

2. The Nizam-ul Mulk (Nizam I) paid the *chauth* tax to the Maratha court at Poona and his first instruction to his successors was, 'It behoves the Prince of the Deccan to be at peace with the Mahrattas, who are the landholders of this territory'. Hyderabad Administration Report, 1331 F. Companion volume quoted in Khan (1935: viii).

one

State on the Edge

Watan ki fikar kar naadaan, museebat aane waali hai,
Teri barbaadiyon ke mashware hain aasmaanon mein

—Iqbal

Worry for the nation, you innocent, trouble is on its way
Premonitions of disaster are in the air

The Telangana movement has made an indelible mark on the national consciousness. The election of 2009 resulted in 90 per cent of the voters of Andhra Pradesh casting their votes for parties espousing and promising statehood for Telangana. Apart from the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) and the All-India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM), all the other major political parties like the Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Telugu Desam Party (TDP), Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) promised separate statehood for the region. On 7 December 2009, these parties, along with the Congress Legislature Party (CLP), re-asserted their resolve to support the Telangana cause. On 9 December, the union government, after having deliberated within the Congress Core Committee and the cabinet, and with the consent of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, announced the initiation of the long-awaited process.

Much of what has happened since then has only convinced the rest of the state that a separate statehood for Telangana is not only a foregone conclusion, but is also one that is both just and

necessary. However, there are three elements at work attempting to avert the inevitable.

The first of these is the Andhra real-estate interest which has 'acquired' much of the lands of the Nizam's *sarf-e-khas* (private estate), crown lands, Paigah properties and Wakf Board assets, all of which are concentrated in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy districts. The Lanco Hills case where the Wakf's Manikonda *jagir* land was handed over to Congress Member of Parliament (MP) L. Rajagopal's Lanco Company is a clear example (*Times of India* 2013a). The real-estate lobby fears that once Telangana becomes a reality, an investigation initiated by a government favouring the Muslim population could lead to their losing these questionable assets. It has been reported that the beneficiaries of these 'acquisitions' have used their money power to influence political opinion and prevent a government that could begin an investigation.

The second group is composed of those Delhi-based politicians who do not have a firm grasp over the grassroots realities of the region. Bereft of ideas, these politicians perhaps do not realise that what was possible in the case of Punjab, and may still be possible in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, may not be viable in the Telangana region. Telangana is situated in the heart of the country, and, therefore, policies that alienate the local populace do affect the rest of the country.

The third group is the high command of the Congress party which continues to calculate whether the 17 MPs will compensate for what is left after YSR Congress party chief Jaganmohan Reddy takes his share in the rest of the state. In this confusion, they consider that delay may be the best recourse. The close linkage between the Congress party MPs with the Hyderabad real-estate lobby adds to further confusion (SKC 2010: 319).

In all this, the reports from the villages are clear. The youth are no longer prepared to end their lives merely protesting against injustice. They are seething with rage, and news biased against Telangana is only making them angrier still. They are at present chastising their elected leaders and may take to violence against those opposed to their demands. Under these circumstances, Delhi's dithering portends chaos.

In Coastal Andhra, the feeling is one of plain disgust and acceptance of the inevitable. If they are not wanted, they seem to say, so be it. They will chart their own course and develop their own towns. In Rayalaseema, there is a quiet desperation about selecting which way to go—whether to go with Coastal Andhra that will dominate them, or to strike out on their own, perhaps with the addition of Nellore and Ongole to make the state more viable. At the very fag end, they even contemplated a Telangana state, which included the two districts of Kurnool and Ananthapur (the 'Rayala Telangana' option) in order to secure irrigation water supplies from the Krishna river and to obtain access to employment and educational opportunities in Hyderabad. At the moment, they are hoping their leader, Jaganmohan Reddy, will show them the way forward.

Violence is in the air. Inflammatory speeches can already be heard—it is feared that physical violence is round the corner. Payyavula Keshav, senior leader of TDP and legislator, warned of suicide attacks in a bid to keep Andhra Pradesh united. In response, Congress MP Ponnam Prabhakar called upon people not to commit suicide but kill those who came in the way of a separate Telangana state (Bharatwaves in 2011).

Under the circumstances, politicians cutting across party lines do not seem to realise that due to their indecision, and by raising false hopes, they are playing with fire. The suicides by the youth of Telangana culminating in Yadi Reddy's suicide in New Delhi[1] were a forlorn attempt to remind the union government of its promises. In the meantime, policy-makers are taking contradictory decisions as they are alternately being influenced by those who have the most to lose and those who have the most to gain.

Historically, the merger of Andhra with Telangana was clearly a merger of unequal political entities. Andhra state (as an offshoot of Madras province) was a Part A state and Hyderabad state was a Part B state under the Constitution of India. This meant that in the 'integration of services', all the employees of the Hyderabad government were re-employed in the Government of Andhra Pradesh at the lowest levels of seniority, losing income as well as promotion prospects as a result! Some of the cases went on till 1972 involving the important posts of the chief engineers of the vital

irrigation department, which were finally resolved by the Supreme Court of India. As was inevitable, decisions of the government were contested not only by the officers from the Telangana region but also by the Andhra officers, as the issue determined who should get seniority and promotion. The engineers from the irrigation department were the ones who led the agitation and exposed the unfairness meted out to the Telangana irrigation sector. The original sin of this 'unequal merger' set the scene for Telangana to be treated unequally for the next 55 years (*D. Satyanarayana and Anr. Vs. P.T. Reddy and Ors.*, http://www.legalcrystal.com/661824. accessed on 1 January 2014).

One of the problems that has prevented the relationship from developing into a more equitable one is that differences among the dialects of a common language divide the Andhra migrants in Telangana from the original residents. There is also a perception that these settlers consider themselves culturally superior to the local inhabitants. Another major problem is the perception that the settlers who came from Andhra have been successful in manipulating the state government machinery to secure assets and jobs that they are not entitled to. Moreover, they consider that the state government should function for their benefit alone rather, than that of the people of the entire state.

This is not an attitude the people of Telangana face from the Urdu, Hindi, Marathi, Bengali or Tamil-speaking residents of the region. The contrast makes for conflict with the Andhra settlers, a conflict that can perhaps only end with the formation of a separate Telangana state, where everyone who lives and works harmoniously with the original residents would be considered Telanganites.

two

Telangana and the Republic

In the Deccan, the Kakatiya Kingdom (AD 1083–1323) encompassed what is now known as the Telangana region. With its fall to the Muslim invaders, Telangana was thrown into confusion and was later ruled by successive Muslim kings for more than 600 years till the Republic of India was proclaimed. With the merger of parts of Hyderabad state with parts of Madras state, the specific identity of Telangana was submerged within the larger Andhra Pradesh state.

Telangana in the Modern Period

Telangana is an old nomenclature, and the first time we come across the same in the British papers of the late eighteenth century. James Grant, in his study 'Of the Northern Circars, from a Political Survey of the Deccan' (dated 20 December 1794, submitted to the Commons Select Committee on the East India Company), says:

> The native inhabitants of these provinces, exclusive of a few thousand Mohamedans dispersed in the principal towns and among the more regular infantry and militia, are wholly Hindoos, and may, with great moderation be numbered at two million and half, under all denominations. They are parts of two *nations of Telinga and Oria, Wöria or Orissa formerly divided from each other by the Godavari*. (Firminger vol. 3, 1812: 9, emphasis mine)

This seems to indicate that the Northern Circars and especially those areas south of the Godavari were considered part of Telangana. He goes on to say,

> In the year 1512, the Kootubshahy, or Second Dynasty of Deccany Mussulman kings, dismembered, as turrefdars or governors, in right of power, the eastern division of the Bamineah Empire, called *Telinga*, but in after ages, more generally denominated, from its capital and principal fortress indiscriminately, the state of Hyderabad or Golconda.
>
> What further regards the character, customs, manners and religion of these Deccanee Hindoos, is the subject of a more ample description, in another part of our Political Survey, which treats generally of all the six Indian nations inhabiting the Peninsula, giving their names to, or denominated from the grand divisions of the country, Malabar, Canara, Merhat (Maharat?), Telinga, Oria and Goudwannah, into which the Deccan is naturally and properly distributed. (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)

When the Kingdom of Golconda was conquered and annexed by Aurangzeb, Telangana became a Mughal province. Nizam ul-Mulk (the First) was appointed by the weak Mughal court, ruined completely after the Persian emperor Nadir Shah's invasion and massacres in Delhi, to be its subedhar of the Deccan. He assumed sovereign status and rights.[1] After this, the territory became a patrimonial state of the Asaf Jah dynasty. The seven Nizams ruled their ever-declining territory for the next 228 years till 1950.

The East India Company's territories consisted of the original three great Presidencies—Fort St. George (Madras), Fort William (Calcutta) and Bombay Castle (after the move from Surat). These became provinces under the (British) Indian Empire in 1857. The other large acquisitions were the North-West Province of Agra and Oudh, later called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and now Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Sind, which was annexed by Bombay province. Apart from these, some isolated but strategic enclaves were also under direct British control.

It is a little known fact that during the East Indian Company's expansion, the Company recruited some of its soldiers from 'Telinga' region, by which name the soldiers were also called. In the treaty with Mir Kasim signed on 27 September 1760 it was agreed, '... the Europeans and Telingas of the English Army shall be ready to assist the Nabob Meer Mahomed Cassim Khan Bahader (i.e. Mir Kasim) in the management of all affairs; and in all affairs dependent on him, they shall exert themselves to the utmost of their abilities.'[2] In a footnote on the same page it is clarified, 'Verelst: op.cit, p. 157. Verelst defines a Telinga thus, 'A Sepoy, so called from the country of that name, from whence the first sepoys were probably enlisted.' The Telangana soldiers seemed to have been sent from Madras to Bengal and have participated in the Battle of Plassey, after which the Company's power was fully established in the Gangetic valley.

By the Queen's Proclamation of 1857, the rest of the country beyond the direct control of the British was ruled by the princes who were sovereign rulers, but were under the suzerainty of the British Crown. In her proclamation, Queen Victoria guaranteed the interests of the princes and the integrity of their states. Their treaties were exclusively with the Viceroy of India, who was Crown Representative of the (British) Empress of India, and not with the Government of India represented by the Governor-General. This as we shall see was a moot point in 1947, a point which was camouflaged by the fact that the Governor-General was also by tradition the Crown Representative, the Viceroy. The Crown Representative's Department, however, was clearly not an office of the Government of India but an office under the Viceroy.

Status Quo Ante or Back to the Basics

When the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act of 1947, it relinquished control over the Indian Empire to the Dominions of India and Pakistan. At the same time and with the same Act, it also released itself and the princes of all treaty obligations between Britain and the princes.

> The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the Rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise. (Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEO. 6, CH. 30, Sec 7 [1][b])

This was a unilateral termination of treaties by the British Crown and Parliament—done without consultation let alone agreement with the princes concerned. 'Perfidious Albion', or 'Treacherous England', a term coined by the French and the Germans, is perhaps not an entirely undeserved epithet. More betrayal was to follow from the British Crown's successors in India—the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Later, the Republic of India abolished the princely states and rescinded its own treaty obligations with them.

The Nizam had in the last decades of his rule converted 'His Exalted Highness' Dominions' into 'Hyderabad state' with representative government—limited franchise no doubt—but representative nonetheless (Schmidt 1953). This process of political change had been initiated under the advice of the Crown and in view of the general conditions in the Indian Empire created by the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935.

Force Majeure

The Nizam, who still retained the supreme power, was alarmed at the change that was thrust on him by British withdrawal. It was a serious threat to his patrimonial rule but it could also hold out an opportunity—for his independence. The invasion (as the 'Police Action' certainly was) of the state by the Indian Army took place in September 1948. This was in gross violation of the 'Standstill

Agreement' between the Government of Hyderabad and the Government of India in force at that time.

However, the Nizam continued to rule—*de jure* though not *de facto*—till 1950. While the military governor and, later, the civil governor exercised power advised by the Government of India, all *firmans* and orders continued to be issued in the name of the Nizam as head of state.[3] The Nizam had neither, unlike all the other princes, signed an Instrument of Accession nor was he asked to even after the annexation of his state. The case of Hyderabad state's protest at the Indian invasion had been filed with and was still pending before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)[4] and despite the Nizam having withdrawn his application, the Council took the position that the withdrawal was done under duress. All this may have had something to do with the Government of India's attitude towards Hyderabad between 1948 and 1956.

New, and Yet Not So New a Status

All these forces contrived to create a tragedy that no one anticipated, let alone wanted, but like a Greek tragedy, it was inevitable once the process was initiated and as vested interests seized the initiative and made the most of it. These are the 'unintended consequences' of public policy made and implemented by short-sighted politicians. However, we need to deal with the issue of Telangana in the context of the Republic of India and its compulsions.

First, the state of Hyderabad with the Nizam as head of state continued to exist even after the 1948 annexation till 26 January 1950. On 26 November 1949, the Nizam had adopted the Indian Constitution as the Constitution of Hyderabad despite the fact that Hyderabad was not represented in the Constituent Assembly.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel announced at the concluding session of the Constituent Assembly, 'I am glad to inform the House that all the nine states specified in Part B of the First Schedule of the Constitution, including the State of Hyderabad, have signified, in the manner indicated in my statement made on October 12th, their

acceptance of the Constitution which the House is now going to adopt' (CAD vol. 11 1949).

Following the promulgation of the Constitution, the Nizam was made Rajpramukh (for life) of Hyderabad state and became responsible to the Government of India whose nominee he now was. He was also responsible to the democratically elected Government of Hyderabad after the first general election of 1952. The period 1950–52 was one of transition. A detailed account of this period based on official archives (which is beyond the scope of this book) would throw light on the policy of the Governments of India and Hyderabad.

Second, and more important, point was Hyderabad's position under the new Constitution. It was classified as a Part B state. The Part A states were the former British Indian provinces (Assam, Bihar, East Punjab, Bombay Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal). The Part B states were the former princely states (Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Bharat, Mysore, Patiala and East Punjab States Union, Rajasthan, Saurashtra and Travancore-Cochin). The Part C states were the old Chief Commissioners' provinces and some princely states (Ajmer-Mewara, Coorg, Bhopal, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, Kutch, Manipur, Tripura, Vindhya Pradesh and Delhi). The group of Andaman and Nicobar Islands became the sole Part D state.

Dr Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, closed the Assembly thus,

> It must be said to the credit of the Princes and the people of the (Princely) States no less than to the credit of the States Ministry under the wise and far-sighted guidance of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel that by the time we have been able to pass this Constitution, the States are now *more or less* in the same position as the Provinces and it has become possible to describe all of them including the Indian States and the Provinces as States in the Constitution. The announcement, which has been made just now by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, makes the position very clear, and now there is no difference between the States, as understood before, and the provinces in the New Constitution. (CAD vol. 11 1949, emphasis added)

Despite Rajendra Prasad's gloss, the situation looked very much like the structure of the former Indian Empire but codified and cloaked in a republican Constitution. Thus, the republic discriminated at its very birth between different regions of the country on the basis of their political history. But why this happened, and what its rationale was, is something that warrants close examination.

Nothing is found by way of clarification on this subject, except the following quotation from C. Rajagopalachari, Governor-General of the Dominion of India and later Union Home Minister (26 December 1950–25 October 1951). Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 26 May 1951 as home minister, Rajaji stated,

> If I had my own way I believe that Parts A and B States should also be reduced to the size and quality of administration of Part C states in course of time. Then we shall be able to govern with a direct touch. The Governor or the Ministers, whatever name you call them by, will have a direct touch with the people in a much more familiar and intimate manner than we now have in the very large states. (Copley 1978: 273, emphasis added)

Further, on 23 August 1951, he said,

> I do not believe that smallness is necessarily bad. I do not believe that a small area is less competent to govern itself than a big area. On the contrary, our limited energies and limited talents may be better suited to smaller governments than for the government of larger areas. (Ibid.)

Rajaji was clearly a man far ahead of his times.

Confronting the Princely States Problem

Now consider the situation. There was a republic with clearly identified and administratively sanctified internal boundaries and sub-cultures belonging to the princely states, which had been in

existence for 200 years or more. Residual India and its Pakistani twin were at war since their very birth. Moreover, India had two cases pending before the UNSC regarding two princely states—Kashmir (S-654) and Hyderabad (S-986). This was perhaps too difficult a situation to be handled by inexperienced leaders of a newly independent nation!

The Constitution-makers perhaps did not understand the implications of nation-building. They made some allowances for Kashmir in the Constitution but acknowledged the identity of the princely states in their Part B/Part C formulation. The problem manifested itself politically in the general election of 1952. Many former princes and their kin were elected, with large majorities, by their former subjects (now citizens of the republic), thereby indicating that old loyalties die hard and the habits of centuries cannot be altered overnight with access to the ballot box. The political danger was clear and the manifest to the leaders of the Congress party.

The man who was wise and shrewd enough to grasp this could only have been Rajaji. Even Sardar Patel did not—he was a man of action for the immediate moment. He, anyway, would not have agreed to violate the treaties with which the Dominion of India was established. He had, moreover, given his word to the princes and, unlike his successors, would not go back on it. But Rajaji was perhaps the only one with experience to anticipate a problem that would arise in the medium and long term. As home minister, for the short while he occupied that office, he may have applied his extraordinary mind to this complex problem and devised a way forward. Somewhere in the archives of the Home Ministry there would be a minute or paper by him on this issue.

Setting up the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) indicated the way forward. Whatever its recommendations, most of them were ignored. The government used the opportunity created by the SRC to devise a political solution of its own to the princely states problem.

It will be seen that the reorganisation left all the Part A states not only intact but also in many cases with expanded territory. Andhra broke off from Madras, even before the SRC, in 1953. It was given Part A status—reinforcing the point that it was not development that

was the alleged basis for the Part A/Part B/Part C division. Andhra was bankrupt even before it was formed and everyone knew it. Only by its merger, would Telangana's surpluses save it from dire penury and provide the funds to develop its river water and other resources. On the basis of financial viability, Orissa and Assam could not also be covered but they were Part A states only because of the direct British rule they had experienced.

The point that is usually forgotten is that the princely states gave up only three powers—defence, foreign policy and communications—to the Dominion of India. This was clear and it was the basis of their Instruments of Accession. Also implied was the preservation of the identity of those states and their rulers. When the Constitution was framed, the identity of the states was safeguarded in the Part B/Part C state formulation but the power that the union government seized for itself in the Constitution was far in excess of those solemnly agreed to in the Instruments of Accession. The betrayal of treaty obligations towards the princely states began with Jawaharlal Nehru—motivated by his drive to centralise the state and capture the 'commanding heights'.

Ambedkar was aware of the problem. On 29 August 1947, he stated to the Constituent Assembly,

> The House also will recall that the (Princely) States at the present moment have joined the Constituent Assembly on a basis of what is called the Instrument of Accession, which does not altogether tally with the subjects included in List No. 1. In fact, the subjects included in the Instrument of Accession fall considerably short of the subjects included in List No. 1. The question, therefore, that arises is this, whether a body of people, who are Members of the Constituent Assembly and who are bound by the Instrument of Accession and have responsibility for a shorter number of items, should be permitted to: take part in motions-and in debates relating to certain other subjects which were not included in the list contained in the Instrument of Accession. (CAD vol. 5 1947)

How then did the framers of the Constitution reconcile this essential dilemma of what they promised solemnly in writing at the

time of accession and what they enforced unilaterally through the Constitution? The sovereigns who signed the instruments were the only ones legally able to waive their rights. Did they play a role?

Or was it the function of the 'constituent assemblies' of the princely states created just for this purpose? In the case of Hyderabad, the sovereign, the Nizam, who never signed an Instrument of Accession, accepted the Constitution of India as the Constitution for his state without recourse to his legislative assembly, which had been dissolved in 1948 and not recalled. So here at least there was no promise; so none was broken. But the rest of the princely states saw their Instruments of Accession converted to scraps of paper. This is perhaps another interesting subject for future historians to examine in detail.

The Solution

Hyderabad, despite Nehru's sympathetic attitude towards its multi-religious framework, was eventually trifurcated. Telangana—now with Hyderabad's Part B status—was merged with Andhra (which was a Part A state). It was merged on the worst possible terms.

Bombay was left untouched and instead the Marathwada region of the Hyderabad state, Vidarbha (territories of the former Raja of Nagpur) and princely state of Baroda were added to it. Also added to Bombay was the entire Saurashtra state (a Part B state), which was formed after great persuasion by Sardar Patel in 1948 with the 217 princely states of Kathiawar, including the former Kingdom of Junagadh. Due to political expediency, the Bombay state assumed a monstrous size after 1956, with no rationale of increased administrative efficiency.

Travancore-Cochin, created in 1948, was merged with the Malabar region of Madras. Mysore was merged with former British-ruled Canara and Coorg and the Kannada-speaking districts of Hyderabad state and parts of Bombay state.

The 34 princely states of the Central Indian Agency had earlier been consolidated into Vindhya Pradesh state in 1948. This was disrupted in 1950 and parts included in the United Provinces

(renamed Uttar Pradesh) or Madhya Bharat (another 1948 creation). Later in 1956, its residual part was merged with the Central Provinces (renamed Madhya Pradesh).

The Malwa union of princely states was renamed and formed into Madhya Bharat state in 1948 and included the princely states of Gwalior and Indore. The entire state was merged in 1956 with Madhya Pradesh. Princely Bhopal, taken over by the union government when its Nawab fled to Pakistan, was also merged with Madhya Pradesh in 1956.

The Rajputana Agency consisting of 21 princely states was formed and renamed Rajasthan as early as 1949. In 1956, Ajmer-Mewar, a directly ruled British province, was merged with Rajasthan. The princely states of PEPSU—Patiala and East Punjab States Union (formed in 1948)—was merged with the East Punjab State in 1956.

Relief at Last?

In this way, after 1956, none of the princely states of India was left with a separate identity. Only Kashmir was an exception—that too because its case was before the UNSC, and due to Nehru's sympathies for his ancestral land.

Even as late as 10 September 2001, 'The Hyderabad Question' remained on the agenda of the UNSC—presumably at the request of Pakistan.[5] Some contend that a prime reason to dismember Hyderabad was to wipe out its identity and confuse the Hyderabad issue before the Council. But, if that is true, then that should have been done to Kashmir too—where there was a greater need and where it would have been far more effective as well.

Now the republic could rest easy. The people of the former princely states were dominated by former British subjects who had become fully empowered citizens of the republic and its strongest political supporters. But what of those princes who were promised that the identity of their states would be preserved? They and their kin were bought off by appointments as Rajpramukhs, ambassadors, or directly recruited as civil servants and army officers. But, in less

than eight years after accession, by 1956, their age-old states were to vanish from the face of the Indian political map.

Assessing the Damage

This was really Nehru deed done after Sardar Patel's death. As we saw, by 1950, many of the powers retained by the princely states were done away with by the Constitution. By 1956, their states had been dissected and merged into new entities. Further and final elimination followed in less than 22 years of the signing of the Instruments of Accession, when what was left of the princes' treaty rights was abrogated unilaterally by Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. She administered the *coup de grace* to those treaty obligations when she abolished the privy purses and all the other obligations of the Government of India towards the princes. The Supreme Court held the action illegal and *ultra vires* of the Constitution, but the Constitution was amended to give retrospective sanction to the measure. The republic that violated its treaties with its own people continued its downward descent till it became a farce in the Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi—this time to fulfil narrow self-interest.

In carrying out a motivated and calculated programme of wiping out the identity and characteristics of the princely states (perhaps to eliminate their political influence in the republic), the Government of India succeeded in wiping out a large part of the history of the people and its land.

Whatever may have been the attributes and roles of the princes, they still represented 'historical' India. Many of the states consisted of multilingual and multireligious populations; many of them were ruled by dynasties whose religion was different from those of subjects. As in multiculturalism? He should ideally elaborate on what he means here: how would this experience have been useful? Is he still talking about the Emergency?

The rulers of Udaipur and Travancore were only *dewans* or *pujaris* of the presiding deities of their main temple. Lord Eklingji (Shiva) is the ruling deity of Mewar-Udaipur and the Maharana ruled as His Dewan. Martanda Varma dedicated his kingdom of Travancore

to Lord Padmanabhaswamy (Vishnu) in 1750. Following this, he and his successor maharajas took on the title of Padmanabha Dasa and ruled as the servants of the deity.

The princes and their subjects played significant roles in the history of the country; they fought the invaders, contested foreign rule, they protected the religion and traditions of their ancestors and maintained peace. Their benevolence made them heroes worth cherishing. To reject and forget their roles is to reject and forget our history.

What are States Meant For—Preservation of Race, Religion and Language?

The slogan of religious unity, which disrupted the Indian Empire created by the British, resulted in Partition. The death of approximately a million Hindus and Muslims and the forced migration of another 12 million peoples from their homes to strange lands is a tragedy of mammoth proportions. The religious basis for the statehood for Pakistan was shown to be hollow in 1971 with the revolution in East Pakistan, the basis of which was primarily language. With the creation of Bangladesh, the two-nation theory of the Muslim League that legitimised Partition died. Even the continued sectarian massacres in residual Pakistan today illustrate the hopelessness of its using Islam as a unifying factor for a nation-state. Like the French Bourbon dynasty, it is said that the Pakistanis 'have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing'.

Interestingly, Pakistan too followed India's bad example with respect to the treatment of its princely states and autonomous provinces. In Pakistan, where autonomy and democracy were sorely needed to maintain that shaky state, it was abandoned. The results were catastrophic. It came apart within 25 years of its creation with the Bangladesh war. Pakistan continues to play the same political game that got it into so much trouble, as it is unable to abandon the founding myth of its state—Islam as the sole basis for statehood.

The slogan of linguistic unity—used to dismember the princely states in India—was never applied uniformly across the country; certainly not to the Hindi-speaking states. The linguistic basis

of the new states of the union, adopted despite fears of it being potentially dangerous to the unity of the nation, he might elaborate in a footnote, now that it has served its narrow political purpose of eliminating the princely states.

All these slogans—racial, religious and linguistic unity—that formed the basis of formation of new states are now being seen to be hollow or dangerous. Meanwhile, better objectives have come to the fore.

In Conclusion

As we have seen, after the collapse of the Kakatiya Kingdom in about 1323 AD, Telangana lost its particular political identity. With its fall to Muslim invaders, Telangana was thrown into confusion and later became subject to successive Muslim kings for more than 600 years till the Republic of India was proclaimed.

Even in the brief period between 1950 and 1952, it was part of the multilingual state of Hyderabad, though Telangana and its people were the dominant majority in the state. The specific identity of Telangana was later merged and submerged in the much larger state of Andhra Pradesh. Even linguistic unity did not serve to protect and enhance the interests of the people of the region. The transformation of the Telangana identity into a political one is still to be achieved, though we seem to be on the threshold of that long desired status.

The question remains—which is not at all premature—to what end is this long desired status going to be used? Is it only a device to achieve narrow personal ambitions? Or are there larger goals aimed at the prosperity and comfort of its entire people? If so, what should these goals be?

Notes

1. As seen earlier, Nizam ul-Mulk (Nizam I) rule in the whole of the Deccan (which included Telangana) existed only at the sufferance of the Maratha court to which he paid tribute. His first instruction to

his successors was, 'It behoves the Prince of the Deccan to be at peace with the Mahrattas, who are the landholders of this territory.' Hyderabad Administration Report, 1331 F. companion volume quoted in Khan (1935: viii).

2. Ibid. vol. 1, p. ix.

3. The Supreme Court of India held *inter alia* that the state of Hyderabad was not part of India and thus not under its jurisdiction till 26 January 1950. Thus, '... this Court had no jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to hear an appeal from a judgment delivered by the High Court at Hyderabad before the 26 January, 1950, since that Court was not within the territory of India.' *Janardan Reddy and Others vs The State of Hyderabad and Others, Janardan Reddy and Others vs The State of Hyderabad and Others*. 1951 AIR 217, 1951 SCR 344, p. 349. http://indiankanoon.org/doc/732516/, accessed on 1 January 2014.

4. UNSC, 56th Session, Item 7 of the Provisional Agenda—Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, Paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations A/56/366.

5. Ibid.

three

Hyderabad
Then and Now

Hyderabad did not exist in 1600. It was an unfortified settlement along the Musi downstream of Golconda, that fabulous hill fort city which foreign travellers wrote so much about.

Hyderabad under the Nizams: Phase I

Francois Bernier, writing on his travels during 1656–68, quoted a letter written by Mir Jumla, the vazir of Golconda, to Aurangzeb, then viceroy of the Deccan, proposing treason against his sultan, Abdullah Qutb Shah (died 1674), the sixth sultan of the Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golconda. On Hyderabad, then called Bhagyanagar, Mir Jumla wrote to Aurangzeb, '... the palace of Bagnaguer where he usually lives is unwalled and without a ditch or fortifications of any sort ...' (Bernier 1891: 20). It would have been easy to trap the man had Aurangzeb heeded his advice. It nearly worked, except that the sultan dashed off to his hill fort city and escaped for a while from the aggressive Mughals.

Hyderabad owes its development to the Nizams. It was Nizam-ul-Mulk, then subedar of the Deccan, who moved his capital from Aurangabad/Daulatabad to Hyderabad. Its development into a beautiful royal city took place during the reigns of Nizam VI and Nizam VII. After that it was downhill all the way as the city grew to its present unsustainable size. In 1820, a British official, Walter Hamilton said about the city,

> Hyderabad, or Baugnuggur ... is surrounded by a stone wall, which is no defence against artillery, but which formerly served as a protection against the incursions of predatory cavalry.... Within the wall the city is about four miles in length and three in breadth. The streets are narrow, crooked, and badly paved. The houses are mostly of one storey, and built of wood or other combustible materials.... The most remarkable buildings are the palace and mosques, of which there are a considerable number, this city having long been the principal Mahommedan station in the Deccan. About six miles to the west is the celebrated fortress of Golconda. (Hamilton vol. 2 1820: 135–36)

On its surrounding, he says,

> The country around Hyderabad has a barren, rugged aspect, and the ranges of hills have a remarkably irregular and jumbled appearance. Vegetables and grapes grow in this vicinity to considerable perfection, which is more owing to the temperature of the climate than the goodness of the soil. (Ibid.: 135)

Secunderabad was beginning to take shape. 'Secunderabad, where the Subsidiary Brigade is cantoned, stands about three miles north of the city, and is now a large and populous village.' It was very much a permanent British encampment (ibid.: 135).

Hamilton devotes much praise for the Mir Alam Tank by saying, 'The last of the useful works that were projected by the Nizam's Prime Minister Meer Allum for the improvement of his country was a tank about a mile to the westward of Hyderabad which, when full, covers about 10,000 acres, and measures nearly 17 miles in circumference' (ibid.: 135–36). It cost Rs 8 lakhs and was operational by July 1812. Reading this description, a person who looks at the tank in its present state can easily imagine how much of the waterbody has been encroached upon since then.

The *Imperial Gazetteer* of 1909, in its special volume on Hyderabad state, has more interesting details, facts and figures:

> [...] it is the fourth-largest city in the Indian Empire. Its population (including the suburbs, Residency, bazars and adjoining cantonment) was 367,417 (in 1881), 415,039 (in 1891) and 448,466 (in 1901). In the last year, Hindus numbered 243,241, Musalmans 189,152 and Christians 13,923. There are also 863 Sikhs, 929 Parsis, 318 Jains and 40 others. (GoI 1909: 114)

Thus, the Muslim population even at that time was 41 per cent of the total population of the city, as it is today. Secunderabad was much smaller, and the *Gazetteer* puts its population in 1901 at 83,550 and that of the population of Bolarum and Trimulgherry at 12,888. That is, about a 100,000 resided under British jurisdiction.

On the other side of the City was the British Residency. 'The Residency is surrounded on all sides by populous bazaars over which the Resident exercises civil and criminal jurisdiction. The population of the bazaars in 1901 was 16,904 and they form a great centre of trade, where branch houses and representatives of all the wealthy bankers in India are to be found' (ibid.: 118).

The *Imperial Gazetteer* comments on the development of Chadarghat:

> ... Northern suburb of the city of Hyderabad separated by the Musi river.... This suburb, which contains most of the houses of the Europeans in the service of the Nizam and also of native officials, has sprung up within the last fifty years. In 1850, with the exception of the Residency and its bazaars, there was scarcely a building to be found where houses may be now counted by thousands, many of them fine buildings. (Ibid.: 113)

Dwelling on the quality of the city's buildings, The *Imperial Gazetteer* notes,

> The houses of well-to-do people in the city are cheaply built of stone and brick, standing in large gardens. Those of the common people were formerly built of mud, but are now gradually being replaced by brick structures. The old streets and lanes are

> narrow, but have of late been widened through the exertions of the municipality. In the northern suburbs, however, most of the houses are of a much superior plan, resembling the bungalows of Europeans and are situated in suitable compounds. It may be said that practically three-fourths of the old city and suburbs have been rebuilt or renovated since the ministry of the late Sir Salar Jung, in addition to the buildings erected during the last century. (Ibid.: 118–19)

These passages conjure up a picture of the rich in their palaces and the poor slowly building up their homes to better standards. A city on the move upwards, it would seem, and thanks to the peace and tranquillity ushered in by Sir Salar Jung I.

What is also interesting is that it tells us that Hussain Sagar, '... when full, extends over an area of 8 square miles' (ibid.: 118). Currently, its surface area is 1.7 square miles—yet another sad example of encroachment.

The *Imperial Gazetteer* then describes the district around the city, i.e. Atraf-i-Balda, presently the Ranga Reddy district. It was designed to surround the Muslim capital city and insulate it from the hinterland that was dominated by a Hindu population. As such, the Nizams had made sure that no landed interest except for theirs dominated the crown lands.

> It is a Sarf-I-Khas or "crown" district and has a total area of 3399 square miles, including the city of Hyderabad (26 square miles). The area of the "crown" lands is 2040 square miles, the rest being jagir. (Ibid.: 106)

Thus, all the land in Hyderabad district was owned personally by the Nizam. Investigations will show how this became the object of unscrupulous land grabbing as a result of indifference or complicity of individuals in the Government of Andhra Pradesh who did not protect or defend the properties that were inherited from the old order. These lands were transferred to the government in exchange for the Nizam's privy purse. Any unbiased investigation into the illegal acquisition of sarf-e-khas

lands (as also Wakf lands), is likely to go against the interest of the Seemandhra real-estate lobby.

Of the district itself, The *Imperial Gazetteer* stated that the population (excluding the city) was 355,787 (in 1881), 389,784 (in 1891) and 420,702 (in 1901). Thus, the district population was equal to that of the city. In 1901, more than 87 per cent of the population was Hindu and about 86 per cent spoke Telugu. The caste break-up was also given: agriculturist Kapus 75,774 (over 18 per cent of the total); Brahmins 39,600; Komatis 13,400; Gollas or shepherds 32,900; Gaundla or toddy-drawers 23,500; and Salas or weavers 17,500. 'Of the lower castes, the Dhers or village menials number 26,000 and the Chamars or leather workers 49,800' (ibid.: 107–08).

The *Gazetteer* concluded, 'The population directly engaged in agriculture forms 33% of the total.' This is not very high, indicating perhaps the close relationship the district had to the city in terms of supply of services, especially labour.

While this royal capital was small in its heyday, it began swallowing outlying municipalities. In 1921, the area of Hyderabad Municipality increased from 55 sq km to 84 sq km. Apart from that, there was Chadarghat (1886), Jubilee Hills (1937) and Secunderabad Municipalities (1945). All these municipalities were merged into the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad in 1960, after it became the capital of Andhra Pradesh.

Hyderabad under the Nizams: Phase II

The Muslim rule that succeeded the Hindu Kakatiya Kingdom of Warangal which spanned four centuries affected and transformed Telangana and Telanganites. The borders of the Nizam's Hyderabad state contained a population whose native languages were Marathi, Kannada, Telugu or Urdu. The people of Telangana were ruled by a dynasty that claimed lineage not only from outside the state but also outside the country. The fact that the state of Hyderabad managed to exist and flourish for 400 years with this combination of subjects and rulers is something to ponder

over and draw lessons from, for as before, this implies that a predominantly 'Hindu' population can thrive 'even' under 'despotic' rule.

Not much is known about the demography of Hyderabad city till the *Imperial Gazetteer* of 1901 published figures of the population of the city and state.

TABLE 3.1 Population Break-up of Hyderabad City, 1901

	1901	2001	Increase (%)
Hindus	2,43,241	21,21,963	884
Muslims	1,89,152	15,76,583	834
Christians	13,923	92,915	667
Others	2,150	74,362	3459
Total	4,48,466	38,29,753	854

Source: *Imperial Gazetteer* (1901).

The balance between Hindus and Muslims did not change very much even over a hundred years, though proportionally other communities increased dramatically. It was estimated that between 1951 and 1961, 126,000 to 177,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan (Alam 1972: 286). The same period saw an equal increase in migrants coming into Hyderabad (ibid.: 167) as shown in Table 3.2:

TABLE 3.2 Total Migrant Influx into Hyderabad by Source, 1951–61

From	To Hyderabad
Telangana	89,946
Coastal Andhra	30,865
Rayalaseema	14,398
Madras State	12,097
Maharashtra	12,308
Mysore	14,492
Other States	26,819
Outside India	3,307
All Regions	204,232

Source: Alam and Khan (1972: 67).

Hindus constituted 81 per cent and Muslims 18.9 per cent of the immigrants. This predominantly Hindu immigration and the mass emigration of Muslims resulted in the proportion of Muslims in Hyderabad falling from 44 per cent in 1951 to 36 per cent in 1961. However, 44 per cent migrated from Telangana and very few from other regions of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, the numbers from other Indian states was much larger than those from Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema combined. This regional migration from Andhra and Rayalaseema was small despite the capital being shifted from Kurnool to Hyderabad in 1956. This suggests that there is no evidence of i.e. excluding Telangana entrepreneurship or interest in 'developing' Hyderabad.

Figures are also available for later periods but these include all migrants, irrespectie of whether they came from within the region, state or country. Thus, between 1981 and 2001 there were 6.8 lakh migrants into the Hyderabad Urban Authority. The SKC report indicated, using the same Census 2001 data, that only about 533,198 (7.2 per cent) out of a total of 7.4 million living in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy were born in the Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions (SKC 2010: 327).

TABLE: 3.3 Population Increase in Hyderabad Urban Authority

Due to	1981–91 Lakhs	% Change	1991–2001 Lakhs	% Change
Natural Increase	8.7	59	9.0	70
Immigration	3.7	25	3.1	24
Area Changes	2.4	16	0.8	6
Total Increase	14.8	100	12.9	100

Source: GHMC (n.d.).

GHMC (Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation). n.d. *Greater Hyderabad City Development Plan*. http://www.ghmc.gov.in/downloads/chapters%202.pdf, accessed on 1 January 2014.

This calls into question the theory that there has been mass migration into Telangana and Hyderabad from Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. Most of the migrants to Hyderabad seem to have come from outside the state. This is substantiated by the National Sample

Survey Organization (NSSO) data for 1999–2000; there were 11.07 lakh persons who migrated to Andhra Pradesh while another 11.59 lakh migrated out of the state. The NSSO states, 'Migration into Andhra Pradesh is from the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh and it is to districts like Hyderabad, Ranga Reddy, Nalgonda, Medak, Visakhapatnam, etc.'[1] Other than to Visakhapatnam, most migration seems to be into Telangana.

The idea of a Telugu linguistic state naturally had its limitations, especially in Telangana. The 1991 Census data (add about 40 per cent to estimate the 2011 figures) indicates that there were large linguistic groups in the Telangana districts: 31 lakh Urdu speakers (12 per cent of the total population) are concentrated in Hyderabad district (39 per cent of the total), but spread across all the other Telangana districts; another 16 lakh Hindi speakers (6 per cent of the total) are also spread more or less evenly across the Telangana districts. Thus, despite Telugu not being the mother tongue of 18 per cent of the total population, people live in peace and prosperity with the rest of the population. This migration seems to continue without any protest from the locals.

TABLE 3.4 District-wise Distribution of Non-Telugu-Speaking Population, 1991

District	Hindi Speakers	Urdu Speakers
Adilabad	95,437	1,82,179
Warangal	2,79,057	1,42,989
Mahabubnagar	1,78,963	2,61,265
Medak	85091	2,59,339
Ranga Reddy	1,26,469	3,03,616
Khammam	2,10,212	1,16,036
Nalgonda	2,37,184	1,39,290
Nizamabad	1,17,320	2,82,674
Hyderabad	2,16,052	12,22,357
Karimnagar	40,229	1,62,951
Total	15,86,014	30,72,696

Source: Census of India (1991).

The data above indicates the accommodating nature of the people of Telangana and their tolerance towards migrants in every district of the region, despite the fact that they are not born Telugu speakers (See Table 3.4). An especially pertinent point is that every settler will normally tend to work harder than the locals and tries to achieve what he or she could not in her/his own land. No one leaves her/his native land unless s/he has faced insuperable difficulties and experienced thwarted ambitions there. The energy and drive of the migrants, whether in Telangana, Mumbai, Delhi or the UK or USA does result in a higher level of achievement than the local population given the same opportunities as the rest.

Nehru, Telangana and Hyderabad

What Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in one of his famous 'Fortnightly Letters to Chief Ministers' casts light upon the decision to de-merge Telangana from Hyderabad state and upon the status of Hyderabad city. The history of Andhra separation from Madras province and the claim for Madras city in an eye-opener for what transpired 60 years later over Telangana and the status of Hyderabad city. The creation of Andhra state was not unanimous. Most of the opposition came from the Rayalaseema region, which feared domination and exploitation by the much more aggressive and richer Coastal Andhra region. Thus, it is no surprise that Nehru acknowledged this dissent. As late as 16 June 1952, he wrote,

> While Swami Sitaram fasted (three weeks from 25 May to 15 June 1952) for an Andhra Province, I get agitated telegrams from people in Ravalaseema protesting against this fast and saying that, if necessary, they will fast against the creation of an Andhra Province. (Nehru vol. 3 1987: 26)

Nehru continued,

> The real difficulty, however, concerns the city of Madras. Some Andhra leaders insist on having it; the Tamil leaders, on the other

> hand, say that they will never lose it, whatever happens. What then are we to do about it? Compel the Andhras or coerce the Tamils? A proposal has sometimes been made that Madras might be separated from both and made into a small separate State. This proposal was considered by the Dhar Committee some years ago. They said that while it was conceivable that an international centre like Bombay might be separated, they did not think that Madras should be considered in that way. It was too intimately connected with provincial life to be isolated from it. (Ibid.: 26–27).
>
> It is perfectly true that the Andhras have had an important share in building up that city and much of their cultural life has centred on it. But it is equally true that Madras city is the intellectual, cultural and nerve centre of Tamil Nadu. If Madras State could have continued jointly as now, everyone could have their own share in it. (Ibid.: 215)

It was really under the British Raj that Madras grew from a fishing village in the 1770s to a metropolitan capital city by 1950.

It was even proposed that the Coum river, dividing the city, become a border of the two states—Andhra and Tamil Nadu! Nehru ruled out separate political status for Madras city. Compared to this Madras proposal, the idea of making Hyderabad a Union Territory (UT) within the state of Telangana must be seen as even less workable, let alone acceptable to the region. If Madras was important to Tamil Nadu, Hyderabad is vital to Telangana. It is the centre of Telangana's economic, social and political structure. Moreover, Hyderabad is totally dependent on Telangana for its power, drinking water and waste disposal as Telangana surrounds the city for nearly 200 miles in every direction.

All about Madras as a Preview of the Hyderabad Issue

Greeting the decision to 'finally' form the state of Andhra, T. Prakasam stated in the Constituent Assembly on 19 November 1949, 'At last the Congress Working Committee has been good

enough to adopt Andhra separation ... we demanded Andhra Province, Sir, without claiming the city of Madras, although there was a demand for a separation and for a division and for constituting it into a separate province.'[2]

Immediately, the Madras government appointed a Partition Committee consisting of T. Prakasam, B. Gopala Reddi, N. Sanjeeva Reddi, Kala Venkata Rao, M. Bhaktavastsalam, T. T. Krishnamachari, and K. Madhava Menon. P. S. Kumarswami Rajah, the chief minister, was its chairman. They were eager that the Andhra province should be formed on or before 26 January 1950, when with the new Constitution a more cumbersome procedure would have to be followed.

The committee's majority view was,

> A provincial capital situated within the limits of the Andhra Province should be named by the Andhra side in time and specified in the Governor-General's Order creating the Andhra Province. The Andhra Legislature should hold its sittings at this provincial Capital and the nucleus of the Andhra Secretariat should also be located there. The provincial Capital will be the seat of the Governor of the Andhra Province and he will be sworn in there. Subject to the above, necessary building accommodation could be found for the Andhra Government in Madras city. (Quoted in Rao 1973: 213)

But Prakasam objected and wrote a dissenting note in which he claimed the right for the Andhra government and the high court to stay on in Madras city and carry on all their work including that of the legislature 'until the new capital and seat of the Andhra High Court were made ready' (ibid.: 214, emphasis added).

The Tamils feared that in the absence of any known legal sanctions, the Andhra government, legislature and high court might stay put in Madras and refuse to leave the city within any stipulated period. This became clear when Kaleshwar Rao told the Madras Legislative Council on 5 January 1950 that according to Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyer, and Pappu Somasundaram, there was no legal impediment for continuing the new high court in Madras for any

length of time. In fact, the high court of Andhra functioned in Madras till July 1955, when it moved to Guntur.

The report of the Partition Committee with Prakasam's dissent reached the Government of India in the first week of January 1950. The Government of India, on 24 January, stated that the outstanding differences and unresolved questions should be settled before the question could be taken up once again. That ended the effort for another year and a half, all due to Prakasam's dissent.

It is also the fact that as per the 1948–49 accounts, the Andhra districts showed a revenue deficit of Rs 201 lakhs and the non-Andhra districts a deficit of Rs 180 lakhs. This did not include Madras city which, on the other hand, had a surplus revenue of Rs 209 lakhs (Rao 1973: 229). Inclusion of the city in one side or the other would make all the difference between poverty and plenty!

On 20 September 1951, after 35 days of fasting, Swami Sitaram gave up the fast in response to the appeal made by Vinoba Bhave. On 26 September, Kala Venkata Rao, then an MP, was sworn in as a minister in the Madras cabinet. Thinking of this as a prelude to the formation of the state of Andhra with Kala Venkata Rao as chief minister, the Andhra Provincial Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party on 30 September, under the presidentship of Prakasam, declared that the JVP report (Andhra without Madras city) should not form the basis for the formation of an Andhra province and criticised the Madras chief minister for including Kala Venkata Rao in the cabinet.

However, there was great expectation everywhere that the Andhra state would soon be formed. The *Hindu* reported that Nehru would make a declaration before 10 October. Bhave advised the Government of India to make an unequivocal declaration to that effect at once. What Nehru wanted was an agreement between the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC), the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC), the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee (TNCC) and the Madras government, all of which were now agreeable. Yet, it is necessary to understand why Nehru remained indecisive in the matter.

Prakasam was very influential in the Andhra districts and became chief minister of Madras in 1946 in defiance of the Congress high command. But his cooperation was essential for the smooth

functioning of the future Andhra state and Nehru needed to take him along. The *Hindu* reported on 29 February 1952 that Nehru blamed Prakasam directly for the delay in forming the state of Andhra. Prakasam replied to the charge (quoted by The *Hindu* on 1 March 1952),

> He [Nehru] had forgotten that certain correspondence passed between me and the late Sardar Patel, then the Home Minister and Prime Minister Pandit Nehru between 25 and 28 December 1949. This correspondence will show the reasons for the failure to obtain the Andhra Province and also as to who were responsible for such failure. (Nehru 1988: 282)

Prakasam further said that since the correspondence was personal and confidential, he was sending copies of it to Nehru for permission to publish them. This correspondence, however, never saw the light of the day. The confidential deal remains unknown to this day.

On every occasion that the issue of Andhra province had come up since 1937, Rajaji had been holding a position of importance in the government. He had been the premier of Madras during 1937–39 and the Governor-General of India between June 1948 and January 1950. During that period important events like the appointment of the Dar Commission, the JVP Committee, the setting up of the Madras Partition Committee and finally the shelving of the issue of the formation of Andhra province owing to disagreement on the status of Madras city had been place. And at the crucial time he had also been the chief minister of Madras province from April 1952–April 1954. Further, during Swami Sitaram's 'fast unto death', Rajaji was concerned with the question as the home minister of India. It would have been his duty to tender advice to the government on these occasions about the formation of Andhra province. It is, however, not known what his advice was.

Notwithstanding, the creation of the Andhra state was postponed for another three years—the reason given was, first, the need to placate Prakasam and, later, the general election of 1952. During that campaign in Andhra, crowds demanding a state of Andhra

disrupted Nehru's election meetings. Nehru, the new darling of the nation, had never experienced anything like this and tried to laugh it off but he was clearly put off by the Andhraites and by Prakasam.

The Congress won only 152 of the 375 seats in the Madras assembly. Of the 145 seats in the Andhra districts, it secured only 43 and the communists 41. Prominent Congressmen such as Kala Venkata Rao, Gopala Reddy and Sanjeeva Reddy lost. The Andhra Congress Party had to achieve statehood at any cost or be wiped out.

Despite its lack of majority, the governor called on the Congress to form the government with Rajaji as chief minister in March 1952. Most Andhra leaders thought that Rajaji had been blocking the creation of the Andhra state all along. His word counted in New Delhi. Post-election, Rajaji urged Nehru to postpone division for a year and warned of communist strength in a separate Andhra Provincial Assembly.

On 19 October 1952, Potti Sriramlu began another fast and died on 15 December 1952 after nearly two months. What was he fasting for? Potti Sriramulu took the decision to fast unto death on 14 September 1952. A statement by Rajaji that Madras city belonged to the Tamils provoked him. What was worse from Sriramulu's point of view was the deafening silence from the hitherto vociferous Andhra ministers and leaders. In his pamphlet, 'Appeal to the People of Madras City and Others' issued just before his fast, he demanded that Madras city be made the common capital for the Andhraites and Tamils. During the fast, Nehru had told the Rajya Sabha that the state of Andhra would be formed but without Madras city.

After Sriramulu's death, violence erupted and police firing on riotous mobs at three places killed 12 and injured 20. On 19 December, Nehru reiterated the intention to form Andhra province but again without Madras. Only the Andhra Communist Party and N. G. Ranga were willing to abandon Madras for Vijayawada. But during Sriramulu's long fast, most Andhra leaders stated that they were determined to have Madras city as a separate state or a joint capital. Yet, Andhra was finally created without Madras city. How did that happen?

Three years later, Nehru threw light on the subject. He wrote to the chief ministers on 14 October 1955,

> The main conflict was in regard to the city of Madras. *Ultimately, the Andhra leaders accepted the new State minus the city of Madras.* There was then no major conflict left.... There is some impression, and there is often reference to this in the press, that the Andhra State was formed because of the self-immolation of Shri Sriramulu. We all regretted that sacrifice but, as a matter of fact, it had nothing to do with our agreement to form Andhra State. That agreement had been reached even previous to the death of Sriramulu. In fact, it followed *naturally from the giving up of the claim to Madras city.* If that demand had not been given up, no amount of hungerstriking or other methods of pressure would have led to that settlement. (Nehru 1988: 282, emphasis added)

So there it is; a deal was done whereby Andhra leaders gave up the claim to Madras city quietly. And was this done without telling Potti Sriramulu? Towards this dramatic end, Rajaji and the veteran Andhra Congress leader, A. Kaleswara Rao, played a leading part. Kaleswara Rao had formed the Vishalandhra Maha Sabha (VMS) to work for the unification of Andhra and Telangana as early as 1949. He doubted that a separate state could be realised unless Madras city was given up. Hyderabad city as the Vishalandhra capital would negate Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema rivalries. Telangana's revenue surplus would cover Andhra's revenue deficit.

The solution was clear to him. He got the (Maharashtrian) leadership of the trilingual Hyderabad State Congress to support the dismemberment of the state and gave all imaginable assurances to the Telangana Congress leaders in favour of a merger with the proposed Andhra state. But nothing could happen till Andhra was formed, Hyderabad dismembered and Telangana and Hyderabad city annexed. But Rajaji, Nehru and Azad were against dismemberment of Hyderabad state. Kaleswara Rao was a wily politician who bided his time and worked quietly behind the scenes.

By September 1953, Kaleswara Rao was president of VMS and also vice-president of the Andhra Provincial Congress Party. He said he persuaded Sardar Patel to make Rajaji prime minister. When Rajaji refused initially, Kaleswara Rao said he had shouted

at him and brought him to the compartment on the same train that they and the Sardar were also travelling on to accept the offer. As a consequence he became the chief whip and chief parliamentary secretary when Rajaji was prime minister (1937–39).

Rajaji's biographer, Monica Felton, was in Hyderabad when he arrived there, and spoke with Kaleswara Rao, who was then speaker of the Andhra Pradesh assembly. He invited Rajaji to tea with a small set of friends, including Dr Jayasuriya and Pattabhi Sittaramayya. Rajaji began to talk about the disputes over the separation of Andhra from Madras state and the demand for the inclusion of Madras city in Andhra. Felton describes the conversation (2003: 168–69). 'He [Rajaji] said, "You were determined to have Madras". They laughed. "... Indeed, yes", somebody chuckled. "But you gave up the idea at once", Rajaji said, "... when I offered you Hyderabad as your capital." "Ah, yes", said another, "... we never thought of that possibility". (Rajaji said) "No that was a real surprise, wasn't it?"' (ibid.: 169).

So Kaleswara Rao and Rajaji arranged a deal—Rajaji convincing Nehru and Azad, and Kaleswara Rao persuading the Andhra leaders. And Nehru agreed to dismember Hyderabad state and offer Telangana and Hyderabad city to Andhra. The formation of Andhra, and later Andhra Pradesh, changed the face of the republic, but it is by manipulative, hidden backdoor deals like this that the republic was built up.

Andhra Pradesh today is unravelling. Yet again, after 42 years, we see history repeating itself with unfulfilled promises and backdoor deals over the statehood of Telangana and the status of Hyderabad city.

Hyderabad as the Capital of Andhra Pradesh: Phase I

In more modern times, we have evidence that illustrates the importance of the city to the Telangana region. The following section explores the situation in the late 1960s.

The population of the city—the Hyderabad Town Group (HTG) was 1.251 million in 1961 and was projected to go up to 1.40

million in 1971 and 1.61 million in 1981. In his book *Metropolitan Hyderabad and Its Region: A Strategy for Development*, Alam and Khan write, 'The Hyderabad urban region—the biggest of the states' four urban regions—occupies about 41% of the state's geographical area, contains 35.3 & 39.0% of its overall & total urban population, respectively, and has 33.4 per cent of its urban centres, including its only million-city' (Alam and Khan 1972: 17).

TABLE 3.5 Distribution of Population by Religion in Hyderabad Town Group

	1951	1961
Hindus	53.2	59.7
Muslims	43.5	36.4
Christians	2.7	3.2
Others	0.6	0.7
Total	100	100

Source: Alam and Khan (1972: 109).

Thus, the population percentage of Muslims in the city fell significantly in the 10-year period following its merger with Andhra state, and this may have been due to out-migration of Muslims and also in-migration of Hindus (Alam and Khan 1972: 286–88).

While the study tentatively estimates that nearly 126,000 to 177,000 Muslims (ibid.: 286) may have migrated to Pakistan in the aftermath of the take-over of Hyderabad by the Indian union, post-independence Hyderabad seems to have been seen by Muslims elsewhere as a safe haven. Even in the period 1947–48 there was considerable migration of Muslims from central India to Hyderabad, though estimates of the numbers are not available.

> Muslim out-migration, particularly emigration to Pakistan, may no longer be a significant factor. On the other hand, on account of the increase in economic opportunities in Hyderabad, the trend of Muslim in-migration seems to have strengthened. Muslim in-migration, especially from Telangana, Marathwada & Karnataka—all regions of erstwhile Hyderabad state, has been

> fairly substantial during 1951–61. Of the 204,231 in-migrants in the HTG reported as having come between 1951–61, as many as 38,649 (18.9%) are Muslims.... It may also be mentioned here that 68.6% of all Muslims in-migrants in the city between 1951–61 are reported to have come during the last six years of the decade (1954–60). (Ibid.: 221)

Very interestingly, the study also casts light on the nature of the migrants to the city. During 1951–61, a total of 204,232 migrants moved to the city—making up for nearly 16 per cent of the population. Of the total migrants, nearly 30,865 (15 per cent) originated from Coastal Andhra, 14,398 (6 per cent) from Rayalaseema and 89,946 (45 per cent) from Telangana (ibid.: 159).

TABLE 3.6 1951–61: In-migrants to the Hyderabad Town Group

Percentage from	Craftsmen, workers, etc.	Clerical	Administrative	All
Telangana	60.7	30.7	22.3	44.8
Coastal Andhra	8.9	31.1	13.0	14.9
Rayalaseema	4.3	10.1	4.0	5.9
State Total	73.9	71.9	39.3	65.6
Other States	24.5	26.6	57.9	32.4
Other Countries	1.6	1.5	2.8	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Alam and Khan (1972: 221).

Obviously, the city had large requirements for craftsmen and workers who came from Telangana and for clerical staff, who also came largely from Telangana. About 10,000 came from Coastal Andhra. Migration from Rayalaseema was not so significant.

The study gives very little data on finances except to say, 'Hyderabad (City) share in total (AP) state revenue from commercial taxes was 33.8% of total state' (ibid.: 159). It also says that in 1967, out of the 77 registered offices of industrial companies, only 5 belonged to companies with plants in Coastal Andhra or Rayalaseema. Hyderabad had not yet become a major business centre for Andhra

Pradesh even 10 years after the merger. Even in 1967, Hyderabad revenues dominated the state revenues. Current estimates, 2010–11, indicate the same order of magnitude (Pingle 2013).

Hyderabad as the Capital of Andhra Pradesh: Phase II

The Srikrishna Committee (SKC) report, based on Census 2001, indicates that nearly 204,602 (5.4 per cent) persons out of 3.8 million living in Hyderabad were born in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. The corresponding data for Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy district (formerly Atraf-i-Balda) are 533,198 (7.2 per cent) out of a total of 7.4 million. This figure is less than the 16 per cent that moved into these districts during 1951–61. These may largely be migrants during and after the 1970s, i.e. after the Telangana and Jai Andhra movements dissipated.

The SKC says, based on no data at all, that there may be 8 lakh Hyderabad residents who go away for Sankranti to Seemandhra—thereby implying that this may be the population size of the migrants from Seemandhra (SKC 2010: 325). As a 400-year-old city with a primarily Muslim population, Hyderabad has slowly been losing its character. As reported by several Bengali associations, the estimate of the number of Bengalis currently residing in Hyderabad is 5 lakh.[3] There may other linguistic groups settled in the city and as they tend to increase in size, they bring their customs and festivals and food to the common melting pot of the city.

In 2007, the land grab began in earnest. The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), covering 626 sq km, was formed by the merger of the MCH with 12 outlying municipalities. As SKC notes, 'The expansion of GHMC has led to a sharp decline in vote share for MIM from 29% to 14% and an equivalent increase for the TDP and also the Congress' (SKC 2010: 300). This debunks the claim that the actions of the politicians were influenced in favour of the Muslim vote bank. Matters were soon made worse.

In 2008, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) was created. It covers 7,073 sq km with a population of over 7 million. On HMDA's size, SKC commented,

> The area under HMDA is comparable to the size of smaller states. HMDA is almost twice the size of Goa, and much larger than the National Capital Territory of Delhi, which is 1,483 square km. It is much larger than Union Territories like Chandigarh (114 square km) and Puduchery (492 square km).... HMDA covers a larger area, has political representation at the highest level of the state and is well funded and resourced, as compared to the GHMC. (Ibid.: 301–02)

Note the expressions 'well-funded and resourced' and 'political representation at the highest level'; there is no talk about the residents and their role in the running of the municipality. Most citizens everywhere have little control over state and central politics and consequent decisions, but they usually are able to affect local ones. That is evidently not the case in Hyderabad. As the SKC said,

> Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy form a large share of modern economic activity in the Telangana region. It comprises 44% of registered manufacturing and 39% of construction of the region and this ratio has been stable since 1999–2000. The share of transport is very high at 62% but it has declined by 5% since 1999–2000. Most critically, these two districts comprise 54% of modern services GDP in Telangana and this share has risen by 12% (from 42%) since 1999–2000. This high proportion of modern services, especially financial services, is one characteristic of a world city economy. (Ibid.: 309)

The Hyderabad region also accounts for 11 per cent of the total electorate of current Andhra Pradesh. The SKC notes that 'about a sixth of Telangana's GDP comes from Hyderabad' (ibid.: 308)—this indicates how vital Hyderabad is to Telangana's future. The SKC also looked at what went wrong:

> It is critical to note that the share of modern services in Hyderabad's economy has increased from 24% to 39% in a relatively short period of time. Most of this increase is offset by decreases across the

> board, but most significantly in the share of manufacturing (-6%), transport and public services (-4% each). (Ibid.: 309)

The Muslim share (45 per cent) of the total population was badly affected by this shift towards a modern-service based economy. As the SKC points out,

> One striking aspect of this difference is with respect to Muslims. As compared to the rest of the city, the Muslims have been less in modern and public services and more in traditional services and manufacturing, as seen in Table 6.3. Moreover, over time, this difference is becoming sharper, as they are participating much less in the transition to modern services. While the decline in the share of public employment is common across the city, Muslims seem to be moving more towards manufacturing and construction while the non-Muslims are moving towards modern services, as seen in Figure 6.3B. Taken to an extreme, this may have social repercussions, as they may feel excluded if the policies of the city become oriented more towards a service city, rather than a manufacturing city. (Ibid.: 311)

In the area of information technology (I-T), the SKC says,

> In terms of actual figures, this (I-T industry) translates to Rs 32,500 crore out of the total of Rs 2,17,000 crore exports for India in 2008–09. Within Andhra Pradesh, the industry is almost solely in Hyderabad, which accounted for 99% of the total exports from the state in the year 2005–06, and has consistently accounted for 98% of the total exports from the state in the years 2006–07, 2007–08, and 2008–09. (Ibid.: 315)

While there are no clear estimates of the extent of real-estate sector investments or business, the revenue to the state due from property transferred is an indication of the magnitude of this activity. Figures provided by the SKC reveal that in the five years 2004–09, the average annual registration of revenue from land sales came to

Rs 374 crore annually in Hyderabad and Rs 845 crore from Ranga Reddy district (ibid.: 318).

But the SKC comments with some justice,

> A number of transactions may not be formal and registered. Another aspect of Hyderabad's real estate industry is the formal linkage to political leadership, often from other regions in Andhra Pradesh. For example, LANCO, an infrastructure and real estate company is associated with Lagadapati Rajagopal, an MP from Vijayawada; the Gayatri Construction firm is associated with T. Subbirami Reddy, a former MP from Visakhapatnam; and Transstroy, a firm involved in building the Outer Ring Road, is associated with Rayapati Sambasiva Rao, the MP from Guntur. (Ibid.: 319)

It is not surprising that many Seemandhra (Rayalaseema Andhra) politicians-cum-realtors want to retain their influence in Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy. They feel that with the formation of Telangana, the whole market will collapse (SKC 2010: 317, 319). But according to the SKC, 'A positive aspect for Hyderabad is that regardless of the uncertainty engendered by the current political situation, investments in city infrastructure have continued. A number of major infrastructure projects have contributed to improve Hyderabad's capacity to absorb investments' (ibid.: 319).

The City of Hyderabad as a Union Territory

Even the idea of a UT and joint capital for five to 10 years is a non-starter and will only create further and more intense antagonism and conflict. The MIM sees the UT as a ploy to deprive Muslims in Hyderabad of whatever little political power they have gained since 1948 (*Times of India* 2013a).

Today, as in 1901, Muslims constitute 41 per cent of the city's population. If the proposed UT limits are extended to Greater Hyderabad Metropolitan Area (GHMA), their proportion and consequent political strength in the proposed UT will decrease considerably as the Home Ministry in Delhi will exercise full political

control. In fact, Hyderabad today is one of the few cities in India where Muslims have a major physical and political presence. This would remain so if Hyderabad became part of the Telangana state.

The Seemandhra real-estate lobby, which has a strong influence on the Congress party, has reconciled itself to statehood, but are concerned about their investments in and around Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy district. The Seemandhra claim to Hyderabad has less basis than that of Nizam VIII, who perhaps had better justification by the right of developments made by his ancestors and the fact that when his privy purse was abolished, his sarf-e-khas lands should have been returned to him!

No one is proposing to evict people from Andhra or Rayalaseema from Hyderabad once Telangana is created. Today, it is claimed that Hyderabad has 5 lakh Bengalis, along with 8 lakh Seemandhra people. The last time Hyderabad had an exodus was in 1948–52 when nearly 177,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan. No one wants a repeat of that great loss of human resources.

So what remains of Hyderabad's identity after the last 55 years of being converted to an *Andhra patanam*? Today it is the capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh and naturally is politically dominated by the group that dominates the state. Given that Hyderabad and Telangana constitute only 40 per cent of the state's population, it is inevitable that the trend cannot be reversed unless Telangana becomes a separate state and the old native population reinforces and reinvigorates a disappearing culture.

People say Congress president Sonia Gandhi has decided to try and retain the 17 MP seats in a new Telangana state in alliance with the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) in the 2014 general elections. The other alternative was to try for the total 42 MP seats from a united Andhra Pradesh against the combined opposition efforts of the YSR Congress Party and the TDP in Rayalaseema-Andhra ('Seemandhra') regions, with the TRS sweeping the Telangana region. Sonia Gandhi's decision seems sensible, as it appears that her main interest is the survival of the Congress in power. However, now that Sonia Gandhi has finally decided to bite the bullet, the satraps in Andhra Pradesh and membes of the Congress high command in Delhi are trying to continue to extract what they can from the

Seemandhra lobby by suggesting half-measures to her in the process of state formation.

One half-measure is for Hyderabad city to become a UT. This will safeguard the Seemandhra illegal land grabbers and other vested interests—irregular building permissions, regularisation of illegal construction, relaxation of floor-space conditions, master-plan violations, etc. Most of these lands that have been illegally grabbed have been hypothecated to banks at huge fictitious values, which will collapse when the truth about their illegality surfaces. Anyway, most of the leading infrastructure companies in Seemandhra are near bankruptcy with their share prices crashing to 10 per cent of their initial value between December 2009 and August 2013 or so, and their loans and interest burden exceeding their capacity to repay them.[4]

TABLE 3.7 AP Infrastructure and Real-estate Company's Share Closing Prices on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)

Company	9th December 2009	1st August 2013
GMR Infrastructure	70.60	12.64
Gayatri Projects	376.35	57.04
Lanco Infratech	583.25	5.25
Lanco Industries	47.65	13.90
GVK Power Infrastructure	50.30	5.84
IVRCL	380.95	11.41
Maducon Projects	176.70	8.74
NCC	160.50	21.20
Ramky Infrastructure	387.35*	39.20
Navbharat Ventures	383.70	178.10

* 1.10.10 on listing

Note: as of 1 October listing

Source: Approximate prices as per Bombay Stock Exchange

Hyderabad city is at the centre of the Telangana region and constitutes its main growth engine. The total contribution of Hyderabad to the State's Own Tax Revenues (SOTR) in 2012–13 was Rs 11,730 crores out of a total for the state of Rs 51,441 crores

(Pingle 2013). So it appears that the game plan is to deprive Telangana of its Hyderabad revenues, transfer them to the Government of India when Hyderabad is made a UT, and receive the money back from the centre to build capitals for Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions, and finance other 'development projects' there. This is an idea similar to that which motivated the merger of Telangana with Andhra state in 1956.

As Marx would put it, this is a case of history repeating itself, first as a tragedy, then as a farce.

Hyderabad as a political entity will have to depend on Telangana for its water supply, road and rail communications. All its solid waste and liquid waste will have to be disposed of in Telangana. In the absence of cooperation from Telangana, even an airlift by the centre would not be able to provide Hyderabad water, power or sewage disposal.

The SKC recommended only two alternatives: a united state and, if that is not possible, Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital. It did not recommend any of the other four options it put forward including an expanded Hyderabad as a UT. Regarding the option of Hyderabad as a UT with 11 per cent of the AP population it said, '... about a sixth of Telangana's GDP comes from Hyderabad' (ibid.: 308). This indicates how vital Hyderabad is for Telangana's future.

It appears to have been forgotten that converting Hyderabad into a UT will effectively disenfranchise the large section of Muslims in Hyderabad. Naturally, the MIM, which currently controls the office of the mayor, has come out against the idea. If Hyderabad becomes a UT, control of Hyderabad will shift to a lieutenant governor and bureaucrats dooming the MIM as a political party (*Deccan Chronicle* 2013).

So far, the 'only' serious violence has been the unfortunate self-inflicted deaths of more than 630 young men for the sake of Telangana. That tragedy, terrible as its consequences were to their families, should give politicians room for serious thought. It illustrates the passionate commitment of the supporters of statehood for Telangana. If this was not enough, the Telangana March on 30 September, where nearly 2–3 lakh Telangana supporters assembled in Hyderabad, should convince the decision-makers about the

seriousness of the issue. This mobilisation occurred even after the police blockaded all access to Hyderabad by rail and road and arrested the activists supporting the Telangana cause.

The situation does not bode well with politicians and lobbyists playing with the emotions of 40 million people. Passions when aroused can, in frustration, turn on the nearest and most visible neighbours and this anger may end up in violence against persons from Seemandhra living in Telangana.

It is right to separate; even better to separate peacefully. It will be tragic if the parting is accompanied by anger and violence. Politicians should be wary of outcomes they do not intend to precipitate by their ill-considered actions.

Hyderabad belongs to those who live in it, work in it, and to those who love it and those who want to preserve its historic nature.

Notes

1. PRLog Press Release, 'Aide et Action South Asia launches India's largest mapping exercise of migrant population in AP', 22 May 2010. url/, accessed on 23 January 2013.

2. It is worth quoting it in full: 'I may say Sir, one word in this connection. People like myself, Dr. Patabhi Sittaramayya, Prof. Ranga and others who have come from our province, and who have been agitating for separation of Andhra Province, and have been fighting for it for over 36 years could not succeed until now. At last the Congress Working Committee, has been good enough to adopt Andhra separation. I thank the Working Committee Dr. Pattabhi Sittaramayya, the Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister and also Honourable Sardar Valabhbhai Patel and the other members of the Working Committee for having accepted this. They have accepted it so that it might be started immediately and the whole thing might be worked out. There was a dispute over the city of Madras which could not be solved. There was the Dhar Commission appointed by you, Sir, and that Commission went into the whole question and toured the whole country and arrived at certain conclusions in their report. Relying upon those findings, we demanded Andhra Province, Sir, without claiming the city of Madras, although there was a demand for a separation and for a division and for

037552

constituting it into a separate province. This is a question upon which the Working Committee was not able to arrive at any decision. But they were good enough to put it in such a form that that question was left open. And a boundary commission also has to be appointed. I therefore, thank the Government and all those who were responsible for doing this much', Indian parliament, Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. 11. url/, accessed on 23 January 2013.

3. http://www.bengalisinhyderabad.com/hyderabadbengalis.htm, accessed on 23 January 2013.

4. Akbaruddin Owaisi of AI-MIM has been quite vocal both inside and outside Parliament regarding the status of Hyderabad. He alleged that the demand for Hyderabad as UT stems from illegal allotment of huge tracts of land to companies and some Seemandhra leaders by both the Telugu Desam and the Congress governments.

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The Linguistic States
Nehru and States' Reorganisation

The movement for the formation of linguistic states in India was somewhat uneven, with occasional emphasis placed on it in pre-independence days by votaries for and against the notion. The movement took shape politically and practically in the early 1950s. The specific issue that precipitated it was the Andhra region's demand for a state separate from Madras province.[1]

When the agitation became a serious law and order problem, Nehru was forced to concede this. He, however, then extended the process further by appointing the SRC, and issued a caveat against disrupting the traditional diversity of the Hyderabad state which he saw as a successful experiment in bringing together only Hindus of three different linguistic backgrounds (Telugu, Marathi and Kannada) who lived largely in three different regions, but also Muslims—all under the hegemony of the Nizam of Hyderabad (Sherman 2007; Pingle 2010).

The narrative of the reorganisation of the Indian states along linguistic lines begins with the Congress party's position taken at the Nagpur Session in December 1920, when the Congress restructured its organisation and constituted Pradesh Congress Committees on linguistic lines. As early as August 1920, the Madras Legislative Council had given its consent to the proposal for an Andhra province. Under the reformed constitution, the Madras Legislative Council passed a resolution by 40 to 32 votes in favour of formation of a separate Andhra province on 14 March 1927 and forwarded it to the viceroy. The viceroy brought the

matter to the notice of the Secretary of State for India in London. Nothing happened. Much of the resistance seems to have come from Tamils who were employed in government and other jobs in the Andhra area and feared for their livelihoods in a separate Andhra. Moreover, in the financial year 1932–33 alone, the 12 districts from the Andhra region showed an annual surplus in the government revenue after an expenditure of Rs 133 lakh (Rao 1973: 176). This led Pattabhi Sitaramayya to predict, 'It appears that the British would grant us independence sooner than the Tamil ministers would give us a separate province' (quoted in *Andhra Patrika* 1937).

The Congress Election Manifesto (1945–46) stated,

> The Congress has also stood for the freedom of each group and territorial area within the nation to develop its own life and culture within the larger framework and it is stated that for this purpose such territorial areas or provinces should be constituted, as far as possible, on a linguistic and cultural basis. (Quoted in Nehru 1954: 54)

The Government of India set up the Linguistic Provinces Commission (the Dar Commission) in December 1948 to consider the issues, especially those regarding the formation of the new states of Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra. The commission, however, decided against the formation of new states as 'it was not in the larger interests of the Indian nation and should not be taken in hand' (Rao vol. 4 1968: 482). It also found that in the case of Andhra, all the Rayalaseema districts were facing revenue deficits, while the Coastal Andhra districts had surpluses. It became amply clear that there was no homogeneity in the proposed Andhra state. This caused more agitation in Andhra.

The pressure from the Andhra region was immense and, by 1949, the leadership had 'practically decided to have an Andhra province, because most matters had been settled by the Tamil people, the Andhras and others concerned' (Nehru 1954: 55). But the issue kept being deferred, ostensibly on grounds relating to Madras city and Rayalaseema (ibid.: 55). In February 1949, the Bombay Legislative Assembly passed a resolution recommending

the creation of a new state of Maharashtra which included Bombay city. Faced with demands for both Andhra and Maharashtra, Nehru formed a committee which included, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sittaramayya (JVP Committee) and himself, to examine the issue and tried to put the matter on hold for 10 years. However, this did not happen and, in November 1949, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) asked the government to form the Andhra state, but without Madras city. This delayed the process, as seemed to have been the intention too, for the Andhraites were not yet prepared to give up Madras in exchange for a separate state.[2]

The position on the linguistic states was reiterated in the Congress Election Manifesto of 1952:

> The demand for a re-distribution of provinces on a linguistic basis has been persistently made in the South and West of India. The Congress expressed itself in favour of linguistic provinces many years ago. A decision on this question ultimately depends upon the wishes of the people concerned. While linguistic reasons have undoubtedly a certain cultural and other importance, there are other factors also, such as economic, administrative and financial, which have to be taken into consideration. Where such a demand represents the agreed views of the people concerned, the necessary steps prescribed by the Constitution, including the appointment of a Boundary Commission should be taken. (Quoted in Nehru 1954: 54)

It is clear that 'the wishes of the people concerned' and 'agreed views of the people concerned' referred to the people who wished to have a separate state. Dealing with the demand of the Andhraites and the suggestions of a plebiscite or referendum, the prime minister stated that he would 'entirely agree that 95 to 97 per cent of the people concerned would vote for it' (ibid.: 54).

However, having said that the leadership had accepted the creation of Andhra state as long ago as 1949, Nehru wrote to the chief ministers on 2 December 1952 that 'the decision to establish the Andhra State will, no doubt, open out the questions relating to other demands about linguistic provinces. We shall have to consider

them and it would not be wise to wait till circumstances force our hands' (Nehru 1987: 201).

As late as 16 December 1952, three days before he announced the formation of Andhra, Nehru wrote to Rajaji, the then chief minister of Madras state,

> Their state will be a backward one in many ways and financially hard up. They cannot expect much help from the Centre. However, that is their look out. If they want the state, they can have it on conditions that we have stated (i.e. without Madras city). (Gopal 1979: 258)

On 18 January 1953, the Congress passed a resolution approving the steps taken by the government relating to the formation of Andhra and reaffirmed the policy of the Congress in favour of linguistic provinces (Nehru 1987: 238).

On 2 July 1953, Nehru wrote to the chief ministers,

> So far as we are concerned, we have declared quite clearly that *after* the Andhra State is *well* established; we shall appoint a high-powered Commission to consider the question of reorganization of states *in all its many* aspects. We do not propose to consider the question of one state separately now. Instead, this cannot be considered because *in every* such instance many states are concerned. Nor do we propose to consider this matter on the *purely* linguistic plane, although language and culture are necessarily important.... I am surprised that suddenly some people should have galvanized themselves into activity in regard to Hyderabad State and demanded its disintegration.... I am sorry for this because it denotes an outlook with which I have no sympathy whatever, and which, I am sure, if given free play, would bring utter chaos in a great part of India and lead to other disastrous consequences also. (Nehru 1987: 320–21)

On the issue of splitting Hyderabad state, Nehru considered it was 'injurious to Hyderabad and would upset the whole structure of South India'. 'It would', he added, 'be very unwise to do anything that would destroy the administrative continuity that has

been achieved in Hyderabad after so much effort' (Nehru 1954: 60). Finally, 'I think it will be extremely undesirable, unfortunate and injurious to Hyderabad' (Nehru 1987: 58). In response to the CPI-Front's demand for disintegration, Nehru stated forthrightly to the chief ministers on 2 October 1952,

> Then there is the cry for a division of Hyderabad on a linguistic basis. For my part, I am entirely opposed to this. If it is accepted, I am sure it would retard progress in Hyderabad for many long years and would create all manner of problems and upset that balance of South India. All our Five Year Plans and the like will have to be put on the shelf till some new equilibrium is reached. (Ibid.: 114)

Nehru also stated in Parliament, on 7 July 1952, 'I, for my part, would be perfectly agreeable if there were a proposition that Uttar Pradesh, for instance, be split into four provinces. However, I doubt very much if my colleagues from Uttar Pradesh would relish the idea; on the contrary, they would probably like to have an additional chunk from some other province' (Nehru 1954: 60).

Yet, while the leadership was prepared to concede Andhra, it (this included both Nehru and Sardar Patel) refused to consider the request for a Gurkha province in north Bengal as 'unreal, misconceived and harmful to national interest' (ibid.: 57).

Ambedkar had mixed feelings. However, his position on linguistic states was reasonably consistent with his earlier positions:

> We, therefore, want linguistic States for two reasons: to make easy the way to democracy and to remove racial and cultural tension. In seeking to create linguistic States, India is treading the right road. It is the road which all States have followed. In the case of other linguistic States they have been so, from the very beginning. In the case of India, she has to put herself in the reverse gear to reach the goal. But the road she proposes to travel is a well-tried road. It is a road which is followed by other States. (Ambedkar chapter III, 1955)

Ambedkar, nevertheless, was afraid of the challenge to the unity of the country and to the rights of the minorities. More dominant

in his mind was that '... the Union of India is far, far away, from the United States of India. But this consolidation of the North and balkanisation of the South is not the way to reach it' (Ambedkar chapter II 1955). He was also fearful of linguistic chauvinism—in this he was prescient.

Nehru tried to stonewall, and hardly any action was taken between 1949 (when he said he accepted the idea of a separate Andhra) and 1953 (when the Andhra state was created). Then, when it did happen, he seemed quite eager to limit it to Andhra while opposing the disintegration of Hyderabad. Yet, he did what was inevitable and set up the SRC. That bought another two years' time but the mood, instead of settling down, became more assertive and fearful. With two months to go before the release of the SRC report, Nehru wrote on 2 August 1955 to the chief ministers, anticipating the SRC's recommendations in general and alerting them on the need to be balanced,

> No possible recommendation or solution to this problem can meet with universal approval and, therefore, whatever they suggest is bound to displease somebody.... As far as I can see, the only statesmanlike approach would be *to accept, broadly speaking, the unanimous recommendations of the Commission*, whether we like it or not. Any other attitude for Government to take up would be to take sides in this controversy and thus be fiercely assailed for partiality. It may be that some of the recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission appear to us to be unwise. It is better to accept that bit of unwisdom than to do something which leads to unfortunate consequences. *The best course, therefore, appears to me for us to accept the main recommendations of the Commission, subject to minor modifications if necessary* and thus try to put an end to these controversies and conflicts. If possible, we should try to implement those decisions before the *next general election*. (Nehru 1987: 225)

On Hyderabad and Telangana, as late as 21 December 1955, Nehru told Parliament,

> Some honourable members here may well remember that I delivered some speeches in Hyderabad opposing the disintegration

> of the State of Hyderabad. That was my view. I would still like the State of Hyderabad not to be disintegrated, but circumstances have been too strong for me. I accept them. I cannot force the people of Hyderabad or others to fall in line with my thinking. I accept their decision and I adjust myself to the position that Hyderabad will be disintegrated. The Commission has suggested that if Hyderabad was going to be disintegrated, the Telangana area should remain separate for five years and then decide whether it should merge with the other areas of Andhra. We have no particular objection to that, but *logically speaking*, it seems to me *unwise* to allow this matter to be left to *argument*. Let it be taken up now and let us be done with it. (Nehru 1954: 179, emphasis added)

On 16 January 1956, Nehru wrote to the chief ministers that he had spoken on the radio, and the government had issued a communiqué on the reorganisation of states. In the broadcast, he announced that Bombay city would be centrally administered, Vidarbha would be merged with Maharashtra, Saurashtra and Kutch would be merged with Gujarat, and Hyderabad would be split. The communiqué added that the future of Punjab and the Telangana area of Hyderabad would be decided later. On 14 March 1956, he reported, '... it is a happy omen that the difficult and ticklish question of the Punjab has been settled more or less satisfactorily' (Nehru 1987: 334).

Nehru was mistaken. The Akalis immediately started an agitation demanding a separate state and the Maha Punjab Samiti demanded merger of PEPSU, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, as recommended by the SRC. The communists demanded two states: a Hindi-speaking Haryana merged with Himachal Pradesh and a Punjabi-speaking state. The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) demanded the merger of PEPSU with Punjab and Greater Delhi, or as an alternative, the formation of Haryana.

Nehru exploded. Writing to the chief ministers on 15 June 1956, regarding the Punjab agitation, he stated,

> I cannot remember having seen a more misguided or misconceived agitation. I do not expect anyone to agree with

> me or the Government, but one does expect a modicum of intelligence in understanding and appraising any step taken. I regret that this is completely absent today in Punjab among those who are getting so vastly excited about the regional formula. (Ibid.: 385–86)

He continued,

> There is a loud demand for a Maha Punjab, including Himachal Pradesh. If there is one thing that is quite clear, it is that the people of Himachal Pradesh do not want to be merged with Punjab. In fact, they resent the idea. Are we to compel them simply because the Maha Punjab group so desired? The entire regional formula of the Punjab is on a line with regional formulas we have suggested to some other part of India. (Ibid.)

Regarding Bombay city and its independent status, the government was confronted with a memorandum from 220 MPs in the Lok Sabha proposing a bigger bilingual state of Bombay state on 2 and 3 August 1956. This bilingual state would include Saurashtra, Kutch and Vidarbha as a solution for the tangled issue of Bombay city. The proposal was accepted by the government on 6 August and by the Lok Sabha on 9 August. The Bill was altered radically to reverse the bifurcation and ensured that Bombay would continue to be one province with the additional areas added to it. Promptly, violent demonstrations began from 8 August 1956 in Ahmedabad.

The idea that there could be many states speaking the same language was applied only to the Hindi belt where nearly five such states lay spread-eagled east to west from Rajasthan to Bihar and north to south from Himachal to Madhya Pradesh encompassing most of northern India. The SRC's recommendation for Telangana was clear and balanced. It considered the case for Vishalandhra and Telangana and dealt with all those 'other factors' that Nehru often referred to in the larger context.

The SRC stated the argument for merger of Andhra and Telangana:

The advantages of a larger Andhra State, including Telangana are that it will bring into existence a State of about 32 millions with a *considerable hinterland, with large water and power resources, adequate mineral wealth and valuable raw materials.* This will also solve the difficult and vexing problem of finding a permanent capital for Andhra; the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad are *very well suited to be the capital of Vishalandhra.* (SRC 1955, emphasis added)

Referring to the river water issue it is pointed out,

Complete unification of either the Krishna or the Godavari valley is not, of course, possible. *But if one independent political jurisdiction, namely, that of Telangana, can be eliminated, the formulation and implementation of plans in the eastern areas in these two great river basins will be greatly expedited.* Since Telangana, as part of Vishalandhra, will benefit both directly and indirectly from this development, there is a great deal to be said for its amalgamation with the Andhra State. (Ibid., emphasis added)

Despite these strong arguments, the SRC contended,

The case of Vishalandhra thus rests on arguments, which are impressive. *The considerations which have been argued in favour of a separate Telangana State are, however, not such as may be lightly brushed aside.* (Ibid., emphasis added)

The first problem was the poor state of Andhra finances:

The existing Andhra State has faced a financial problem of some magnitude ever since it was created and in comparison with Telangana the existing Andhra State has a low per capita revenue. Telangana, on the other hand, is much less likely to be faced with financial embarrassment. The much higher incidence of land revenue in Telangana and an excise revenue of the order of Rs 5 crores per annum principally explain this difference. *Whatever the explanation may be, some Telangana leaders seem to fear that the result of unification will be to exchange some settled sources of revenue, out of*

> *which development schemes may be financed, for financial uncertainty similar to that which Andhra is now faced.* Telangana claims to be progressive and from an administrative point of view unification, it is contended, is not likely to confer any benefits on this area. (Ibid., emphasis added)

The per capita annual government revenue for Andhra was Rs 11, while that of Telangana was Rs 14. Whatever the differences in economic activity, the state revenues in Telangana were better and, in 1954–55, yielded a surplus of Rs 0.51 crore while Andhra had a deficit of Rs 5.18 crore. Moreover, Andhra had an overdraft of Rs 2.67 crore while Telangana had Rs 11 crore in marketable securities.[3]

This was anticipated by the SRC:

> *Telangana, it has further been argued, can be a stable and viable unit considered by itself. The revenue receipts of this area on current account have been estimated at about Rs 17 crore,* and although the financing of the Krishna and Godavari projects will impose a recurring burden on the new State by way of interest charges, *the probable deficit, if any, is unlikely to be large.* In favourable conditions, the revenue budget may even be balanced or indicate a marginal surplus. This fairly optimistic forecast can be explained or justified by a variety of reasons. (SRC 1955, emphasis added)

With regard to river waters, the SRC felt,

> When plans for future development are taken into account, Telangana fears that the claims of this area may not receive adequate consideration in Vishalandhra. The Nandikonda (i.e. Nagarjunasagar) and Kushtapuram (i.e. Pochampad) projects are, for example, among the most important which Telangana or the country as a whole has undertaken. Irrigation in the coastal areas of these two great rivers is, however, also being planned. *Telangana, therefore, does not wish to lose its present independent rights in relation to the utilization of the waters of Krishna and Godavari.* (Ibid., emphasis added)

On the issue of employment, the SRC pointed out,

> One of the principal causes of opposition of Vishalandhra also seems to be the apprehension felt by the *educationally backward people of Telangana that they may be swamped and exploited by the more advanced people of the coastal areas*.... The real fear of the people of Telangana is that if they join Andhra they will be unequally placed in relation to the people of Andhra and in this partnership the major partner will derive all the advantages immediately, *while Telangana, itself may be converted into a colony by the enterprising coastal Andhra*. (Ibid., emphasis added)

Summing up, the SRC stated,

> It seems to us, therefore, that there is much to be said for the formation of the larger State and nothing should be done to impede the realisation of this goal. At the same time, we have to take note of the important fact that, while opinion in Andhra is overwhelmingly in favour of the larger unit, *public opinion in Telangana has still to crystallize itself. Important leaders of public opinion in Andhra themselves seem to appreciate that the unification of Telangana with Andhra, though desirable, should be based on a voluntary and willing association of the people and that it is primarily for the people of Telangana to take a decision about their future*. (Ibid., emphasis added)

Therefore, it concluded,

> After taking all these factors into consideration, *we have come to the conclusions that it will be in the interests of Andhra as well as Telangana, if for the present, the Telangana area is to be constituted into a separate State*, which may be known as the Hyderabad State with provision for its unification with Andhra *after the general elections likely to be held in or about 1961 if by a two-thirds majority the legislature of the residual Hyderabad State expresses itself in favour of such unification*. (Ibid., emphasis added)

Many of the forebodings of the SRC, which dissuaded it from recommending merger, continued to exist and form the basis of persistent unsatisfied demands.

Notes

1. For a definitive work on the subject, see Rao (1973).
2. This somewhat confusing issue has been dealt with in chapter 3.
3. Andhra 1956 and Andhra Pradesh 1957.

five

The Electoral Situation in the Two States*

Andhra State

The Andhra state came into being on 1 October 1953. The legislators who had been elected from the Andhra area to the Madras legislature in 1952 were transferred (without fresh elections) in 1953 to a new Andhra Legislative Assembly that consisted of 140 members. The Congress had 38 MLAs (with 28.4 per cent of the popular vote) and the CPI 41 MLAs (with 17 per cent of the popular vote). The remaining 61 MLAs were either Independents or from small parties. T. Prakasam, formerly a Congressman and chief minister of Madras province, left the PSP and founded the Praja Party. A coalition government of the Congress, Krishikar Lok Party (KLP) and Praja Party was formed with Prakasam as chief minister and N. Sanjiva Reddy as deputy chief minister.

From the start, as is usual in an unstable coalition, the Prakasam government veered from one crisis to another. The site of the capital was the first issue with Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema legislators differing violently on the choice. This even resulted in Gouthu Latchanna resigning from the cabinet and, with his party the KLP led by N. G. Ranga (a former CPI supporter), leaving the coalition and sitting in opposition. No sooner was this sorted out, further agitation arose over the issue of a bill to establish a new university in Rayalaseema. But the most important issues that divided the polity were land reforms and prohibition.

The land reform legislation had been pending as only the great estates had been abolished under the Madras Estates Abolition Act. However, the target of the new legislation was the older tenure known as *inamdari*—which were tax-free lands that had been granted for service, either for secular or for religious purposes. Brahmins held much of this land and tenant farmers who typically cultivated it were peasant castes such as Kammas, Kapus and Reddys. Tenants were being evicted in anticipation of a sweeping land reform similar to that which the neighbouring Hyderabad state had enacted in 1950. As a result of agitation by political parties and tenants, the government issued the Andhra Tenancy Protection Ordinance of 1954, giving temporary protection to certain classes of tenants. However, this did not please the PSP and the agitation continued.

The CPI launched another agitation in the summer of 1954 for distribution of 13.5 lakh acres of government-owned wasteland and newly drained swamplands to landless labour and the poorer sections of society. When the government announced its own policy in June, it was denounced by the communists as bogus and intended to benefit the politically connected, and protest simmered on. As a result of the two land agitations, the Andhra jails were crowded with 2,000 protestors, which led deputy chief minister Sanjiva Reddy to say, 'Andhra State today is full of satyagraha and, in fact, too full to be good for the country' (quoted in Windermiller 1955: 58).

The issue that eventually brought the government down was that of prohibition. There had been considerable pressure to abolish prohibition to enable the state revenues to be enhanced and to provide employment to the toddy-tapping caste. At the time of the creation of Andhra, Justice K. N. Wanchoo's report[1] had warned that Andhra Pradesh would face 'bankruptcy' if prohibition was not scrapped. The S. V. Ramamurthi Special Committee surveyed the prohibition scene and, in a 160-page report, stated that enforcement of prohibition had failed, illicit consumption and corruption was widespread and public order was affected. It recommended repeal of prohibition. The

government declined to implement the recommendations. The assembly passed a resolution in favour of repeal. The government remained adamant.

At this stage, both the CPI and the KLP introduced a no-confidence motion when the assembly re-convened in October 1954. The government lost the motion when four cabinet members voted in favour of the no-confidence motion, and President's Rule was enforced despite the CPI's offer to form the government with support of the PSP (which was withdrawn later under pressure from the Governor). Fresh elections were announced for 1955 (ibid.: 60).

The Mysterious Side Issue

An interesting historical fact has come to light which shows how politics in Andhra Pradesh was planned and conducted. The first issue has to do with the number of members of the legislative assembly (MLA).

The website of the Andhra Pradesh assembly says,

> Consequent to the formation of State of Andhra Pradesh *the 140 Members of Andhra State Legislative Assembly* and 105 Members representing the Telugu speaking areas of Hyderabad State were merged together resulting in the formation of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. In 1956, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature was Unicameral with only a Legislative Assembly consisting 245 Members.... Due to delimitation of constituencies several ups and downs have taken place in the number of elected Members of Legislative Assembly in Andhra Pradesh. *In 1956 it was 245*, in 1962 it was 300, in 1967 and 1972 it was 287 and from 1978 onwards it is 294. (Andhra Pradesh Legislature, emphasis added)

This is not entirely true—especially the figures relating to 1956. The Election Commission's data, shown in Table 5.1, provides a slightly different picture.

TABLE 5.1 Telangana and Seemandhra Legislative Assembly Members

Election Year Region	1952	1953	1955	1956	1962	2009
Telangana	101			105	106	119
Seemandhra	146	140	196		194	175
Total				301	300	294

Note: The issue with 1952 is that in both cases the elections were held in Hyderabad state and Madras state. But we know for certain how many MLAs were sent to Andhra because the Andhra Act 1953 said so. We do not exactly know how many MLAs were elected from the Telangana region in 1952 as some of the border constituencies with Mysore and Bombay were disrupted in 1956.
Source: Election Commission of India.

In 1952, both regions were parts of larger states (Madras and Hyderabad) and the figures are approximate within one or two seats as some constituencies on their borders where split when their states were divided. However, the 1955 election was solely for Andhra state and involved 56 more constituencies than the 1953 figure. In the 1956 election, Telangana region alone went to the polls while being part of Andhra Pradesh state as the Andhra MLAs' term were still in force, and which anyway was extended to 1962 (beyond their normal five-year term). However, in 1962 and thereafter, both regions went to the polls together.

TABLE 5.2 Population in the Regions of Andhra Pradesh[2]

Population in Lakhs	Seemandhra	Telangana	Both Regions
Census 1951	204.9	107.5	312.5
Census 1961	232.7	127.1	359.8
% Increase	16.5	25.7	15.1

Source: *Census of India* (1951).

As the Census figures in Table 5.2 show, there is no population explosion in Seemandhra but a sharp increase in Telangana. The latter occurred once the disturbances caused by the intervention

by the Indian Army and the communist problem subsided and due to migration, especially in the Khammam district by Andhra settlers which was part of the 3.57 lakh increase in population—amounting to a 51 per cent increase!) (*Census of India* 1951 as quoted in Government of Hyderabad 1953: 1; *Census of India* as quoted in GoAP 1961: 2). The increase in Hyderabad district (which contained the capital city) was only 2.45 lakhs or 13.5 per cent—much less than the average growth of population in the region. This is proven by the fact that parliamentary constituencies have not been altered so radically as in the case of assembly constituencies. Most of the small increase in the assembly seats between 1952 and 1956 came in Telangana and remained constant thereafter (Government of Hyderabad 1953: 2, 6; GoAP 1961: 4).

TABLE 5.3 Telangana and Seemandhra Members of Lok Sabha[3]

Election Year Region	1952	1956	1962	2009
Telangana	13	15	15	17
Seemandhra	27	28	28	25
Total	40	43	43	42

Source: Election Commission of India.

So how and for what reason did the Andhra assembly seats increase by 56, i.e. by 40 per cent between 1953 and 1955?

It seems that after the 1951 Census it was obvious that the Andhra region of Madras state had a population three times as much as the Telangana region of Hyderabad state, while it had only 1.4 times the number of assembly seats. This would not have mattered if they were to be in different states—but if they merged this would have given the Telangana region an overwhelming advantage. So in order to avoid this situation, the seats in Andhra assembly were raised by 56, i.e. by 40 per cent, in early 1955 itself. That means that even by late 1954 the plans for merger were already set in motion, and the Andhra seats were increased for the election to be held in February 1955.

The Election of 1955

The mid-term election of 1955 was a watershed, not just for Andhra but also for the country. The CPI, which had done exceedingly well in 1952, was now extremely confident that it would rule Andhra state. It promised a land ceiling of 20 acres of wet land and 30 to 60 acres of dry land, distribution of excess land to the landless and poor peasants, abolition of inamdari tenure without compensation, abolition of prohibition and a three-year moratorium on all debts due by poor peasants and landless labour and long-term interest-free loans to farmers. The CPI along with the PSP, also supported Vishalandhra, i.e. a merger with the Telangana region of Hyderabad state.

The 1952 general election was the first election fought based on a fully adult franchise. The previous ones had an electorate limited by property and tax paying qualifications.

To counter this and to convince the recently franchised electorate (quoted in the *Hindu* 1950), the Congress promised to continue prohibition (which had brought their government down!), to try and achieve immediate abolition of *inam* (village rights) and to enforce a ceiling on landholdings (without stating the limits). It also encouraged popularisation of *neera* (as a substitute for toddy), cancelled land revenue for those paying less than Rs 10 and announced a minimum wage for agricultural labour. However, no mention of Vishalandhra was made in its manifesto.

Manifesto promises apart, the real politics lay in the 'democracy vs communism' issue. The Congress high command entrusted S. K. Patil with the election strategy and its implementation. Patil was a Bombay-based trade-unionist and a staunch anti-communist who launched a violent and organised campaign. He consolidated the non-communist parties into a United Congress Front (UCF), giving up 49 seats to the coalition partners, which brought in the Kamma-dominated parties into the anti-communist front and split the Kamma vote. This was decisive.

The Kamma population figures (in the 1921 Census) showed sizable proportions in the total population in critical districts: Krishna (26 per cent), Guntur (36 per cent), Nellore (13 per

cent), Godavari (7 per cent) and Chittoor (11 per cent). This community had earlier supported the Kamma leadership of the CPI. The Brahmin vote, considerable as it was—in Krishna (20 per cent), Guntur (19 per cent), Godavari (13 per cent), Vizag (12 per cent)—tended to go to the Congress party and to Prakasam. With the CPI threat of drastic land reform, the richer Kamma and other landed interests backed the UCF.

The Hyderabad State Congress sent in hundreds of party workers. Donations of money, jeeps and loudspeakers poured in from all over the country. S. K. Patil was responsible for mobilising money and men from all over India. He thoroughly revamped the Congress party structure and conveyed the idea to the voters that if the communists came to power, the union would not allow them to rule much less allow funds to flow to a 'bankrupt' state, which it needed to survive.

The Hyderabad chief minister, B. Ramakrishna Rao, from his sickbed, issued an appeal to the Andhraites to vote for Congress, otherwise,

> The people of Telangana, who have had bitter experience of the Communist atrocities, would be loath to accept a Vishalandhra in case a non-Congress government is formed in Andhra. If there is a Government favourable to the Congress ideas in Andhra, the way for the formation of Vishalandhra will be clear.... A non-Congress Government in Andhra would be against the early execution of the Nandikonda (Nagarjunasagar) project, which would do good to people in Hyderabad and Andhra States. (Quoted in *Hindu* 1950)

Less than three weeks before the Andhra election, the CWC met at Avadi and endorsed a socialist line to pre-empt the communists. This would be the famous 'Socialistic Pattern' which borrowed the Stalinist model of heavy industry led-growth as opposed to the line of Gandhi, which was based on co-operatives and handlooms. With this, the Congress took much of the economic argument away from the communists.

Among other communist defectors was C. V. K. Rao who called his former party 'fascist' and 'opportunist and anarchic'. Taking aim at the Kamma caste leadership and resource base of the CPI, he contended that the CPI was dominated by what he called 'kulak *pettamdars* (Windermiller 1955: 63).

The masterstroke was to come. A month or two before the election, Khrushchev and Bulganin, leaders of the Soviet Union, arrived on a state visit to India. On 26 January 1955, *Pravda* published a glowing tribute to Nehru and 'the New India'—a tribute that was copied, translated and circulated in thousands during the Congress election campaign. Moscow had dealt the Andhra Pradesh communists a body-blow.

The election had a high voter turnout (64 per cent) and out of a total of 194 seats, the Congress got 119 and the CPI only 15! With the KLP and PSP getting 22 and 13 seats respectively, the UCF had, to everyone's surprise, cleared the board. The Congress formed the government with Bezwada Gopal Reddy as chief minister.

Yet, while the Congress got only 37 per cent of the vote, KLP 9 per cent and PSP 5 per cent, the CPI still got 31 per cent (doubling their 1952 share), which showed that sentiment was still strong and widespread despite the enormous efforts to counter it.

Among the defeated CPI candidates were stalwarts like T. Nagi Reddy, leader of the opposition and brother-in-law of Congress leader N. Sanjiva Reddy, M. Basavapunnaiah and C. Rajeswara Rao, while Puchallapalli Sundarayya got a majority of only 821 votes (ibid.).

The caste equations were also reversed in favour of the UCF. The merger of the Kamma-dominated KLP of N. G. Ranga, the panic of Kamma and Reddy landlords and kulaks over the threatened land reform, the achievement of statehood, the need to placate the Congress-ruled union government and the UCF manoeuvre of matching communist candidates with opponents of the same caste, all helped Congress to capitalise on the caste equations in critical areas. Thus the Congress made deep inroads into the political and caste base of the CPI. With this development, the Kamma-Reddy rivalry moved from the CPI-Congress level to the intra-party factions within the Congress party.

Hyderabad State

The communist insurgency of 1948–50 (Dhanagare 1983) in Hyderabad state had been crushed by the Indian Army, which had occupied Hyderabad state and replaced the Nizam's government. To add to this, Moscow's Zhdanov line in favour of armed insurrections had been dropped after the death of Stalin. Thus the Congress party (which was never a force in the princely state) got breathing space, further helped by the drastic land reform initiated and implemented during the 1950s by the military/civil administration of the state then directed by the Government of India.

An interesting feature is that while the annexation of Hyderabad to the Dominion of India was billed as bringing responsible government to the state to which the Nizam was opposed, such responsible government was delayed by almost four years after the annexation till 1952. This curious piece of politics may have originated in the recommendation of the Pandit Sundarlal Committee which said,

> *We have already drawn attention to the very real fear in the Muslim mind that a responsible Government in Hyderabad implying as it does, a government under the will of the Hindu majority, is likely to be little short of disaster considering the present strained relations of the two communities, besides a cleavage in the Congress ranks. We are constrained to remark that the State Congress has failed to give and absolutely satisfactory account of itself during the period of trouble.* Therefore the time for any radical changes in the form of government does not appear to be propitious. We would respectfully suggest that their postponement for at least *some years to come.* (Noorani 2013: 366)[4]

Even in the Constituent Assembly, Hyderabad was not represented. The Government of India continued to recognise the Nizam as the *de jure* head of state and maintained the fiction that Hyderabad was a princely state till January 1950. While there was no instrument of accession that the Nizam was asked to sign, it was only in November 1949 that the Nizam by a *firman* and letter addressed to the Government of India adopted the Constitution of India (which was yet to be promulgated) as the Constitution of Hyderabad

state. Thus the self-government for the people of Telangana (who constituted a majority of 57 per cent of the population of Hyderabad state) was delayed and, when it came in 1952, did not last longer than 1956, when the state was trifurcated.

In the 1952 elections, 26 per cent the Hyderabad state electorate had voted in favour of the CPI-Front parties, while another 12 per cent voted for the socialists. In the Telangana region alone, the CPI-Front parties (the Peoples' Democratic Front and the Peasants and Workers Party) got 37 seats, polling 31 per cent of the votes; Congress polled 39 per cent of the popular vote and got 44 seats. Having won 93 seats overall in Hyderabad state, the Congress was in a governing position.

The cry for disintegration of Hyderabad state was due largely to the general hostility to the erstwhile Nizam's state which had defied the union government and the Indian national movement (Sherman 2007). Other strategic interests were also involved as we have seen in chapter 3. This required a wholesale submergence of the princely states and their unique culture and society into the former British ruled-Congress dominated provinces. The only exception was Kashmir and it illustrated the problem that was sought to be avoided.

The agitation for the disintegration was also led by the Marathi and Kannada elements in Hyderabad state, who preferred to merge their strongholds with Bombay province and Mysore state respectively (Rao 1973: 289). Yet, with the disintegration of Hyderabad, the Congress' position in Telangana would have to be reassessed both in terms of party politics and caste dominance.

Even the issue of Hyderabad city was somehow sold to the Andhra politicians as a concession for the loss of Madras by Rajaji, as we have detailed in chapter 3. The disintegration of the Hyderabad state and the merger of Telangana and Hyderabad city with Andhra served many political purposes.

Notes

*Much of what follows relies heavily on Windermiller (1955), Harrison (1956), Elliot (1970), Ram (1973), Rao (1973), and Walch (1976). These

authoritative works on the formation of Andhra and Andhra Pradesh and the politics of that period may be a useful read.

1. The 63-page Wanchoo Report ('Report on the Financial and Other Implications Relating to the Creation of the New Andhra State') was a result of the Government of India appointing Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court, after the decision to divide Madras state and create a new state of Andhra. He was asked, '... to set out, consider and report on the financial and other implications of this division and various questions which will arise in the course of implementing the decision of the Government of India more particularly the non-inclusion of the city of Madras in Andhra State' (Wanchoo Report 1953:1).

2. Census of India (1951) quoted in Bureau of Economics and Statistics ([BES)(1953), p.: 1)] and Bureau of Economics and Statistics ([BES) (1956), p.: 4)] and Census of India, (1961) quoted in Bureau of Economics and Statistics (BES) (1961:), p. 2).

3. Election Commission of India, Statistical Reports of Assembly Elections. url/, accessed on 30 November 2013.

4. The draft report had the words '*for at least three years, if not more*', which was altered to '*for at least some years to come*' in the final report, alternative url: 'Exclusive Sundar Lal report on Hyderabad police action', *Deccan Chronicle*, 29 November 2013. http://www.deccanchronicle.com/131129/news-current-affairs/article/exclusive-sundarlal-report-police-action, accessed on 1 January 2014.

six

Caste Politics and the Merger*

Once Partition was effected, the idea of linguistic identity raised its head—an issue that the Congress had used as a handle against the multilingual British provinces and the princely states. A Pandora's box was opened and like the earlier religious issue proceeded inexorably to its logical conclusion. Once linguistic unity was achieved, Andhra Pradesh and most of the other states began to shift focus to another dimension of identity politics—caste, which was to dominate party and legislative politics for many years to come.

The Andhra Dimension

In Andhra, the elections of 1955 saw caste equations crystallised and united in the UCF. Yet, the communists were not a spent force as yet as they had contested 169 of the 170 seats (though they got only 15 seats) and doubled their earlier share of the popular vote to 31 per cent, while the UCF got 50 per cent of the vote. The Congress had won only 28.4 per cent of the votes in 1952, when it had fought alone. Of the 146 seats won by the UCF, the Reddys won 45, Kammas 24 and Telegas 15.

The Congress had become a Reddy-dominated party, something Ambedkar had warned against in 1953 when he said,

> Take Andhra: there are only two major communities spread over the linguistic area. They are either Reddis or the Kammas. They hold all the land, all the offices, and all the business. The untouchables live in subordinate dependence on them.... In

> linguistic states what would remain for the smaller communities to look to? (Ambedkar 1953)

The battle over the location of the state capital which involved Kamma landed and real-estate interests in Vijayawada (supported by the communists and the KLP) had already revealed the caste antagonism within the Congress. This resulted in N. G. Ranga, the leading Kamma Congressman, walking out in 1951 and setting up the KLP despite all of Nehru's efforts to unite the two caste factions. In the end, it was the Madras legislature that decided in favour of Kurnool. In other words, the Rayalaseema faction supported by the Tamil MLAs won. *Times of India* reported on 6 June 1953,

> In recent years the rivalry between the Reddys of Rayalaseema and rich Kammas of the delta districts has grown to alarming proportions. Congressmen have tended to group themselves on communal lines, and the Sanjiva Reddy–Ranga tussle for leadership which finally resulted in Ranga's exit from the Congress is [a] major instance in this regard. And rightly or wrongly, the choice of Kurnool is looked upon by the Kammas as another major triumph for the Reddys.

This rivalry and antagonism continued to plague the new Andhra state and affected party politics, and even the communist party was not immune. Puchallapalli Sundarayya, a leading communist (and Reddy by caste), charged that the Congress,

> [...] it wanted to rouse communal feelings, and that is why it selected Kurnool as the capital. ... The Congress raises the slogan of Reddi vs. Kamma. It says: if you want to change Kurnool to any centralized place, then Kamma domination will come and Reddi domination will go. These are facts that cannot be controverted by anybody who knows anything about Andhra. (Quoted in Harrison 1956: 398–99)

While most members of the Congress and the communist parties were in favour of Vishalandhra, N. G. Ranga and his group were in doubt,

> It is indeed a matter of serious thought whether acquisition [sic] of Telangana would be a source of strength or embarrassment, whether it would pave the way more easily for the emergence of a Communist State in India. (Quoted in *Indian Express* 1953)

However, despite fears of Coastal Andhra and its Kamma MLAs being marginalised in an enlarged state, the Andhra assembly, in late November 1955, passed a unanimous resolution demanding the formation of a single Telangana state.

The Hyderabad Dimension

Had the 1952 voting pattern (Congress with 44 seats and the CPI-Front, which included the People's Democratic Front [PDF] and Peasants and Workers Party [PWP] 37 seats) held also in the 1957 general election, it would have been a difficult thing for the Congress to dominate a 101-member Telangana assembly. The socialists had polled 14 per cent of the votes in 1952 and had got 11 seats, with independents polling a higher 17 per cent but getting only five seats. A separate Telangana could easily become a communist bastion. Much would depend on what the socialists would do before and after the election. With the Brahmins and Reddys dominating the Congress party in Telangana, a merger with Andhra would strengthen the Reddy element present on both sides as well as the anti-CPI-Front. Once dismemberment of Hyderabad was decided upon, it would become difficult for the Congress party (divided by the Brahmin and Reddy factions) to hold its own in a separate Telangana.

After annexation by the union, the region had already experienced what an influx of out-of-state government officials and others could do to destabilise employment and business. This had resulted in a violent Mulki agitation (1948–52) that had quietened down only after jobs were safeguarded for sons of the soil. This situation would be repeated after the merger with Andhra state.

The demand for a separate Telangana state seemed to have support in the Hyderabad state Congress party. In November 1955, newspapers reported that seven out of the 10 Congress Committee

members from Telangana, 73 out of the 105 Telangana Congress delegates, the state executive of the Indian National Trade Union Congress and 10 MPs from Telangana supported a separate state. However, the team of K. V. Ranga Reddy, M. Channa Reddy and J. V. Narsing Rao who were to go to Kurnool in November to discuss the issue with Andhra leaders, cancelled their visit at the last minute (Rao 1973: 295–96).

The eight-day debate in the Hyderabad assembly in late November 1955 on the issue was lively but no vote was taken, which in itself was significant. Nor was a vote taken as per Article 3 of the Constitution of India. Only the views were ascertained and most of them were from the Marathwada and Kannada leaders who wanted dismemberment of Hyderabad and attachment of their districts to their main provinces.

The main political actors in the Congress—Chief Minister B. Ramakrishna Rao, K. V. Ranga Reddy and M. Channa Reddy changed their positions depending on whether they were in office or not, or on swiftly changing faction politics. Even the mouthpiece of the Telangana Congress politicians, the *Golkonda Patrika*, switched its support from Vishalandhra in 1954 to a separate Telangana in 1955.

Between the Andhra mid-term election of 1955 and the decision to merge Andhra and Telangana not much seems to have happened, yet all the expected outcomes were reversed. Why?

Despite linguistic similarities, the economic and cultural legacy argument seemed to go against the merger, as stated by the SRC. Throughout most of recent history, the Telugu people had been divided: the Telangana Telugus had experienced 400 years of Muslim rule and the Andhra Telugus had been under British colonial rule for 150 years. Fiscal imbalances between the regions, fears among the educated class of Telangana regarding loss of opportunities and the apprehensions of the people of Telangana who had lived under military rule for four years (1948–52) contributed to the general unease. Besides, democratic participation under the Government of India Act 1935 in the assemblies and the district boards had empowered the Andhra elite. In Telangana, despite the institution of representative assemblies in the Nizam's Dominions, democracy was not as developed. Even on the linguistic plane, differences in vocabulary and

accent, deepened the schism between the two Telugu populations, as did various social and everyday practices.[1] Sagacious statesmen were needed to sort out and smooth over these sensitive issues.

So, did the political argument tip the balance? Was the Congress concerned about the outcome of the coming general election in 1957, with 30 per cent of the vote in Andhra (1955) and 31 per cent in Telangana (1952) in communist hands? After the Avadi Line,[2] Moscow's new friendliness and the experience of defeating the communists in 1955, did the Congress think merger would eliminate the communist threat once and for all from both the states?

When the announcement of merger came from Nehru, it was unexpected, was made in Nizamabad at a public meeting on 5 March 1956. He also said that there would be two regional councils to take care that there was no discrimination, and indicated that the decision had been arrived at with the consent of all parties concerned (*Hindu* 1956).

The Congress high command had agreed to bilingual states in Bombay and Punjab. It had not touched the United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh) and Bihar, though Madhya Bharat was merged with the Central Provinces and Berar to make Madhya Pradesh. In Bengal, it refused a separate state for the Gurkhas.

How did the merger take place with no sentiment, no reason, no recommendation by the SRC and no interest shown by Nehru? It seems fairly obvious from the historical and political context of Andhra state and the Telangana region that several issues were instrumental in the merger decision:

1. As predicted before its formation, the Andhra state was virtually bankrupt and needed resources to run the government and take up public investment.
2. The Telangana region had surpluses in government revenue despite being a poorer area and had substantial negotiable securities accumulated and inherited from the Nizam's government. With nearly 26 major industrial undertakings, many of them state-owned or controlled, its industrialisation was more advanced than Andhra's. However, agriculture was backward, partly due to tenurial conditions and partly because it did not

have access to the great rivers, though the two proposed projects on the Godavari and Krishna would substantially make up for the deficiency.

3. In the coastal areas, though the agriculture of the delta districts was advanced (based on the British-built anicuts across the Godavari and Krishna), there were only a few industrial units—AP Paper, Andhra Sugars and two/three jute mills. Rayalaseema had much less of an economic base; all its districts had revenue deficits and needed the help of the surplus generated by the coastal districts.
4. Selecting an already built-up major city like Hyderabad as a third neutral choice could eliminate the rivalry between Kurnool and Guntur/Vijayawada and give Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra easy access to the capital if the merger came about.
5. The merger of the regions would also merge the two Congress parties there and present an effective defence against the CPI. Moreover, the Congress felt that it could repeat its 1955 Andhra success in Telangana in the 1957 general election.

After the merger, the Congress party was enormously strengthened. Taking a strategic decision to not hold the assembly election in the Andhra region in the 1957 general election (because they had held one in 1955), allowed the party to concentrate on Telangana. With a revived party, and alliance-building with other minor parties and caste groups, the Congress romped home with 68 of the 107 seats contested and 47 per cent of the popular vote. The communists were reduced to 23 seats with 26 per cent of the popular vote, belying their confidence accruing from their sizable share in votes in both Andhra and Telangana earlier on.

With the consolidation of the two Congress parties, infusion of revenue and industrial resources from Telangana, a ready-made capital with the prestige of Hyderabad city and the surplus food of the coastal region, the new state was ready to move forward.

The Congress became a Reddy-dominated party with its bases largely in Rayalaseema and Telangana, and maintained its power by forming alliances with other dominant castes in their strongholds and trying to cater to the interests of the Scheduled Castes (SCs). Of

the 11 cabinets formed from 1956 to 1980, the Reddy contingent supplied an average of 26 per cent of the total, Brahmins (7 per cent), Kammas (8 per cent) and Kapus and other Backward Castes (28 per cent). This was in line with the general dominance of the Reddy community in the seven assemblies (with an average strength of 294 seats) during the period 1957–85, when they had an average of 25 per cent of the seats, with Brahmins getting 9 per cent, Kammas 14 per cent and Backward Castes 17 per cent. While all this was going on, during the same period there was a drastic drop in Brahmin presence in the seven assemblies (from 23 to 11 MLAs) as well as in the 11 cabinets (from 23 per cent to 6 per cent) (Reddy 1989: 305–06).

Yet, despite its successes, the Congress party was perceived to have ignored important interests with a regional base—of the powerful and rich Kamma community in the coastal districts and the development needs (especially irrigation) in Telangana with serious consequences to pay for in the future.

Notes

*Much of what follows relies heavily on Windermiller (1955); Harrison (1956); Elliot (1970), Ram (1973); Rao (1973) and Walch (1976).

1. Even Gray (1971: 464–66) noted the social tensions within the population.

2. The Avadi Session of the Indian National Congress (INC) held in 1955, adopted a resolution that a socialistic pattern of development was the goal of the party. This effectively outflanked the communist party by moving the Congress sharply to the Left.

seven

The Telangana Tragedy

After the take-over of Hyderabad and the consequent military rule for four years between 1948 and 1952, there was general uncertainty among the people of Telangana. The people had trusted their sovereign, the Nizam, and he had failed them. They went along with their natural leaders—the feudal aristocracy and the urban intelligentsia who had been frightened by the sudden transition, and by the communist threat. The Muslim aristocracy and the generally hereditary bureaucracy either fled to Pakistan or were extremely wary of expressing their views or defending their interests. There had been violence against and massacres of the Muslims, especially in the Marathwada districts of the Hyderabads state in the wake of the Indian Army's take-over (Sundarayya 1972: 88–89; also Noorani and chapter 13). There was an on-going insurrection led by the communist party, funded and directed from Andhra, and as a result, large parts of Telangana were not under full state control. To blunt the communist thrust and simultaneously diminish the power of the feudal class that had supported the Nizam's rule for centuries, the most drastic land reform in the country to date was enacted under military rule (Reddy 1989: 293).

Not only was the entire feudal structure consisting of the *paigahs*, *deshmukhs*, *desais*, *zamindars*, *jagirdars* and *samasthans* abolished, but the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act 1950 also gave all tenants property rights and thus undermined the economic base of the landed class.[1] In other words, the old elite in Telangana was virtually extinguished as an economic force and undermined as a

political class. It also meant that the new elite had very little time to develop before the merger overtook them in 1956. Besides, the Congress and the communist party had been banned in Hyderabad state, and political activity was heavily restricted though elections to the state assembly were conducted in 1946 under the limited franchise similar to that of the Government of India Act 1935. In Telangana, despite the institution of representative assemblies in the Nizam's Dominions, democracy was nascent and not as developed as in Andhra. There had also been minimal involvement in the independence movement. This resulted in a small, weak and inexperienced political elite lacking in all-India network.

In Andhra, on the other hand, democratic participation under the Government of India Act 1935 in the assemblies and, even earlier, in the district boards, had empowered the local elite who had also benefited from living under the British rule of law, courts and a relatively progressive polity for a hundred years. The Andhra people had participated actively in the independence movement and their leaders had extensive national experience in Congress party politics, even contributing a president to it.

Nehru had said on 5 March 1956 at Nizamabad, '*We are marrying off an innocent girl to a naughty boy—they may get on; if they do not, they can divorce*'.[2] Nehru envisaged problems from the very start but consoled himself (and Telangana) that separation was possible if the merger did not result in a fair outcome.

The Gentleman's Agreement[3] involved all the possible guarantees and assurances[4] and political formations[5] that were possible within the constitutional framework. For those that were not, the Constitution was amended giving the president of India powers to issue orders to ensure equity and fairness. The details were extensively reported and accepted by successive state governments, but nonetheless led to unrest in Telangana between 1968 and 1969, largely due to the perception that the guarantees had become ineffective.

With the steady decline of the CPI, accelerated by its split in 1962 and the formation of the CPI-M, the ruling Congress party was now predominant. This dominance of the Congress party seemingly ensured that its Telangana section offered no political counter-pressure.[6]

The penny dropped late in 1968. By this time, i.e. 12 years after the merger with Andhra Pradesh, the middle classes in Telangana had grown in number and confidence. They had got themselves educated and demanded their fair share of government jobs. The Telangana youth rose in protest at the lack of opportunities, the unfair treatment to their region and a whole series of broken promises and guarantees. Their revolt was combined with the agitation of Telangana irrigation engineers who exposed the scandals of Telangana's Nagarjuna Sagar Left Bank canal being deprived of water, the delay in taking up Pochampad project and the diversion of Telangana 'surpluses' to Andhra.

All this drove the movement for separation forward, and the blame is to be equally distributed between the Andhra Congress leadership and Telangana politicians. There was a dire need to harmonise the interests of the Andhra and Telangana regions, which were dissimilar in almost every aspect except language (and even here there were significant differences in spoken Telugu). The Telangana agitation of 1969–71 led to the general election of 1971. The Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) contested the election on the single issue of statehood, and defeated the Congress party—the only other political force in the region—and secured 10 of the 14 parliamentary seats. The will of the Telangana people was clearly expressed. Under the insistence and pressure of Mrs Indira Gandhi, the TPS merged with the Congress. Despite their electoral success in 1971, when the Congress high command issued a diktat, they meekly accepted the idea that a Telangana man (P. V. Narasimha Rao) as chief minister would make the difference.

P. V. Narasimha Rao, also known as PV, was made chief minister in mid-1971 with a cabinet of 28 ministers of whom 18 were from the Andhra region, as also a deputy chief minister, B. V. Subba Reddy, from Rayalaseema. PV thought he could do to the Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema kulaks what was done to the Hyderabad landed elite in 1948–50 after the military defeat and occupation by the Indian Army. His government proceeded to reduce the agricultural land ceiling to 12 acres of irrigated land by an ordinance on 2 May 1972, and followed it up by the assembly passing the Land Ceiling Act on 15 September 1972. This set off a tidal wave

of anger in the Coastal Andhra region from the kulaks, formerly associated with the communist party.

However, with victory in the Bangladesh War, two-thirds majority in the assembly and, more importantly, a similar majority in the Lok Sabha also, Mrs Indira Gandhi was the virtual 'Empress of India'. The Coastal Andhra kulak-politicians had little choice but to disguise the cause of their opposition to the land reform and the PV government.

The state assembly election of 1972 saw the Congress party under PV get an 80 per cent majority in the house (219 out of the 270 seats) and this enabled the introduction of drastic land reforms to be implemented despite the vested interests within the party.

As the British academic and former MP, Hugh Gray, wrote,

> The Kamma landlords of the Coastal districts were among the dominant agricultural castes incensed by P. V. Narasimha Rao's reforming zeal. The Kamma caste had lost its power to the ubiquitous Reddis when Andhra Pradesh was formed, as there were no Kammas in Telangana. Kammas such as Professor Ranga (then in the Swatantra Party), had been among the first to support the demand for a separate Telangana in 1969 and they were now joined by many others in discussing the desirability of separating Telangana and Andhra. (Gray 1974: 339)

Now it was the turn of the 'Jai Andhra' movement of 1972, ostensibly over the re-introduction of Mulki Rules for protection of employment in the Telangana region for its residents.[7] The reluctance to allow reservation of jobs within the region for its residents, the refusal to accept a chief minister from Telangana and the drastic land ceiling laws that threatened to dispossess the kulaks and big farmers of Andhra combined to fuel the Andhra separatist movement (Gray 1974).

The deputy chief minister and nine other Andhra ministers (out of a total of 18) resigned during December 1972. Kakani Venkata Ratnam, the popular Kamma leader, died on Christmas day and nearly five lakh mourners turned up for his funeral.

Fearing a unanimous resolution in favour of bifurcation in the APCC and also in the assembly due to meet shortly, the high command dissolved the APCC on 11 January 1973 and appointed an ad hoc committee. On 12 January, another eight ministers were sworn in. Under the high command's instructions, the ad hoc committee, on 16 January, asked the chief minister to resign and he complied by doing so on 17 January. Following this, President's Rule was proclaimed on 18 January in the state where the Congress party had two-thirds majority in the assembly! On 23 January 1973, 114 Congressmen from Andhra handed in their resignations from the party to B. V. Subba Reddy and the Andhra Congress Action Committee sent an ultimatum to the centre to concede separation by 5 February 1973 (ibid.: 346).

By January 1973, it was clear that the entire polity—both in Andhra and Telangana—was in favour of bifurcation. Thus consensus was at last achieved and an amicable solution possible. Bifurcation would have met with the greatest approval in both regions. However, Mrs Indira Gandhi decided against it for reasons best known to her. So, once again, it was a Nehru who gave assurances[5] to keep the state and the state Congress party united.

As Hugh Gray says, 'It is difficult to know why the demand for a separate Andhra failed, leaving aside the Prime Minister's firm decision not to concede it.... Although expressed more efficiently and forcibly, the demand for a separate Andhra never had the same emotional drive as the demand for separate Telangana' (Gray 1974: 347).

There were major differences between Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions as well, which needed to be managed. In this task, it seems obvious that successive governments failed despite the shock of the 1968–72 agitations for restoration of the *status quo ante* of 1956 (Gray 1970; 1971; 1974; and Bernstorff 1973).

The official estimated number of Telangana students killed in police firing in 1968–71 varies between 30 and 40. Unofficially, this number stands between 200 and 300 (Bernstorff and Gray 1998: 169). Many thousands are reported to have joined the Naxal movement and tens of thousands went away to the US, a land that gave them a brighter future than their own.

The Congress party's perceived apathy to the powerful and rich Kamma community in the coastal districts and to the development needs of Telangana, especially irrigation, cost it heavily when the Kamma-dominated TDP challenged its power in 1983 on a slogan appealing to Telugu self-respect.

Launched by the popular and charismatic film actor N. T. Rama Rao, the TDP swept into power in 1983 with a strong showing. The Congress won only 60 of the 294 seats in the assembly. The TDP did surprisingly well in Telangana where there was hardly any Kamma caste dominance (Reddy 1989: 291). It seemed that the people of Telangana hoped for fairer treatment from the TDP. They were to be disappointed once again.

The TDP was ejected from power by its breakaway faction encouraged by the Congress party (ibid.: 287–89), but returned in 1985 with a thumping majority of 202 seats out of 294 (winning 46 per cent of the vote); the Congress got only 50 seats (with 37 per cent of the vote). In Telangana, the Congress won only 13 of the 106 seats (Election Commission of India 1985).

In the legislative assemblies and cabinets which were crucial to both the Reddy-dominated leadership of the Congress and the Kamma-dominated leadership of the TDP, the party leaders managed to handle the caste equations well. In terms of representation of castes, the assemblies from 1982 to 1985 did not show any change in the number of assembly members elected from each dominant caste except for a drop of nine seats for the Reddys. In the four cabinets between 1982 and 1985, there was a fall in the representation of Brahmins by 2 per cent, and of Reddys by 6 per cent. There was a sharp decrease in the representation of the Backward Caste Kapus from 58 per cent to 30 per cent. The Kamma representation in the cabinet doubled to 6 per cent in 1983 but fell back to 4 per cent in 1985 (Reddy tables 12 and 13 1989: 305–06).

However, by 1999, caste-based voting had become a well-established fact of state politics. Survey data showed that 87 per cent of Kammas and 62 per cent of the 'Peasant Other Backward Castes' in AP voted for the TDP, and 77 per cent of the Reddys, 64 per cent of the SC and 60 per cent of Muslims for the Congress (Suri table 6 2002). This meant that the overall election result rested

with the other communities such as the Kapus, 'Service OBCs' and Scheduled Tribes (STs) who voted almost equally for the two major parties (ibid.) and could swing the very fine division of the floating vote (10 per cent) that decided which party would get the majority of seats in the assembly.

The emergence of other caste groups such as the Kapu-dominated Praja Rajyam Party (PRP) and issues such as a separate Telangana upset the caste balance which first came into being in 1956 and the new balance that was re-established in 1983 (Srinivasulu 2002). It is not clear what this current balance represents. These events are still to crystallise but one thing is sure, separation of Telangana will change everything, including the caste equations within all the three regions: Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana.

A Constitutional Amendment (Constitution of India [Thirty-Second Amendment] Act, 1973) and a Presidential Order on Public Services 1975 (GoAP 2007), had been issued to protect Telangana's legitimate employment opportunities. Employment guarantees renewed in 1969–75 once again proved as useless as the earlier ones and successive government committees revealed this (see Girglani 2004). A detailed report was issued by the state government on the implementation of the Presidential Order and the consequent GO Ms 610 (ibid.). Successive TDP and Congress governments accepted the recommendations of this report and a legislature committee was set up to monitor and ensure their effective implementation. A study of these reports indicates that the will to be fair simply did not exist, and this was acknowledged by the legislature in its attempt to correct the distortions of the past and ensure justice.

The massive expansion of Hyderabad city itself reveals the enormous acquisition of wealth by non-Telangana people with political connections. The growth of tertiary education increased the demand for white-collar jobs. With sluggish growth in general employment, attention turned once again to the government jobs that had been assured for Telangana since 1956, and lost in 1971 with the abolishment of Mulki Rules and renewed in 1975 by the Presidential Order but not implemented.

Between the period 1977 and 2004, the Telangana movement was contained largely due to the co-option of the politicians into

the state system. The growth of Naxalism in the region meant that the Telangana politicians were under great pressure and increased their dependency on the state police and law and order mechanism to be even able to maintain their positions. The advent of the TDP in 1982 with its anti-Congress stance and its call for Telugu unity persuaded much of the Telangana electorate to vote for the new party. This too did not yield results in the form of a separate Telangana state. By 2004, the Congress, exhausted by its battle to regain power in the state, adopted the slogan of statehood for Telangana and, along with a breakaway faction of the TDP—the TRS, which was committed to a single-point agenda of statehood, and managed to win the 2004 election.

This began a new phase in the movement for statehood. By this time the two national parties, Congress and BJP had committed themselves in election manifestos to statehood for Telangana. The BJP, despite its assurance given in 1999, could not deliver even after coming to power in Delhi due to the refusal of its ally, the TDP, to permit the separation. However, three new states, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh were carved out of the Hindi-speaking states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh respectively by the BJP-led union government.

Notes

1. Even the CPI(M-L) acknowledged, 'Telangana movement is the precursor to land reforms initiative in Andhra Pradesh. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act enacted in 1950 with its subsequent amendments resulted in the Conferment of Protection to nearly 6 lakh tenants with over 75 lakh acres in their possession. This constituted 33 per cent of the total cultivated area'. CPI-ML. 2005. 'Status of Land Reforms in Andhra Pradesh and the Need to Implement Radical Land Reforms', Summary of the paper presented by K. Gopal Iyer in the Hyderabad convention on 'Land Reforms and State Repression'. *Liberation*, September. http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2005/september/report5.htm, accessed on 6 May 2011. The success was ensured by 'the best-framed and most comprehensive census in the country conducted in 1949' (Thorner and Thorner 1962: 170–71).

2. '*Ek masoom bholi bhali ladki ko ek natkat ladke ke saath shaadi kiya jaa raha hai, chahe toh woh milke reh sakte hai ya bichad sakte hai*'. See Nehru (1956).

3. For the text, see Rao (1973: 301–03).

4. The Nizam's Mulki Rules safeguarding jobs for Telangana residents was re-issued as a Government Order (GO Ms. GAD 813 dated 18.5.1957) with retrospective effect from 1.11.1956—the date of the merger. These rules were repealed in 1959 with the Public Employment Act and Rules which came into force on 21.2.1959.

5. Such as a regional council for Telangana. See Rao (1973: 301–03) for details, see the Gentleman's Agreement.

6. The Gentleman's Agreement accepted that the Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee would be kept separate from the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee. This would ensure that Congress candidates for elected office would be selected separately by each regional party. This arrangement was terminated in 1960, leaving little time for the Telangana party elite to find their feet.

7. The Mulki Rules Bill in Parliament was enacted in October 1972.

8. These were the Six-point Programme of 1971 and the Five-point Formula of 1972. All parties agreed on another Six-point Formula in 1973, which formed the basis of the Presidential Order of 1975. The GO Ms. 610 to give effect to the order was issued only in 1985! It took 10 years for the state government to formally issue its orders to implement the Presidential Order and even that GO was ignored or violated (see Girglani 2004).

eight

Caste War, Naxalism and the Telangana Vote Bank

The spectacular victory[1] of the TDP in the Telangana region securing huge majorities in 1983, had something to do with Naxalism. As Ajai Sahni, well-known security analyst, writes, 'In 1982, the then leader of the Telugu Desam Party, N. T. Rama Rao (NTR, as he was popularly known), described the Naxalites as "... [the] true patriots, who have been misunderstood by [the] ruling classes" (Sahni 2005). Unsurprisingly, NTR found it expedient to secure their support during the assembly elections the following year, and succeeded in unseating the Congress government in the state. In the years that followed, his government gave the People's War Group (PWG) a free hand to consolidate their activities. So, yet again, Telangana was used to consolidate the power of a particular political party.

The victory of the TDP in 1983 as well as in 1985 with massive majorities within the Telangana region broke the Telangana–Rayalaseema–Reddy alliance and ensured 10-odd years of TDP rule in the state. It is remarkable how despite its enormous economic and political power, the Congress never chose a Kamma as a chief minister of the state (see Pingle 2011). Since then, the politics of Andhra Pradesh has primarily been dominated by two parties, while previously it had been largely dominated by the Congress only. The advent of the TDP on the political scene (NTR and his son-in-law Chandrababu Naidu both belong to the Kamma caste) changed the caste dynamics of the region considerably.

The Telangana cause suffered nonetheless. As the SKC notes, 'The rise and subsequent long rule of the Telugu Desam Party, led/dominated by the kammas of Coastal Andhra, further consolidated [the] Telugu identity, while successfully suppressing the demand for a separate Telangana state' (SKC 2010: 342).

But what one party can do, another can imitate. Sahni comments,

> This time, it was the Congress-I party under the leadership of Dr Marri Chenna Reddy that recognised the "patriotic" potential of the Naxalites, and sought and secured their support in the elections of 1989. For two years thereafter, under Chenna Reddy's chief ministership, the Naxalites went on the rampage, culminating in the ghastly murder of 43 innocent civilians who were burnt alive on board the Kakatiya Express near Hyderabad. Chenna Reddy lifted the ban on the PWG in December 1989 and released 190 hardcore Naxalites lodged in jail, giving them unprecedented freedom of political and criminal action. In the following years of 1989–91, extremists grew by leaps and bounds. They extorted crores of rupees, and people's courts and parallel government were run killing hundreds of innocent people, including two IPS officers. (Ajai Sahni, 'Naxalism: The Retreat of Civil Governance', *Faultlines*, vol. 5, 2000, pp. 79–103. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume5/Fault5-7asahni.htm, accessed 1 January 2014)

According to Sahni,

> Chenna Reddy's policy was reversed by his successor, N. Janardhan Reddy, towards the latter half of 1991, after the murder of a former Minister Hayagreeva Chary, in Warangal, and a rising flood of violence, large-scale extortion, arson and destruction of private and public properties. In May 1992, the ban on the activities of the PWG and its front organisations was re-imposed. The impact was palpable, with killings and other offences declining immediately and continuously till 1994, when N. T. Rama Rao was returned to power. NTR lifted the ban and the old policies of conciliation and complicity gave the Naxalites another opportunity to revive,

strengthen and extend the scale and geographical scope of their activities. (Ibid.)

During the period of the Telangana agitation (1968–74), the total number of deaths due to extremism averaged 40 a year, and fell to half of that in 1975–82. The real rise in this figure happened during the TDP rule (1983–89) with 83 deaths reported a year (four times as many as in the previous period), rising to 323 a year (almost one death a day) during the Congress regime (1990–94) (See Table 8.1 below).

TABLE 8.1 Casualties of Left-wing Extremist Violence in Andhra Pradesh

Period	Civilian Forces	Security	Extremist	Total	Annual Average
1968–74	118	5	156	279	40
1975–82	113	2	53	168	21
1983–89	334	52	194	580	83
1990–94	828	168	620	1616	323
1995–2004	1221	286	1479	2986	299
2005–11	231	33	398	672	96
Total	2887	549	2943	6389	145

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Andhra Pradesh Data Sheets, 'Fatalities in Left-Wing Extremist Violence in Andhra Pradesh', http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/andhra/data_sheets/annual_casualties.asp (accessed on 1 January 2013).

This level continued during the TDP period (1995–2004) and petered out during the Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR) Congress regime. During the entire 44-year period (of the 55 years of Andhra Pradesh's existence) Telangana suffered one death every two days due to left-wing violence and counter-violence!

Between January 1990 and March 2000, official figures indicate that Naxalites killed 2,010 civilians and security personnel. During this period, close to around 1,557 Naxalites were killed and another

33,063 were arrested by the security personnel. Around 14,237 surrendered and 2,393 weapons were seized. The estimated damage to property was Rs 112 crores. With law and order in disarray, development in the region came to a standstill (Sahni 2000).

Chandrababu Naidu claimed that during elections the Naxalite groups were supporting only 'certain' political parties and were playing an active role in thwarting the development of the state. But his popularity was high. There was an aversion towards Naxalite activity in the Telangana region that had in the three years before the election (1997–99) lost 649 civilian and police lives, with about the same number of Naxalites killed and 8,092 surrendering. Both these factors allowed Naidu to retain power.

The Chandrababu Naidu government revived the ban on Naxalite organisations, and reverted to the policy of confronting extremist violence with the force of arms. However, in 2002, he too resorted to the electoral manoeuvre of lifting the ban on the Naxalites ostensibly to facilitate peace talks (which did not produce results). By now, it was clear that the Telangana Naxalites were an electoral force to be used and discarded by the two main parties, whatever might be the impact on the people and the development of the region.

During the TDP reign, it was obvious that the Rayalaseema Reddys were under severe pressure, especially with Naidu's successful attempt at putting up a public image of being a modernist politician, while fulfilling the dreams of his vested interest lobby. His period is marked by the rise of Kamma power in Rayalaseema.

Enter Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR), who became the leader of the opposition in 1999. YSR's two-pronged approach succeeded in seizing power from the TDP. First, he managed to espouse the Telangana cause as the TDP (which stood for a united state) had its main electoral base in the region. The TDP received this support partly due to the Telangana voter's disillusionment with the Congress and partly due to the party's hardline stand towards the Naxalites. In 1999, Congress president Sonia Gandhi wrote a letter to the then Union Home Minister L. K. Advani seeking the creation of a Telangana state in the aftermath of the formation of the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand.

The TRS was formed in 2001 with statehood as one of its primary objectives. YSR and the Congress allied with the TRS for the 2004 election and made their manifesto promise statehood for the region, should they win. This helped Congress win back its support base and undermined the base of the TDP as the latter opposed statehood for Telangana. A survey of voting intentions in 2004 established significant variation in caste voting attitudes towards the two political formations: (i) Congress and its allies; and (ii) TDP and its allies (*Outlook* 2004). This showed that in Telangana, 53 per cent of the sample voters supported a separate Telangana state, while 44 per cent opposed it and 3 per cent had no views on this issue. The TRS polled 7 per cent of the total vote. However, it contested in only 54 constituencies (of the 119 constituencies in the region). It won 26 seats and polled an average of 34 per cent in those seats it secured. The TRS became a decisive factor in helping its ally the Congress erode the TDP base in the region.

But that was not all.

The second move was to bring the Naxalites[2] into the picture and the Congress-TRS combination sailed through. As Ajay Mehra comments,

> Y. S. Rajashekhara Reddy-led Congress government in the state too began peace talks on 15 October 2004, a few months after it took over.... The PWG leadership not only came overground, the organization began regrouping, spanned out to other states and regions obviously on a recruitment mission, issued tough statements as a prelude to the talks as psychological warfare virtually continued with their activities (Mehra 2008: 28).

YSR could not afford to let the Naxalites take-over Telangana. He concentrated on the issue and was successful in eliminating them.[3] The Naxalites ceased to exist as a physical and political force, and were no longer available to keep the Telangana elite chained to the coastal and Rayalaseema leadership in both parties. But YSR could hardly afford to lose the newly acquired base in Telangana by conceding what he and the high command had promised TRS and the voters—a separate state. It may not have mattered to the

Congress high command or the party but it mattered a lot to the Rayalaseema-Reddy faction. So the policy of 'delay and deceive' was implemented till the TRS was forced out and the 2009 election came around.

By then, the TDP had woken up and, in any case, Chandrababu Naidu was under tremendous pressure with investigations of allegations against him. This time, there were no Naxalites left to strike a deal with, so he decided that it would be a good idea to jump on the Telangana bandwagon. Consequently, in 2008, the TDP did a U-turn and supported a separate Telangana and allied with the TRS in the 2009 election. Success did not come as expected but YSR's plans went completely awry.

The Congress saw a decline in its prospects but managed to retain power in the 2009 election. During this entire period, i.e. 2001–09, the Congress, TRS and TDP thought that the Telangana movement could and would be turned on and off at will like a tap. This did not happen, as the movement gathered grassroots support among the masses. With the death of YSR and under the guidance of the Congress high command, the political parties in the state agreed to a separate Telangana on 6 December 2009. The union government concurred formally on 9 December 2009 and announced its decision to both Houses of Parliament.

After protests from Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions, an attempt was made to divert the process by appointing the SKC. The committee carried out a massive exercise. While it did not fully support statehood for Telangana, it provided much ammunition to the movement. Statehood seemed imminent with the mass resignations of 101 MLAs and 13 MPs from the region.

As the SKC comments, 'The Telangana upper castes have thrown in their lot with the rest of the region in their demand for separate Telangana as they see greater political and economic opportunities for themselves in a separate state. The leadership of the movement remains with the upper castes while the mass following is provided by the SCs and OBCs' (SKC 2010: 380).

The collapse of the TDP and the rise of the Telangana movement brought a deep sense of concern to the Kamma notables in the Congress party. They were reasonably happy with the TDP

given their caste-based connections to its top leadership, but YSR had sidelined them totally within their own party. With his death and the inevitability of statehood for Telangana, the latent anger erupted. The situation had detoriated to such an extent that veteran Guntur Congress MP Rayapati Sambasiva Rao is quoted in the press as saying,

> Kammas like me, my family, Eluru MP Kavuri Sambasiva Rao, Vijayawada MP Lagadapati Rajagopal, Renuka Choudhary, have ceaselessly toiled for the party. Yet, Reddys and others tell the high command not to give any posts to Kammas. I spend nearly Rs 15 crore in every election. But what is the use as our services are not being recognized? (*Times of India* 2010a)

The coastal Kammas are afraid for their investments in land in Hyderabad Ranga Reddy and other Telangana districts, and are apprehensive that irrigation in the Krishna delta would be badly hit if Telangana and Rayalaseema got their rightful share of the river waters. They are well aware of the fact that they do not have the support of most of the ordinary people in Coastal Andhra, who do not really care as their problems, unlike those of rich investors and large land-holders, have pressing day-to-day issues.

Many of the Reddys in Rayalaseema are naturally apprehensive that they will be unable to cope with Kamma economic clout. Rayalaseema Rashtra Samiti (RRS) President Kuncham Venkata Subba Reddy has asked the UPA government to carve out a Greater Rayalaseema before conceding statehood. His idea of a Greater Rayalaseema encompasses Kadapa, Kurnool, Anantapur and Chittoor districts in Rayalaseema, Vellore and Krishnagiri districts in Tamil Nadu, and Raichur, Bellary and Kolar districts in Karnataka—a maximalist position, to say the least (*Hindu* 2010).

The SKC too expected that statehood for Telangana would provoke the move for a separate Rayalaseema state, stating, 'the agitation for separation of Rayalaseema from Coastal Andhra may also start taking shape sooner than expected' (SKC 2010: 451). It added, for good measure, 'The other combination of

regions—Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema together can also sustain themselves as a state; in fact they can also sustain themselves separately' (ibid.: 121).

By that time, the Telangana movement had acquired a life of its own; it dominated the villages, had a popular mass base beyond the control of individual politicians or parties, with a vast number of youths, estimated at close to 630, committing ritual suicide for the Telangana cause, and the mobilisation by the Joint Action Committee both in urban and rural areas. It had become a mass movement with serious implications.

Yet, even after the process for statehood had been completed, the knowledge that without the Telangana vote bank, Coastal Kammas and Rayalaseema Reddys would have to compete directly, has made all the Seemandhra politicians reluctant to give up on their hitherto captive Telangana vote bank, not heeding that in their aim for electoral gains, they have caused great damage to Telangana and retarded the progress of the region and its people.

The only equitable solution will be to divide the state into three parts. The dominant politicians from the Kamma and Reddy castes will then have their own strongholds, which they can develop without diverting their energies in wasteful competition with dominant castes of other regions. A separate Telangana is almost a reality; Rayalaseema may soon be following on the same path, and if Coastal Andhra does not learn from past mistakes, north coastal Andhra may soon wish to emerge as another state.

Notes

1. At debut, in 1983, the TDP secured 210 of the 294 seats in the assembly, while the Congress lost 145 seats and emerged with only 60 seats. In the 1985 snap election, the TDP maintained its strength at 202 and the Congress fell further to 50 seats.

2. The Wikileaks cable revealed that the US Consulate, Chennai, on 7 July 2005, advised Washington thus, 'Several journalist contacts have told Post of the tacit support the Maoists extended to the Congress-TRS combine in the 2004 elections. According to senior journalist Amin Jafri,

the Congress-TRS coalition itself was forged due to the intervention of the Maoists', WikiLeaks, 2005, Cable 05CHENNAI1582, 'MAOIST SCARE FORCES FIVE AP MINISTERS TO QUIT', http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/07/05CHENNAI1582.html, accessed on 1 January 2014. Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu claimed, 'The TRS says it will implement the extremist agenda and the Congress supports it. The extremists, on their part, are killing the TDP leaders, besides threatening them against participating in election campaign.... The two parties have colluded with the extremists who are playing with the lives of people. At the same time, we want to know from the extremists whether they support the Congress and the TRS' (*Hindu* 2004). BJP President L. K. Advani alleged that the Congress had won the assembly elections in Andhra Pradesh in connivance with Naxal groups and launched a broadside against the UPA government for its 'failure to establish internal security in the nation'. Addressing a public meeting at Shivaji Park as part of the ongoing silver jubilee convention of his party, Advani, a former deputy prime minister who also held the home portfolio, blamed the 'faulty' policies of the UPA regime for the deterioration of internal security. He alleged that in Andhra Pradesh, the Congress had lifted the ban on Naxal groups and even invited them for talks without asking them to surrender their arms' ('Naxal Terror Watch' 2005).

3. The resumption of police operations came even as chief minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy unveiled a 'two-pronged strategy' to tackle the Maoists, on 19 September 2005. Reddy declared that the strategy included the implementation of development programmes in the Naxal areas ('Naxal Terror Watch' 2006).

nine

The Ongoing Movement and the Promises Made

This time around, the Telangana movement is being spearheaded by a revolt of the children of the working class and peasant families who have invested their money and future in their education in the hope that they will be able to get meaningful employment. But with liberalisation leading to a dearth of government jobs, there is resentment in almost every village in the region, with the people quietly, firmly and steadfastly demanding a separate state in the hope that the future of the next generation will be far better in the new state.[1]

Post-liberalisation, the rapid growth of business, the rise in land prices, the scams in allocation of land in and around Hyderabad, and the influx of settlers from Andhra in the region, have only aggravated the issue. Things had to reach a flashpoint, and they did. Till date, 630 students have committed suicide demanding the creation of a new state (GR8 Telangana 2011). The SKC report, however, over a three-month period, places the figure at 313 (SKC 2010: 387).

In the 1999 general election, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with the TDP as one of its alliance partners emerged victorious. Of the many electoral promises, one was the creation of four new states in the country which also included Telangana. But while in power, the NDA created only three new states—Uttaranchal, now Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand—and left Telangana out. What are the reasons behind this omission? L. K. Advani writes,

> A peculiar situation has arisen in the case of the demand for a separate Telangana, a demand which is as old as the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956. The BJP has backed this demand. However, we could not do anything in this regard since Telugu Desam, which supported the Vajpayee government between 1998 and 2004, was opposed to it. (Advani 2008: 740, 742)

Before the 1999 general election, the Telangana Congress leaders claimed that the region would not get its due share under the TDP regime. More decisively, after 1999, the Congress party took up the issue of Telangana in right earnest. Congress president, Sonia Gandhi, wrote to L. K. Advani, then home minister, asking for statehood to be extended to Telangana in line with the other three states.

By the time of the 2004 general election, the pre-election party alliances were set. The TRS was formed with the sole agenda of the creation of a Telangana state. The Congress-led UPA allied with it and capitalised on the Telangana sentiment to drive the TDP and its ally, the BJP, out of power in the state and at the centre respectively in 2004. The UPA promised, '... [it] will consider the demand for the formation of the Telangana State at an appropriate time after due consultations and consensus'.[2]

After the general election, the state and the central governments seemed committed to statehood for Telangana. Since the TDP, which had opposed the demand for a separate state, was thrown out of power in Andhra Pradesh in 2004, it may be inferred that the entire electorate voted for a government committed to the bifurcation of the state. The parties that promised a separate state—the Congress, TRS, BJP and the CPI—won 51 per cent of the votes cast all over the state, while the TDP and CPI-M, which opposed the break-up, got 39 per cent (Election Commission of India 2004).

The president, in his address to the joint session of Parliament in 2004, stated, 'The UPA Government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate time after due consultations.'[3] The UPA set up the Pranab Mukherjee Committee in November 2004 to establish a national consensus and come to a

decision. Most national parties stated their views in writing to this committee in 2005.

Former prime minister Chandra Shekhar wrote, 'The demand for Telangana state is a genuine demand emanating from the aspirations of the people. Telangana has all the qualities that a self-sustaining state needs: economic viability, public support, unique cultural traditions, optimum geographical size and relevant historical context.'[4]

Another former prime minister, V. P. Singh stated, 'Any delay in clinching the issue will not only cause erosion of credibility of the present government, but will also force the people of Telangana to go back to the agitation mode.'[5]

A third former prime minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, invoked history. He said, 'Over the years—ever since the Indira Gandhi era—I have felt that the formation of this state would go a long way to end many agonies and sufferances of the people in this region and provide opportunities for their socio-economic development.'[6]

Sharad Pawar, leader of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), added, 'The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or a sudden development. It has been there for more than five decades. The grievances of the people of the region are real and their demand for a Telangana State is genuine.'[7]

Lalu Prasad Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) understood what was driving the movement.

> The people of the region have been fighting for it for more than a half a century now. It is a people's movement in the real sense. This movement has always been solidly backed by every section of the people of the region. Intellectuals, government employees and students remained all through the backbone of the movement. And now, it has percolated down to the agrarian sector and the working classes.... The people of this region strongly feel and they have every reason to feel, that they can no longer live in the integrated state of Andhra Pradesh with self-respect and dignity.[8]

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) supremo Mayawati put it even more strongly. She said, 'The demand of the people of Telangana for a separate state is not a new or sudden development. It has been

there for the last five to six decades.... Any further delay in forming the state of Telangana will send wrong signals to the people.'[9] Furthermore, as a four-time chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, she wanted her own state to be divided into four separate units to help develop the state and devolve power closer to the people.

Despite the fact that all the national political parties were supporting the Telangana cause by 2005, why did statehood still not happen? Initially, it was the BJP which could not do much due to the opposition from the TDP. Later the Congress high command could do nothing due to the opposition of Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy, the then chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, who had by then become a major regional player with considerable influence within the Congress party. Whatever the compulsions, the Congress did not deliver, despite the positive views of the national-level leaders, forcing the TRS to leave the coalition governments both in the state and at the centre and resumed the Telangana agitation in 2006.

In the wake of another renewal of the Telangana statehood agitation in 2006, the leaders from Coastal Andhra met in Vijayawada on 25 December, the 34th death anniversary of Kakani Venkataratnam. The meeting included Kavuri Sambasiva Rao (Congress MP from Eluru), Pinnamaneni Koteswara Rao (former zilla parishad chairman and father of higher education minister P. Venkateswara Rao), Vasantha Nageswara Rao (chairman of the AP State Co-operative Bank), Chanumolu Venkata Rao (legislator and former minister), Paladugu Venkat Rao (former minister), Ch. V. P. Murthy Raju (former minister), Kadiyala Raghava Rao (former Zilla Parishad chairman), Karnati Ramamohana Rao (eminent advocate) and Yalamanchili Sivaji and Yarlagadda Lakshmi Prasad (former TDP MPs). K. S. Rao declared, 'In the wake of a strong sentiment prevailing in the Telangana region for a separate state, they felt that the time was ripe for the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh into two separate states—Telangana and Andhra, without any rancour' (rediff.com 2006).

Reacting to the Vijayawada meeting, APCC president K. Keshava Rao is reported to have said, 'There was nothing wrong with the demand by the Coastal leaders for a separate Andhra state when a similar demand was made for separate Telangana state' (ibid.).

TRS president K. Chandrasekhara Rao is reported to have welcomed the call for a separate Andhra, saying, 'There is no need for rancour. People of Telangana and Andhra should respect each other even during the process of separation' (ibid.).

However, the issue dragged on till the 2009 general election. By 2008, the TDP, realising the adverse outcome of its stand, adopted Telangana statehood as the only way to win votes in Telangana and allied with the TRS. The Congress responded by repeating its promises of 2004 and adding further promises. On February 2009, Congress chief minister Y. S. Rajasehkara Reddy made a statement in the legislative assembly,

> The demand for the formation of a separate Telangana state is [a] highly emotive issue and is one which is close to my heart and that of the Congress Party also. The Congress Party always respected the sentiment of the Telangana people and its stand on the demand for a separate state was clear from the beginning. We have never in the past deceived anyone on this issue nor will we do so in the future. Right from the start we were in favour of a Second SRC to go into this issue.... The Congress MLAs and leaders from Telangana met the Congress President Smt. Soma Gandhi after the 1999 election.... The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution in 2001, the election manifesto of 2004 mentioned Telangana and Vidharbha.... (YouTube, 'YSR assembly statement on Telangana', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flgCnfrIDYOw, (accessed on 1 January 2014).

This was echoed by Sonia Gandhi herself in a mammoth election meeting at Karimnagar where she stated in Hindi, 'We have written also in our election manifesto that we have no objection to Telangana state and we will take up the issue on a priority basis' (YouTube, Sonia Gandhi Sabha at Karimnagar Speech on Telangana, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBwM_c4aCzY, accessed on 1 January 2014).

It is amply evident that whenever there was consensus whether in 1973 or 2006 or 2009, the high command always chose to ignore it and acted against it. It is about time that this extraordinary consensus

over the last 37 years is implemented without any vested interests coming in the way.

The election of 2009 was decisive for Andhra Pradesh. This time, all the major political parties—the Congress, TDP, PRP, CPI, TRS and BJP—supported and promised bifurcation of the state and the creation of Telangana. Opposed to this were the AI-MIM and the CPI-M, though these two parties were formally allied to Congress and TDP respectively. All the political parties which promised statehood for Telangana together polled 89 per cent of the votes cast in 2009.[10]

Much of the usual delay and obfuscation resulted from the inaction of the ruling Congress party in the state in the implementing this electoral promise, as in 2004, provoking the agitation by students, many of whom committed ritual suicide for the Telangana cause. The Congress avoided addressing the issue till suddenly, the leadership in AP changed with Y. S. Rajasehkara Reddy dying in a helicopter crash.

Immediately the Congress high command was faced with the demand by nearly 122 of the 150 Congress MLAs that his son Y. S. Jaganmohan Reddy be made chief minister in his place. The Congress high command responded with the tried-and-tested divide-and-rule tactics. Faced with an uncertain future, the TRS leader, K. Chandrasehkar Rao, announced a fast unto death. Further agitation led the state political parties to agree to statehood for Telangana, and the CLP left the decision to party president Sonia Gandhi. She decided in favour of statehood, the union cabinet resolved to do the same and the historic announcement of Home Minister P. Chidambaram on 9 December 2009 followed with the statement, 'The process of forming the state of Telangana will be initiated. An appropriate resolution will be moved in the State Assembly' (Thaindian News 2009a). The next day, he announced this to the Lok Sabha (Thaindian News 2009b) and the Rajya Sabha (Thaindian News 2009c). He made a full statement to the press to this effect (NDTV 2010).

Some political leaders from Coastal Andhra and people holding land in and around Hyderabad then sparked off a counter-agitation. This time it was not 'Jai Andhra' as in 1972 but an agitation backed

by real-estate developers who feared a loss of value of their holdings if the state was bifurcated with Hyderabad as its capital.[11] The leading advocates of a unified state, or failing that, ensuring that at least Hyderabad remained a UT,[12] had major investments in land in and around Hyderabad (SKC 2010: 316–19, 404, 442).

The agitation in the Andhra region resulted in the SKC, formally called the 'Committee for Consultations on the Situation in Andhra Pradesh', being set up. The movement shifted from agitation and electoral politics to an argumentative and propagandist phase. While the JAC refused to engage with the SKC dialogue process,[13] all the groups in Andhra Pradesh—whether for Telangana or Coastal Andhra or Rayalaseema—as well as caste groups, NRIs and civil society activists—vied with each other to make submissions to the SKC. This distracted the Telangana movement for 11 months while the SKC carried on with its work, field visits and public consultations. The committee engaged all the interests concerned and was provided with an enormous volume of data and tens of thousands of submissions (NDTV 2010).

The SKC field visits took the issue to almost every district of Telangana as also to many in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. This also had the effect of convincing elements in Coastal Andhra that bifurcation would be the best solution (*New Indian Express* undated). By now, the Kamma dominant caste in Coastal Andhra had begun to feel that they were getting a raw deal under the Reddy-dominated Congress government (*Times of India* 2010a).

The year 2010 saw a virtual split in the main parties—Congress, TDP and PRP, neither of which were in a position to make a single submission and, therefore, allowed each regional group within their party to take its own stand. As a result, this hardened into a real division within these parties with the PRP even quietly abandoning its position as its Telangana elements defected to other parties (the PRP was anyway to merge with the Congress in 2011). The division on the regional basis affected not only the political parties but also those in the legal profession, non-gazetted government officers, irrigation and power employees, students, academics, journalists and, finally, the police (*Times of India* 2011b). Even the state cabinet was divided, with 16 ministers from the Andhra region stating in a

written submission to the SKC that the whole Telangana movement was 'seditious' and anti-national (*New Indian Express* undated).

The caste alignment brought the division between the Malas (dominant in Andhra) and the Madigas (dominant in Telangana) into the regional issue, with each supporting their regional base and preferring bifurcation as a way of averting the intra-SC conflict that had been brewing for a decade (*Times of India* 2010b). The Kammas and Kapus (dominant in Coastal Andhra) seemed to back bifurcation, and even trifurcation with a separate Coastal Andhra, just as the Reddys were demanding a Rayalaseema state.

The Rayalaseema Reddys preferred a Rayala-Telangana option, preferring to deal with Telangana Reddys rather than Coastal Andhras if the state was to be divided. When this option was seen as unacceptable to Telangana (*New Indian Express* undated), the Greater Rayalaseema option was touted, with the coastal districts of Nellore and Ongole (with Reddy dominance) proposed to be added to the four Rayalaseema districts (*Hindu* 2009) as a last resort.

Among the Muslim parties,[14] the AI-MIM preferences were, first, for a united state; next, for Rayala-Telangana and, last, for a separate Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital. This revealed a remarkable negotiating position which showed how open it had kept its final choice (SKC 2010: 300). The only option it opposed was that of Hyderabad as a UT (IBNLive 2010).

The long-sought creation of a separate Telangana seems imminent. In this eventuality, the only remaining political question is whether there will be a bifurcation or trifurcation of the state. In any event, all the newly created states will do well with some stabilisation and hard work, provided that the political parties in Andhra Pradesh reduce their focus on party and caste politics that they have been engaged in for the last 55 years.

Notes

1. See Kannabiran et al. (2010) for a vivid picture of the grassroots attitudes.

2. UPA Common Minimum Programme was adopted in 2004.

3. For further discussion, see President of India, 'Address to the Joint Session of Parliament', New Delhi, 7 June 2004.

4. For further discussion, see Chandrashekhar's letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 21 May 2005.

5. For further discussion, see V. P. Singh's letter to Sonia Gandhi, 25 May 2005.

6. For further discussion, see I. K. Gujral's letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 24 May 2005.

7. For further discussion, see NCP President Sharad Parwar's letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 2 May 2005.

8. For further discussion, see Lalu Prasad Yadav's letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 20 May 2005.

9. For further discussion, see Mayawati's letter to Pranab Mukherjee, 8 May 2005.

10. For further discussion, see Wikipedia, 'Andhra Pradesh State Assembly election, 2009', http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andhra_Pradesh_state_assembly_elections,_2009, accessed on.

11. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar writes, 'Vast amounts of land around Hyderabad have been grabbed in questionable ways. In a new Telangana, many existing landowners—including major industrialists—may lose enormous tracts of land worth thousands of crores. Illegal land grabbing has till now been very lucrative, but may become the kiss of death after Telangana's creation' ('More Satyams in a New Telangana', emphasis added, http://swaminomics.org/?p=256, accessed on 4 May 2011.

12. This idea of Hyderabad as a UT has a long history, and is often revived. Mrs Indira Gandhi, writing to M. Narayana Reddy, MP, said, 'I have heard of the suggestion to make the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad a Union Territory as a means to solve the present Andhra Pradesh crisis. It seems that its full implications have not been considered by those who have made this suggestion' (Letter dated 23 February 1973, personal communication).

13. The single exception was the Joint Action Committee (JAC), which was responsible for leading the movement. It rejected the SKC, refused to appear before it, held that making submissions was a waste of time as a political decision had been taken and all that was required was to implement it. The SKC recognised the importance of the JAC thus, 'During this period, numerous Joint Action Committees (JACs) have been formed, the most prominent among them being the one at Osmania University led by Prof. Kodandaram. Initially, all political parties

were members of this JAC but subsequently most parties, including the TRS, left the fold. However, JACs have spread to the district, mandal and village level in Telangana resulting in a groundswell of demand for a separate state' (SKC 2010: 349).

14. Muslims were divided, with the AI-MIM taking a complex and flexible position. Other Muslim bodies favoured separation (Twocircles.net 2009).

ten

The Rayalaseema Region

Rayalaseema was a part of the Vijayanagar Empire: the backyard of the imperial capital city and a great source of revenue for the imperial court. It was annexed by Golconda/Hyderabad in 1645, 80 years after the destruction of the imperial army at the Battle of Talikota in 1565. After the conquest of Golconda/Hyderabad by the Mughals, the region was administered by the subedars of the Deccan between 1636/37 and 1857. Under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, it became a frontier war zone between the two kingdoms of Mysore and Hyderabad and suffered the onslaughts of both parties.

When the combined British-Nizam-Maratha armies finally defeated Tipu Sultan in the Fourth Mysore War in 1799, Rayalaseema fell to the share of the Nizam. The Nizam could not manage the lawlessness of the local *poligars* (*palegars*)[1] and, after less than a year, ceded the region to the British in 1800. Thereafter, the region was called the Ceded Districts until the modern period. (The name Rayalaseema acquired currency as late as the 1930s.) In exchange, the Company agreed to station 'a permanent Subsidiary Force of eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry' in the Hyderabad state for its protection.

It was Sir Thomas Munro who, as principal collector of the Ceded Districts between 1800 and 1807, broke the power of the poligars and restored law and order within 18 months of taking charge. He completed the survey and settlement of the entire cultivated area, assigned survey numbers to each field, registered the name of the holder of the land and fixed the assessment for 30 years. Crop loans were extended, as were loans to dig wells; in the drought

that followed, public works were carried out without waiting for sanction from Madras. Munro brought to the Ceded Districts the peace that had been disturbed by the fall of the Vijayanagar Empire in 1565, and the people of the region gave the British and Munro all the credit for that. The measures brought prosperity to the region and Munro earned immense respect and popularity among the people. For a long time after his death, it was not uncommon for villagers to name their first-born sons 'Munrolappa'.

Some of the problems Rayalaseema faced as part of the Ceded Districts way back in 1800 continue to this date. The region is still divided into 'areas of influence'. In 1800, there were 80 poligars with combined armed retainers numbering around 30,000, who not only systematically looted their own people but other poligars as well. Today, the successors of the poligars are the political leaders with the legitimacy of the ballot box, howsoever obtained. The region is run by these leaders who exploit the economy, government and natural resources of the area under their 'control'. Furthermore, every election is witness to the rigging of votes, bargaining for legitimacy by the dropping of criminal cases, transfer of police officers and increased looting of people, government and natural resources (Andhra Pradesh 2004).

A prime example of a factionist cloaked with the legitimacy of the ballot box is the late chief minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy. In his article, 'Democracy as Mafia Warfare' published in the *Times of India* on 17 July 2004, Swaminathan A. Aiyer characterised YSR thus, '... the new chief minister is widely believed to have risen to power on the basis of murder, loot and terror. Local journalists narrate in the most matter-of-fact manner how warlords routinely kill one another to monopolise works contracts and win elections in the Rayalaseema region, from where YSR hails. The hair-raising history of YSR's rise to power through terror is documented by K. Balagopal in a recent issue of the *Economic and Political Weekly*.

As for governance, Aiyer remarks, 'Mineral wealth permitted YSR to become the supreme economic and political warlord in Cuddapah district. Elections would be concluded in his favour, and his musclemen would ensure he monopolised all the civil/excise contracts he coveted. This sounds bland when stated in this fashion,

but the process involved a tremendous amount of violence and inaugurated a veritable regime of terror in the area' (ibid.).

Indiscriminate deforestation has led the region to lose its forest cover along with its top soil to such an extent that it is now derisively called Rallaseema from the word *rallu* which means stones, and has turned it into a drought-prone zone. The region is also mineral-rich, and most often the fights are over rights over these resources, as also over liquor contracts, bus services, and smuggling of red sanders wood.

The situation was so terrible that on 21 August 2001 the 11th Legislative Assembly appointed an 18-member All-Party 'House Committee on Factional Violence in Rayalaseema'. Its report stated that the trend had

> ... acquired the form of a multi-headed hydra, spreading its sinister tentacles to many villages in Rayalaseema Region. The faction leaders penetrated deep into the social fabric of society, acquired wealth and social status, and even started compelling the lower rungs of administration to toe their line of thinking. They started applying "Fear Psychosis" as an effective device to get things done ... this was the first phase.... The second phase seems to be rather more worrying and it is the "politicization of factionalism" or "factionalism making inroads into politics". (Andhra Pradesh 2004: xi)

The result was that,

> Extortions, illegal mining, self-imposed role of arbitrators, forcible capturing of tender works, marketing of illicit liquor, promotion of *matka* (gambling), hired killings, selling of explosive materials and forcible occupation of immovable properties like lands and building were found to be the main sources of illegal income to factionalists. (Ibid.: 7)

The report concluded:

> From mere supporters of politicians, the factionists then transformed themselves into contestants in elections and were even successful in

> acquiring political office. Thus the political atmosphere was prone to factional disease in Rayalaseema Region. Who is to be blamed for this? It is none other than the politicians and their respective political parties. (Ibid.: 11–12)

Rayalaseema's position in the Andhra state and the merged state of Andhra Pradesh was unenviable. With only 30 per cent of the population of the Andhra state, its leaders had fought an uphill battle to try to ensure that Kurnool would be the capital. With the merger with Telangana, Rayalaseema, with only 20 per cent of the population in the expanded Andhra Pradesh state, had to play a balancing act between the financial muscle of Coastal Andhra and Telangana's need for development. Since money was decisive, Rayalaseema, despite having produced chief ministers who have ruled Andhra Pradesh for 25 out of 56 years of its existence as Andhra Pradesh, is still underdeveloped, more so than Telangana, as the SKC report says. Thirteen out of 23 districts of Andhra Pradesh have been identified by the centre for inclusion in the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF). Out of these 13 districts, nine are in Telangana (Telangana has 10 districts) and three in Rayalaseema (Rayalaseema has four districts).

As the SKC says, 'The relatively deprived region of AP is Rayalaseema; but it ranks just a notch below the all-India average in per capita income and its overall GDP is higher than Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Goa and northeastern states excepting Assam.' And, therefore, the SKC says: 'The other combination of regions—Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema together can also sustain themselves as a state; in fact they can also sustain themselves separately' (SKC 2010: 121).

With statehood for Telangana imminent, the political leaders belonging to Rayalaseema are apprehensive about the prospect of dealing with their colleagues from Coastal Andhra. They recall from history that during the movement for the creation of Andhra state the Rayalaseema leaders had been reluctant to join hands with the Coastal Andhra leaders. To allay their fears an informal non-binding 'Gentleman's Agreement' between the notables of both regions, called the Sri Bagh Agreement of 1937, had been put together

(Rao 1968: 486–87). This had not quite worked as intended once the Andhra state was created in 1953. When Andhra Pradesh was created by incorporating the Telangana region, the Rayalaseema leaders had become more important but development in the region did not take place to the extent required despite the fact that many of the state's chief ministers came from that region.

The Sri Bagh Pact was the outcome of considerable discussion that took place because of the marked reluctance of the Rayalaseema elite to the idea of a merger with Coastal Andhra. Some 15 leaders agreed to the pact, which was signed on 16 November 1937. The pact agreed to the following proposals: (1) university centres would be set up in Waltair and Anantapur; (2) preferential claim would be given to Rayalaseema and Nellore in respect of the utilisation of the waters of the Tungabhadra, Krishna and Pennar, for 10 years or as long as it takes; (3) each district would have the same number of seats in the legislature; and (4) while the main university would remain at Waltair, the high court and the capital would be either in Rayalaseema or Coastal Andhra, with the choice resting with Rayalaseema.

The location of the university centres was a relatively easy option, and development of irrigation projects required funds to be allocated, but the provision of an equal number of seats for each district was a clear violation of the principle of one man, one vote, even if the voters were taxpayers and propertied persons franchised under the 1935 act. For some reason, the coastal leaders thought they could get away with it politically.

Nonetheless, the Sri Bagh Pact acted to unite the separatist forces within Rayalaseema. During 1947, mention of Andhra was to be made in the Draft Constitution. This was initially agreed upon and then deleted as it was not legally possible to mention an entity that did not exist at the time. The Andhraites lay the blame for this, as also for earlier and subsequent events, on C. Rajagopalachari, the then governor-general of India, and later, at another crucial time, the chief minister of Madras.

The solution to this problem was found in the constitution of the Commission on Linguistic Provinces (called after its chairman the Dar Commission) (Rao 1968: 339–502). The Dar Commission held exhaustive hearings and recorded considerable evidence.

First of all, it assessed the issues of Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra and said,

> In manner, customs, traditions and general outlook on life also the two groups differ, and in a general way, though in a less intensified form, the distrust and apprehension of domination and exploitation which exist in a Telugu mind against the Tamil, find their counterpart in the Rayalaseema mind against the Coastal districts. (Ibid.: 445)

It examined the Sri Bagh Pact and its results and concluded,

> Eleven years have passed since this Pact was signed, but the differences between the Coastal districts and Rayalaseema still remain unbridged and the Pact still stands as a witness to these differences and to the failure to settle them. (Ibid.)

Twenty out of 25 Rayalaseema MLAs led by N. Sanjiva Reddy (later chief minister of Andhra Pradesh) presented a statement to the commission in which the demand for a separate province was opposed as being wholly misconceived and inopportune and its acceptance, if unavoidable, was made conditional upon the literal enforcement of the Sri Bagh Pact.

Based on this submission, the commission concluded,

> Rayalaseema being educationally, politically and economically backward, it apprehends Coastal domination and exploitation in services, legislatures, and in development schemes. And altogether, it sees a better chance for the future development of Rayalaseema in undivided Madras than in divided Madras after the separation of Andhra, Kerala, etc. (Ibid.: 445)

However, three of these 20 MLAs later withdrew their opposition to the proposed Andhra state and did so before the commission. The other faction was willing to throw in its lot with the coastal districts in forming the new province; it was prepared to take the risk even if the Sri Bagh Pact was not enforced. This convinced

the commission that there were differences in Rayalaseema on this issue. The coastal leaders, on the other hand, stated that the Sri Bagh Pact still stood and they were prepared to honour it and give it statutory force.

The commission refused to make a judgment on this issue except to state that it was obvious that the Sri Bagh Pact was the crucial factor and worse, 'The terms of the Pact cannot be fitted into the Draft Constitution and are unlikely to be enforceable under any new Constitution we can foresee.' It further said, '... the conclusion is inevitable that a substantial section of Rayalaseema is opposed to the formation of Andhra Province and one essential condition for the creation of such a province is wanting' (ibid.: 446).

With this, the Dar Commission concluded that there was no basis for a united Andhra state, which included Rayalaseema. There was large-scale agitation in Coastal Andhra and a new committee was set up with Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sittaramayya as members (JVP Committee; see also chapter 10). This committee, however, postponed the whole issue once again. It took till 1953 to unite the leaders from Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra to achieve the Andhra state.

In keeping with the Sri Bagh Pact, the capital was located at Kurnool and the high court in Guntur, before both were eventually shifted to Hyderabad. As for irrigation projects, it was only Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy who carried out the plan of developing irrigation projects in Rayalaseema—at the risk of bankrupting the state. It is him to that Rayalaseema owes the credit of implementing the best and the most productive part of the Sri Bagh Pact some 70 years after it was signed.

Sadly, after 57 years, not only is Telangana not comfortable being part of the merged state, but Rayalaseema too is still apprehensive of the Coastal Andhra alliance even after 59 years. As we have noted earlier, RRS President Kuncham Venkata Subba Reddy has asked the UPA government to carve out Greater Rayalaseema before conceding the demand for statehood for the Telangana region. His Greater Rayalaseema envisages inclusion of Vellore and Krishanagiri districts in Tamil Nadu and Raichur, Bellary and Kolar districts in Karnataka (*Hindu* 2010)!

Erasu Pratap Reddy and T. G. Venkatesh, both Congress MLAs from Kurnool district, have been quoted as saying at a media conference that the people of Rayalaseema cannot live together with people from Coastal Andhra districts because of cultural, geographical and political differences: 'Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema are separate regions; they cannot go together if there is going to be a division of the state. we want trifurcation and not bifurcation.' TDP general secretary and founder of the Rayalaseema Parirakshana Samiti, Byreddy Rajasekhar Reddy, stated, 'If the bifurcation of the state is imminent, the Centre should form three separate states—Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana' (Fullhyd 2012).

The SKC too expected that statehood for Telangana would provoke the move for a separate Rayalaseema state: 'The agitation for separation of Rayalaseema from Coastal Andhra may also start taking shape sooner than expected' (SKC 2010: 451). If the Rayalaseema politicians, aggressive as they are, are unable to cope with their coastal colleagues, imagine the inefficacy of the mild-mannered Telangana politicians in the past. It is only with the co-operation of the politicians from Telangana that their counterparts from Rayalaseema were able to just about match up with Andhra money power, entrepreneurial skills and political strength in the assembly. And the fact that all this did little either for the Rayalaseema or for the Telangana regions is evident, but it did indeed help the regional politicians and, of course, the coastal districts.

Notes

1. Poligars or paligars are a kind of warlords.

eleven

Tribal Land Rights and Demand for a Separate State

> There were two dangers to which subjection to normal laws would have specially exposed these peoples, and both arose out of the fact that they were primitive people, simple, unsophisticated and frequently improvident. There was a risk of their agricultural land passing to the more civilized section of the population, and the occupation of the tribals was the most part agricultural; and, secondly they were likely to get into the "wiles of the moneylenders". The primary aim of Government policy then was to protect them from these two dangers and preserve their tribal customs; and this was achieved by prescribing special procedures applicable to these backward areas.
>
> Simon Commission Report (quoted in Samatha 1997)

Tribal land rights were violated under the Nizams and the British Raj in the East Godavari Agency Areas (transferred subsequently to the Khammam district of Telangana), but measures for controlling land transfers to non-tribals and ensuring continuity of land ownership for tribal populations were reasonably effective as Telangana was a low-population-density and land-extensive region and there was very little mobility of farmers to other areas.

Tribals were also given *pattas* (legal titles for land ownership) for the land they cultivated and this ensured protection by law. In the case of one district, Professor Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, Advisor on Tribal Affairs, HEH the Nizam's Government of Hyderabad State, reported,

> Despite all such obstacles, the allocation of land to the tribals of Adilabad, which began in 1944, made good progress. By 1945, a total of 45,417 acres of land had been granted to 3,144 tribals, and by 1949 the amount of land assigned on *patta* to tribals had risen to 160,000 acres and the numbers of beneficiaries to 11,198. The work continued until about 85 per cent of the tribal householders of Adilabad got adequate holdings of cultivable land. (Quoted in ibid., para 2)

Nonetheless, the Nizam's government in Hyderabad state recognised the issue of tribal land rights and the protection they needed from exploitation by non-tribals. The Tribal Areas Regulation, 1356 Fasli (AD 1948) and the Hyderabad Tribal Areas Regulation (Regulation No. III of 1359 F, AD 1951) were in force to restrict transfer of land in the scheduled/notified areas.

The British government of India enacted the Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act of 1917 which sought to limit interest payable by tribals and, more vitally, land transfer.

The relevant section of the act provided that:

> *Notwithstanding any rule or law or enactment to the contrary*, any transfer of immovable property situated within the Agency tract by a member of a hill-tribe shall be *absolutely* null and void unless made in favour of another member of the hill tribe. (Quoted in ibid.: 6, emphasis added)

The language of this section left no doubt about the intention to ban any transaction of immovable property, including land, between the tribals and non-tribals though the loopholes provided in the case of lease agreements (not deemed to be alienations under the act) have led to dispossession, as tribals often did not recognise the distinction between the two types of transactions. The 1917 act was the basis for providing the constitutional special guarantees for tribal land, and it was mentioned in Schedule V of the Constitution which identified the particular tribal areas where such transactions could not take place and, if they did, they were null and void.

Pursuant to the Simon Commission Report, the Government of India Act, 1935 dealt with excluded and partially excluded areas as per Order 1936 issued under Section 91 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

Thus, it is clear that even under the British Raj, protection of tribal land from acquisition by non-tribals was given high importance. This emphasis continued in independent India. However, while the securing of special right for tribals (as well as other protected populations) had been easily done in the British/Nizam period, in the Constitution of India, such special rights for tribals and SCs (and conversely deprivation of rights of other citizens vis-à-vis the tribals and the SCs) went against the constitutional right to equality of all citizens. This needed a special constitutional provision which put these rights beyond the scope of the courts. The president, by the Scheduled Areas (Part 'B' states) Order, 1950, which became effective from 7 December 1950, declared certain specified areas as Scheduled Areas in Part 'B' states, including the state of Hyderabad (Adilabad, Karimnagar, Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam and Mahabubnagar districts).

Chapter VI Part X of the Constitution deals with 'Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas'. Article 244 provides that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to the administration and control of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any state, other than the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.

The Fifth Schedule makes provisions regarding the administration and control of Scheduled Area and Scheduled Tribes. It enjoins that the governor of each state, having Scheduled Areas therein, shall annually, or whenever so required by the president, make a report to the president regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas in that state, and the executive power of the union shall extend to the giving of directions to the state as to the administration of the said area.

Special power has been conferred to prohibit or to restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the STs in such areas and to regulate the allotment of land to members of the STs in such areas and to regulate moneylending to the tribals in the Scheduled Areas.

As far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the main statute governing tribal land and provision of safeguards in Schedule V areas is the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation (LTR), 1959 (Regulation No. 1 of 1959) as amended in 1970, 1971 and 1978, and the rules framed under this regulation in 1969.

In the Telangana area of the state of Andhra Pradesh, prior to the regulation and pursuant to Part B, State Regulation in the Fifth Schedule, the AP Tribal Area Regulation, III of 1359 F promulgated by the Nizam, as the Rajpramukh of Hyderabad, was in effect. The regulation came into force on 4 March 1959 in the Andhra area and from 1 December 1963 in the Telangana area. Prior to this, in the Telangana area, the law prohibiting any transfer of agricultural lands without prior permission was in operation. The non-tribals in the Schedule V area were presumed to have acquired title from tribals unless they were able to prove to the contrary that their possession of properties in the Agency tracts was lawfully acquired.

However, with independence and merger, there was a considerable influx of non-tribals from areas with high population density to those with low population density, especially in the tribal areas. Since most of the tribal areas were in the Godavari river valley and were very fertile, the influx from Coastal Andhra areas proceeded upstream along the river in the Telangana districts of Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar. The Coastal Andhra settlers were attracted by the black cotton soil with the potential to grow cotton, chilli, tobacco and other cash crops in the cultivation of which they had considerable experience and for which there was a ready commercial market in Coastal Andhra.

The influx became widespread and, finally, with the intervention of the Supreme Court in the 1995 Samata judgment[1], the situation needed assessment. This three-bench Samata judgment cleared all legal controversy regarding the protection of tribal land and removed any ambiguity that governments had exploited earlier.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, commissioned J. M. Girglani IAS (retd.) to study the issue of the Telangana tribal land rights. He presented his 'Report of Tribal Land Issues in the Telangana Area' (GoAP 2005) dated 16 August 2005. It indicates widespread violations of tribal rights, which had been guaranteed by the

Constitution and were supposed to be monitored by the governor of the state (who has to submit an annual report to the president on Schedule V areas). These violations have been going on for at least 53 years—and largely by 'settlers' from outside the region.

As can be seen, the LTR was issued in 1959 just after the merger of Telangana with Andhra state with the avowed purpose of protecting Telangana tribal rights from the expected influx of settlers from the Andhra area. However, it will be noted that the rules, which are the operative part of any statute, were not issued till 1969, i.e. 10 years after the basic law—and mainly due to the Telangana agitation of that year! The government issued GO Ms 971, dated 7 October 1969, which prohibited assignment of government land in Scheduled Areas to non-tribals. Subsequent to this, to favour non-tribals and in relaxation of GO Ms 971, three other GOs were issued which, in due course, were struck down by the high court as *ultra vires* of the Constitution. This indicates the motives behind the issuance of the LTR, the non-issuance of operative rules, the subsequent ameliorative GOs and violations despite these rules and regulations as detailed below from extracts of the Telangana Tribal Lands Report.

1. The report states, 'In Govindrao Mandal, *in almost all the villages*, the land is under cultivation by non-tribals. 75 per cent of the population is also non-tribal. *Most of the non-tribals* are not originally from these villages but *are "settlers" from Coastal districts*. It is stated that the process *started before the 1950s*.... The major thrust of infiltration and "detribalisation" has been during the *last ten years*. This influx of non-tribals has resulted in tribals leaving these villages ... the lands occupied by the non-tribals are not only patta lands but *also government lands*. (Ibid.: 5, emphasis added)
2. It further states, 'Like Govindrao Mandal, in Mulug Mandal there is an *influx of "settlers", on the invitation of non-tribals who are originally not inhabitants of this Mandal. The influx is still continuing*. A large extent of the land occupied by non-tribal "settlers" is government land. They are not evicted; pattas have not been granted either to them or to tribals. There are 2,000 acres of

land ceiling surplus land of which 1,200 odd acres are under occupation of non-tribals. *The restoration orders have been issued under LTR for 350 acres. The orders are not being implemented since 1980 due to 'non-tribal resistance'*. (Ibid.: 8, emphasis added)

3. Again, the report states, 'In Narsingpet Mandal, one of the Scheduled Villages has 2400 acres of Government lands of which 1700 acres are assigned to tribals *as well as non-tribals*. Lambadas and non-tribals have come to the village in large numbers. *The Koyas have therefore vacated the village*.... The assignment of government land to the *extent of 1,700 acres to non-tribals is in violation of the LTR*.' (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)
4. The report also details the extent to which non-tribal settlers will go to protect their illegal possession of tribal land: 'In Kothaguda Village there are 21,000 acres (worth about Rs 110 crores at the minimum value of Rs 50,000 (per acre) of Billa number lands. A Billa number is a large part of surveyed land that has been left without numbering for whatever reason mainly because at the time of the survey it was not cultivated though cultivable. In course of time, these unnumbered surveyed lands got occupied by enterprising non-tribals, who brought them under the plough or acquired them informally from tribals, who had started cultivating them. *In 1993, the land was surveyed by Assistant Director, Palvancha. In 2002, the MRO's office was blasted and the Survey records were destroyed*.' (Ibid.: 15, emphasis added)
5. Also, 'In Medapllai Village, the Billa no. is 536 acres. Of these 50% Maktadar's portion admeasuring 180 acres was declared as surplus land under the Land Ceiling Act. Out of these, 90 acres are under submersion and *another 90 acres under non-tribal occupation, the village has no tribal population*.' (Ibid.: 15, emphasis added)
6. Bhadrachalam village was notified under Schedule V. It later became a municipality. However, the Schedule V status did not alter because of this change as Schedule V specifically carefully excluded Hyderabad as well as major Panchayat towns only from its ambit. On page 31, the report states, '... *a staggering Rs 10,000 crores worth of government and tribal lands are in the hands of non-tribals*

in the town for nothing except what may be called authorities turning the Nelson's eye for over one or two decades.' (Ibid.: 31, emphasis added)

7. Apart from the lands owned by tribals and the government, even sacred temple lands, that too of a great temple at Bhadrachalam, were not left alone. The report states, 'As mentioned above, the current market value of land in Bhadrachalam town is around Rs 4,000 per sq yard ... *the total value of the Endowments lands under encroachment and held in violation of the LTR can thus be estimated at Rs 500–1000 crores, by conservative estimates.* (Ibid.: 33, emphasis as in the original.)
8. The government issued GO Ms 971, dated 7.10.69, which prohibited assignment of government land in scheduled areas to non-tribals. Thereafter, it issued three GOs: GO. MS 41 Revenue dated 12.10.71; GO MS 951 dated 4.12.1974 and GO MS 129, dated 13.08.79, which amended the GO MS 971 and, according to the report, '... *which were intended to benefit non-tribals and protect them against the operation of the LTR.*' (Ibid.: 40, emphasis added)
9. 'The High Court struck down these GOs but in spite of these clear judgments striking down *ALL* these three GOs, strangely in all the Mandals of all the three districts, Warangal, Karimnagar and Adilabad, certain lands occupied by non-tribals were identified under GO Ms 41 and excluded from any action for eviction. There is no clear explanation as to why protection was given to the non-tribals under GO Ms 41 Revenue alone, among all the other GOs struck down by the High Court.... When a GO is struck down by the High Court, it becomes inoperative, null and void and it cannot be treated as valid.... Whether it indicates a deliberate conspiracy or collective naivety or a convenient alibi to avoid taking action, or, to be charitable, compassion for the poor occupants (presuming that they are poor which is doubtful. They are powerful), or that eviction may have the unpredictable fallout for the concerned officials, it is totally indefensible.' (Ibid.: 41, emphasis in the original)

The report goes on to detail case after case in Adilabad, Warangal and Khammam districts, making for painful and sad reading.

In summing up, the report stated,

> *Incredibly vast areas, in some cases whole villages and at least one whole Mandal and 70% of the lands in another Mandal are under occupation by non-tribals.* If that had been the position 50 years ago, the villages would not have found place in Schedule V, inclusion in which is based on tribal population and land under their occupation. *Their protection in their habitat and protection of their occupation is the very raison d'être of Schedule V.* Inclusion of an area under Schedule V therefore is by itself sufficient evidence that most of the land is under tribal occupation. *That much of it has gone into the hands of non-tribals shows that it has passed off illegally.* The presumption in the LTR to this effect is also based on this premise. In this context, to assume that the lands held by the non-tribals are under 50 year old *pattas* or pre-1970 of pre-1959 *pattas is a rationalization of the administrative system's incapacity to cope with the magnitude of the problem, of putting every case under scrutiny under LTR.* (Ibid.: 23, emphasis added)

These extracts from the 80-page report show that even the most vulnerable section of the population, i.e. the tribal population of Telangana with heavily protected rights guaranteed by the Constitution, monitored specially by the governor of the state and the president of India, have not escaped the greed of the 'settlers'. The whole process is one of internal colonisation by an outside population supported actively in all cases by the inability and unwillingness of the politico-bureaucratic system.

A situation that was not allowed to arise under the feudal rule of the Nizams has come about now where the 'settlers' have been allowed, encouraged and abetted by the successive democratic governments of Andhra Pradesh to violate the constitutional rights of the tribals and dispossess them of their land and livelihood, and drive them from their ancestral villages. To illegally acquire government land in a non-Scheduled V area is one thing, but to acquire tribal land in Scheduled V areas and to drive out the tribal population from their own ancestral lands and villages is quite another matter.

The conclusion drawn from a close reading of this report is that there is a systematic attempt by the 'settlers' from outside the region to dispossess the tribals of their land. Worse, successive state governments seem to be complicit in ignoring, allowing, abetting and profiting from such violations. This has been true of all governments since 1956. Protection of tribals and their land is not possible under a political government dominated by 'settler's' interests. The situation is so severe that the entire tribal villages and Mandals are being 'detribalised'. This is, in effect, ethnic cleansing presided over by the democratic governments of the state which are more inclined to serve the vested interest of 'settlers' than to protect the vulnerable tribal population, let alone the rest of the population of the state.

One wonders why the SKC ignored the tribal land issue. It concludes, 'Thus Telangana has a higher proportion of tribal communities and both Adivasi and other tribal groups have expressed strong opinions on the demand for Telangana' (SKC 2010: 372). However, on the following pages, it says, 'As discussed later in this section, Adivasis residing in districts of Telangana prefer to remain in united Andhra or have their own state of Manya Seema' (ibid.: 373).

A separate Telangana state could be the best solution for the tribal population and would rectify the injustices done to them over the past few decades. Nonetheless, any government would have to pay special attention to remedial action and continued protection of tribal rights as enshrined in the Constitution. If the successive governments of Andhra Pradesh have not been able to protect even the tribal people of this area, it is no wonder that, despite several promises, assurances and guarantees at the time of merger of and thereafter, they have not been able to do the same for the rest of the Telangana population.

The Scheduled Castes

The attitude and interests of the SC community is one important aspect among the many-faceted issues of the division of Andhra

Pradesh. The 12-million strong dalit community of the state is divided into two distinct groups—the Malas and the Madigas. The Malas at 42 per cent and the Madigas at 49 per cent make up 91 per cent of the dalit population. The proportions vary between the three regions. Of the dalit community, the Malas constitute 55 per cent of the total population in Coastal Andhra, while the Madigas make up 61 per cent in Telangana, and the Madigas are a majority with 52 per cent in Rayalaseema.

Their economic, social and political development is seen to be uneven. In the words of the SKC, 'The Malas shared in the educational development and prosperity brought to the region under British rule (especially through the introduction of education in standard Telugu or in English language) and also from later capitalist development of the region brought about mainly by the Kamma castes. Among the Malas, those who embraced Christianity (about 60 per cent) are able to avail of reservations by calling themselves the Adi-Andhras, or declaring themselves under other dalit categories. The Madigas, especially those residing in the Telangana region, suffered economically and educationally under the Nizams and hence remained backward. They are, therefore, less able to compete with the Malas for positions in education and employment' (ibid.: 370).

As a result, the Usha Mehra Committee[2] pointed out, 'Mala and its allied castes are enjoying 70% representation in Class I and Class III posts in the State Services (para 22). This has provoked the formation of the Madiga Reservation Porata Samiti (MRPS) and its agitation for sub-categorisation, which the Supreme Court has rejected, assuming that the dalits are an 'indivisible homogenous entity' (quoted in ibid.: 370).

The issue has since surfaced in the bifurcation debate where the Malas and the Madigas have come to believe that they can only benefit if the state is divided. The SKC itself quoted the leaders thus, 'Despite uncertain advantage, [the] Dalit leaders feel that separate states would resolve the *Madiga/Mala* dispute and at the same time increase political representation of the Dalits and allow them to exercise greater political power' (ibid.: 371). This may not fit into the calculations of the ruling elite.

But the dalits have driven the Telangana movement. As the SKC found, 'Large-scale involvement of students, including those from Dalits and Backward Castes, in the current movement for Telangana seems to testify to this. A large proportion of student leaders of the movement located in Osmania and Kakatiya universities is known to be from Dalit/BC background. According to many sources, purported student suicides during the course of the agitation are also largely by Dalit and Backward Caste students' (ibid.: 163).

This has led to an interesting situation, which the SKC noted: 'The SCs of Coastal Andhra differ in their stance on the issue of separation. While the *Malas* of this region seem divided in their outlook, the *Madigas* are consistent in their demand for a separate state.... Thus *Madigas* from Telangana and Coastal Andhra prefer separate states, reflecting a regional and reservation-oriented perspective' (ibid.: 368).

In December 2009, the dalit leaders led by Amalapuram MP G. V. Harsha Kumar, Bapatla MP Panabaka Lakshmi and K. Sivaji, were said to be backing a dalit organisation, Mala Mahanadu, to launch a separate Andhra ('Jai Andhra') movement, which would support the creation of a separate state of Telangana on the basis that it would help the Malas of Andhra (*Indian Express* 2009).

The Andhra Dalit Mahasabha demanded a separate state for Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra with its leader, Katti Padma Rao, declaring, 'Only two castes are dominating all others in the two regions. Formation of separate Andhra state by excluding Telangana would herald equitable development' (*Outlook* 2010).

Incidentally, way back in 1956, Dr B. R. Ambedkar had warned of the dangers to the dalits from the new reorganisation, but his warnings were not heeded. Between 1969 and 1973, dalits did not play a significant role in the Telangana and Jai Andhra movements which were being led by the middle class in Telangana and by the kulak farmers in Coastal Andhra. Now, at least with the stakes so high for the dalits and their contribution and sacrifices so significant, their interests and hopes for real material benefits from this separation need to be taken into account.

Landless Labour

The SKC relied on data based on a sample survey of different groups by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) during 1993/94 and again in 2004/05 (SKC 2010: 106–10). The committee, while speaking about the poorest of the poor, i.e. the landless agricultural labourers in Telangana, said:

> On the other hand, the Telangana region is *experiencing a considerable erosion of relative income amongst the relatively poorer sections*, although the richest seem to have gained during the reference period. (SKC 2010: 107, emphasis added)

> This analysis provides credence to the fact that *the most of the deprived communities in Telangana are facing hardship.* (Ibid.: 108, emphasis added)

> Such deepening inequity in Telangana can not only sustain the separatist agitation but it can also carry it further and increase its intensity. (Ibid.: 119, emphasis added)

> But, what is revealing is the fact that *considerably larger proportions have reported themselves as agricultural labourers in Telangana which has increased from 38% to 47%*, and in Rayalaseema this share has increased from 24% to 39%. In Coastal Andhra region, the share of agricultural labour has increased only by about one percent. (Ibid.: 101, emphasis added)

> While the farmers in all regions have shown stable income or income which has hardly changed: *the real income of the agricultural wage labour has declined considerably in Telangana*, whereas it has increased considerably in Coastal Andhra region (See Figure 2.39). (Ibid.: 108, emphasis added)

However, while the SKC refers to charts, etc. it does not deal with the real figures in the text. Instead it hides them in the Appendix volume 2. A closer analysis of the actual figures reveals a different picture.

According to the SKC, the rural population in Telangana is 18.2 lakh, in Rayalaseema it is 9.0 lakh and in Coastal Andhra it is 21.4 lakh. In reality, however, the figures, are wrong—the commission, in fact, missed a decimal point. They are 182 lakh for Telangana, 90 lakh for Rayalaseema and 214 lakhs for Coastal Andhra! Thus, 47 per cent of the rural population are agricultural labourers in Telangana, which means that nearly 85.5 lakh belong to this category. The SKC admits that the 'real income of the agricultural wage labour has declined considerably in Telangana' and proceeds to refer the reader to another chart. This chart (Figure 2.39), when closely examined, indicates that in the decade between 1993–94 and 2004–05, this group of Telangana people (nearly 90 lakh persons) has seen a decline of 35.9 per cent in their income (ibid., vol. 2, Appendix Table 2:1: 121)! During the same period, 42.7 lakh of the Rayalaseema group have suffered a real income decline of only 6.7 per cent. It is a sheer marvel that the real income of the same group in Coastal Andhra (no figures are given by the SKC but the committee says it has increased by only 1 per cent) has increased by a phenomenal 42.2 per cent!

So, while the real income or the purchasing power of Telangana's worst-placed economic group amounting to nearly 10 million persons fell by 36 per cent, the real income of the same group in Coastal Andhra rose by 42 per cent. Attempts to discount the deprivation in Telangana by comparing it with Rayalaseema (the SKC's standard method) did not work, as the decline in Rayalaseema is one-fifth of that in Telangana.

How does the SKC explain the disparity in real incomes among the regions of Telangana, Rayalaseema and Andhra? The SKC avoids this issue altogether and mentions that the Telangana region's GDP being high (Appendix para 2.4 shows an increase of 38 per cent between 1993–1994 and 2000–01), the region is not backward (despite the Government of India identifying nine of the 10 Telangana districts for relief through the BRGF), that the increase in irrigation is 'whopping' (despite the fact that government irrigation acreage fell by 11 lakh acres) and that crop productivity is as high or higher than that of Andhra or Rayalaseema. Try telling these stories to the 10 million agricultural laborers whose real income fell by a

third, while their Andhra cousins saw an increase of 42 per cent. It is no wonder that their children are revolting. A pertinent question arises as to whom the SKC talked to when it was preparing the report. It was certainly not to the landless agricultural labourers. In any case, which political party cares about their plight anyway?

Notes

1. Samata, a non-governmental organisation (NGO), closely associated with 10 community-based institutions in 300 villages of Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam and East Godavari districts, began to work for the rights of the tribal people when it found them being alienated from their lands and exploited by non-tribal people and the state, in contravention of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and various central and state government laws. After a four-year legal battle, it won a historic Supreme Court judgment, which declared null and void the transfer of land in the Scheduled Areas for private mining and upheld the Forest Protection Act of 1980, which prohibits mining in reserved areas. The main issue in the Samata case was whether or not the word 'person' in Section (3)(a) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act included the government. The Supreme Court held that indeed it did, and that the state should adhere to the laws and principles governing the tribal areas, as any other person.

2. The Justice Usha Mehra Committee was constituted after the TDP government of Andhra Pradesh decided to classify the SCs into different categories depending on their social and financial status. This was seen as an attempt to benefit the Madigas and restrain the Malas in the competition for SC privileges. It was also seen as an attempt to divide the SCs politically. The Supreme Court struck down the order as being without proper basis. It is in consequence of the judgment that the Usha Mehra Committee was set up by the Government of India to examine the issue before considering special legislation.

twelve

The One Man Girglani Commission

The SKC dealt with many of the assurances given to Telangana that were intended to avoid unfairness and injustice to its people. The assurances and safeguards intended for the region were many: a unanimous Andhra Assembly Resolution (1955), the Gentleman's Agreement (1956), the Eight-point Formula of the Prime Minister (1969), the Supreme Court Judgment on Mulki Rules[1] (1972), the Six-point Formula of the Prime Minister (1972), Constitution 32nd Amendment to Article 371-D (1975), Presidential Order—AP Public Employment Order (1975) and GO MS No. 610 (1985). These were expected to protect the interests of the people of this region from their more aggressive cousins from Andhra. However, everyone knew what was in store and tried desperately to reduce what impact.

These assurances given presumably in good faith, and confirmed by two assemblies, Parliament, the Supreme Court, a president and a prime minister—and in full public view, were to be implemented and enforced by the state government. If successive Congress and TDP political and bureaucratic governments in the state could not resolve the problems, then the solution certainly does not lie within the ambit of state governance. Moreover, no one in public knowledge has contended that these assurances were implemented as contemplated by their authors and supporters.

The Kumar Lalit Committee (1969)[2] concluded that Telangana was denied its rightful share. The Justice Bhargava Committee (1969)[3] confirmed Lalit's findings, differing only on the quantum of Telangana surpluses. While Lalit estimated the Telangana

surpluses not spent in Telangana at Rs 63.92 crores, Justice Bhargava Committee put the figures at Rs 28.34 crores—both for the same period 1956–68. Both reports established the fact of diversion of surpluses to the other regions and, of course, breach of agreement. The Officers' Committee[4] under the chairmanship of K. Jayabharat Reddy (1985) found that Telangana did not get its due share in employment. The House Committee on Implementation of GO 610 (2001)[5] and the J. M. Girglani Commission (2003) found that the GO, which was supposed to redress the grievances of the employees from Telangana, had not been implemented even two decades after its issuance.

The J. M. Girglani or the One Man Commission (OMC) was set up in 2002 to examine the non-implementation of GO 610 which made provisions for reservation of government jobs for the local people within the Telangana region. This GO 610, issued 10 years after the Presidential Order of 1975, has remained unimplemented. The commission revealed the current situation vis-à-vis these solemn assurances and guarantees agreed nearly three decades earlier by all political forces in the state and the centre in the shape of the Presidential Order of 1975 safeguarding the interests of Telangana. The fact that this order needed validation by a constitutional amendment indicates the national importance of the need to protect Telangana interests within the state of Andhra Pradesh from being further eroded since merger in 1956.

Girglani's report (2004) describes the deviations from the Presidential Order, grievances, remedial measures and safeguards. The time-frame of the report was 18 October 1975 till 22 September 2004 and it covered the entire state. The main causes of the deviation are the administrative system, sometimes bypassing the Presidential Order, obliviousness to and ignorance of the Presidential Order and lack of any monitoring or guiding machinery or a nodal agency. The deviation are arranged in terms of 18 'Deviation Genres' delineated into 126 findings and 35 sets of remedial measures. Some of the issues of the 126 findings that Girglani examined in the light of the Presidential Order and the consequent GO 610 need to be considered.

The first is related to the exemption from the Presidential Order of the offices of the heads of department (HoDs) of 51 departments in the state government from the operation of the order. The idea, sensibly, was that since the offices of the HoDs service the whole of the state, their staffing would be statewide. Girglani writes:

> Thus, the 51 Heads of Departments listed in the Annexure to G.O.P. No. 728 of 1-11-1975, 54 in the Budget Manual, 66 in Financial Code and 78 in Fundamental Rules—got multiplied into 288 (Planning Department's List), 174 (Finance Department's List) and to 145 (GAD's List). Even the Heads of Projects are treated as HoDs.... However, the Report has listed out 102 HoD offices that alone are legitimately entitled to exclusion from localisation of cadres under item (b) of Para 14 of the Presidential Order. (Girglani 2004: 3)

A department can have only one head, while it may have many wings. Yet, the heads of each of these wings were designated as heads of departments. The Departments of Irrigation, Roads and Buildings (R&B), Panchayati Raj Engineering and Health resembled the mythological figure *Ravana*. With 16 heads, the Irrigation and Command Area Department has outdone even Ravana, while R&B has five, and Panchayati Raj Engineering and Health have seven each! In order to facilitate the posting of the non-Telangana officers and staff, the state government opted for dismantling its command and control structure and set up multiple HoDs.

But for what purpose? It is worth quoting extensively from the report regarding what he had to say on the HoDs:

> ... the Commission has shown how offices which should not be classified as Head of Department offices *have been treated as head of Department offices thereby putting them outside the purview of the Presidential Order under Para 14(b)*. In this process, the posts in such offices, which should have been subjected to reservation for locals of Districts and Zones in which the offices are located, have been made free posts depriving the locals of their reservation. Most of

these offices are in Hyderabad City and therefore the adversely affected locals are of Hyderabad District and Zone VI. The Commission wanted to check up how many locals have been thus adversely affected, and called for information from the offices of all the existing Heads of Departments. Only 52 existing HoDs have responded..... The sample shows that in the posts below LDC level 81.1% are locals. In the posts of LDC level only 41.4% are locals. In Zonal posts 39.3% are locals. *If we are to extrapolate from this sample it would mean that in all the non-legitimate HoDs 39% posts have been lost to the locals in the LDC level posts, which is the largest category, and similarly, 30% in Zonal posts.* This is based on the reservation percentage of 80 to 70 respectively. Normally, in the free percentage of 20 and 30 also some locals could get in. This finding is recorded to show that even the simple quantification *which can be done if HoDs cooperate* and send the figures of the staff in Head Office, we could get an idea of the magnitude of deprivation suffered by locals under this one single Genre of Deviation.... *Government may devise some means by which the HoDs will cooperate in giving information required by the Commission* in matters of Deviations.... (Ibid. chap 16, 1–2, emphasis mine)

The second deviation was in the Work Charged Establishment. This group largely consists of manual labour in a casual capacity without the tenure, perks and salaries of regular government employees. They are mainly employed in the Irrigation, Panchayati Raj and Roads & Buildings Departments. Their employment was exempted from the operation of the Presidential Order as they were temporarily employed and did not constitute a regular government cadre.

Right from the beginning before and after the promulgation of the Presidential Order to date, work-charged employees have been kept out of the purview of the Presidential Order for no reason at all. They are "civil posts" in all connotations of this term and the Presidential Order should have been applied to them, but this has not been done. (Ibid.: 6)

Yet, the Girglani Commission recorded,

> Today they number 40,870. Of these 16,161 are in Irrigation Department, 5,984 in Roads & Buildings, 6,860 in Panchayat Raj Engineering and the rest in other departments. Surplus staff including a part of the work charged establishment totaling to 21,866 has also been kept outside the Presidential Order while absorbing them in regular posts. Such exclusion is even more unjustifiable. They have to be brought under Local Cadres. (Girglani 2004a: 7)

Girglani states,

> Surplus staff including a part of the work-charged establishment totaling to 21,866 has also been kept outside the Presidential Order while absorbing them in regular posts. Such exclusion is even more unjustifiable. These have to be brought under the Local Cadres. (Ibid.: 7)

He further says,

> Work-charged employees have not only been appointed in disregard of the Presidential Order but also continued to be treated as outside the Presidential Order. They are being transferred from anywhere to anywhere, regardless of their local status. This results in the seniorities of other work charged employees being adversely affected apart from the violation of the Presidential Order *already inherent in the system*, being further compounded. (Ibid.: 20, emphasis added)

The third deviation is the cross-cadre movement relating to deputations. 'From one post multiple promotions have been churned out by sending persons on deputations, filling the same post by promotion and keeping up the chain of promotions and deputations. Deputations from excluded organization to other excluded organizations have curtailed the opportunities of the local

candidates which the fair share principle would have provided them' (Girglani 2004a: 6).

The fourth is the elaborate and systematic procedure adopted in the polytechnic colleges. Posts of part-time junior lecturers were filled by appointments of non-locals, though these temporary jobs are by direct appointment and covered by the Presidential Order. Subsequently, the order was violated twice over by regularising the posts of these part-time junior lecturers. Thereafter, the regularised part-time junior lecturers were 'transferred' to their 'native districts' and given seniority as of a particular date, instead of being put in the last rank, thus disturbing the seniority of those selected by the AP College Service Commission/AP Public Service Commission (Girglani chap 16, 2004: 4–5).

The fifth kind of deviation illustrates the elaborate ways in which the bureaucracy functioned:

> In some cases, all the rules about deputations laid down in the Fundamental Rules and the General Service Rules have been indiscriminately flouted to churn out promotions. From one post multiple promotions have been churned out by sending persons on deputations, filling the same post by promotion and keeping up the chain of promotions and deputations. Deputations from excluded organization to other excluded organizations have curtailed the opportunities of the local candidates which the fair share principle would have provided them. Deputations as a source of deviations need stringent vigilance. Damage done has to be set right. (Ibid.: 6)

To emphasise the continuation of the violations into the present:

> The *recent* appointment of Panchayat Secretaries has been done under GO Ms. No. 369 PR&RD (Mandals II) Dept., dated 12.12.2001. The GO has not stated that these appointments should follow the rule of local candidates for local cadres. It has completely overlooked the Presidential Order. The appointments are all in-service appointments. These need to be reviewed

and rearranged in terms of localisation of cadres. (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)

Girglani goes on in this vein for about another 121 counts of deviation from the Presidential Order. The expressions used by this experienced administrator in this report sum up the conduct of successive administrations for over 30 years. The following has been extracted from chapter 16 of his report titled 'Summary-Conclusions':

1. *This Rule has been mutilated out of context and misapplied for inter-zonal transfers within a Region.* (Ibid.: 16.3.0, emphasis added)
2. One case has come to the notice of the commission but it could be *the tip of an iceberg.* (Ibid.: 16.3.1, emphasis added)
3. The persons who have been *illegally benefited by the transfers* should be repatriated to their respective Zones and fixed in the Zonal seniority retrospectively and their promotions reviewed accordingly. (Ibid.: 16.10.2, emphasis added)
4. Neither the general service rules nor the F.R.S. *have any concept like 'floating posts' which have been described in the GOs....* (Ibid.: 16.14.1, emphasis added)
5. The 'floating posts' order was to be deleted by the goernment. *But this did not happen and the violation of the Presidential Order continues from the date of this G.O. and is further aggravated....* (Ibid.: 16.14.2, emphasis added)
6. We have shown how the *device of 'other duty' has been misused to bring persons from various Zones* to Hyderabad city or other places *of their choice,* circumventing the need for a transfer under Para 5 (2) of the Presidential Order (Ibid.: 16.15.0, emphasis added)
7. Perhaps the government may also consider taking action against those who are responsible *unless it has been permitted at the Government level itself.* In the latter case, the Secretariat Department may *specifically record Governments' decision against this pernicious device* (of 'other duty') and communicate it to all the departments and particularly to all officers of the Irrigation and Command Area Department. (Ibid., 16.15.4, emphasis added)
8. The Commissioner called for applications for transfers from teachers who had put in at least two years in the 'local cadre'.

His interpretation was that each post itself constitutes a 'local cadre'! Thus a Secondary Grade School Teacher was treated as a separate 'local cadre' and School Assistant in the same district as a separate 'local cadre', though both posts are district cadre posts under the Presidential Order. *By a peculiar interpretation and specious logic*, the Commissioner insisted on this *preposterous connotation* of 'local cadre'. This connotation would have led to a *very ridiculous situation* and upset the entire scheme of the Presidential Order. (Ibid.: 16.21.0, emphasis added)

9. This Finding shows the far-reaching consequences with regard to the Presidential Order and its implementation, when *Heads of Departments take to unilateral and exotic interpretations and definitions of the basic concepts and terminology of the Presidential Order.* (Ibid.: 16.21.2, emphasis added)
10. *No department should interpret anything in the Presidential Order on its own without clearance from GA (SPF) Department which should carefully examine the ramifications of the interpretations. The power of interpretation is a very powerful instrument that should be exercised by the highest authority, with circumspection. Otherwise a whole legislation can be brought to naught. In the legal system it is called judge-made law and only at the apex level it gets finality.* (Ibid.: 16.21.3, emphasis added)

It is very obvious that such blatant disregard of the Presidential Order over three decades and under different political administrations of different political parties could not have been effected without the active connivance, ignorance, and initiative of the bureaucratic administration of the state. This was amply evident from the fact that in the two years that Girglani worked on this job, only 52 departments responded to his requests for data. So much for the writ of the government!

The refusal of nearly half the HoDs to provide data to the commission appointed by the state government shows the level of utter disregard. Almost all the HoDs are all-India cadre officers with a responsibility to conduct the business of government as per the Constitution and in conformity to the laws and regulations in force.

As indicated generally by the commission and in successive instances, all senior all-India cadre officers would have to be party to decisions to violate the Presidential Order. The individual officers initiating and abetting these violations should be identified and action taken against them for this blatant abuse and violation of the order. The misuse of their position to benefit one class of persons at the expense of another (safeguarded) class should not be condoned. If this could be done to the settled population of Telangana, one can imagine what may have been done to the ST and SC and other classes of persons whose rights are protected by the Constitution.

If nothing else, the All-India Civil Service Cadre is expected to defend the constitutional authority, uphold the law and conduct the business of the state in conformity with rules and regulations of the government. That these senior officers could systematically flout Presidential Order is an extraordinary example of the breakdown of civil and legal authority in the conduct of government. The question of whether they were motivated by their political masters, regional feeling or by even worse considerations must be left unanswered.

Even a cursory reading of this contemporary report would easily enable even a generous reader to conclude that the administration of the state had broken down and that there was a need for intervention by the union government in order to correct the violation of, and ensure implementation of, its orders as well as to correct the effects of illegal actions, interpretations and obfuscations.

We need to bear in mind that this report was commissioned by the TDP government and has been accepted by the next Congress government. A house committee of the legislature and a group of ministers (GoM) have extensively discussed it. There is, therefore, nothing controversial about it except the revelations. These have confirmed the popular conviction that the interests of the people of Telangana cannot be safeguarded, much less advanced, within the current structure of state governance.

The figure for Telangana's share of government jobs misallocated to non-Telangana persons varies from 100,000 to 200,000. The total number of government jobs in the state is estimated at 12 lakh, of which Telangana should get a share of at least 4 lakh. A loss of

one-quarter to half of its government job entitlement would have an impact on the income of the region.[6] It further exacerbates the ever-present alienation of citizens from local government functionaries, which increases when they are dealing with non-local government employees.

Girglani hesitated to give overall figures due to lack of data from all HoDs. Whatever the real number, it is evident that not only were jobs diverted, but the whole process has undermined the legitimacy, integrity and credibility of successive political and bureaucratic administrations over the last 30 years. The final conclusion seems to be 'enough is enough', and trust in the current governance structure among the people of Telangana seems to have reached rock bottom. The saying goes, 'all politics is local'. In Telangana, this saying seems to have been reversed to the effect that 'all politics in non-local'!

We also need to bear in mind that what little evidence there has been of action taken on this exhaustive report indicates that very few, if any, remedial measures have resulted. The lethargy of the bureaucracy, the indifference of the political system, the fear of assignment of culpability, the agitation of the illegal beneficiaries and the interventions of the courts have led to an even worse situation than before the report was released. For now with the report, the problems have been highlighted and definite evidence on specific cases provided. But since the government has done nothing to rectify the illegal acts and restore the effectiveness of the Presidential Order, it has destroyed what little faith and hope the Telangana people had in the ability and willingness of the state government to give them due justice.

In the context of the tribal population, Girglani said, that it is 'the story of *nirbal se ladai balwan ki—yeh kahani hai diye ki aur tufan ki*' (the battle between the lamp and the storm). It is, therefore, abundantly clear that a separate Telangana state is needed in order to implement the assurances, guarantees and entitlements which have been acknowledged by everyone over the past five decades as necessary, fair and equitable for the people of the region. It is also an essential pre-condition for rebuilding the trust of the people in

constitutional governance norms and structures and to re-establish the rule of law.

But what does the SKC say of the Girglani Commission?

> The most important aspect of implementation of recommendations of the One Man Commission was the repatriation of non-locals. The state government issued various directions to identify non-locals appointed in deviation of the provisions in each unit of appointment. (SKC 2010: 280)

> If we look at the department-wise details of employees identified for repatriation (18,856), this preliminary conclusion by the OMC is confirmed. Of these, it is understood that 14,784 employees now stand repatriated. (Ibid.: 281)

The SKC concluded,

> We, therefore, suggest that there is no real need to have any additional administrative instrumentalities for protection of persons belonging to Telangana region in public employment. However, existing safeguards should be implemented with renewed vigour. The Committee noted the positive indications from employees from Telangana about their grievances relating to employment issues being seriously addressed by the Government *in the last five years*, which have provided them with a sense of satisfaction, notwithstanding the discontent the earlier delay had caused. (Ibid.: 293, emphasis added)

In conclusion it may be said that the SKC did not read, let alone want to understand, the Girglani (OMC) report. But why did the committee ignore a report to which much importance has been given by the GoM, cabinet and the assembly? If there was 'no real need', then why should the SKC recommend its implementation with renewed vigour? Had the SKC analysed the findings of the Girglani Report, it would have concluded that it would be difficult to safeguard the interests of the people of Telangana in a united state largely dominated by politicians and bureaucrats from Andhra.

Notes

1. The Nizam by his *firman* (order) of 1919 promulgated rules defining the parameters under which any person can be called a "mulki" (a native) and thus entitled to hold an appointment in his service. These included a persons birth in the state of Hyderabad or that of his father or that of her husband or someone who has lived there for 15 years or his father had completed 15 years of service at the time of his birth.

2. This was the report of an accountant general appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India at the request of the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh to work out the quantum of Telangana surpluses (income over expenditure) over the 12-year period on the basis of the accord arrived at by the leaders of all political parties in the state on 19 January 1969. These 'surpluses' should have been spent in the Telangana region itself as per the agreement between leaders of the two regions—Telangana and Andhra at the time of merger in 1956 (GoAP, *Report on the Quantum of Telangana Surpluses for the Period 1.11.1956 to 31.3.1968*).

3. This was a committee to further verify and confirm the findings of the Kumar Lalit report to which objections had been raised.

4. This was a committe of IAS (Indian Administrative Service) Officers to examing the issue of equitable representation of Telangana persons in government employment.

5. The House Committee was an all Party Committee of the Legislature Council and Assembly to monitor the implementation of the Government order 610 which armed at rectifying of the irregularities in the appointment of non-locals to 'local' posts.

6. As later as 2013, the argument for a united Andhra Pradesh rested on the issue of 'jobs-for-the-boys', i.e. for the Andhra boys, of course. Rayapati Sambasiva Rao, MP, and leading light of the coastal Kamma group in the Congress party said, '... they would not agree to the bifurcation of the state at any cost as it would deprive the youth of Seemandhra region of employment opportunities', 'Naidu's Telangana letter has no clarity: Rayapati Sambasiva Rao', *Times of India*, 10 February 2013.

thirteen

Muslims and Telangana
A Roundabout Journey

A perusal of history will reveal that the desire to unify territories often has many motives and much depends on who is making the case for it. Lucien D. Benichou, in his work, *From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State (1938–1948)*, gives a balanced and well-researched view (Benichou 2004). It is required reading for those interested in the last days of Hyderabad state and reveals the historical stand of the Andhra and Rayalaseema regions on unification with that state. In this chapter, we will now turn our attention to Hyderabad and briefly trace the history of the MIM to understand events better from the perspectives of the Muslims of the region.

The Nizam and His Attempt to Unite the Telugu Lands

The MIM was formed in 1929. Its young founder, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, was sophisticated, eloquent, temperamental, dynamic and reckless. He not only dealt with Nizam Asaf Jah VII directly, but also negotiated with M. Narsing Rao and others of the Andhra Jana Sangh who represented the Congress and Hindu interests. In the political drama of Hyderabad, the principal actors were the Nizam and Bahadur Yar Jung as they tried to use or complement each other. This *jugalbandi* continued till Bahadur Yar Jung died suddenly on 25 June 1944. He was only 39 years old, but

had made his presence decisively felt, for good or for bad, in the history of Hyderabad.

Most importantly, the MIM advocated a reversal of history regarding the Nizam's former possessions. In 1766 and 1778, Nizam Asaf Jah II had given the Northern Circars (Coastal Andhra region) to the East India Company for an annual rent of Rs 5 lakhs. Fifty-five years later, in 1823, when Nizam Asaf Jah III needed money, these lands were sold outright to the Company for Rs 1 crore and 66 lakhs. In 1800, Nizam Asaf Jah II had also made a deal with the Company, giving away the Rayalaseema region (as a result called the Ceded Districts).

Bahadur Yar Jung, in September 1940, proposed to reverse these treaties. Hyderabad would buy back outright the Circars and the Ceded Districts for 40 million pounds sterling. Jung also indicated that the British were agreeable, campaigned in South India and spoke in Bandar (Machilipatnam), Madras and Eluru. While local Muslims in the Coastal Andhra and Ralayaseema regions were in favour, Telugu-speaking Hindus were vociferously against this plan.

The whole idea seemed quite plausible since in 1940, the British appeared to be short of money. The British Isles were besieged by the Germans and the Luftwaffe, the German air force, was bombing London and other cities. The German invasion of England was expected any day.

The States' People, a Congress mouthpiece, stated in October 1940 that while this fabulous offer might be tempting to the British in their distress, 'The Andhra Desa is not a football ... to be kicked from one goal to another. The proposed transfer by gift or purchase concerns the life and liberties ... of eighteen millions of Andhras. You cannot uproot them in a day and transplant a whole sub-nation on a different soil that is ... barren of democratic springs' (ibid.: 124).

It was a simple land transaction for Bahadur Yar Jung and the Nizam, as it had been 150-odd years earlier, for the people's wishes did not come into the picture. Nizam Asaf Jah VII had already made massive donations towards the British war effort, including

the cost of a destroyer (lent by the British to the Royal Australian Navy and called HMAS Nizam). Additionally, he offered 50,000 pounds from the Hyderabad state exchequer and an unprecedented personal gift of Rs 5 lakhs in July 1940. The Nizam had the money and the British needed it!

At the MIM's 13th Annual Conference at Jalna on 1 January 1942, Bahadur Yar Jung repeated before 15,000 delegates the Hyderabad offer for the Northern Circars and Ceded Districts. The *Deccan Times* (Madras) reported on 1 February 1942 that the British government was 'quite amenable to His Exalted Highness' demands' and that a notification confirming it would be issued shortly.

The *Hindu* (1942) published the Masulipatnam Journalists Association resolution that: '... no portion of the territory in and outside the town of Masulipatnam or forming part of ... the Northern Circars should be given over to ... the Nizam of Hyderabad as he has surrendered his sovereign rights ... by previous historical treaties and declarations' (Benichou 2000: 125–26).

The controversy finally ended when the British denied the existence of the recession plan for Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. What Bahadur Yar Jung proposed can also be seen as an attempt to unify the Telugu people under one government. But in 1939–42 it was unacceptable to the people of Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema. And yet, a decade later, once the Nizam had been dispossessed, the same people became the driving force for the merger with Telangana.

In the background of all that has happened—(i) the ceding of territories to the British; (ii) the attempts at recession; (iii) the outcry of the people of these areas against it; (iv) the merger of these areas with the Telangana region of Hyderabad state; and (v) the demand for bifurcation or possible trifurcation of the merged state—it is clear that the problem of keeping Andhra Pradesh united dones not emerge from Telangana or Rayalaseema but from the aggressiveness and highly developed economic and political power of Coastal Andhra. This is why the politicians of Telangana, and now, of Rayalaseema, seem to fear their Andhra counterparts and want separate states of their own.

The End of Muslim Rule

With the take-over by the Indian Army, Hyderabad came under military rule. The Government of India was uncertain about the action itself as it violated the Standstill Agreement signed with the Nizam's government. It was also concerned about the legal position which indicated that Hyderabad state became independent with the passage of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 by British Parliament. With that act the British sovereign gave up his paramount power over the Hyderabad (and all other princely states). This being the case and with the Nizam having already appealed to the UNSC against the invasion, the situation was uncertain.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the invasion, there had been extensive massacres of Muslims in the western districts of Hyderabad state bordering Bombay. This was known but concealed till a semi-official committee toured the areas and reported to Nehru and Sardar Patel. This was the Sundarlal Committee Report.

The report surfaced in 2001 when the noted advocate and author A. G. Noorani revealed it to the media. Noorani wrote, 'Dr Charan Sandhilya, Director of Pandit Sunderlal Institute of Asian Studies at Ghaziabad, oftained for this writer a copy of the full text of the Sunderlal Report from the Nerhu Memorial Museum and Librry, New Delhi' (*Frontline* 2001a). In the companion piece, Noorani published the covering letter conveying the report to Prime Minister Nehru and state's minister Sardar Patel (*Frontline* 2001b).

The covering letter says that the team consisting of Pandit Sundarlal, Kazi Abdul Ghaffar and Maulana Abdulla Misri visited Hyderabad state between 9 November and 21 December 1948. The letter 'clarified our position, whenever opportunity presented itself saying that ours was not a Commission of investigation or Inquiry into events preceding or following the police action and that ours was merely a goodwill mission charged with the task of restoring better communal relations' (Pingle 2012).

They toured nine out of 16 districts of the state, seven district headquarters, 21 towns and 23 important villages. They concluded,

> Out of them (16 districts) only three districts remained practically, though not wholly, free of communal trouble which affected the State first during the activities of the Razakars and then during the reprisals that followed the collapse of that organisation. In another four districts the trouble had been more serious but nothing like the havoc that overtook the remaining eight. Out of these, again, the worst sufferers have been the districts of Osmanabad, Gulburga, Bidar and Nanded, in which four the number of people killed during and after police action was not less, if not more, than 18,000. In the other four districts viz. Aurangabad, Bir, Nalgonda and Medak those who lost their lives numbered at least 5,000. We can say at a very conservative estimate that in the whole State at least 27,000 to 40,000 people lost their lives during and after police action. (Ibid.)

Speaking of the worst-affected districts, the team wrote,

> It is a significant fact that out of these eight the four worst affected districts (Osmanabad, Gulburga, Bidar and Nanded) had been the main strongholds of Razakars and the people of these four districts had been the worst sufferers at the hands of the Razakars. (Ibid.)

Most of the districts cited were the ones bordering Bombay province. The committee added,

> The perpetrators of these atrocities were not limited to those who had suffered at the hands of Razakars, or to the non-Muslims of Hyderabad state. These latter were aided and abetted by individuals and bands of people, with and without arms, from across the (Bombay) border, who had infiltrated through in the wake of the Indian Army.
>
> We found definite indications that a number of armed and trained men belonging to a well-known Hindu communal organisation from Sholapur and other Indian towns, as also some local and outside Communists, participated in these riots and in some cases actually led the rioters. (Ibid.)

It can be seen that according to the Sunderlal Committee, Arya Samajists, RSS and communists had banded together in murdering helpless Muslims.

But the team also stated,

> Duty also compels us to add that we had absolutely unimpeachable evidence to the effect that there were instances in which men belonging to the Indian Army and also to the local police took part in looting and even other crimes. During our tour we gathered, at not a few places, that soldiers encouraged, persuaded and, in a few cases, even compelled the Hindu mob to loot Muslim shops and houses.... Complaints of molestation and abduction of girls, against Sikh soldiers particularly, were by no means rare.... Unfortunately there was a certain element in the Army which was not free from communal feelings, probably because some of them could not forget the atrocities committed elsewhere on their own kith and kin. Lest we might be understood to imply a slur on the Indian Army, we hasten to record our considered opinion that the Indian Army and its officers in Hyderabad generally maintained a high standard of discipline and sense of duty. (Ibid.)

Also,

> This communal trouble followed close on the heels of the police action and the consequent collapse of the Razakar organisation, which had stood in the Muslim mind as an effective barrier against the establishment of responsible government which was synonymous, to the average Hyderabadi Muslim, with Hindu Raj, because it would be based on the will of the Hindu majority. Muslim masses were generally slow to realise that their sufferings were the inevitable repercussions of the atrocities committed on the Hindus only, a few days before, by the Razakars. (Ibid.)

And the saving grace was,

> We were given by Muslims instances in which Hindus had defended and given protection to their Muslim neighbours, men and women even at the cost of their own lives. In some professions, the fellow feeling was particularly marked. For instance, at places Hindu weavers defended Muslim weavers against Hindus and protected them often at a very heavy cost (including loss of life) to themselves. Many Hindus helped in the recovery of abducted Muslim women. (Ibid.)

The trauma of the take-over was to last for a long time as many Muslim middle-class families migrated to Pakistan while many rural Muslim families migrated to Hyderabad city. The total loss of life in that brief period has never been exceeded since by deaths of persons of any religious status due to communal riots in India. The psychological impact of the loss of political power and economic well being by the Muslim ruling elite in Hyderabad was also in many ways conveyed down the social and economic pyramid to the Muslim masses. The onset of democracy did very little for the minority Muslim community and helped them only in areas of concentration such as in the Old City of Hyderabad. Here Muslim politics took a different turn depending on the tension between Congress party factions and later between the Congress and other political parties. The main issue was of course to consolidate the Muslim vote bank by ensuring that tension continued to exist between the two communities—Hindus and Muslims.

'Spontaneous Communal Riots'

The Muslims and Hindus of the Old City have, on several occasions, been subject to apparently contrived communal riots initiated in order to destabilise Congress chief ministers, usually by Congress faction leaders. The 'usual' riots, which are an instinctive response to a rumour or trivial incident, typically die down within a day or two without much damage or loss of life. But these 'engineered' riots with a hidden agenda are much more violent and longer, leading to extensive loss of life and property.

The first such instance was in 1989 when Hyderabad saw its worst communal riots which were triggered after Dr Marri Channa Reddy, a senior Telangana politician, took over as Congress chief minister. These riots were widely rumoured to have been engineered by a powerful Rayalaseema faction in the Congress, which wanted to see its leader as chief minister instead. In fact, there is a long and persistent history of almost senseless violence based on a medieval clash of egos, family feuds and economic and political interests in Rayalaseema, long predating Naxalism (*Siasat Daily* 2011). This has now pervaded not only the political world of Rayalseema, but spread to other parts as well.

The 2010 riots are another illustration of how communal riots seemingly can be manufactured to order. In March that year, a communal clash occurred in the Old City in response to the removal of green flags (strung up for a Muslim festival) and their subsequent replacement by saffron flags on the occasion of the Hindu festival of Ram Navami.

The media reported that at a meeting held by Home Minister Sabita Indra Reddy with city MLAs, MIM MLA Akbaruddin Owaisi said the clashes were engineered to bring down the then Congress chief minister K. Rosaiah's regime (*Economic Times* 2010). Similar views were echoed by Congress Rajya Sabha MP V. Hanumanth Rao and Nizamabad Congress Lok Sabha MP Madhu Yashki Goud (*Times of India* 2010b).

The then city police commissioner A. K. Khan was quoted as having described the clashes in the Old City as an 'organized attempt' by some persons, which would be probed by the Special Investigation Team (SIT). Briefing the media about the clashes, Khan said, 'It looks like some persons incited the violence deliberately' (*New Indian Express* 2010).

More interestingly, the media asked, 'But is there a similarity of purpose between now and 1989? Riots were triggered in 1989 after Marri Channa Reddy took over as chief minister, frustrating the attempts of another powerful faction within the Congress, which wanted to see its leader in the gaddi' (Ibid.).

Muslims, Communal Riots and Telangana Politics

The Telangana leaders added their perspective to these claims. Madhu Yashki Goud claimed that the same forces that had fomented trouble in 1989 to dislodge Channa Reddy were responsible for the 2010 riots. He is quoted as saying, 'Violence broke out at eight places. All the incidents were pre-meditated. They were engineered to bring down Chief Minister K. Rosaiah's government' (*Siasat Daily* 2010). Mr Yashki also alleged that leaders of the Andhra and Rayalaseema regions saw the riots as serving twin objectives of Rosaiah's exit and an end to the Telangana movement (ibid.).

Other Telangana leaders such as Congress dalit MLA P. Sankar Rao were quoted as supporting the contention: 'This seems to be a repeat of 1989. This is a conspiracy against Rosaiah. Party president Sonia Gandhi is being briefed by the IB' (ibid.). It was further reported that when Mr Rosaiah held a meeting with city MLAs and police officials, MIM floor leader in the assembly, Akbaruddin Owaisi, expressed the same views. However, the BJP suspected the hand of MIM in the riots (ibid.).

The 2010 riots were seen as a repeat performance, the modus operandi and the Congress opposition faction being the same, to remove a chief minister, this time from Coastal Andhra, who was selected by the high command, overruling the open demands of the Rayalaseema faction led by Y. S. Jaganmohan Reddy, son of the late chief minister Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy, but also as an attempt to derail the Telangana statehood movement.

If reports of this nature found their way into the mass media, it may well be imagined how great was the fear and anxiety in Muslim and Hindu localities of the Old City. The issue of Telangana needs to be seen in the context of the potential for communal violence. The grievances of the Muslims in the region, which took birth and grew after the end of the Nizam's rule in 1948, has allowed politicians to cash in on it for electoral gains for many decades.

In 2007, the Congress government of Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy formed the GHMC covering 626 square kilometres by merging the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (covering only 175 square kilometres) with 12 outlying municipalities.

As a result, as the SKC report says, 'The expansion of GHMC has led to a sharp decline in vote share for MIM from 29% to 14% and an equivalent increase for the TDP and also the Congress' (SKC 2010: 300). This too would have had its effect on the usual apprehensions of 41 per cent of the Andhra Pradesh Muslims who live in Hyderabad and who had elected 43 corporators, seven MLAs, two members of the legislative concil (MLCs) and one MP from Hyderabad and none from the rest of the state. This would seem to indicate that the MIM electoral base was concentrated only in the Old City.

While Hyderabad has shown tremendous growth and change there was inevitably a downside to it. As the SKC mentioned,

> It is critical to note that the share of modern services in Hyderabad's economy has increased from 24% to 39% in a relatively short period of time. Most of this increase is offset by decreases across the board, but most significantly in the share of manufacturing (-6%), transport and public services (-4% each). (Ibid.: 309)

The Muslim population was affected badly in the changing scenario:

> One striking aspect of this difference is with respect to Muslims. As compared to the rest of the city, the Muslims have been less in modern and public services and more in traditional services and manufacturing .... Moreover, over time, this difference is becoming sharper, as they are participating much less in the transition to modern services. While the decline in the share of public employment is common across the city, the Muslims seem to be moving more towards manufacturing and construction while the non-Muslims are moving towards modern services, ... Taken to an extreme, this may have social repercussions, as they may feel excluded if the policies of the city become oriented more towards a service city, rather than a manufacturing city. (Ibid.: 311)

But SKC also admitted, 'The Muslims in Telangana, contrary to common belief, are doing well on consumption improvement (by

76%) and poverty reduction levels (by 33 points)' (ibid.: 363). The reality and perception of the Muslim condition seems to be quite mixed and needs closer study.

The AI-MIM claims to represent the interests of all the Muslims of Andhra Pradesh. Its strength, however, is largely localised in Hyderabad and that too in the Old City where a large concentration of Muslim population exists.

In its Wikileaks cable dated 13 May 2009, US Consulate, Hyderabad advised Washington,

> In this Congress stronghold state, MIM survives partially through a tacit agreement with the ruling party. Congress consistently runs weak candidates against the MIM, and in return the five-strong MIM delegation in the state assembly supports the Congress. The MIM continues to emphasize its role as spokesman for India's Muslims in Parliament, where, in the party's view, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) represents the greatest long-term threat to the community. Making no secret of its disdain for the BJP's Hindu-nationalist ideology and with no apparent concern for hypocrisy, the MIM presents itself to its Old City Muslim supporters as a secular antagonist to the BJP. It is a widely held view that this MIM stand against Hindu nationalism is an important factor behind the party's continued strength in this small pocket of Andhra Pradesh. (Wikileaks 2013)

In late 2006, spokesperson for MIM, Akbaruddin Owaisi, the younger son of the founder, spoke about the history of the region.

> The state had witnessed two violent agitations—firstly in Telangana region during 1969–71 and secondly in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema region in 1972–73—which claimed scores of innocent lives and led to untold repression on the people by the security forces. It may be recalled that the Telangana Praja Samithi swept the Lok Sabha polls in Telangana in 1971 and Shri Satyanarayana Rao was among the 10 MPs elected on the TPS banner out of the 14 in the region. The TPS contested the polls on the plank of separate Telangana state. (Rediff.com 2010)

Subsequently, Congress leaders in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema, seeking a separate Andhra state, spearheaded the Jai Andhra movement. During both these violent agitations, the AI-MIM adopted a clear-cut stand against bifurcation of the state. The AI-MIM stood for an integrated Andhra Pradesh, much before the votaries of separate Telangana merged the TPS back into the Congress, and the Jai Andhra protagonists had no qualms about rejoining the Congress. It was the AI-MIM's stand that was vindicated by the developments that followed both these separatist agitations (Pingle 2012).

MIM President and MP Asaduddin Owaisi stated,

> If Telangana is formed, politically it will be beneficial for my party as it can win 15 to 20 seats in a 119-member assembly. But we are not looking at the issue from the angle of political benefit. We feel that it will not be in the interest of Muslim minority. BJP can never think of coming to power in an integrated Andhra Pradesh but they will have a chance in separate Telangana. We are neither for Telangana state nor for a united Andhra Pradesh. We are just saying that when they sit for discussion to decide the fate of the state, MIM should have chair at the table and Muslims as a stakeholders should be heard. (Rediff.com 2010)

In keeping with its position, the MIM made the following submission to the SKC,

> In their detailed memorandum submitted to the Committee and during an extensive meeting held with the Committee, the President and the senior office-bearers of AI-MIM strongly advocated the cause of united Andhra Pradesh underlining that it was in the best interest of not only the state's economic growth, but also the well-being of the minority Muslim community. Although the influence of the party is generally limited to the city of Hyderabad, it does have district offices spread all over the state. The delegation also voiced the opinion that in case the Committee recommends division of the state then it would be in the interest of the minority community to form a new state

> combining the Telangana and Rayalaseema regions into Rayala-Telangana state. If, however, neither of the above two desirable options are found feasible and formation of Telangana (without Rayalaseema) becomes inevitable, then Hyderabad should be part of Telangana and should not be given any other status. The argument of creating Rayala-Telangana is possibly based on the demographic composition of Rayalaseema. It has over 12% Muslim population, as compared to just above 8% in the rest of Telangana and the MIM may believe that it will be able to extend its influence beyond the city of Hyderabad in a Rayala-Telangana state. (SKC 2010: 300)

Thus, according to the SKC, MIM's first option was a united state, despite the reservation expressed by it to the government over Telangana rights being violated. The second option is the curious Rayala-Telangana formation that does not make any sense except for the greater Muslim population and, finally, if none of these works, Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital (ibid.: 383).

Much had been considered but remained publicly unexpressed on the communal implications of statehood for Telangana but this was divulged unexpectedly in the extracts of the secret note of chapter 8 of the SKC report as revealed in the high court judgment of 23 March 2011. It quoted extracts from the SKC's secret note on Muslims:

> ... There is a certain sense of mutual suspicion between two communities who are living in the above-mentioned areas. If communal passions become an additional factor in an atmosphere where unemployment, social unrest, etc. exist, it may give rise to birth of militant, Jihadi elements.... (Reddy 2011: 37)

And, as regards Hindus,

> Telangana has large number of Muslim pockets and, to counter Muslim influence, Hindu fundamentalists may compete with them and try to polarize the Hindu population.... (Ibid.: 37)

On communal violence, the SKC has this to say,

> As the State has, by and large, been able to neutralize most of the Jihadi elements in the last two decades and has evolved a suitable mechanism to contain communal and factional resistance, there may not be much change on the position on these two fronts. The status quo may remain. Since the alignment of political forces on communal lines is likely to be less probable, the outbreak of communal violence would be contingent upon extraneous factors. (SKC 2010: 38)

Thus the secret note to chapter 8 of the SKC adds further dimensions to the communal angle without going into the background of communal riots that took place in March 2010 while the SKC was active but took no cognisance of these extraordinary events. This surprising omission has not helped allay concerns about its capacity for balance and fairness.

The high court judgment itself comments,

> Option No. 3 in the report was about merger of Rayalaseema with Telangana. In the main report, almost a rosy picture was painted about it, even while expressing the view that no political party may agree for that course. In the (secret) report, however, the Committee has this to say, "Since the BJP has a strong presence; it may try to consolidate in Telangana area and further extend its base. AI-MIM may try to expand in Rayalaseema regions resulting in the birth of militant communalism in certain pockets". (Ibid.: 38–39)

At this juncture, it appears that the aggressive capitalist-politicians from the Seemandhra region realising that they could no longer prevent the formation of Telangana, tried to find a solution that protected their own interests by ensuring that Hyderabad was to be given the status of a UT.

After attempting to be as flexible as he possibly could, finally, on 6 July 2011, Asaduddin Owaisi declared that MIM, in principle, was not in favour of bifurcation of the state but if it is done, then Hyderabad should be the capital of Telangana (*Siasat Daily* 2011).

The MIM and the Owaisis represent the electoral will of Muslims in Hyderabad and also claim to speak for Muslims across the state. The Muslims in Seemandhra seem quite capable of taking care of themselves without MIM assistance, as they had for a hundred-odd-years before the merger of Andhra with Telangana. As for the Muslims of Telangana, heirs to the long tradition of the Nizam's state, in the end, they may find it safer and easier to have to deal with only their age-old neighbours—the Hindus of Telangana.

fourteen

Irrigation in Telangana
The Rise and Fall of Tanks

Are the agriculturalists in thy kingdom contented? Are large tanks and lakes constructed all over thy kingdom at proper distances, without agriculture being in thy realm entirely dependent on the showers of heaven?

—Narada to Yudhishthira (Ganguly vol. 2 2001: 12)

Irrigation works are the source of crops; the results of a good shower are ever attained in the case of crops below irrigation works.

—Kautilya (Shamasastry 1915: 374)

Virtue and prosperity will increase only when tanks and irrigation canals are constructed and favour shown to poor cultivators in the matter of taxation and services.

—Emperor Krishna Deva Raya of Vijayanagara (Appadorai vol. 2 1936: 668)

In comparing socio-economic indicators and Millennium Development Goals, there is an almost perfect correlation between poverty and lack of access to irrigation.

—Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP 2010: 7)

Over a period of 53 years from 1956 to 2009, Telangana lost 3.12 lakh hectares of tank irrigation (see Table 14.2). This implies a loss of nearly Rs 30,000 crore in government investment and it has again declined from its mid-period peak of 1990–92. Serious

attention needs to be paid to stabilising surface irrigation flow in Telangana. Meanwhile, during the same period, the area irrigated by wells has grown 10-fold from about 1.30 lakh hectares to nearly 13 lakh hectares (overtaking, by a big margin, tank as well as canal irrigation) (see Table 14.9) as the major contributor to Telangana irrigation. The chief component of the growth is the tube well segment, which is a high-cost source of irrigation, both in terms of capital and operating costs, and is entirely dependent on the recharge of groundwater and both the availability and cost of power.

Agriculture now produces only 24 per cent of the total Telangana income but nearly 62 per cent of the population of Telangana population survives on it (SKC 2010: 69, 98; Figures 2.4 and 2.32). Whatever the future irrigation policy, it will need to include a close co-ordination between efforts at the ground level, at the local, district and at the regional government levels.

Telangana had been the major region of the princely state of Hyderabad from 1724 to 1956. From the 1870s onwards, under the pressure and 'guidance' of his British suzerain, the Nizam of Hyderabad and his government began to take an interest in irrigation as a means of avoiding and mitigating famine. However, reliable data on acreage under different sources are available only since the 1920s when detailed statistical and revenue records began to be published.

The taxes on unirrigated and irrigated land (the latter at a much higher rate) were the major source of government revenues. While these taxes took a substantial part of the value of the crop, irrigation development became the basis of sound revenue and fiscal policy. Hyderabad state had a much higher incidence of land taxation (taxes in relation to value of crop) compared to the British-ruled provinces. This strategy paid off and Hyderabad became the richest princely state in India, capable of funding part of the war effort of the British Empire in the two World Wars. It also funded a bankrupt Pakistan when it ran short of money soon after its creation. The Nizam himself was reputed to be the richest individual in the world but the Telangana farmers remained poor and insecure. By 1956, the Hyderabad state was generating substantial annual surpluses and had accumulated reserves. Even after trifurcation of the state, the Telangana region showed similar trends, generating surplus revenues over expenditures.[1]

The Andhra Pradesh state-level figures for irrigation are given in Table 14.1 below. They show substantial rises in canal and well irrigation but a drastic fall in tank irrigation. The decline in tank irrigation seems curious considering that it nearly tripled in the many decades before the creation of Andhra Pradesh.[2]

TABLE 14.1 AP Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Tank	Canal	Well	Total State
1903–04	4,26,258	6,42,472	2,17,065	12,85,795
1956–57	11,79,987	12,74,305	3,70,759	28,25,051
1970–72	9,56,700	15,16,901	5,70,900	30,44,501
1980–82	9,43,251	17,27,843	8,00,600	34,71,694
1990–92	9,33,019	18,30,076	13,72,600	41,35,695
2001–05	4,89,974	15,84,697	18,85,966	39,60,637
2005–09	6,21,657	16,18,470	21,59,848	43,99,975

Source: Bureau of Economics and Statistics (BES), various years.

The three sources of irrigation in Telangana will be examined to understand their variations over time, occasionally referring, where relevant, to the two other regions and the state as a whole. The source-wise distribution of irrigation in Telangana is given in Table 14.2.

TABLE 14.2 Telangana Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Tank	Canal	Well	Total
1875[3]	41,000	7,000	46,000	95,000
1901[4]				3,04,423
1920[5]	1,39,511	27,447	1,08,535	2,75,492
1930[6]	2,56,714	61,700	1,77,980	4,96,394
1940[7]	3,73,684	51,417	1,94,332	6,19,433
1956–57	5,30,565	1,16,619	1,29,869	8,01,586
1970–72	3,30,920	1,98,701	2,14,500	8,50,055
1980–82	3,86,351	2,81,843	3,41,400	10,34,487
1990–92	3,80,319	3,38,276	7,04,400	14,85,795
2001–05	1,65,303	1,62,315	9,74,470	13,44,604
2005–09	2,18,124	2,59,629	12,17,642	16,95,395

Source: BES, various years.

It is evident that in Telangana while well irrigation has advanced substantially, canal irrigation reached a peak in 1990–92 and then showed a decline, to recover later. Tank irrigation, on the other hand, has declined drastically ever since 1956–57 and shows little signs of recovery. Despite this, the total irrigated acreage has grown but it is driven largely by private sector investment in well irrigation which has doubled since 1956–57. There has, therefore, been a drastic relative decline in the share of government-funded irrigation in Telangana since 1956–57 as evidenced by the radically different growth rates of irrigated area under wells (private investment) and canals and tanks (public investment).

Tank Irrigation

The role of tank irrigation in south India is well known to historians of the area. The enormous numbers of inscriptions at tank sites and in temples proclaim the active role of Chola, Pandya, Vijayanagara and Kakatiya kings and viceroys in the construction of tanks.[8] Some tank-irrigated lands were granted tax-free to temples for the performance of rituals: as were some lands to carpenters, masons, boatmen, fishermen, water regulators and others for the upkeep and maintenance of tanks and desilting operations (IDA 1917–18: 145).[9] Other inscriptions also show the builder to be a private individual seeking merit by dedicating tank-irrigated lands to the temple or investing for his own benefit (Venkayya 1906: 202–11; also see Talbot 2001: 104–05).

While the state or donor underwrote the capital costs, 'tank committees' carried out maintenance operations (IDA 1918–21: 143).[10] This seems to have been a source of great strength and resilience for south Indian agrarian society when faced with war and conquest and the successive dissolution of one state and the rise and dominance of another. In short, south India owes the survival of its culture, religion and ritual to the independent economic base built around 'tank and temple' (Talbot 2001: 92–125).

By the thirteenth century, moral incentives were strengthened when construction of tanks was included among the seven acts of charity which were considered especially meritorious. The construction of tanks had become the major investment activity for

rulers and local potentates. So common were these tanks that the *Padma Purana* (circa 750 BC) has an entire chapter on ritual for the consecration of tanks (Venkayya 1906: 202).

The topography and rainfall pattern in Telangana made tank irrigation an ideal type of irrigation. The dense forest cover and generally favourable soil structure helped in promoting paddy/rice cultivation through tanks irrigation, and shallow rock below facilitated groundwater storage and recharge and, consequently, subsequent exploitation by wells.

The knowledge and technology for identification of sites, construction of dams and maintenance of tanks was well developed in south India (Srinivasan 1970: 315–25). Till the decline and end of the Kakatiya dynasty, the construction of tanks seems to have been a common feature in Telangana (Talbot 2001: 40–41; 95–99). Many of these tanks are still in use. Elaborate technical and ritual specifications were developed for identification of sites and construction of tank bunds and canals.[11] Krishna Deva Raya, Emperor of Vijayanagara, even sent for Portuguese masons in order to build an embankment 'a cross bow shot wide' (Nuniz as quoted in Longhurst 1917: 50).

Under Muslim rule, the religious part of the motivation ceased to guide the rulers but, in course of time, the economic rationale ensured some construction activity.[12] Data on this is scarce, and trade and commerce seem to have had more importance in this period than agriculture.

TABLE 14.3 AP Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Andhra Coastal	Total State
1875[13]	41,000	70,600[14]	n.a.	1,11,600
1903–04[15]	1,39,511[16]	1,07,349	1,79,398	4,26,258
1956–57	5,30,565	1,83,942	4,65,389	11,79,896
1970–72	3,30,920	1,47,800	4,77,980	9,56,700
1980–82	3,86,351	91,000	4,65,900	9,43,251
1990–92	3,80,319	88,800	4,63,900	9,33,019
2001–05	1,65,303	42,479	2,82,192	4,89,974
2005–09	2,18,124	54,439	3,49,094	6,21,657

Source: BES, various years.

Table 14.3 indicates that in the Telangana region between 1956–57 and 2008–09 there was a loss in tank irrigation from 1956–57 and 2005–09 of 58 per cent, i.e. 312,441 hectares. Over the same period, Rayalaseema lost 129,503 hectares, which was about 70 per cent of its acreage in 1956–57. Similarly, the loss in the Coastal Andhra was 116,295 hectares but its relative decline over this period was only 25 per cent and is substantially lower compared to the other regions. So, while there has been a decline in tank irrigation in Andhra Pradesh generally, the decline has not been uniform across the regions.

These facts merit a closer look at the Telangana region and its irrigation sector with emphasis on tank irrigation where the decline has been most severe and the well irrigation sector where the rise has been phenomenal. Canal irrigation in Telangana has been variable and subject to major investment decisions at the state level, which are dependent on complex issues of political economy, inter-state and intra-state relations.

In Telangana, as will be seen from Table 14.4, the major push in tank irrigation came over the 65-year period between 1875 and 1940 when tank irrigation multiplied by nine-fold, while the total irrigation in Telangana grew by seven-fold (Table 14.2). Between 1940 and 1957, however, tank irrigation increased by 42 per cent and total irrigation by 25 per cent. On the whole, the Nizam's government can justifiably claim credit for this massive effort and achievement. The next five decades or so (1956–57 to 2008–09), after the merger of Telangana with Andhra, on the other hand, saw a fall in tank irrigation by about 59 per cent or 2,92,546 hectares, while the total irrigation from all sources doubled (Table 14.2).[17]

The four year averages for 2001–05 and 2005–09 indicate a sharp recovery. However, Table 14.5 gives the annual data for the eight-year period from 2001 to 2009, which shows a sharp and steady decline in tank irrigation in the first four years. The average for the period 2001–05 conceals a drastic decline of over 34 per cent within the period, losing nearly another 66,324 hectares. But in the four years, i.e. between 2005–09 there has been a recovery. The average for the period 2005–09 is higher than that of 2001–05 due to better monsoon conditions, but the acreage is variable.

TABLE 14.4 Telangana Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Telangana
1875[18]	41,000
1920[19]	1,39,511
1930[20]	2,56,714
1940[21]	3,73,684
1956–57	5,30,565
1970–72	3,30,920
1980–82	3,86,351
1990–92	3,80,319
2001–05	1,65,303
2005–09	2,18,124

Source: BES, various years.

TABLE 14.5 Eight-year Tank Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Year	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Andhra Coastal	Total
2001–02	1,92,844	78,421	2,96,284	5,67,549
2002–03	1,53,090	35,147	2,37,440	4,25,677
2003–04	1,88,758	27,131	2,73,671	4,89,560
2004–05	1,26,520	29,218	3,21,371	4,77,109
4-year Average	1,65,303	42,479	2,82,192	4,89,974
2005–06	2,43,855	81,019	3,26,752	6,51,626
2006–07	2,29,035	34,788	3,38,404	8,36,806
2007–08	1,61,587	56,456	3,66,922	5,84,965
2008–09	2,38,019	45,491	3,64,299	6,47,809
4-year Average	2,18,124	54,439	3,49,094	6,21,657

Source: BES, various years.

As we have seen, in the last five decades, tank-irrigated area in Telangana has declined by 3,12,441 hectares. At the opportunity cost of Rs 4 lakh per acre or Rs 9.88 lakh per hectare (the estimated cost of new canal irrigation), this is a massive loss of capital (AP Vision 2020 1999: 171–74). What makes it worse is that the total irrigated area under all sources, after reaching a peak average of 14,85,795

hectares in 1990–92, declined to 13,44,604 hectares in 2001–05 and then rose to 16,95,395 hectares in 2005–09 (Table 14.2). This indicates a shift of primacy from tank irrigation to well irrigation.

The decline in tank irrigation is intriguing and needs close study, especially as its advantages are obvious. First, it is a type of irrigation favoured by the terrain and its topography. Second, tanks are a quick gestation project where paddy fields can be brought into cultivation within a short period. Third, the system of maintenance is well-established and can be continued on lines similar to the past. Fourth, the technology is simple and needs no sophistication engineering (though with earth-moving equipment the gestation period can be reduced and de-silting accelerated). Fifth, tank irrigation is more amenable to the farmers' control than irrigation under major canal systems.

There are apparently four crucial reasons, however, that seem to be the cause of decline in tank irrigation. One reason may be the transfer of tanks (below 100 acres) to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and their consequent neglect due to the lack of funds allocated to them for this task.[22] Furthermore, the state budget allocations[23] to the minor irrigation acreage are very poor compared to the potential to be realised. The second reason could be that, in practical terms, tanks, in contrast to large projects, constitute too small an investment for the political-administrative class to bother about.

Encroachment on tank beds arising from government allocation of this land to the landless is the third reason for the decline of tanks. The consequent disputes have led to declines in acreage as tank bed farmers have little interest in maintaining water levels in the tank. The grant of fishing rights in tanks by government to 'recognised' fishermen co-operatives also set up an opposed interest of a different kind. This group does not want water to be released at all in order to maintain their fisheries. Given this policy, which did not recognise the primacy of farmers dependent on tank irrigation, the inevitable consequence was a decline in tank irrigation, which was not foreseen by the decision-makers.

The last and the most important factor is that the general loss of heavy forest cover in Telangana has had an adverse effect on rainfall and this, in turn, has impacted tank irrigation by reducing the rate of replenishment of tanks.

The major weakness of tank irrigation is that it is wholly dependent on monsoon rainfall. Tanks need to be recharged by rainwater and they, in turn, recharge the groundwater by seepage from the irrigated as well as from the storage areas. The dependence on rainfall is illustrated by variability of acreage irrigated under tanks. The figures for the period 1956–57 to 2005–09 indicate a wide variation between a high of 5,26,000 hectares (in 1978–79) to a low of 1,07,715 hectares (in 1997–98) (BES 1980; 1999); though with all the variation due to rainfall, there seems to be a decline in tank-irrigated land.

Comparison of rainfall data available for the last eight years indicates that monsoon was initially poor (2001–05) and then quite good (2005–09) (Table 14.6). The results show up in fluctuations in tank irrigation acreage. In the years 2002–03 and 2004–05, when all the Telangana districts received below-normal annual rainfall, there was a sharp decline in tank-irrigated acreage of 21 per cent and 33 per cent respectively over the previous year. On the other hand, the best year, 2005–06, when all districts showed above-normal figures, witnessed an extraordinary recovery, nearly doubling the previous years' acreage.

TABLE 14.6 Telangana Districts: Annual Normal Rainfall in Millimetres and Percentage Deviations from Normal

District	Normal (N)	2001–02	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2006–07	2008–09	2008–09
Mahabubnagar	604	14	-11	3	-32	61	-20	40	-24
Ranga Reddy	781	1	-24	13	-23	45	-19	17	-2
Hyderabad	779	6	-21	10	-19	50	-5	22	25
Medak	874	-21	-38	-6	-39	3	-16	-8	-19
Nizamabad	1036	-15	-37	-16	-26	13	-7	-7	-19
Adilabad	1158	-12	-24	-3	-35	4	-2	-21	-23
Karimnagar	969	-22	-36	-20	-43	6	11	-8	-19
Warangal	993	-18	-37	0	-30	20	3	12	4
Khammam	1125	-18	-32	10	-6	37	-5	13	18
Nalgonda	751	-8	-40	-1	-31	33	-27	9	-9

Source: BES, various years.

Canal Irrigation

During the Asaf Jahi rule, one major irrigation project, Nizamsagar, and several medium schemes were undertaken. The real momentum, however, came with independence and assistance from the central government when giant projects such as Nagarjunasagar and Pochampad were undertaken. As Table 14.7 indicates, the post-merger period saw a sharp increase in canal irrigation in Telangana by 70 per cent between 1956 and 1970–72. Compared to 1970–72, there is a growth of another 42 per cent by 1980–82. Thereafter, between 1980–82 and 1990–92, the rate of growth fell to 20 per cent. This turned into a decline of over 50 per cent between the periods 1990–92 and 2001–05. During 2005–09, fortunately, new irrigation projects seem to have come on-stream and canal irrigation has seen a stabilisation at an average of around 2,60,000 hectares.[24]

TABLE **14.7** AP Canal Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Coastal Andhra	Total AP
1903–04[25]	27,447[26]	47,287	5,67,738	6,42,472
1956–57	1,16,619	82,940	10,74,746	12,74,305
1970–72	1,98,701	1,53,000	11,65,200	15,16,901
1980–82	2,81,843	1,63,400	12,82,600	17,27,843
1990–92	3,38,276	1,64,700	13,28,000	18,30,076
2001–05	1,62,315	3,61,721	10,60,661	13,13,406
2005–09	2,59,629	1,29,423	12,29,409	15,68,460

Source: BES, various years.

Table 14.8 shows that the decline in canal irrigation *within* the period 2001–05 was alarming: it fell precipitously by 53 per cent or 1,31,887 hectares[27] from 2000–01 to 2004–05. It then improved during 2005–09 to exceed the 2001–02 figures, partly as old areas recovered under the very favourable monsoon conditions of 2005–06 and the slightly less favourable years thereafter.

TABLE 14.8 Eight-year Canal Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Year	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Andhra Coastal	Total
2001–02	2,48,091	1,11,418	12,02,904	15,62,413
2002–03	1,48,815	64,900	9,94,823	12,08,538
2003–04	1,36,151	76,680	9,23,865	11,36,696
2004–05	1,16,203	1,08,723	11,21,053	13,45,979
4-year Average	1,62,315	90,430	10,60,661	13,13,406
2005–06	2,63,422	1,33,700	11,75,100	15,72,222
2006–07	2,79,493	1,10,296	12,32,965	16,22,754
2007–08	2,22,023	1,33,816	12,53,579	14,09,418
2008–09	2,73,579	1,39,878	12,55,990	16,69,447
4-year Average	2,59,629	1,29,423	12,29,409	15,68,460

Source: BES, various years.

Thus, weather conditions seem to affect canal irrigation, despite it being thought of as a guaranteed all-weather irrigation. From media reports, the new canal irrigation is yet to materialise fully.[28] Nevertheless, official statistics show an increase in new canal irrigation ayacut (major and medium) of 1,18,739 hectares during 2004–07, with nearly 59 per cent of this or 69,876 hectares coming into being in 2006–07 (Irrigation and CAD Department 2010). The Irrigation and Command Area Development (I&CAD) and the BES figures of irrigated acreage (given by the Revenue Department) cannot be reconciled largely because I&CAD reports 'developed' ayacut, which may not immediately (if ever) materialise as irrigable areas available to farmers.

The state government can hardly afford to neglect this underutilisation of expensive investment. At Rs 4 lakh per acre or Rs 9.88 lakh per hectare (estimated for new projects), this is an extraordinary loss of sunken capital, and more so, if this canal irrigation is based on water rights allocated from the inter-state Krishna-Godavari rivers. However, much interest in the political economy system is devoted to 'developing' unused water rights on the Krishna-Godavari and to pre-empt any other state or region demanding a share.

In 1999, it was suggested in *AP Vision-2020*,

> Harnessing water resources as envisaged will require an investment of Rs 1,25,000 crores and power of 9,000 MW. Committing these resources will enable the State to utilize 856 TMC of dependable water and 300 TMC of flood flow water available to the State, 50 per cent of which would need to be pumped to a height 100–300 meters to lands situated at higher elevations. (GoAP 1999: 174)

The Vision document gave skimpy details (ibid.: 171–72):

1.	Godavari for Telangana	775 TMC	23.5 lakh acres
2.	Krishna for Rayalseema, Telangana, Andhra	Flood flow	8.0 lakh acres
3.	Pennar for Andhra and Rayalaseema	Flood flow	nil
4.	Vamsadhara, Janjhavati and Bahuda for Andhra	?	?

Thus, the *Vision* involved more than 32 lakh acres at a cost of Rs 1,25,000 crore, working out to almost Rs 4 lakh per acre. This is subject to the condition that we take the 9,000 MW as part of the Rs 1,25,000 crore bill.[29] If this is not included, the per acre cost would be much higher. Of this estimate, the state has already spent Rs 64,469 crore between 2005–10 (GoAP Table 17 2010a: 38) with little result as far as Telangana is concerned.

While Telangana would benefit from such investment, the high power requirement for pumping water, technical feasibility of pumping large volumes continuously over long periods, inter-state and central clearances, high capital costs and scarce funds would indicate that it is better to concentrate on saving and restoring existing canal and tank irrigation, extending new tank irrigation and ensuring higher productivity for well-irrigated land.

However, the Telugu Desam government of Chandrababu Naidu did very little to achieve its vision of irrigation. On the other hand, the Congress government under Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy moved very fast by convincing the Planning Commission and obtaining clearances.[30] YSR's government began pumping thousands of

crores into the Jalayagnam scheme aimed at creating vast acreage of irrigation in Rayalaseema and Telangana. It started irrigation projects, which will take decades to fructify, even if all the funds required for them can be mobilised in time. The use of the EPC method of contracting has its critics and some projects seem not to have been planned to the detail required before being tendered out.[31] This will result in confusion, further delays and cost overruns. Funding of such a magnitude has already put state finances under acute stress.

The Jalayagnam package[32] is an intriguing one. The lift irrigation components of three of the five projects located in Telangana, as well as those of another five independent lift irrigation projects, together require nearly 4,700 MW of power. The entire funding for these 'national projects' is to be requested from the union government.[33] The power requirement of these Telangana irrigation projects cannot be supplied from the existing generation of 14,000 MW (which is itself insufficient to meet current demands).

Interestingly enough, the area to be irrigated by 1,000 million cubic metres (TMC) in Telangana is factored to be over 30,000 acres while the same volume of water is estimated to irrigate only 6,000 acres in the Coastal Andhra region. Thus these Telangana projects will have to await union government clearances and funding and additional generation of power, and if they are realised, the acreage actually irrigated per TMC will be one-fifth of the 'planned' figure.

It does not take much to conclude that an ingenious sleight of hand shows higher total allocation and larger irrigable areas for Telangana for which clearances, funding and power backup are unlikely to be obtained in the near and medium-term future. The figures for Telangana being projected need very careful scrutiny.[34]

In Ravalaseema, the more viable and modest-sized 14 projects are to cost Rs 30,000 crore and are funded entirely from the state budget year-after-year.[35] they also need Karnataka and union government approvals and these are not likely to materialise in the near future. Notwithstanding this, work is in progress. Further, the water for many of these projects is sourced from the Srisailam Reservoir on the Krishna, which is expected to supply an additional 300 TMC annually.[36]

Well Irrigation

Well irrigation has been in existence in Telangana for a long time though the human and animal labour costs of lifting water using traditional devices has been the main hurdle in its growth. Even in the time of monsoon failure and consequent famine in the late nineteenth century, well irrigation was able to hold its own as it relied on ground water (Ali 1879: 31). Its growth took off only after the electrification programme began to be implemented and started covering village after village. Most, if not all, the investment in wells is privately funded and productivity tends to be high as farmers have flexibility in the selection of crop pattern and can cultivate more crops a year per acre irrigated (many of them being commercial crops of higher value than food crops) than under other sources of irrigation (Pingle Table 11 1976: 103, 212–15).[37]

Table 14.9 indicates that in all the regions, well irrigation has increased over time and seen an acceleration. The major advance, however, has been seen in the Telangana region.

TABLE 14.9 AP Well Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Period	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Coastal Andhra	Total
1875[38]	46,000	40,760[39]	n.a.	86,760
1903–04[40]	1,08,535[41]	82,656	25,874	2,17,065
1956–57	1,29,869	1,57,414	83,473	3,70,759
1970–72	2,14,500	1,90,600	1,65,800	5,70,900
1980–82	3,41,400	2,31,800	2,27,400	8,00,600
1990–92	7,04,400	3,26,800	3,41,400	13,72,600
2001–05	9,74,470	4,06,837	5,04,659	18,85,966
2005–09	12,17,642	4,12,193	5,30,013	21,59,848

Source: BES, various years.

Table 14.10 indicates the growth of both open and tube well irrigation in Telangana and the results are quite remarkable, with 56 per cent of the total well irrigation in the state contributed by Telangana farmers by 2005–09.

TABLE 14.10 Telangana Well Irrigation (Hectares)

Period	Open Well	Tube Wells	Total Wells
1875[42]	46,000		46,000
1920[43]	1,08,535		1,08,535
1930[44]	1,77,980		1,77,980
1940[45]	1,94,332		1,94,332
1956–57[46]	1,29,869		1,29,869
1970–72	1,91,472	193	2,14,500
1980–82	3,32,245	8,545	3,41,400
1990–92	6,35,307	71,011	7,04,400
2001–05	4,73,697	5,00,773	9,74,470
2005–09	5,16,467	6,68,974	12,17,642

Source: BES, various years.

As Table 14.10 indicates, the well-irrigated area has grown nine-fold from about 1,29,869 hectares in 1956–57 to nearly 12,17,642 hectares in 2005–09 (rapidly overtaking tank as well as canal irrigation) to become the major contribution to Telangana's irrigation. The chief component of the growth is the tube well segment, which is a very high-cost source of irrigation, in terms of both capital and operating costs, and is entirely dependent on the availability of groundwater and both the cost and availability of power.

Table 14.11 shows a growth in well irrigation over the eight-year period 2001–09. The most dramatic increases are in the Telangana region, while growth in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra has been stagnant or marginal.

Left to their fate by the government, the farmers from Telangana have invested their capital in digging or boring wells, fitting pump sets and laying pipelines to bring water to their fields. The only concession given to farmers dependent on well irrigation is recent, i.e. providing free power to their wells since 2004. This power, however, is provided only when no one else needs it, mostly at unearthly hours, and is of low quality, being below 230 volts. With free power being doled out in two shifts, one in the dead of the night, farmers report that their crops are adversely affected due to poor timing of power supply.

TABLE 14.11 Eight-year Well Irrigated Area (Hectares)

Year	Telangana	Rayalaseema	Coastal Andhra	Total
2001–02	10,31,193	4,33,628	4,62,617	19,27,438
2002–03	9,26,710	4,21,608	4,93,947	18,42,265
2003–04	9,43,020	3,86,510	5,39,990	18,69,520
2004–05	9,95,957	3,85,599	5,22,080	18,85,716
4-year Average	9,74,220	4,06,837	5,04,659	18,85,716
2005–06	10,97,400	3,89,748	4,99,086	19,86,234
2006–07	11,48,652	4,11,858	5,13,030	20,73,540
2007–08	13,14,243	4,24,304	5,48,638	22,87,185
2008–09	13,10,274	4,34,972	5,77,922	23,23,168
4-year Average	12,17,642	4,12,193	5,30,013	21,59,848

Source: BES, various years.

TABLE 14.12 Power for Well Irrigation in Telangana

	No. of connections in Lakhs (% of state total)	Connected Load (MW) (% of state total)
As of 31.03.2004	13.82 (60)	4,320 (52)
As of 31.03.2009	15.66 (58)	5,447 (53)

Source: BES (2005; 2009).

As Table 14.12 indicates, in Telangana, due to free power (announced by the Congress government in 2004), and inadequate rainfall, the number of connections in 2009 increased by 13 per cent as compared to 2004, while connected load (though not necessarily power consumption) increased during the same period by 26 per cent. This indicates how important the availability and cost of power are for accelerating well irrigation in the absence of adequate surface irrigation.

The state government is said to provide seven hours of free power daily to farmers and this accounts for 40 per cent of the state's total power consumption (BES Table 10 2005: 222; BES Table 10.8 2009: 264). There is a question about the accuracy of this figure as it is based on power generated and not power received at the end of

the consumer. It is suspected that whatever consumption the power utility cannot account for, whether due to theft by industry or by residential users, or due to losses in transmission and distribution, has been attributed to 'free power' and billed to the state government.

Much of well irrigation depends on the condition of the water table. As far as groundwater depletion is concerned, nearly 54 per cent of the 462 groundwater basins in Telangana have been declared 'safe', while 18 per cent are 'overexploited' and 28 per cent are 'critical' or 'semi-critical'.[47] Evidence indicates that the water table is falling and with the decline in surface irrigation, largely that of the widely dispersed tanks, recharge of groundwater depends almost entirely on the monsoon. As Telangana overlies a shallow rock region, overextraction does not necessarily involve long-term groundwater loss. The shallow aquifers of this region can be quickly recharged by one or two wet years or by safeguarding existing tank irrigation sources which are widespread in Telangana (Fishman 2009). If tank irrigation were not so badly affected, the recharge of groundwater would probably have been much better thus allowing well irrigation to expand further.

As mentioned earlier, though agriculture currently produces only 24 per cent of Telangana's income, it is the basis for survival of nearly 62 per cent of its population. In the semi-arid tropics, irrigation is a key element in raising land productivity and farmers' incomes and assuring stability of livelihoods.

It needs to be admitted that while monsoon conditions could explain some of the fluctuations, the figures seem to indicate an underlying secular decline of considerable magnitude. To lose nearly 3 lakh hectares (or 7.62 lakh acres) of tank irrigation in Telangana in the last 53 years is surely something about which successive governments should be truly concerned. This implies a loss of Rs 30,000 crore of government investment in Telangana irrigation. In addition to this is the loss of nearly 2 lakh hectares (or 5 lakh acres) of canal irrigation from a peak of 3,38,276 hectares in 1990–92 to a low of 1,16,203 hectares in 2004–05. The loss of another Rs 20,000 crore of investment in this older irrigation is a major one.[48] Serious attention needs to be paid to restoring and stabilising these lost surface irrigation flows in Telangana, which

entail a replacement cost of Rs 50,000 crore. This is more so if new irrigation potential, as alleged, has come into usage in the period 2005–09 and thus is hiding an even greater decline in older canal irrigation.

There has obviously been loss of agricultural production and income to the nation and to the farmers of Telangana from the non-utilisation of these extensive and expensively developed irrigated areas. The consequent loss of groundwater recharge, the decline in the water table and slowdown in the growth of well-irrigated acreage, further reduce Telangana farmers' incomes from their private irrigation sources.

It is also curious that successive state governments seem to be oblivious to the needs of the Telangana region in restoring defunct or damaged tanks and stabilising canal irrigation. As far as tank irrigation is concerned, the Nizam's government seems to have done a better job than the popular and democratic governments that followed. As for canal irrigation, democratic governments did well till 1990–92 but the momentum was lost thereafter and regained only in 2005–09. Whether this is due to new irrigation capacity coming into use or recovery of old irrigated areas because of better monsoons needs to be examined more closely.[49] In contrast, the Coastal Andhra region had the benefits during British rule investment in canal irrigation of the Godavari and Krishna deltas even today,[50] which continue to sustain agricultural development and incomes there.

Much of Telangana's need to stabilise its older surface irrigation, and to realise its entitlements of new surface irrigation, seems to have been ignored. Only where well irrigation is concerned has Telangana done extremely well, largely because its farmers have had no other option, though much still depends on the availability of power (free, subsidised or otherwise) and the level of the water table which, again, is dependent on the monsoon and on surface irrigation recharge.

Successive state governments seem to have been too pre-occupied to tackle the problems of Telangana irrigation and too uncertain of their tenure to take a holistic view of the agricultural development of the region. What is obviously needed is to move the level of enquiry, data collection, analysis, intervention and

investment further down, at least to the district if not a lower level, and devise irrigation plans, especially for tank and well irrigation, taking into account the weather, geography and soil conditions in the region. Too much of the attention of the political-bureaucratic system has been paid to huge investments in inter-state river projects, which take too long to complete and involve considerable fund mobilisation, a significant part of which may be subject to diversion and distortion. What is needed is a farmer-centric approach as against the politician-bureaucrat-contractor system that now dominates irrigation policy in the state and, as some would say, ignores the basic needs of the farming community.

Whatever the future irrigation policy and the nature of its implementation by whichever governmental dispensation that may preside over it, it will need close ground-level, local, district and regional efforts to balance the delicate surface and groundwater situation in Telangana with the need for farmers to access irrigation in order to improve their livelihoods and raise their incomes.

Notes

1. For details, see GoAP (Kumar Lalit Report) 1969, and GoI (Justice Vashishtha Bhargava Report), 1969.

2. While there are reports of similar decline in south India, the figures for Karnataka tend to belie this general impression and indicate a secular increase over a century or more. Dikshit (1993) gives a remarkable set of annual irrigated acreage figures from 1880 to 1950; Nadkarni (1979) from 1950 to 1975.

3. For details, see Ali (1898: 31).

4. The figures for 1901 are given in the total irrigation for Telangana as 304,324 hectares, with 18,969 tanks and 58,001 wells. Figures were given in square miles for each district. GoI (1909), see section for each district.

5. Pavier (1981: 23), quoting Qureshi (1947: 94–96).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. The records in successive issues of *Epigraphica Indica*, *Annual Report of Epigraphy*, *South Indian Inscriptions*, etc. are populated with references to tanks and temples—usually associated with each other.

9. The inscription is dated 1023 CE and many more are available for later periods.

10. The inscription is dated 1 December 996 AD. See also DA (1919: 96).

11. The Porumamilla (called Ananthrajasagar) Tank inscription of Bhaskara Bhavadura, son of Bukka I, brother of Harihara II of the First Dynasty of Vijayanagara, gives a detailed account (*Epigraphica Indica* vol. 14, no. 4: 97). This tank is in Badvel taluk of Cuddapah district of Rayalaseema.

12. 'Before this Country was Conquer'd by the Moguls it was Divided into Several Circles under the Government of Particular Rajahs which descended from Father to Son. Their Revenues for the most Part arose from the produces of the Land, and they therefore weer always carefull to keep up the Banks of the Tanks or Reservoirs of water and to cleanse 'em of the Mud, of which they were at the Expence themselves, knowing that the Land wou'd produce more or less according as they had a Quantity of Water. But the Mogulls, who have now the Government of the Country, and are continued in those goernments only during Pleasure, do not think themselves under the same Obligation to be at that Expence for their Successors. By which means, in the Process of Time the Tanks are almost Choack'd up, and great Part of the Lands lye uncultivated for want of water. This alone wou'd Occasion Grain to be scarce and of Course Dear....' (Governor of Fort St. George, George Morton Pitt, to England, vol. x, 1 January 1733–34, spelling as in original, quoted in Love vol. 2 1995: 252).

13. For details, see Ali (1898: 31).

14. The figure is for 1804 (Firminger vol. 3 1985: 516). The report is by Thomas Munro, Principal Collector for the Ceded Districts.

15. The figures for 1903–04 are given in Francis (2001).

16. The figure is for 1920; see Pavier (1981: 23 quoting Qureshi 1947: 94–96).

17. In Coastal Andhra, the tank-irrigated area maintained a stable figure of 4,65,000 hectares between 1956–57 and 1990–92 and then fell by about 1,00,000 hectares between 1990–92 and 2008–09. In Rayalaseema, in the century between 1803 (Firminger vol. 2 1985: 516; 1903) and 1903 (Francis 2001), the acreage under tanks only increased from 70,000 to 1,07,000 hectares.

18. Ali (1898: 31–32). He also says, 'But in order to get at the correct figures, the area should be increased by 50–25% to cover the difference between the correct area and the area entered in Patwari's records from which the above statements have been taken and a 25% for double cropped area.' He reports on a survey of 14 villages in Tekmal taluq of Medak district where the differences between the record and actual ground

position there was an increase of 263 per cent for irrigated land and 1,635 for unirrigated land (p. 113). He also says, 'There are about 18,089 large tanks in Telangana, of which 4,924 are in use and about 3,165 are out of repair. Besides these, there are 10,110 small tanks, of which 5,616 are in use and 4,494 are out of repair. If these were put in through repair about 1,000,000 acres (405,000 ha.) of land would be irrigated' (pp. 33–34). This seems to have been done by 1901 (see note 8 above).

19. Pavier (1981: 23 quoting Qureshi 1947: 94–96).

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. This has been lately reversed and one hopes that more attention and funds will be allocated to rehabilitate small tanks, which have become defunct.

23. The total amount allocated in the state budget during 2005–10 for minor irrigation (largely tanks) works out to Rs 3,974 crore compared to the allocation for major and medium projects in the same period of Rs 64,624 crore. That is, minor irrigation was allocated 6 per cent of the total irrigation budget! (GoAP Table 17 2010a: 38).

24. In Coastal Andhra, the canal acreage expanded from 10.75 lakh hectares in 1956–57 to 12.55 lakh hectares in 2008–09. In Rayalaseema, it grew from 83,000 hectares in 1956–57 to 1,39,000 hectares by 2008–09.

25. The figures for 1903–04 are given in Francis (2001).

26. The figure is for 1920; see Pavier (1981: 23, quoting Qureshi 1947: 94–96).

27. That this should be the result of spending Rs 62,998 crores on major and medium irrigation during the period 1956–1997 (from the Second to the Eighth Plan) is extraordinary. The expenditure figure for 2005–10 is almost the same!

28. The chief minister is reported to have stated that despite the fiscal troubles, the state government had decided to complete 39 irrigation projects costing about Rs 6,900 crore during the financial year 2010–11. Projects which are in the final stages of completion under Jalayagnam will be taken up on a priority basis, the objective being 'least effort and maximum benefit'. 'Chief Minister K. Rosaiah today directed the officials to complete the projects on a priority basis by March next year. On completion, the projects will provide irrigation facility to about 14.33 lakh acres of new ayacut' (*New Indian Express* 2010).

29. Current generating capacity is 14,047 MW and is insufficient to meet current demand (GoAP 2010b: 23).

30. K. Rosaiah, the then chief minister of Andhra Pradesh is reported

to have said, 'When I accompanied the late Chief Minister to New Delhi in 2005, Planning Commission Members put their foot down on the concept of Jalayagnam. However, within a short time they changed their view based on the necessity and urgency as presented by the State' (*Times of India* 2010b). What persuasive skills were used is not mentioned!

31. Allegations of poor planning, mismanagement of tender processes, favouritism and outright corruption have been laid by opposition parties, and demands for an investigation are pending with the Government of India. Two of the contracting parties are Maytas Infra and Madhucon Projects now owned by IL&FS after Satyam debacle; see http://www.ilfsengg.com/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maytas and http://madhucon.com/compietedirrigation.html, both accessed on 24 March 2010.

32. There is enormous confusion about the cost and benefits (in terms of new irrigated areas) of this controversial project. The official statement says, 'Jalayagnam programme to complete 32 major and 17 medium irrigation projects at a cost of Rs. 65 000 crores to provide irrigation to an extent of 71 lakh acres besides stabilization of an existing ayacut of 21.32 lakh acres while providing drinking water to a population of 1.2 crore and generating power to the tune of 2700 MW. Eight of these projects were to be completed before the kharif season of 2006', http://www.aponline.gov.in/apportal/HomePageLinks/Jalayagnam.htm, accessed on 14 January 2014. However, the Jalayagnam set of projects were finally estimated to cost Rs 1,86,000 crores but by June 2013 the cost had escalated by another Rs 52,116 crores. These projects were expected to irrigate 97.40 lakh acres (which includes 'stabilization' of existing irrigated acreage). Thus at the current cost of Rs 2,38,116 crores this works out to Rs 2.44 lakhs per acre if we take 97.40 lakhs acres as the benefit. But if we take only the new irrigated acreage of 71 lakh acres then the cost goes up to Rs 3.35 lakhs per irrigated acre. Thus far only 12.74 lakh acres said to have received irrigation when the completion date was March 2012. The final cost taking into account completed cost and eventually irrigated area may be well above this figure. See http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/jalayagnam-cost-goes-up-by-rs-52116-cr-cag/article4837515.ece, accessed on 13 January 2013.

33. 'The most expensive of the projects are the lift irrigation projects intended to irrigate the dry Telangana region and supply water to the Anantapur-Ongole-Mehaboobnagar area which is "turning into a desert". With the land level being 300 metres above the water level, lift irrigation is supposed to be the only way out to take water to the dry region. Currently, 3,000 TMC water from Godavari is wasted into the sea as the

land is at a higher elevation. For the first time in the post-independence era, the Congress government took up linking of Godavari and Krishna by constructing Indira Sagar Project and Rajiv Sagar project across River Godavari. By executing projects like Rajiv Sagar, Indira Sagar flood flow canal, SRSP Phase-II and so on, 21 lakh acres of parched land in Telangana region would be made fertile' (ibid.).

34. In the budget speech for 2010, the chief minister (as finance minister) stated on 10 February 2010, 'The Government has taken up Major, Medium and Minor Irrigation projects in a big way under the "Jalayagnam" programme to utilize every drop of water in the State for agriculture and drinking water purposes. Where it is not possible to command the area by gravity, lift irrigation schemes are being taken up to benefit the backward and drought prone areas. The State Government aims at completing 86 Major and Medium Irrigation Projects besides taking up programmes for raising Flood Banks, Modernization of Delta and Lift Irrigation Schemes with an ultimate objective of creating new Irrigation Potential of 98.41 lakh acres, besides stabilization of 22.26 lakh acres. During 2004–05 to 2008–09, as part of "Jalayagnam" programme an additional irrigation potential of 19.26 lakh acres was created in addition to providing stabilization of 3.09 lakh acres' (GoAP 2010b: 8). 'The Budget Estimate Allocation for 2010–11 is Rs 19,708 crores for Major and Medium Irrigation and Rs 2,074 crores for minor irrigation' (GoAP Table 17 2010a: 38, emphasis added).

35. The total amount spent out of the state budget between 2005–10 on major and medium irrigation projects works out to Rs 64,469 crore (GoAP Table 17 2010a: 38).

36. Srisailam is already overburdened with having to generate power, supply existing irrigation to Rayalaseema and act as a balancing reservoir for Nagarjunasagar project downstream and (thereafter) the Krishna delta. The Srisalam Reservoir, therefore, has to be maintained at a high enough water level to allow flows into the Rayalaseema canals. Consequently, this means power generation and releases into the Krishna river towards Nagarjunasagar, to the detriment of the delta. Keeping Srisailam at full reservoir level increases the risk of catastrophe due to dam breaks for Nalgonda, Vijayawada-Guntur and the Krishna delta and its high population density areas in eight districts, 108 mandals and 12 lakh hectares (Commissioner, CAD 2010: 82). This nearly happened in the unprecedented flood of August 2009 when Srisailam was kept at full reservoir level to facilitate Rayalaseema irrigation. The situation resulted in Srisailam backwaters flooding Kurnool and Alampur towns and causing more extensive damage along the Krishna and Tungabhadra river valleys

further upstream of Srisailam. Fortunately, the dam itself, despite full and emergency releases into the river (and after giving everyone a scare) held and the flood eased off. The releases too had to stopped. The downstream Nagarjunasagar project was nearing its full capacity and further release from there would have inevitably flooded the high population density areas of Vijayawada and Guntur agglomerations and the delta itself. Co-ordination and synchronisation of the Krishna flows need to be based solely on technical parameters of dam safety, irrigation and power generation. This requires integrated releases by Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh—and by Telangana and Rayalaseema states (when they are formed)—if the entire valley and the coastal delta of the Krishna are to have predictable and flood-free river flows and secure irrigation.

37. In this statistically representative sample survey of 564 farms in 1970–71, it was found that even by using five different methodological analyses well irrigation showed higher per acre returns. These relative rankings are not likely to change by much even as the absolute figures will alter due to price and other changes.

Returns to Irrigation in Telangana (1970–71) (Rs/Acre)

	Canal	Tank	Well
Gross Output	720	703	805
Business Income	425	454	520
Net Profit	74	82	103
Production Function Analysis	102	108	239
Net Profit by Linear Programming	215	257	985

38. For details, see Ali (1878: 33).

39. The figure is for 1804 (Firminger vol. III 1985: 516). The report is by Thomas Munro, principal collector for the Ceded Districts.

40. The figures for 1903–04 are given in Francis (2001).

41. The figure is for 1920. Pavier (1981: 23, quoting Qureshi 1947: 94–96).

42. 'In the Telangana districts, there are in all 52,685 wells, of which 33,851 are in use and about 18,834 are out of repair. If these were put in repair, an area of about 210,740 acres (85,000 ha.) at the rate of 4 acres per well would in like manner be completely protected in a season of drought. This area would on an average yield about 225,792 tons of grain which would support a population of 91,000'. For further discussion, see Ali (1879: 33). The areas under well irrigation were remarkably stable during the famine period, 1875–77. By 1901, the defunct wells seemed to have come into use (see note 8 above).

43. Pavier (1981: 23 quoting Qureshi 1947: 94–96).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Sree Rama Sastry (Table 3 n.d.: 62).

47. The Groundwater Department. The figures are for 2007.

48. The increase since 2005 seems largely from new canal irrigation potential reported to have been created rather than a recovery of old areas. This implies a loss of Rs 30,000 crore of government investment in Telangana irrigation. In addition to this, is the loss of nearly 2 lakh hectares (or 5 lakh acres) of canal irrigation from a peak of 3,38,276 hectares in 1990–92 to a low of 1,16,203 hectares in 2004–05. The loss of another Rs 20,000 crore of investment in this older irrigation is a major one. Serious attention needs to be paid to restoring and stabilising these lost surface irrigation flows in Telangana, which entail a replacement cost of Rs 50,000 crore.

49. The chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, in a press interview, said, 'During 2004–09 about 5,70,000 acres (2,30,000 hectares) of new *ayacut* was brought under minor irrigation and another 10,00,000 acres (4,05,000 hectares) stabilized' (*New Indian Express* 2010, emphasis added, figures are for the entire state).

Whether this is due to new irrigation capacity coming into use or recovery of old irrigated areas because of better monsoons needs to be examined more closely.

The increase since 2005 seems largely from new canal irrigation potential reported to have been created rather than a recovery of old areas.

The chief minister of Andhra Pradesh, in a press interview, is supposed to have stated, 'During 2004–09 about 5,70,000 acres (2,30,000 hectares) of new ayacut was brought under minor irrigation and another 10,00,000 acres (4,05,000 hectares) stabilized' (*New India Express*; emphasis added).

50. In the Godavari and Krishna deltas, the construction of anicuts in the mid-nineteenth century on the initiative of Sir Arthur Cotton (1803–1899) and his associates under the rule of the East India Company ensured that these areas (hitherto famine-ridden) became the basis of the high population densities and culture and civilisation of the Coastal Andhra area—especially those of the Central Delta districts. That such a massive effort should be undertaken by a foreign joint-stock company—which profited from the investment it made here—is a remarkable example for democratic and popular governments of today. It is little wonder that Sir Arthur is revered to the extent of being worshiped today by the population in the delta as a demigod.

fifteen

A Summary Submission to the Srikrishna Commission

This is a submission to the SKC on the issue of statehood for Telangana. The committee has received a vast number and quantity of written submissions, including those from the present author. It has also heard and examined a number of witnesses, both individuals and representatives of political and other parties, and has toured the area and spoken to the ordinary people of Telangana.

This submission is, therefore, offered in the nature of a summary submission and sets out the most inconvertible facts relied upon and stated by official reports and committees on the issue.

It is structured on the basis of the terms of reference of the committee:

I. *To examine the situation in the State of Andhra Pradesh with reference to the demand for a separate State of Telangana as well as the demand for maintaining the present status of a united Andhra Pradesh.*
   1. The political party positions in the run-up to the 2009 election were significant in that they all, with the exception of the CPI-M, promised separate statehood for Telangana.
      a. The Congress party, in electoral alliance with the TRS in the 2004 general election, supported a separate Telangana state. Contesting on its own, in the 2009 general election it reasserted its position in support of a separate Telangana state.
      b. The most significant change came with the TDP's complete reversal of its 2004 general election position

against separation and its declaration of commitment in the 2009 general election to a separate Telangana state with an electoral alliance with the TRS.

c. Other parties like BJP and the CPI had also voiced their support for a separate Telangana state in the 2004 and 2009 general elections.

d. The PRP, formed in 2008, supported a separate Telangana state in the 2009 general elections.

e. The only party consistently opposing a separate Telangana state was the CPI-M, which won only one seat in Telangana and none in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra.

f. The AI-MIM party, entirely based in the Old City area of Hyderabad, took an ambiguous position in the 2004 and 2009 general elections; it now advocates a separate Telangana with Rayalaseema attached to it.

2. In the address to both Houses of Parliament on 7 June 2004, the president declared, 'The government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate time after due consultations.' The Pranab Mukherjee Committee was set up to carry these and report to government on the issue. The committee's report was to be made available to the SKC.

3. In the general election of 2009, the parties supporting separation of Telangana secured 106 of the 119 seats in Telangana, all the 123 seats in Coastal Andhra, and 52 seats in Rayalaseema. This means that parties supporting a separate Telangana state secured 284 of the 294 seats in the assembly.

4. On 3 December 2009, the all-party meeting agreed to a separate Telangana state and the ruling CLP passed a unanimous resolution abiding by the decision of the central leadership on the issue of creating a separate state. Following this, the Government of India announced the process for the formation of Telangana.

II. *To review the developments in the state since its formation and their impact on the progress and development of different regions of the state.*

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was initially sceptical about merging Telangana with Andhra state fearing a 'tint of expansionist imperialism' in this proposal. Later, he compared the merger to a matrimonial alliance with 'provision for divorce' if the partners in the alliance could not get along well.[1]

As the Wanchoo Committee predicted, the Andhra state was 'bankrupt'—Rs 5 crore per annum in deficit and with large overdrafts, it was necessary to save the state. Since Telangana had a surplus on the revenue account and also Rs 11 crore in investments, the solution was to effect what is called in corporate finance a 'reverse merger'—a loss-making entity with debts taking over a surplus entity with assets.

The assurances and safeguards, among the many intended for Telangana, included the unanimous Andhra Assembly Resolution (1955) and the Gentleman's Agreement (1956). None of these were observed and the movement for separation was started in 1969–71. In the general election of 1971, the separatist TPS polled 46 per cent of the votes cast and secured 10 of the 14 Telangana parliamentary seats. But another settlement was put together to ensure unity.

More assurances were given and now set in law: the Eight-point Formula of the Prime Minister (1969), the Supreme Court judgment on Mulki Rules (1972), the Six-point Formula of the Prime Minister (1972), the Constitution 32nd Amendment to Article 371-D (1975), the Presidential Order–AP Public Employment Order (1975), and GO MS. No. 610 (1985).

On the other hand, the Kumar Lalit Committee (1969) concluded that Telangana was not granted its rightful share. The Justice Bhargava Committee (1969) confirmed Lalit's findings, differing only on the quantum of Telangana surpluses. The Officers' Committee under the chairmanship of K. Jayabharat Reddy (1985) found that Telangana had not got its due share in employment. The House Committee on Implementation of GO 610 (2001) and the J. M. Girglani Commission (2003) found that the GO supposed to redress

the grievances of Telangana employees was not implemented even after two decades.

These assurances were given, presumably in good faith, and confirmed by two assemblies, Parliament, the Supreme Court, a president and a prime minister and in full political, media and civil society scrutiny. The promises were to be honoured and enforced by the state government. None was implemented as contemplated by their authors and supporters.

III. *To examine the impact of recent developments in the state on different sections of the people such as women, children, students, minorities, Other Backward Classes (OBC), SCs and STs.*

a. Tribals

They are the most vulnerable group in Andhra Pradesh because their numbers are few and their influence weak, as they do not constitute an important vote bank for the major political parties. They also occupy some of the most valuable agricultural lands and forests with timber and mineral resources.

Since most of the tribal areas are in the Godavari river valley and are very fertile, the influx since 1956 from the Coastal Andhra areas proceeded upstream along the river in the Telangana districts of Khammam, Warangal and Karimnagar.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, commissioned J. M. Girglani, IAS (retd.), to study the issue of Telangana tribal land rights. He presented the 'Report of Tribal Land issues in the Telangana Area' (2005).

The whole process is one of internal colonisation by a 'settler' population, supported actively in all cases by the inability and unwillingness of the political and bureaucratic systems to safeguard tribal interests.

b. Scheduled Castes

All the dalit MPs feel that statehood for Telangana would resolve their fear of SC sub-categorisation, which has divided the dalits along Mala-Madiga lines.

It is felt that carving out Telangana from AP would end the fear of sub-categorisation. Madigas outnumber Malas (70 per cent to 30 per cent) in Telangana. While the two have nearly

equal strength in Rayalaseema, Malas are said to form 80 per cent of the population in the coastal region as compared to 20 per cent Madigas.

c. Muslims

Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Forum for Telangana, Jamat-e-Islami Hind, Muslim Minority Joint Action Committee, Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ), Students Islamic Organisation (SIO) and Girls Islamic Organisation (GIO) are clear in their support for Telangana. The MIM Party supports a separate state of Telangana joined with Rayalaseema.

IV. *To identify the key issues that must be addressed while considering the matters mentioned in items I, II and III above.*

Key issues

1. There is a complete destruction of trust in the political and bureaucratic structures and personnel and their ability to be fair and just in extending, protecting and furthering the interests of the Telangana region and its people in:
   a. allocation and expenditure of funds for development of the region,
   b. protection of employment for locals—nearly 2 lakh jobs reserved for Telangana residents have been given to non-locals from the rest of the state,
   c. ensuring protection of tribal land from illegal acquisition by Andhra settlers,
   d. prevention of the destruction of 5 lakh hectares of surface irrigation in Telangana.
2. There are political machinations by almost all political parties, dominated by politicians from the rest of the state, to secure Telangana voter approval at election time by promising separate statehood for Telangana and then reneging on, or vacillating in fulfilling, these promises.
3. The events of December 2009 exposed to public scrutiny the machinations not only of political parties which reversed their position in weeks but also the entry of vested interests and political splinter groups opposing separation.
4. The mass resignations of both separatist and status quo MLAs and their subsequent withdrawal.

5. All of the above have created a clear divide between the general public of Telangana and the rest of the state.
6. If successive Congress and Telugu Desam political governments in the state and also successive bureaucratic administrations could not solve the problem (they have, in fact, worsened the situation), then the solution does not lie in the present structure of state and pattern of governance.
7. In view of the experience of the last 53 years, as far as Telangana is concerned, it is entitled to legitimately demand de-merger and separate statehood of the 10 districts of Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital—as recommended by the SRC in 1956

Terms of Reference (V), (VI) and (VII)

After 53 years of experience we see no alternative way of administering the state in a fair and equitable manner for the region's development. Even the Vidarbha model of regional protection and development which was more robust than the Telangana model is currently shown to be faulty and a similar situation as in the case of Telangana seems to prevail there too.

It is not for us to suggest what the committee should recommend in this important matter. However, given that the political parties are evenly divided and almost all the Telangana MLAs are in support of the de-merger of Telangana, the choice before the committee is limited.

For the committee, given:

- the balance of evidence accumulated over the last 53 years,
- the position of the political parties,
- the expressed will of the people of Telangana through their elected representatives,
- the committee's extensive hearings and close and intensive analysis of the data and documents provided,

it will naturally have to conclude,

- for the good of the entire population of Andhra Pradesh,
- and particularly for the people of Telangana,

that the de-merger of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh would be

- correct,
- just,
- equitable,
- a politically necessary solution,
- in keeping with the will of the people of Telangana,
- and fulfilling the promise of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Notes

1. *The Indian Express*, on 17 October 1953, reported that Nehru felt the merger had a 'tint of expansionist imperialism' in it and thus feared it. http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=msw-AAAAIBAJ&sjid=W0wMAAAAIBAJ&pg=4365%2C259207, accessed on 23 January 2013, and the *Andhra Patrika*, on 3 November 1956, reported Nehru as having described the merger as a marriage between 'an innocent girl to a mischievous boy and therefore if both the regions fail to go together they could separate like wife and husband', http://i51.tinypic.com/kbvui8.jpg, accessed on 23 January 2013.

sixteen

The Findings of the Srikrishna Commission

The process of forming the state of Telangana will be initiated. An appropriate resolution will be moved in the State Assembly.

—P. Chidambaram, Union Home Minister, on 9 December 2009

Palku Ravanudu teliya leka poye
(Ravana could not understand this truth)

'Sarasa Saama Dhaana'
—Saint Thyagaraja

The agitation begun in the Andhra region resulted in the stalling of the process of formation of Telangana and the movement was on the back-burner for 11 months while the SKC formally known as the 'Committee for Consultations on the Situation in Andhra Pradesh', worked towards compiling its report taking into account the information garnered from its field visits, public consultations,[1] interactions with parties concerned and the massive volume of data and tens of thousands of submissions (SKC 2010).

A distinguished former Supreme Court judge, who had received plaudits for his report on the Mumbai riots, Justice B. N. Srikrishna, chaired the committee on Telangana set up in February 2010. Four other members, including a vice-chancellor of a law university, a retired secretary of the Government of India and two academics, assisted him. The committee was further assisted, both formally and

informally, by a large staff of retired and serving bureaucrats and consultants in writing the report.

The committee received oral and written representations from 102 political and civil society groups. In the end, they produced a main report of 505 pages and an appendix volume of 183 pages. Yet, the output seemed somewhat cumbersome, contradictory and left a lot of scope for people to speculate, suspect and misunderstand. It was little wonder then that the Government of India was left confused, as were all the political parties.

It is difficult for an ordinary person to obtain the report, let alone read it with patience and understanding. The following is a set of 25 extracts (with important parts highlighted for the readers' convenience) from the report. The SKC was under extreme pressure to oppose the creation of Telangana, but while so doing it still could not avoid stating the case for Telangana. It did leave out significant issues, which will be highlighted later, but what it said is enough to make a solid case for separation.

A thorough analysis and critique of the SKC's report is given below (SKC 2010).

Status Quo Opposed—Telangana Deprived

1. 'Overall, in spite of 50 plus years of policy, protected planning and execution, one finds *regional variations* in the economic development of AP' (SKC 2010: 118, emphasis added).
2. The SKC noted, '*Planning Commission notified as backward nine of the 10 Telangana districts*, with the exception of Hyderabad, and resources have been allocated under its Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF). These districts contain, as the SKC says, 87 per cent of the population of Telangana' (ibid.: 81, emphasis added).
3. Considering the allegation that 'Telangana has low per capita income, lower access to employment, lower business opportunities and low access to education and so on', the SKC said, '*At the outset, some or all such allegations appear true when absolute amounts, numbers and percentages are reviewed*' (ibid.: 117, emphasis added).

4. In Telangana, the 'net irrigation by canals has increased only slightly from about 1 lakh hectares to around 2.5 lakh hectares. *Tank irrigation has reduced from 4 lakh hectares in 1955–56 to around 2 lakh hectares at present*' (ibid.: 189, emphasis added).
5. '*The implementation of G.O. 610 during 1985 to 2005 was, at best, tardy, which remains a grievance of Telangana employees.* This issue continues to be highly contentious even today' (ibid.: 48, emphasis added).
6. 'However, the data received from the State Government shows (Appendix 3.16) that the combined amount released to government and aided colleges *together is Rs 93 crores in Telangana while it is Rs 224 crores in Coastal Andhra (with the college-going population similar to that in Telangana) and Rs 91 crores in Rayalaseema (with the population share being less than half of that in Telangana)*' (ibid.: 153, emphasis added).
7. 'The real income of the agricultural wage labourers has declined considerably in Telangana whereas it has increased considerably in coastal Andhra region. Similarly, *the SCs, STs and minorities in Telangana region have suffered a decline in income during the past decade or more,* whereas these communities have gained substantially in Coastal Andhra' (ibid.: 119, emphasis added).

The Movement

1. 'The present agitation, however, shows that the demand only lay dormant and could get re-ignited under specific circumstances. While the issue of rightful shares in public employment remains the key point of discord even in the current agitation, *a new turn has been given to the demand by Telangana region asserting that it has a separate cultural identity which is distinct from that of Andhra and Rayalaseema regions*' (ibid.: 342, emphasis added).
2. '*The movement has also successfully performed the function of educating the people about Telangana's grievances to the extent that even school children have now been made conversant with issues around the demand for a separate state.* Equally helpful to this cause have been NRI Telangamites (NRIs from the opposite side have participated

by opposing formation of Telangana) who are known to be supporting the movement in several ways and who have also represented to the Committee. *The present movement is considered to be much more extensive than the one in 1969 (which was mostly confined to urban locations)*, a process in which modern technologies of communication and modern ways of conducting politics have surely helped' (ibid.: 352, emphasis added).

3. 'While the JACs[2] have sprung up in all the three regions, the most vibrant and numerous are in Telangana region with their reach going down to mandal and even village level. *The JACs have successfully mobilized the common people who have articulated their particular interests through the movement*' (ibid.: 359, emphasis added).

Power Groups

1. '*The dominant upper castes, the Reddys, Kammas, Velamas and Kapus, continue to hold the reins of power in the state.* The Brahmins are much less influential politically due to smaller numbers; *however, Coastal Andhra Brahmins played a historic role in forging a Telugu identity through their writings, eventually leading to the birth of Andhra state.* They were equally important in intellectual articulation of the cause of economically oppressed social groups and contributed to the extreme left movement to which major support was provided by coastal Kammas' (ibid.: 380, emphasis added).
2. '*The upper castes in Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra are vehemently against the idea of dividing the state; their greatest fear being the loss of Hyderabad.* The accommodation between these two regions has been in terms of *political domination by Rayalaseema and economic domination by Coastal Andhra. Together the two regions have ruled the state through Congress and TDP political formations.* Telangana feels dominated by the upper castes of these regions and its struggle is primarily to shake off their yoke' (ibid.: 390, emphasis added).
3. '*Large scale involvement of students including those from Dalits and*

Backward Castes in the current movement for Telangana seems to testify to this. A large proportion of student leaders of the movement located in Osmania and Kakatiya universities is known to be from Dalit/BC background. According to many sources, purported student suicides during the course of the agitation are also largely by Dalit and Backward Caste students' (ibid.: 163, emphasis added).

4. 'The Madiga caste, which is predominant in Telangana and more numerous on the whole, has had less access to reservation benefits than the Malas who predominate in Coastal Andhra. The former would certainly benefit from a separate Telangana but then their brethren in the coastal state would lose out without sub-categorisation. *The economic disaffection of SCs in Telangana versus their rapid strides in education form a potent mixture for agitation politics as is seen from the extensive participation of Dalit youth in the student movement.* This is the very same constituency which may feel attracted towards and become co-opted by extreme left ideologies' (ibid.: 415, emphasis added).
5. '*The Muslims in Telangana, contrary to common belief, are doing well on consumption (improvement by 76 per cent) and poverty reduction levels (33 points)*' (ibid.: 363, emphasis added).
6. 'In 2007, *literacy rates for the youth population aged 8–24 for SCs and Muslims in Telangana are ahead of or at par with those in the other two regions*' (ibid.: 131, emphasis added).
7. 'For example, *it is possible that the ST community and the Muslims in AP may get a relatively better say in governance on separation, in the state of Telangana*' (ibid.: 122, emphasis added).

Logic of the Movement

1. 'Although as a sub-regional movement, *the Telangana movement does not pose a threat to national unity*' (ibid.: 344, emphasis added).
2. '*The Telangana movement can be interpreted as a desire for greater democracy and empowerment within a political unit.* As stated earlier, sub-regionalism is a movement, which is not necessarily primordial but is essentially modern—in the direction of a

balanced and equitable modernization. *Our analysis shows that cutting across caste, religion, gender and other divisions, the Telangana movement brings a focus on the development of the region as a whole*, a focus on rights and access to regional resources and further, it pitches for a rights-based development perspective whereby groups and communities put forth their agendas within a larger vision of equitable development' (ibid.: 415, emphasis added).

3. 'However, given the long-standing history of the demand for a separate state, the deep penetration of the sense of grievance and the widespread emotion around the issue, unless genuine steps are taken to address both real and perceived disparities, *the demand is unlikely to go away permanently even if it is subdued temporarily*' (ibid.: 417, emphasis added).
4. 'Thus, from the point of view of sheer size of economy, *Telangana as a new state can sustain itself both with and without Hyderabad*. The other combination of regions—Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema together can also sustain themselves as a state: *in fact they can also sustain themselves separately*' (ibid.: 121, emphasis added).

A Summary of the Report

1. 'In view of the complex background of the situation and the rather serious and sensitive emotional aspects involved, *the Committee is of the unanimous view that it would not be practical to simply maintain the status quo in respect of the situation*' (ibid.: 442, emphasis added).
2. 'Given the above first hand observations of the Committee during its tours of the regions, *the Committee feels that the issue of sentiment has to be considered only as one among several factors to be evaluated*. While not discounting people's wishes or sentiments, the overall implications of bifurcation (or trifurcation as the case may be) have to be carefully delineated to arrive at a responsible recommendation' (ibid.: 352–53, emphasis added).
3. 'The Committee is of the view that given the long history of the demand for a separate Telangana, *the highly charged emotions at present and the likelihood of the agitation continuing in case the*

demand is not met (unless handled deftly, tactfully and firmly as discussed under Option Six), consideration has to be given to this option. The grievances of the people of Telangana, such as non-implementation of some of the key decisions included in the Gentleman's Agreement (1956), certain amount of neglect in implementation of water and irrigation schemes, inadequate provision for education infrastructure (excluding Hyderabad), and the undue delay in the implementation of the Presidential Order on Public Employment, etc. have contributed to the felt psyche of discrimination and domination, with the issue attaining an emotional pitch. *The continuing demand, therefore, for a separate Telangana, the Committee felt, has some merit and is not entirely unjustified.*' (ibid.: 453, emphasis added).

4. 'Therefore, after taking into account all the pros and cons, the Committee did not think it to be the most preferred, but the second best option. *Separation is recommended only in case it is unavoidable* and if this decision can be reached amicably amongst all the three regions' (ibid.: 453, emphasis added).

The SKC tried to do a difficult enough job but failed to defuse the Telangana movement.

It admitted that the united state would not work as usual (Option 1). It toyed with Options 2 to 4 and rejected them.[3] It preferred Option 6, i.e. a united state with a Telangana Regional Committee (TRC), a River Water Development Board and constitutional amendment. This history of trying to deal with the rights of Telangana seems to be repeated without much change. Trying to repeat history can hardly find support from those who feel ill-served by it in the past. The TRC had been set up, along with a similar one for Punjab, by amending the Constitution. When the Punjab model did not work, the state was divided. When the TRC was abolished, the same lesson was not drawn as for Punjab.

The SKC labelled Option 5—what had been accepted by all parties in December 2009—, i.e. a separate state for Telangana, as the 'second-best' one. It felt that the Telangana state should be conceded only if it was 'unavoidable'. This was the whole point of the agitation and the decision of 9 December 2009!

The issue was simple: 40 million-odd Telangana citizens preferred to have a state of their own. The committee, however, failed to understand or chose to ignore what the people wanted. It did not, for example, suggest a referendum or opinion poll to assess the will of the people of the region. Yet, SKC suggested, perhaps uncharitably, that it was only local party political machinations that had driven the movement. It is inconceivable that anyone would say this of a movement that has existed on and off for the past 60 years.

Notes

1. The single exception was the JAC, which was responsible for leading the movement. It rejected the SKC, refused to appear before it, held that making submissions was a waste of time as a political decision had been taken and all that was required was to implement it. The SKC recognised the importance of the JAC thus, 'During this period, numerous Joint Action Committees (JACs) have been formed, the most prominent among them being the one at Osmania University led by Prof. Kodandaram. Initially, all political parties were members of this JAC but subsequently most parties, including the TRS, left the fold. However, JACs have spread to the district, mandal and village level in Telangana resulting in a groundswell of demand for a separate state' (SKC 2010: 349).

2. Joint Action Committees have become the driving forces of the movement.

3. However, Chidambaram, speaking to the press on the day of the release of the report, stated that the SKC had itself rejected the first three options. For further discussion, see '1st 3 options on Telangana not practical: PC', IBNLive, 6 January 2011. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/1st-3-options-on-telangana-not-practical-pc/139630-37.html, accessed on 6 May 2011. A careful reading of chapter 9 (pp. 440–58) would indicate that the SKC ruled out the first four options as impractical. Besides, its terms of reference confined it to only two options—united AP, or bifurcation and creation of Telangana, 'To examine the situation in the State of Andhra Pradesh with reference to the demand for a separate State of Telangana as well as the demand for maintaining the present status of a united Andhra Pradesh' (SKC 2010: v).

seventeen

The Srikrishna Commission
The Truth about Its Secret Chapter

The SKC report's secret chapter 8 titled 'Law and Order and Internal Security Implications' (in the published report containing only 152 words) was challenged in the high court. The last 52 words of chapter 8 said, 'A note on the above *covering all aspects* has been prepared and is being submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs in a *separate cover* along with this Report. The Committee has *kept these dimensions in view while discussing various options included in chapter 9 of the Report, i.e. "The Way Forward"*' (SKC 2010: 423, emphasis added).

The court felt that these critical words damned the painstakingly constructed edifice of a 1,46,071-word report (Reddy 2011: 65–71). Never in the known history of 60 years of official reports has any official committee or commission dared to keep a part of a report secret and that too the most significant part of it. However, certain events have overtaken the recommendations of the SKC. This is entirely due to the revelations of the secret chapter 8 by the high court and the subsequent full disclosure of the secret chapter in *Deccan Post* and *Namaste Telangana* (see appendix to this chapter).

The committee seemed to be saying that they had studied everything and had stated the cases for and against and come up with six options (of which four were not workable), and felt that a decisive element was the law and order and internal security aspects, so they did not think the public should read it but the government should take into account while deciding the fate of 40 million people.

Since common sense, decency and legal prudence seemed to have been abandoned, an ordinary citizen had no other recourse but to approach the courts of justice through a writ petition before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The eminent Attorney-General of India insisted on appearing before the bench and more or less stated that the committee had no legal standing and that it was not a commission under law and, therefore, anything it said or wrote was of little or no consequence—a storm in a teacup, as it were! He added that the courts had no jurisdiction over what was a private affair of the government and could not pass judgment on what was private correspondence.

The judgment of the high court stated,

> The *manoeuvre suggested by the Committee* in its secret supplementary note poses an open challenge, if not threat, to the very system of democracy. If the source of inputs that gave rise to this is the Government, it [the Government] owes an explanation to the citizens. If, on the other hand, the origin of inputs is elsewhere, the Government must move in right earnest to pluck and eradicate such foul source and thereby prove its respect for, and confidence in, the democracy. (Ibid.: para 103, emphasis added)

Thus the court revealed what amounts to a conspiracy involving many personalities in an attempt to mislead 40 million people of Telangana. It did not take much—only a fair and independent judiciary—to bring into the open the secret notes of the SKC.[1] The court revealed that the whole chapter/note outlined the steps to be taken to defeat the Telangana separatist movement. It led the high court to state, 'If one has any doubt about the hidden opposition of the Committee for formation of Telangana, that stands removed with this note'.[2] This rang the death knell for the report and cast doubt on the intentions of its five members.[3]

Even before the judgment by the high court, some distinguished intellectuals from Andhra had issued an open letter pleading for bifurcation. It is written with great balance, grace and wisdom and it is worth quoting extensively. They said that the inclusion of Telangana to create Andhra Pradesh in 1956 had been against the wishes of the majority of leaders from the region.

> The separation between the Telangana and the Seemandhra areas since 1800 CE had created unbridgeable gulf between social, educational, economic milieu and political and cultural consciousness of the two regions. The last five-and-a-half decades of togetherness had failed to bring about equitable development in different regions and harmonize the relations between the peoples. (*Times of India* 2011a)

They also said,

> The presence of about 30 lakh people from Coastal and Rayalaseema in Hyderabad for the last 56 years should not be a factor in deciding the future of the state. They will continue to remain an integral part of Hyderabad the same way as the Maratha, Kannadiga, Gujarati and Punjabi people. Claiming special rights by these or any other group is irrational and unjustified. (Ibid.)

They added,

> The apprehensions of these people have to be removed by discussions with the leaders of Telangana and Central government. The need of the hour is emotional oneness, which is severely lacking, rather than an enforced administrative and political togetherness of the regions as a single integrated state. (Ibid.)

Even as early as 2003, the former home minister Chidambaram had stated, 'Someone—or something has to break this logjam'. He further said, '... the answer does not lie in police action. Perhaps there may be an answer if the people of the region are empowered in a different way, and new opportunities are created for the disaffected sections to gain political power and a say in the governance of the region.' Chidambaram concluded, 'Strange as it seems, the option of a new state of Telangana may turn out to be the answer to deal with the menace of Naxalite terrorism' (Chidambaram 2003b).

It may be concluded that the SKC's exercise seemed to have consolidated public opinion in favour of a separate state despite its

ambiguous report. The SKC rejected the continuation of the status quo (Option 1) and it dismissed Options 2, 3 and 4 as unworkable. Its choice was for a united state with constitutional guarantees and regional councils that had been either neglected (constitutional guarantees) or abandoned (regional councils). By confessing that the status quo was not maintainable, this particular logic of the SKC seemed somewhat obscure. Finally, all other logical reasoning leads towards the division of the state and the state polity is again coming around to accepting the inevitable as it did on 9 December 2009, as illustrated by the public statement by the Andhra intellectuals cited above.

The revelation in the print media (*Deccan Post* in English and *Nameste Telangana* in Telugu) of the entire secret chapter 8/note of the SKC report follows significant extracts already quoted in the high court judgment directing its full release. The full chapter is interesting to study as a matter of public policy. As the SKC says of this note,

> A note on the above covering all aspects has been prepared and is being submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs in a separate cover along with this Report. (SKC 2010: 423)

This note reveals how the committee perceived the consequence of its recommendations.

Fundamentally, it says that all the five options, except Option 6 (granting of separate state for Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital) would immediately involve extensive agitation and disruption and undermine the viability of the political process and development. It also considers the communal, Maoist and caste/regional angles of each option. In Option 5, agitations are expected to occur only if there is non-fulfilment of the hopes placed by the people on the benefits of a separate state. These are expected material benefits at some unspecified time in the future, but the SKC admits the issue is emotional so that at least it is not an issue for agitation except for 'scapegoating'.

Agitation Backlash

The SKC's views on the agitation in the event of the different options being adopted are enumerated below.

Option 1–Scenario 1 (Maintaining Status Quo)

> Immediate backlash will take place in the *form of violent agitations* in Telangana region, which may continue for a few months. However, beside *sporadic agitations* on specific demands like employment opportunities, sharing of water resources, etc. may *continue for a longer period*. (Appendix to this chapter, p. 5, emphasis added)

Furthermore, it is anticipated that the agitation in and around Hyderabad would be intense, since the various JACs of students, advocates, government employees, youth and mass organisations would try to paralyse normal life in and around Hyderabad. The agitations by coal workers of Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (SCCL) (spread over Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and Warangal districts) would adversely affect coal production. This, in turn, would affect the coal supply to the thermal power plants and thus to the power position in both the state and national level. The rail and road traffic in the Telangana Region may also be affected. The agitations are also expected to adversely affect the functioning of industrial and other business establishments and financial interests/ assets of the 'Seemandhra leaders'. (Ibid.: 5–6, emphasis added)

Option 2–Scenario 2 (Telangana State but with Hyderabad as UT)

> Apart from the backlash mentioned in Scenario 1, there may be severe discontentment among the people of Telangana, that Hyderabad city, which has historically been part of Telangana has been taken away from them. Telangana without Hyderabad will be handicapped in terms of State revenues, industrial growth, employment potential, education, infrastructure and other

facilities, leading to *large-scale disaffection and unrest in the region.* Hyderabad could emerge as an island surrounded by a region that is unhappy with its residents—while the residents of Hyderabad would be dependent on the surroundings for several resources and transport. In addition, Hyderabad city, which is dependent upon Telangana for drinking water supplies and is surrounded by Telangana, may face the *consequences of violent agitations in Telangana* which could lead to a blockade of supply of drinking water, transportation, other services, etc. Hyderabad may also provide *the base for agitation* by both Telangana and Seemandhra people. (Ibid.: 7, emphasis added)

Hyderabad as UT may also have an influx of migrants from other States, increasing the pressure on land, water, and disparities between people of various regions fuelling social unrest both in Telangana as well as in Hyderabad. The citizens of Telangana may get treated as non-locals in Hyderabad city, limiting their employment prospects and economic growth, *and this frustration can lead to conflicts.* (Ibid.: 7, emphasis added)

Option 4–Scenario 4 (Telangana with Greater Hyderabad as UT)

Inputs received indicate that *reactions to this option are also expected to be on the same lines as indicated in Scenario 2 discussed earlier* and there will be, at least for a period of time, *serious agitations particularly from the Telangana region* on two counts, namely (i) Hyderabad not becoming exclusively the capital of Telangana and (ii) merging parts of two districts of Telangana for creation of a the larger Union Territory. The political agreement on this proposal may also prove to be difficult to arrive at, thus *creating other governance related tensions.* (Ibid.: 9, emphasis added)

Option 5–Scenario 5 (Telangana)

In this scenario, although the emotional aspirations of the people of Telangana to have their own state will be satisfied,

economic expectations, including enhanced job opportunities, which they expect, may not actually materialize. This may lead to frustration among the youth (who are in the forefront of this agitation), professionals and even farmers. This frustration may lead to 'scape-goating', leading to *targeted attacks on Seemandhra settlers and their properties.* (Ibid.: 9, emphasis added)

There is also likelihood of *revival of agitations against the formation of a new State in the Seemandhra region*, including in the city of Hyderabad. (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)

Option 6–Scenario 6 (Status Quo Plus)

This option would not satisfy the people of Telangana having regards to the entrenched emotional feelings they harbour for the creation of a separate state. (Ibid.: 12)

While the emotional aspect, that of being discriminated against by Seemandhra people is *likely to remain*, the extent to which the emotional aspiration (the fulfilment of the psychological need for self-governance) is taken care of by the constitutional/statutory guarantees will determine the *extent of backlash by the pro-Telangana people*, their demand for a separate State not having been met. (Ibid.: 13, emphasis added)

In view of the background of the complex situation, it would be seen *that under each of the scenarios listed above, there is a high possibility of immediate agitational backlash in the different regions of the State.* (Ibid.: 14, emphasis added)

Communal Issues

As far as communal issues are concerned, the SKC brackets both the AI-MIM and BJP together as communal parties. As a result of Options 2, 3 and 5, it sees potential for conflict. It does not comment on this aspect in Options 1, 4, and 6.

Option 2–Scenario 2 (Telangana State but with Hyderabad as UT)

The political forces, viz. the AI-MIM and the BJP in their race to consolidate and expand their base may arouse passions causing a deeper divide between the Hindus and Muslims. This may create *a favorable atmosphere for the communal forces* to take charge and cause disharmony, which may have a cascading effect in other parts of Telangana and the rest of the country, *providing a fertile hunting ground for the terror elements*. This scenario may lead to coordination problems for the security forces to *carry out their operations*. (Ibid.: 7, emphasis added)

Option 3–Scenario 3 (Rayala Telangana with Hyderabad as Capital)

This scenario is not likely to be accepted either by the pro-Telangana or by the united-Andhra protagonists. The only groups that are likely to be satisfied are (i) AI-MIM, who have been saying that if a new State has to be carved out, then it should comprise of the area of Telangana and Rayalaseema and (ii) certain sections of the Rayalaseema region. (Ibid.: 8)

Option 5 (Telangana)

The Muslim community, especially the All-India Majlis Ittehadul Musalmeen (AI-MIM), the main Muslim political party of Andhra Pradesh, is *apprehensive of the fate and status of the Muslim community*, in the eventuality of a separate Telangana being formed. The concern arises out of the fact that BJP being a strong proponent of the on-going pro-Telangana agitation is likely to play a bigger role after the formation of the new state. The AI-MIM, however, has decided against openly opposing the formation of separate Telangana, *fearing a backlash*, both *against the party* and the *Muslim community*, in event of the new state being formed. (Ibid.: 4, emphasis added)

> The AI-MIM, BJP, RSS and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) have a reasonably strong presence in the Telangana region and in general take to *inciting passions*, indulging *in communal rhetoric*, etc. Both political parties (AI-MIM and BJP) will *be competing* to expand their bases in Telangana state and in the process will try to ignite passions creating potential for *communal unrest*. (Ibid.: 11, emphasis added)

Maoist Issues

Regarding Maoist issues, the SKC sees problems in Options 2, 5 and 6. It sees Gaddar's Telangana Praja Front (TPF) as a Maoist front organisation ('totally Maoist-backed and motivated') but does not propose any action against it. Repercussions of Options 1 and 4 are not commented upon.

Option 2 (Telangana with Hyderabad as UT)

> Telangana without Hyderabad city may face a setback with a vast chunk of its populace deprived of economic opportunities and thereby provide a *fertile ground for Naxalism* to flourish. *Hyderabad city may also be affected by Maoist activities*, as Maoists will try and use Hyderabad city for shelter and generation of funds. Since the state would be divided, it may become a difficult task for the security forces to coordinate operations to curb Maoist activities in the urban areas of Hyderabad, in the forest areas tracts of Telangana and Seemandhra. (Ibid.: 7, emphasis added)

Option 5–Scenario 5 (Telangana with Hyderabad as Capital)

> *The Maoists are also likely to gain by the creation of a new state.* The new state is likely to be soft towards them initially, given that they have, over the years, supported the struggle for the formation of Telangana. (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)

> Gaddar floated a new front called Telangana Praja Front (TPF) *on the instructions of the underground cadre of the Maoists* to sustain agitation for a prolonged period. This front, which is *totally Maoist-backed and motivated*, tried to project itself as an alternate to KCR and TRS. Thus, the Maoists are *trying to make a comeback* through the Telangana agitation. (Ibid.: 10, emphasis added)

> Although TPF has some time back moved away from the TRS they have again come back together, which is *matter of serious concern*. (Ibid.: 11, emphasis added)

Option 6–Scenario 6 (Status Quo Plus)

> Some opinions have been expressed that this situation can also be exploited by Maoists on the plea that unless an *armed/violent agitation* is carried out by the people of Telangana, Government of India will not create separate Telangana. *This call of the Maoists may attract unemployed youth both in rural and urban areas to join the movement* and hence needs to be watched. (Ibid.: 13, emphasis added)

Caste and Regional Equations

As far as caste and regional equations are concerned, SKC comments only on Options 3, 5 and 6, and these comments are not very severe. The real issues seem to revolve around the financial, industrial and landed interests of the Seemandhra leaders (particularly the Rayalaseema leaders) in Hyderabad city and its surroundings. As it says, '*Hyderabad … has emerged as the key issue in the entire scheme of things* (Ibid.: 8, emphasis added).

Option 3–Scenario 3 (Rayala Telangana with Hyderabad as Capital)

> The emotional as well as the economic aspirations of the people of Telangana will also not be served, as *there is a predominant feeling*

among the people of Telangana that the Rayalaseema leaders have taken over the commercially profitable land of Hyderabad city and will continue to dominate the people of Telangana. It is to be noted that not a single political and social group from Telangana responded favorably to this suggestion wherever the Committee had an opportunity to discuss the same with them. (Ibid.: 8, emphasis added)

Option 5 (Telangana with Hyderabad as Capital)

Telangana area is dominated by *upper-caste Reddys and Velamas*, while the bulk of the population is *from backward communities*, viz. Munnur Kapu, Mudhiraj, Gouds, Padmashalis and the Scheduled Caste community of which the majority are Madigas. Historically, political and economic activity has always been *dominated by Reddys and Velamas* and an important cause of Naxalism was the feudalism and discrimination by the dominant castes over the others. Even today, while the leaders of the Telangana agitation are from *the dominant castes*, the actual foot soldiers are mainly *from the BCs and SCs*, who are aspiring to acquire political space and leadership. These aspirations, if not realized, may become an important factor contributing to social unrest. (Ibid.: 11, emphasis added)

Option 6–Scenario 6 (Status Quo Plus)

The success of the preferred solution proposed by the SKC, that is, Option 6, is highly dependent on 'management'. This is described vividly in the supplementary note in which advice is given: (i) to manage the Telangana Congress legislators (ii) to 'soften' the TRS and, worse, (iii) to get TDP on the 'same page' as the ruling Congress.

> The TDP should be advised not to participate in any further meetings that would be called by the Centre. This could be an effective stumbling block for any meaningful dialogue on resolving the Telangana demand. (Ibid.: 15)

Much worse is the blatant use of the 'Kamma caste card' as the TDP is considered a Kamma party,

> The Andhra Congress MPs belonging to the Kamma caste must be encouraged to work in tandem with TDP leadership, which is now caught in a bad shape. (Ibid.: 15)

> But *every method* must be adopted to *avoid giving finality to any discussions*, to *drag on the matter until the agitation is totally brought under control*. (Ibid.: 15, emphasis added)

> The impression that the Telangana people have been *somewhat let down* in view of the fact that though *earlier an indication had been given* that the process of creation of a new State would be initiated and now since this will not be done in case the State is to stay united, *has to be dispelled in a suitable manner* bringing out that it is in the best long-term interest not only of the State but also for the people of Telangana. It is to be *effectively instilled in their minds* that this option is the best possible solution under the circumstances, not only for the State but for Telangana as well. *Towards this end, all / most of the stakeholders/important leaders of the state and media have to be brought on the same page, primarily through an active interactive process.* (Ibid.: 13, emphasis added)

> The most important requirement for addressing the law and order problems that may arise in our view will be (i) *political clarity in terms of the future course of action and* (ii) *the need for effective governance*. (Ibid.: 14, emphasis added)

This task of 'management' of media and political parties, etc. was detailed in the supplementary note, which has been extensively quoted in the high court judgment, which directed the Government of India to publish the secret report in its entirety. The government appealed this decision. The media has now done what the government refuses to do.

The result is that there has been disillusionment among those who had reposed faith in the integrity of the SKC. In this, there is

some benefit as it leads to full awareness of the forces at work trying to undo what a legitimate process of public policy, reacting to a continuous, stable and firm democratic sentiment, had achieved on 9 December 2009. We return, however, by a delayed and circuitous course to that watershed event, the acceptance of a Telangana state.

Notes

1. It turned out that there was not a secret chapter but two secret 'notes'—one on the issue itself and the other on how to manage the politicians, press and electronic media, police, etc. in order to ensure an atmosphere conducive to a united state (see Reddy 2011).

2. Ibid., para 81.

3. In May 2011, the XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court directed the police to book a case against all five members of the SKC under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) sections 153A (promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc.), 418 (cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect), 504 (insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) and 505 (publishing or circulating statements of rumours), 'FIR against Srikrishna committee', *Siasat Daily*, 18 May 2011. http://www.siasat.com/english/news/fir-against-srikrishna-committee, accessed on 1 June 2011.

Appendix to Chapter 17

United Andhra vis-à-vis Separate Telangana Issue

SKC's Secret Chapter 8*

1. Introduction

This detailed note covers the likely immediate backlash/law and order situations that get created in the state on the submission of the report at the end of the month as a reaction to the perceived course of action by the Government of India on whatever option may finally get exercised. The note also discusses some major long-term internal security related issues. The assessment given in the note is based on: (i) analysis of certain relevant memoranda given by the political parties and other groups, (ii) information gained through interaction with different political parties/groups at state level and during field visits (districts and villages), (iii) discussions held with senior officers of the state government including that of the police department with district collectors and superintendents of police and with other sources, and (iv) own experience.

2. Background

2.1 The demand for a separate Telangana state had been existing even before the creation of the State of Andhra Pradesh on 1 November 1956 after the merger of Telangana areas of

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the erstwhile Hyderabad State with the State of Andhra that had been carved out in 1953 out of the Madras Presidency. Prior to the merger and with a view to provide safeguards for protecting the interest of Telangana, an agreement called 'The Gentleman's Agreement' involving the leaders of both the regions was signed in February 1956. However, discontent over the ab initio non-implementation of some of the key decisions (ibid. chapter 1 of report) in the Agreement resulted in a major 'separate Telangana agitation' in 1968–1969. This agitation which was mainly spearheaded by the students started in Warangal District in December 1968 and spread to other regions of Telangana receiving support of various parties and organisations of the region. In the wake of this agitation there was large-scale destruction of public/private property.

Besides, reportedly it resulted in the death of 57 persons with 217 persons injured as per the figures based on Andhra Pradesh police inputs). The agitation was, however, brought under control after a few months on account of the strong stand taken by Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister. The Government of India promised to undertake remedial action against the violations of the Agreement and P. V. Narasimha Rao belonging to Telangana region, was made chief minister of the state on 30 September 1971.

2.2 On 28 March 1969, the Mulki Rules were held invalid by the high court. However, the Supreme Court declared them constitutionally valid on October 3, 1972 giving rise to a situation where jobs occupied by the Andhra People were required to be vacated. The reaction to this development was that it led to a strong 'Jai Andhra movement' in Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions in late 1972. This movement also witnessed a high level of violence resulting in 69 causalities. Among these, seven government personnel were killed and 66 injured. Around 350 citizens were also injured. This movement was also contained through firm handling with the intervention of the Government of India. P. V. Narasimha Rao resigned as CM on 10 January 1973 and President's Rule was imposed. A political settlement was worked out and a Six-point Formula

(SPF) was agreed upon on 28 September 1973 by both the regions. A Presidential Order was promulgated on 3 May 1975 which provided for accelerated development of backward areas, state-level planning boards/sub committees for backward areas, reservation for local candidates for non-gazetted posts/ educational institutions, discontinuation of the Telangana Regional Committee and Mulki Rules.

Accordingly, the state was divided into Six Zones and Hyderabad was included in Zone 6.

However, for the state secretariat, directorates, commissionerates and state-level offices located in Hyderabad, recruitment was done treating Hyderabad as a free zone, i.e. anybody in the state could compete. Over a period of time, there were violations in the implementation of SPF and GO 610 was issued (30 December 1985) to rectify them.

The Girglani Commission appointed by the state government pointed out in 2004 that there had been several instances of violations of the GO 610 during the previous 30 years and recommended corrective action. AP High Court also issued direction for implementation of GO 610 within 3 months. The government issued 4 GOs, out of which GOs 72 and 116 were not implemented, while GOs 399 and 415 were issued and later cancelled.

The implementation of GO 610 in the last 4 to 5 years, however, has been reported to be satisfactory with a major part of the grievances redressed. Recently, the Supreme Court cancelled (9 October 2009) the transfer orders of some police inspectors (as per GO 610), holding that Hyderabad being a cosmopolitan city should be treated as a free zone.

Subsequent to this order the Andhra Pradesh Assembly passed a resolution on 18.3.2010 as quoted below, 'This House resolves to request the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India to obtain the approval of President of India to Clause (1) of Para 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (organisation of Local cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruit) Order 1975'. (The above resolution has been forwarded to Government of India.)

2.3 Meanwhile, simmering discontentment among Telangana people over non-implementation of various protective provisions for Telangana was highlighted by TRS which was floated on 27 April 2001 by K. Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR). In 2004 general elections, TRS entered into an alliance with the Congress party with a commitment for creation of Telangana as a separated state. TRS joined both the state and Central Government, and the issue was included in the Common Minimum Programme of UPA-1. The GoI appointed a Cabinet Sub-committee headed by Pranab Mukherjee on 5 January 2005 to evolve a consensus on the issue. However, the Pranab Mukherjee Committee could not arrive at any clear-cut conclusion and reportedly suggested appointment of a Second States' Reorganization Commission to look into the issue. KCR rejected the suggestion and withdrew from both the Central government and state governments in protest. Between 2004 and 2009, KCR represented the Karimnagar Parliament seat. Sensing adverse mood of the people towards the failure of KCR he resigned his seat in 2006. He retained his seat in the keenly contested by-election by a huge margin. Many protagonists of Telangana campaigned extensively for that election. Subsequently, KCR started losing support within the party and yet again he enforced byelections in four Lok Sabha seats and 16 assembly seats. The outcome of the bypolls was a huge setback as KCR lost many seats held by his partymen. The percentage of vote share obtained by the TRS attracted the attention of TDP and its leader Chandrababu Naidu to explore a possible tie-up. The TDP which fought the 2004 general elections on the plank of united Andhra Pradesh has reversed its decision to take advantage of the strong sentiment prevailing in the Telangana districts.

At the time of general elections held in 2009, TRS joined the TDP's grand alliance. The Congress party contested without any allies.

The Telangana Congress leaders asserted that Smt. Sonia Gandhi, would take an appropriate decision on Telangana at an appropriate time.

The TRS suffered big electoral defeat winning just 10 seats for the state assembly and just two seats for Parliament. The Telangana protagonists deserted the TRS and KCR. Only after the demise of former CM YS Rajasekhara Reddy, the state politics ran into instability bringing back the demand for Telangana state.

The announcement over the formation of state of Telangana made by the union government on 9 December 2009 had generated unrest among the Seemandhra people. The union government had constituted this committee to examine the demand for a separate state of Telangana as well as the demand for maintaining the present status of a united Andhra Pradesh.

3. Present Situation

3.1 The demand for a separate state of Telangana has its root in the perceived discrimination against the people of Telangana by the Seemandhra leaders in the fields of education, water and irrigation resources, job opportunities including employment in government and issues of development, besides the unfulfilment of some key assurances given in the Gentlemen's Agreement particularly pertaining to political space for Telangana (e.g. CM/Dy. CM).

Different communities/groups have their own perception on benefits which may accrue to them from the formation of Telangana. In addition, there is a strong emotional factor attached with the demand for a separate state.

The people of Telangana believe that the problem of discrimination against their region that has existed hitherto can only be overcome by having their own independent identity.

3.2 The student community and the unemployed youth feel that the creation of a new state will lead to increased employment opportunities for them, as the government jobs in Telangana region will then not go to the Seemandhra people. The student community is already campaigning for 42% reservation in Group-I posts for those belonging to Telangana and boycotted

classes/examinations and organised bandh on the issue on 4 and 5 September 2010, respectively.

Telangana lawyers also see a separate state as an opportunity to get more appointments to the posts of public prosecutors, assistant public prosecutors and standing counsels in the new state. They, under the banner of Telangana Advocates Joint Action Committee, started an agitation on 13 September 2010 targeting judges and advocates belonging to Seemandhra region demanding a 42% reservation in the said posts. There has been a longstanding demand for appointment of the Advocate General hailing from Telangana. The government employees of Telangana also welcome the formation of a new state as they feel that this may lead to faster promotions.

Government employees belonging to Seemandhra region, though generally opposed to the formation of a new state, are not coming out openly against the demand for Telangana, fearing action and witch-hunt by pro-Telangana political parties in the eventuality of a separate state being formed. The expectations of the farmers have also been raised that they will gain both in terms of availability of water as well as power, in the new state. Several caste groups, especially those belonging to backward classes and minorities have also been allured with promises of free education at all levels and increase in reservation for them in government jobs in the new state.

3.3 The Muslim community, especially the All-India Majlis Ittehad ul Musalmeen (AI-MIM), the main Muslim political party of Andhra Pradesh, is apprehensive of the fate and status of the Muslim community, in the eventuality of a separate Telangana being formed. This concern arises out of the fact that BJP being a strong proponent of the ongoing pro-Telangana agitation is likely to play a bigger role after the formation of a new state. The AI-MIM, however, has decided against openly opposing the formation of separate Telangana, fearing a backlash, both against the party and the Muslim community, in the event of the new state being formed. Besides, many Muslims residing in various districts of Telangana are also strongly supporting the new state. Their

grievance of not getting adequate jobs and loss of land held by them is noteworthy. Accordingly, AI-MIM has diluted its stand of completely opposing Telangana and is now indirectly supporting the formation of a new state albeit, comprising the erstwhile territory of the Nawab of Hyderabad, viz. Telangana region along with Rayalaseema (Rayala Telangana) as a second option in case keeping the state united does not work out.

However, this may not be acceptable to the Andhra leaders who would lose Hyderabad completely and also face hardship in securing rights over river waters.

4. Possible Options

4.1 The committee has discussed six possible options in the concluding part of the report not recommending the first three and giving preferential order to the remaining three. The backlash/law & order problems and the internal security related issues in case of each of the six options/scenarios (as listed below) have been covered in this paragraph.

Scenario 1: To treat the movement as a normal law and order situation to be handled purely by the state with usual support from the Centre.

Scenario 2: Creation of a separate state of Telangana with Hyderabad becoming a UT.

Scenario 3: To merge Rayalaseema with Telangana and create a new state Rayala Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital.

Scenario 4: In case of a separate Telangana, creation of a larger UT of Hyderabad by connecting Hyderabad (HMDA) with Guntur (Coastal Andhra) in south-east and Kurnool (Rayalaseema) in the south via Nalgonda and Mehboobnagar (both Telangana districts) respectively through creation of appropriate corridors by merging a few Mandals with Hyderabad (HMDA).

Scenario 5: To grant statehood to Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital.

Scenario 6: Providing constitutional/statutory safeguards to Telangana region by guaranteeing redressal of the region's major grievances and keeping the state united.

Scenario 1

To treat the movement as a normal law and order situation to be handled purely by the state with usual support from the Centre:

(a) Agitations:

(i) In view of the fact that under this option the employment and other expectations and particularly the emotional satisfaction of the people of Telangana will not be met, immediate backlash will take place in the form of violent agitations in Telangana region which may continue for a few months.

However, besides sporadic agitations on specific demands like employment opportunities, sharing of water resources, etc. may continue for a longer period. In Telangana, the backlash is likely to be more pronounced in TRS-dominated districts of Karimnagar, Warangal, Medak and parts of Nizamabad.

(ii) Furthermore it is anticipated that the agitation in and around Hyderabad would be intense, since the various JAC of students, advocates, government employees, youth and mass organisations would try to paralyse normal life in and around Hyderabad. The agitations by the coal workers of SCCL (spread over Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam and Warangal districts) would adversely affect coal production. This, in turn, would affect the coal supply to the thermal power plants and thus the power position both at the state and national level.

The rail and road traffic in the Telangana region may also be affected. The agitations are also expected to adversely affect the functioning of industrial and other business establishments. The pro-Telangana agitators are likely to target business establishments and financial interests/assets of the Seemandhra leaders. This will adversely affect the

inflow of investments into Hyderabad thus hampering the city's economic growth and creating public unrest on account of lost employment opportunities.

(iii) The peoples' representatives especially MLAs, MLCs and MPs from Telangana region belonging to all political parties would be under pressure to resign as evidenced earlier. TRS and the recently constituted TPF–Gaddar would take the lead in organising various programmes. Mass resignations could create political crisis in the state. The verbal attack of the Telangana leaders against the Seemandhra leaders is expected to increase. The divisions within Congress, the TDP, as well as the state cabinet will need to be watched and suitably addressed. Public property like government offices, road transport vehicles, etc. would need to be secured as they are likely to be the target of the agitationists. Hyderabad has about 100 central institutions including defence establishments and defence research institutions that are important from the national security point of view. A separate plan would have to be drawn up for the protection of these institutions. Besides, the social, economic and political tensions, prolonged Telangana agitation would put a severe strain on the state's law and order machinery.

(b) Maoist Violence:

In the event of the demand of a separate Telangana state not being realised, some of the militant elements which have been in the forefront of the agitations may go underground to revive the Maoist movement in certain pockets of Telangana which, however, could possibly be tackled within a small time-frame with firm political will and strong administrative action.

The Maoists who are active in Dandakaranya and Andhra-Orissa Border areas, viz. Khammam, East Godavari, Vizag, etc. and certain forest areas of Adilabad, Karimnagar and Warangal may continue to operate along the borders with Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Orissa. Their activities might be more intense in Vizag and Khammam regions

but the fall out of violence may mostly be confined to these few districts.

(c) Communal Violence:

As the state has, by and large, been able to neutralise most of the Jihadi elements in the last two decades and has evolved suitable mechanisms to contain communal and factional resistances, there may not be much change on the position on these two fronts. The status quo may remain. Since the alignment of political forces on communal lines is likely to be less probable, the outbreak of communal violence would be contingent upon extraneous factors.

(d) Migration Issues:

Since Hyderabad city or GHMC limits have been a focused area for development and investments, both skilled and unskilled labour of all the three regions may continue to migrate to Hyderabad city, putting tremendous pressure on water and land utilisation. These migrants may alter the population dynamics of Hyderabad city and the competition for employment opportunities and the subsequent frustration may lead to sporadic conflicts between people of various regions in Hyderabad city.

Scenario 2

Creation of separate state of Telangana with Hyderabad becoming a UT:

(a) Agitations:

Apart from the backlash mentioned in Scenario 1, there may be severe discontentment among the people of Telangana that Hyderabad city, which has been historically part of Telangana, has been taken away from them. Telangana without Hyderabad will be handicapped in terms of state revenues, industrial growth, employment potential, education, infrastructure and other facilities, leading to largescale dissatisfaction and unrest in the region. Hyderabad could emerge as an island surrounded by a region that is unhappy with its residents—while the residents

of Hyderabad would be dependent on the surroundings for several resources and transport. In addition, Hyderabad city which is dependent upon Telangana for drinking water supplies, and is surrounded by Telangana, may face the consequences of violent agitations of Telangana which could lead to blockade of supply in drinking water, transportation, other services, etc. Hyderabad may also provide the base for agitation to both Telanganites and Seemandhra people.

(b) Maoist Violence:

Telangana without Hyderabad city may face a set back with a vast chunk of its populace deprived of economic opportunities and thereby provide a fertile ground for Naxalism to flourish.

Hyderabad city may also be affected by Maoist activities, as Maoists will try to use Hyderabad city for shelter and generation of funds. Since the state would be divided, it may become a difficult task for the security forces to coordinate operations to curb Maoists activities in the urban areas of Hyderabad, in the forest tracts of Telangana and Seemandhra.

(c) Communal Violence:

The political forces viz., the AI-MIM and the BJP in their race to consolidate and expand their base may arouse passions causing a deeper divide between the Hindus and Muslims. This may create a favourable atmosphere for the communal forces to take charge and cause disharmony, which may have a cascading effect in other parts of Telangana and rest of the country, providing a fertile hunting ground for the terror elements. This scenario may lead to coordination problems for the security forces to carry out their operations.

(d) Migration:

Hyderabad as a UT may also have influx of migrants from other states, increasing pressure on land, water, disparities between people of various regions fuelling social unrest both in Telangana as well as in Hyderabad. The citizens of Telangana may get treated as non-locals in Hyderabad city, limiting their employment prospects and economic growth, and this frustration can lead to conflicts. The students of Telangana region would become more dependent on Hyderabad for

advanced studies in professional courses and higher education, as scope for undertaking professional courses presently is rather limited in the Telangana region. This may lead to discontent among the students, fuelling student agitations. In case of a separate Telangana, the feeling is that Rayalaseema will continue to be neglected in Seemandhra.

Hence there is likelihood of starting of the demand for separate Rayalaseema and consequent agitations.

Scenario 3

To merge Rayalaseema with Telangana and create a new state Rayala Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital.

1. This scenario is not likely to be accepted either by the pro-Telangana or by the United-Andhra protagonists. The only groups who are likely to be satisfied are: (i) AI-MIM, who had been saying that if a new state has to be carved out, then it should comprise the areas of Telangana and Rayalaseema and (ii) certain sections of society of Rayalaseema region. Since BJP has a strong presence, it may try to consolidate in Telangana areas and further expand its base. AI-MIM may try to expand in Rayalaseema regions resulting in birth of militant communalism in certain pockets. The potentially affected areas are expected to be: Adoni (Kurnool), Kadiri, Hindipur (Anantapur), Madanapalli, Punganuru (Chittoor) and Rayachoti and Kadapa town.
2. The emotional as well as the economic aspirations of the people of Telangana will also not be served, as there is a predominant feeling among the people of Telangana that the Rayalaseema leaders have taken over the commercially profitable land of Hyderabad city and will continue to dominate the people of Telangana. It is to be noted that not a single political and social group from Telangana responded favourably to this suggestion wherever the committee had an opportunity to discuss the same with them.
3. The situation described later in scenario-5 may also generally apply in this case too in certain respects.

Scenario 4

In case of separate Telangana, creation of a larger UT of Hyderabad by connecting Hyderabad (HMDA) with Guntoor (Coastal Andhra) in south-east and Kurnool (Rayalaseema) in the south via Nalgonda and Mahboob Nagar (both Telangana districts) respectively through creation of appropriate corridors by merging a few Mandals with Hyderabad (HMDA).

1. This proposal links Hyderabad to all the three regions of the state so that these regions have geographical contiguity and physical access to Hyderabad which has emerged as the key issue in the entire scheme of things.

   Hyderabad may then contain the capitals of both Telangana as well as Coastal Andhra and may even cater to the possible resultant aspirations of Rayalaseema.
2. While larger UT of Hyderabad to be governed on a mixed (Chandigarh Delhi) with a Legislative Assembly and a Lt. Governor may have the advantage of addressing the issue relating to the status of Hyderabad and may even make Hyderabad Megapolis, an economic giant in due course and in the process help the border towns of all the three regions to grow substantially (as seen in Delhi and Chandigarh), inputs received indicate that reactions to this option are also expected to be on the same lines as indicated in Scenario 2 discussed earlier and there will be, at least for a period of time, serious agitations particularly from Telangana region on two counts namely: (i) Hyderabad not becoming exclusively the capital of Telangana and (ii) merging parts of two districts of Telangana for creation of the larger UT. The political agreement on this proposal may also prove to be difficult to arrive at thus creating other governance-related tensions. In fact, Scenario 2 would be relatively easier for convincing Telanganites.

Scenario 5

To grant statehood to Telangana with Hyderabad as its capital:

1. In this scenario, although the emotional aspirations of the people of Telangana to have their own state will be satisfied,

economic expectations, including enhanced job opportunities which they expect, may not actually materialise. This may lead to frustration among the youth (who are in the forefront of this agitation), professionals and even farmers. This frustration may lead to 'scape-goating', leading to targeted attacks on Seemandhra settlers and their properties. The reasons for the same are given below:

(i) The pro-Telangana political parties and forums are blaming the Seemandhra people for the neglect of Telangana region and are offering tall promises after the creation of the new state. However, the fact remains that it would not be possible to fulfil all these promises due to inherent factors. This does not imply that there would be no additional job opportunities and promotional avenues in the new state. However, these numbers are likely to fall way short of expectations.

(ii) The only way, the economic aspirations of the people of Telangana can be met is by accelerated economic development in the region. This is dependent on political stability, maintenance of law and order, availability of natural resources and of skilled manpower. However, it has been experienced in the contemporary period, that nation and its constituents, e.g. states encounter threats from a number of political, social and religious formations with ultra and radical views which tend to threaten the security of nationhood or as in this case statehood. Andhra Pradesh has been under the threat of left-wing extremists for a long period though for the present the problem has been largely contained. The important question that emerges in this context is that, whether a separate state of Telangana can sustain the state supremacy over the left-wing agitations and threats from other radical/extremists organisations/groups. As discussed in the succeeding sub-paragraphs, the existing scenario in regard to this issue does not offer an optimistic picture. Most of the industries, etc. are located in and around Hyderabad. With the bifurcation of the state and Hyderabad in Telangana

region, incidents of agitations, *dharnas* and even violence, are expected. This may result in flight of capital, stagnant growth and disincentive for entrepreneurs, leading to slowdown of economic activity. In the short term, Hyderabad may witness a vicious cycle of agitations, slowdown of economic activity and greater frustration. These factors along with irrigation/water issues would have a definite adverse impact on revenue generation and industrial development of the state and may actually offset any gains in terms of additional employment opportunities and promotional avenues that will emerge.

(iii) There is also every likelihood of revival of agitations against the formation of a new state in the Seemandhra region, including in the city of Hyderabad.

(a) Maoist Violence:

(i) The Maoists are also likely to gain by the creation of a new state. The new state is likely to be soft towards them initially, given that they have over the years supported the struggle for the formation of Telangana. By the time the state realises the Maoist menace, it may be too late for the state to handle them with a bifurcated police force contributing to a weaker response to the problem. The CPI (Maoist) will also use political boundaries of state and districts, to their advantage. It is not without reason that most of the Maoist zones, sub-zones, etc. straddle state and district boundaries.

Experience shows that inter-state coordination in anti-Naxal operations still has a lot of catching up to do and the Naxals have taken advantage of this weakness. Telangana is also contiguous with other highly affected Maoist areas viz., Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra states. As such it is likely that the Maoists will extend their activities from these neighbouring states to Telangana, especially the districts of Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, parts of Nizamabad and Medak in north Telangana and Mahabubnagar and Nalgonda in south Telangana. It is important to note that it is not entirely a coincidence that

the increased spread of Maoist violence in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, has been after the creation of these states. Increase in poverty which is a natural corollary to a slowdown in economic activity, will drive more people into the arms of the CPI (Maoist). This may again lead to a vicious cycle of Naxalism, leading to less of economic activity and greater impoverishment, which may provide fillip to left-wing extremism.

(ii) An important development that has to be noted is that after K. Chandra Shekar Rao gave up his fasting protest on 30.11.2009, Gaddar organised widespread protests and later the top leadership of Maoists including Kishanji @ Mallojula Koteshwar have organised various protests programmes through students of Osmania University and other universities of Telangana. Thus, while the student's involvement in the Telangana agitation became very intense due to the encouragement of the local committees of the Maoists, Telangana Rashtra Samiti was also forced to utilise simmering sentiment in the students. When the intensity of the agitation by TRS started ebbing down, Gaddar floated a new front called TPF on the instructions of the underground cadre of the Maoists to sustain agitation for a very prolonged duration. This front which is totally Maoist backed and motivated, tried to project itself as an alternate to KCR and TRS. Thus, the Maoists are trying to make a comeback through the Telangana agitation. The impact of possible growth of Maoist/Naxal influence in Telangana has to be evaluated in the right perspective keeping in mind that a large number of important and sensitive industries are located in and around Hyderabad.

Although TPF had some time back moved away from TRS, they have again come back together which is a matter of serious concern.

(b) Communal Violence:

(i) Historically speaking Telangana area has more communally sensitive areas, due to the long 400 years of Qutub Shahi and Nizam rule and Razakar movement during the

post-independence days. Telangana region, most specifically Hyderabad city has witnessed many communal riots which in most of the cases were triggered by very small and trivial issues.

The Hindu passions are being incited by the right-wing parties, which has also contributed to the outbreak of communal riots. The pockets which are vulnerable to the communal riots are Hyderabad city, Nirmal and Bhainsa of Adilabad, Nizamabad, Bodhan and Kamareddy of Nizamabad district, Jagityal, Korutla, Karimnagar towns of Karimnagar district, Zaheerabad and Medak town in Medak district, Nalgonda, Bhongir areas of Nalgonda district, Mahabubnagar and Narayanpet areas of Mahabubnagar district, Tandur and Vikarabad of Rangareddy district.

There is a certain sense of mutual suspicion between two communities who are living in the abovementioned areas. If communal passions become an additional factor in an atmosphere where unemployment, social unrest, etc. exist, it may give rise to birth of militant Jihadi elements. The intelligence wing of the State Police and the IB will be more informed on this aspect. Telangana has a large number of Muslim pockets and to counter Muslim influence, Hindu fundamentalists may compete with them and try to polarise the Hindu population. This unhealthy competition between Hindu and Muslim fundamentalist groups may tend to reduce the influence of the main stream secular political parties like the Congress and the communists in the long run.

(ii) The AI-MIM, BJP, RSS and VHP have a reasonably strong presence in the Telangana region and in general take to inciting passions, indulging in communal rhetoric, etc. Both political parties (AI-MIM & BJP) will be competing to expand their bases in Telangana state and in the process will try to ignite passions creating potential for communal unrest.

(c) Education Implications:

Most of the major educational infrastructure in the Telangana region has historically been owned by the Seemandhra people and it is located mostly within the limits of Greater Hyderabad.

The student community which is spearheading the separate Telangana agitation has been using these educational institutions for their agitational activities. This may lead to migration of the faculty as well as these institutions, impacting/reducing the availability of local persons who can be productively engaged by the industry/business-houses.

(d) Migration Issues:

(i) Telangana region is mineral rich having deposits of limestone and granite. The dominant industries here are thermal power stations, pharmaceuticals, etc. which are mostly managed by Seemandhra people. One of the main propaganda issues in the Telangana agitation has been that once a separate state is created, the job opportunities in all these industries will be made available to the people of Telangana. Many of the owners and skilled personnel in these industries have historically been from the Seemandhra region, the inability to substitute them with sufficient number of qualified locals may lead to conflict between the locals and non-locals and also between the management and the workforce.

The Telangana region is dependent on coal reserves for its power generation while the Seemandhra region, though dependent on coal reserves, is rapidly expanding its energy sources, viz., gas, wind, solar and nuclear. Thus, energy deficiencies may lead to migration of population, imbalance in the employment opportunities, which may become a cause for social unrest.

(ii) Farming in Telangana is mostly dependent on ground and rainwater and lift irrigation schemes which require substantial amount of electrical energy. The present government has extended free power facility to the farmers across the state which has benefitted the small and marginal

farmers in Telangana region to a large extent. Some districts of Telangana region such as Nalgonda, Medak, Mahabubnagar and Hyderabad are industrially developed and hence consume substantial amount of energy. Since the sources of energy in the Telangana region are largely coal-based thermal power plants, any economic imbalance may lead to energy starvation of the small and marginal farmers which will adversely affect the productivity of the land. This can cause decline in their earnings which may result in distress sale of lands and their migration to the industrial belt in the Hyderabad city. This may further cause change in the population profile, pressure on unskilled employment sector, land and water utilisation in Hyderabad which in turn may accentuate inter-regional rivalry and tensions in Hyderabad area.

(iii) Telangana area is dominated by upper caste Reddys and Velamas, while the bulk of population is from the backward communities, viz. Munnur Kapu, Mudhiraj, Gouds, Padmashalis and the Community of which the majority are 'madigas'. Historically, the political and economic activity has always been dominated by the Reddys and Velamas, and an important cause of Naxalism was feudalism and discrimination by the dominant castes over the others. Even today while the leaders of the separate Telangana agitation are from dominant castes, the actual foot soldiers are mainly from the BCs and SCs, who are aspiring to acquire political space and leadership. These aspirations, if not realised may become an important factor contributing to social unrest.

Scenario 6

Providing constitutional/statutory safeguards to the Telangana region by guaranteeing redressal of the region's major grievances and keeping the state united:

1. This option would not satisfy the people of Telangana having regard to the entrenched emotional feelings they harbour for

creation of a separate state. Their sentiments have reached a heightened level in the recent past, were well echoed in the 12 Assembly bye-elections of August 2010 and as such have to be fully addressed. The likely agitational activities have been discussed in the section dealing with Scenario 1 but it can be safely said that the intensity of agitations in many parts of Telangana by students, non-gazetted officials, lawyers, unemployed youth and even the farmers will be very high. While the emotional aspect, that of being discriminated against by the Seemandhra people is likely to remain, the extent to which the emotional aspirations (the fulfilment of the psychological need of self-governance) are taken care of by the constitutional/statutory guarantees will determine the extent of backlash by the pro-Telangana people, their demand for a separate state not having been met. It is also equally important that such guarantees are articulated clearly and effectively brought to the notice of the general public of Telangana by all possible means.

2. The guarantees/economic package have to necessarily include the following, to at least meet some of the important demands of the Telangana people:
   (i) Psychological assurance that the people of Telangana shall not be discriminated against as perceived by them in the past and would be appropriately empowered in the decision-making process such as the representatives of Telangana being given key positions in the government. In order to achieve this, the earlier arrangements like the decisions made in the Gentlemen's Agreement may have to be revisited and if need be suitably expanded and strengthened.
   (ii) To ensure that the statutory guarantees/safeguards provided are properly implemented, provision should be made for taking out an Annual Report Card of their implementation as a confidence building measure for the people of Telangana.
   (iii) The above Annual Report Card may also include the implementation of other recommendations made by the committee and accepted by the government pertaining

to different sectors such as education, employment and irrigation and water resources, etc. The above actions are extremely important as confidence building measures since implementation on some of the mutually agreed decisions, and even government orders have been found to be tardy and slow in the past.

3. The impression that the Telangana people have been somewhat let down in view of the fact that though earlier an indication had been given that the process of creation of a new state would be initiated and now since this will not be done in case the state is to stay united, has to be dispelled in a suitable manner bringing out that it is in the best long-term interest not only for the people of the state but also for the people of Telangana. It is to be effectively instilled in their minds that this option is the best possible solution under the circumstances, not only for the state but for Telangana as well. Towards this end all/most of the stakeholders/important leaders of the state and media have to be brought on the same page, primarily through an active interactive process.
4. Some opinions have been expressed that this situation can also be exploited by the Maoists on the plea that unless an armed/violent agitation is carried out by the people of Telangana, the Government of India will not create separate Telangana. This call by the Maoists may attract unemployed youth both in rural and urban areas to join the movement and hence needs to be watched.

5. Conclusion

5.1 In view of the background of the complex situation, it would be seen that under each of the scenarios listed above, there is a high possibility of immediate agitational backlash in different regions of the state. While a strategy for handling medium- and long-term internal security dimensions, as discussed in the foregoing paras, that may emerge can be developed as the final decision on the issue is taken by the government, the

need of the hour will be to handle the immediate backlash. In this context, the fact that TRS, the most vocal and aggressive amongst the political parties, has held the 'Telangana Maha Garjana' rally at Warangal on 16 December 2010, reportedly attended by nearly 5 lakh people and has also plans to launch a civil disobedience movement after 31 December 2010 while initiating the action under 'Maha Yudham' (a massive war) if the Centre does not announce a separate Telangana, has to be kept in mind. Now since TPF-Gaddar and TRS have come together, the situation has become even more serious.

5.2 The most important requirement for addressing the law and order problems that may arise in our view will be: (i) political clarity in terms of the future course of action and (ii) the need for effective governance. The following mechanism is suggested to control the law and order situation that may emerge soon after the report is submitted and becomes public. The mechanism essentially should cover three areas, i.e. (i) political management and sensitisation of political parties (ii) media management and (iii) high level of preparedness by the state government (administration, police, intelligence, etc.) with needed and adequate support from the Centre.

5.3 Going by the history of similar agitations earlier, the sensitivities involved and the emotional undercurrent running across the state, the aim of this exercise has to be to take all possible actions in advance so that the possible backlash and law and order situations are contained and controlled effectively with minimum damage to human life and public and private properly while at the same time ensuring that the normal systems continue to operate and function in the state in a peaceful manner.

5.4 Role of National Integration Council (NIC): It is also felt that besides the action(s) suggested above, there is simultaneously a need for the NIC to play a pro-active role in the state with a view to foster a sense of harmony amongst different communities so that the divisive conflicts are taken care of, disorder and violence is avoided and the important goals and objectives of socio-economic growth are achieved irrespective

of the fact whether the division of the state takes place or not. The committee feels that as enshrined in the charter of the NIC it has to be suitably emphasised that the social and economic justice can only be achieved if all the natives regardless of their linguistic, religious ethnic or cultural affiliations work towards this objective in a peaceful and harmonious manner. The committee, therefore, suggests that in the instant case a suitable mechanism in this regard may be devised by the NIC in consultation with the union and the state governments for implementation in the state in addition to the other suggestions articulated in para 5.2 above. N.B.: may also kindly see the Supplementary Note (3 pages) attached.

Supplementary Note

(a) Political Management:

(i) There is a need for ensuring unity among the leaders of the ruling party in the state. There is also a need for providing strong and firm political leadership and placement of representatives of Telangana in key positions (may be CM/Dy. CM) (Since done). This aspect was discussed with FM & HM in September 2010. Action also needs to be initiated for softening the TRS to the extent possible, especially in the context of the fact that TRS has threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement after 31 December and also initiate a 'Maha Yuddam' (a Massive war) if the Centre does not announce a Separate Telangana. Gaddar's TPF who had parted company with TRS have again joined hands with TRS. Inputs indicate that this agitation can be tackled if Telangana Congress leaders do not give an impression indicating any covert/ overt support to it. Hence the Telangana Congress MPs/ MLAs need to be taken into confidence and asked not to lend any form of support to the agitation. The Congress high command must sensitise its own MPS and MLAs and educate them about the wisdom for arriving at

an acceptable and workable solution. With the ruling party and also the main opposition party (the TDP run by Chandrababu) must be brought on the same page, the support mechanisms have a higher probability of becoming successful. The TDP must be advised not to participate in any further meetings that would be called by the Centre.

This could be an effective stumbling block for any meaningful dialogue on resolving the Telangana demand. The Andhra Congress MPs belonging to Kamma caste must be encouraged to work in tandem with TDP leadership which is now caught in a bad shape.

(ii) Further, on receipt of the committee's report by the government, a general message should be conveyed amongst the people of the state that the Centre will be open for detailed discussions on the recommendations/options of the report with the concerned leaders/stakeholders either directly or through a GoM or through important interlocutors and that this process will start at the earliest. But every method must be adopted to avoid giving finality to any discussions to drag on the matter until the agitation is totally brought under control.

(c) Media Management:

(i) Andhra Pradesh has got about 13 electronic channels and 5 major local newspapers which are in the forefront of moulding public opinion. Except for two channels (Raj News & HMTV), the rest of them are supporters of a united Andhra Pradesh. The equity holders of the channels except the above two and the entire print media are with the Seemandhra people. The main editors/resident and subeditors, the film world, etc. are dominated by Seemandhra people. A coordinated action on their part has the potential of shaping the perception of the common man. However, the beat journalists in the respective regions are locals and are likely to capture only those events/news which reflect the regional sentiments. This can be tackled by the owners of the media houses by systematically

replacing the local journalists by those from Seemandhra wherever it is possible.

(ii) Hyderabad city which is expected to be the centre of most of the agitations is generally covered by those journalists who are votaries of a separate Telangana. Hence a lot of media hype on the Osmania University Students agitation, self-immolations, etc. may be created. Therefore, media management assumes critical importance to ensure that only the reality is projected and no unnecessary hype is created. In the immediate past, it is observed that the media coverage on the issue has shown a declining trend resulting in a lower intensity of the agitation. Each of the media houses are affiliated to different political parties. In the print media all major newspapers are owned by Seemandhra people and the regional contents published by them play a vital role. Most of the editors except Andhra Jyothi are pro-united AP. However, similar to the electronic channels, the print media have also got political affiliations. The editorial opinions, the banner headlines, the regional content, the district editions need to be managed to be realistic and should give only due coverage to the separate Telangana agitations. The print media is hugely dependent on the government for advertisement revenue and if carefully handled can be an effective tool to achieve this goal.

However, the Right to Information (RTI) Act may prove to be an impediment for the government to deny due share of ads to publications supporting the Telangana demand.

(iii) In concrete terms, it needs to be particularly ensured that media does not: (a) Create a psychosis of fear amongst the public (b) Indulge in general and baseless speculations that can create unnecessary hype of any kind (c) Arouse communal passions (d) Show old and irrelevant clippings of violence/violent agitations, etc.

For this purpose necessary prohibitory orders under appropriate provisions of law can be issued in advance.

(d) Full Preparedness:

(i) As under each of the options there is a high possibility of agitational backlash, notwithstanding the actions taken in advance as suggested in (a) and (b) above, an appropriate plan of deployment grid of police force (both Central and state) with full technical support needs to be immediately drawn up. Advance preparedness in this regard would go a long way in containing the law and order situation and minimise destruction of lives and property.

It would also be necessary to have a mechanism for monitoring the situation and collection of real time intelligence with a view to ensure taking up of effective advance action to pre-empt any break of violence in the potentially troubled spots. The likely troubled spots (e.g. Osmania, Kakatia, Krishna Devraya Universities, etc.), and the trouble creators in the three regions must be identified in advance and suitable action plan prepared. In my discussions with chief secretary and Director General of Police (DGP), the kind of equipment and weaponry to be used were also discussed and it was agreed that weaponry used should be such as not to cause fatal injuries, while at the same time effective enough to bring the agitationists quickly under control.

In a nutshell, it may be concluded that the first couple of months will be critical after the submission of the report, as speculative stories will thrive and emotions of people incited.

eighteen

The Srikrishna Commission Report
The Judgment

The mystery about chapter 8 in the SKC report has only partly been solved by Justice L. Narasimha Reddy's path-breaking judgment of 23 March 2011 (Reddy 2011). The judgment has brought into the open the unfortunate situation whereby the committee subverted its own report by excluding a significant chapter from public scrutiny and discussion. The part not opened to public view was the most significant section of the SKC report. As the extracts quoted in the judgment and full text in the appendix to chapter 17 indicate, the hidden part of the report is now exposed, not only to judicial scrutiny but also to public debate.

The question that arises is that if the SKC felt as strongly as the secret note implies, why did it not say so in the text, openly and boldly? What was the purpose in preparing the open-to-public 505-page report? Is there a logical explanation for how this happened? The probable story is presented here and readers are reminded that this is only a possible explanation for the situation created by the SKC.

Justice Srikrishna is reported to have told his committee members and the extensive committee staff that he was determined to complete and submit the report by the due date—31 December 2010. He seems to have been influenced by the criticism against the long time he took over the report on the Mumbai riots. He also told them that if they could not meet the deadline, they were to say so and that he would write the report on his own.

The committee members and staff then allocated work amongst themselves, hired consultants to write the rest and proceeded with the report writing. The report became a set of chapters, each revealing only the biases and personal views of the particular author rather than a combined, considered and careful view of the entire committee.[1] It is obvious that there has been no co-ordinator to verify the facts and numbers and consolidate the report. To add to the confusion, there were apparently some unofficial consultants who helped draft some of the chapters and provided data to justify a result determined beforehand.

The committee seems to have considered the entire report only on its 32nd meeting held on 29 December 2010. At that stage, three of the members (thought to be Justice Srikrishna, Dr Abusaleh Shariff and Professor Ravinder Kaur) objected to chapter 8 as it was not a part of the terms of reference of the committee and that it was likely to cause trouble. Apart from that, they refused to accept the views expressed therein, mainly the views of V. K. Duggal, former home secretary to Government of India. Duggal's insistence, coupled with his claiming to be authorised by home minister P. Chidambaram, apparently resulted in their agreeing to separate the chapter and sending it to the Home Ministry in a sealed cover with every page marked 'secret'.

The chapter then became a 'note' while the report still called it a chapter. Thereafter, Duggal seems to have added a 'supplementary note' advising the Government of India on how to handle the post-report situation. The note mentions that he had discussions as early as September 2010 with the then home minister P. Chidambaram and finance minister Pranab Mukherjee to appoint a man from the Telangana region as the chief minister, which he wrote was 'done'. This refers to the rumour that Jaipal Reddy would become the chief minister. Reddy's good political sense did not permit him to accept the offer. To quote,

> There is also a need for providing strong and firm political leadership and placement of representatives of Telangana in key positions (maybe CM/Dy CM (Since done. This aspect was discussed with FM & HM in September, 2010). (Ibid.: 40)

This indicated that this part was written before 25 November 2010 when Kiran Kumar Reddy was appointed chief minister. So did Duggal forget to correct it or had he already sent the note by then? This will remain another mystery.

It is now obvious that the SKC was set up to reverse the Government of India's decision of 9 December 2009 to grant statehood to Telangana.

First, due to multiple authors, unknown interventions, faulty and incorrect data, the report was already flawed at birth. Further, the 11-month exercise was meant to waste time and ensures that tempers and emotions died down in Telangana. This would allow the government to do what it wanted, rather than fulfil the wishes of 40 million people of Telangana to whom it had promised statehood. The SKC report, therefore, was created on wrong premises that led to it failing to achieve anything worthwhile.

Second, there was no overall editorial control, no single person was appointed to clean up the contradictions, inconsistencies, etc. As chairman, this would have been Justice Srikrishna's job and he failed to do so.

Third, The title of chapter 8 titled is 'Law & Order and Internal Security Implications'. The 52 words seems to indicate that it was the member-secretary (Duggal) who had discussions with senior police and administration officials in 17 districts (not in all 23!). However the chapter also said, 'A note on the above (discussions) covering all aspects has been prepared and is being submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs in a separate cover along with this Report. The Committee has kept these dimensions in view while discussing various options included in chapter 9 of the Report, i.e "The Way Forward"' (SKC 2010: 423). This meant everyone knew there was a secret chapter and that it was not open to public scrutiny though it guided the SKC in its deliberations.

If one has any doubt about the hidden opposition of the committee to the formation of Telangana, that stands removed with this note. This was further revealed by the text and language of the note itself which was essentially a Standard Operating Practice of the security agencies in coping/diffusing popular movement

in the country. One thing is clear: it was not written by Justice Srikrishna himself and if seen by him, he certainly did not envisage its publication for it did nothing but dent his image.

Last, who should take responsibility for this? Duggal, Justice Srikrishna, and all the three other members participated, one way or another, in an effort that may be seen by some to amount a conspiracy. They ended up awakening the conscience of the judiciary and firming up the determination of the people of Telangana to have a separate state. Historically, this is the third attempt to mislead the people of Telangana, the first being in 1956 and the second in 1969.

If the SKC had simply deleted chapter 8 altogether and also erased references to it in the report, no one would have known about it and the real recommendation of the committee would not be known to the world. The extracts of the secret chapter 8 as cited in the judgment are so outrageous that even cynical observers would be astounded. It is best to let the secret chapter/note and judgment speak for themselves.

On Coal and Energy

> Telangana region is dependent on coal reserves for its power generation while Seemadhra region, though dependent on coal reserves, is rapidly expanding its energy sources, viz. gas, wind, solar and nuclear. Thus energy deficiencies (in Telangana) may lead to migration of population, imbalance in employment opportunities, which may become a cause for social unrest. (Ibid.: 36)

> Since the Telangana region energy sources are largely coal based thermal power plants, any economic imbalance may lead to energy starvation of small and marginal farmers which will adversely affect the productivity of the land. This can cause decline in their earning which may result in distress sale of lands and their migration to the industrial belt in Hyderabad city. (Ibid.)

On the Religious Communities

> There is a certain sense of mutual suspicion between the two communities who are living in the above-mentioned areas. If communal passions become an additional factor in an atmosphere where unemployment, social unrest, etc. exist it may give rise to birth of militant, Jihadi elements.... (Ibid.: 37)

> ... Telangana has a large number of Muslim pockets and to counter Muslim influence, Hindu fundamentalists may compete with them and try and polarize the Hindu populations.... (Ibid.: 37)

On the RayalaTelangana Option

> Since the BJP has a strong presence, it may try to consolidate in Telangana and further extend its base. AI-MIM may try to expand in the Rayalaseema region resulting in birth of militant communalism in certain pockets. (Ibid.: 39)

Advice to the Congress

> There is need for ensuring unity among the leaders of the ruling party in the state. There is also a need for providing strong and firm political leadership and placement of representatives of Telangana in key positions (*maybe CM/Dy. CM)(Since done.) This aspect was discussed with FM and HM in September 2010*).... Inputs indicate that the agitation can be tackled if Congress leaders do not give an impression indicating any covert/overt support to it. Hence the Congress MPs/MLAs may need to be taken into confidence and asked not to lend any form of support to the agitation. The Congress high command must sensitize its MPs and MLAs and educate them about the wisdom of arriving at an acceptable and workable solution. With the ruling party and the main opposition party (TDP) (for the Telangana demand) being brought on the same page, the supporting

mechanism has a higher probability of being successful. (Ibid.: 40–41, emphasis added)

On the TRS

Action also needs to be initiated for softening the TRS to the extent possible, especially in the context of the fact that TRS has threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement after December 31 and also initiate a "Maha Yuddam" (a massive war) if the Center does not announce a Separate Telangana. Gaddar's TPF (Telangana Praja Front) who had parted company with TRS have again joined hands with TRS. (Ibid.: 40)

On Managing the Media

Andhra Pradesh has got about 13 electronic channels and quite a few major local newspapers which are in the forefront of moulding public opinion. Except for two channels (*Raj News* and *HMTV*) the rest of them are supporters of a united Andhra Pradesh. The equity owners of the channels except the above two and the entire print media are with the Seemandhra people. The main editors/resident and sub-editors, the film world, etc. are dominated by Seemandhra people. Coordinated action on their part has the potential of shaping the perception of the common man.... Most of the editors except Andhra Jyothi are pro-united AP.... The editorial opinions, the banner headlines, the regional content, the district editions need to be managed to be realistic and should give only coverage to separate Telangana agitations. (Ibid.: 44)

Introduce an alternative

Going by the extract below, its author seems to be Duggal,

The likely trouble spots (eg., Osmania, Kakatiya and Krishnadeva Raya universities) and the trouble creators in the three regions must

be identified in advance and a suitable action plan prepared. *In my discussion with the Chief Secretary and DGP*, the kind of equipment and weaponry to be used were also discussed and it was agreed that weaponry used should be such as not to cause fatal injuries, while at the same time effective enough to bring the agitationists quickly under control. (Ibid.: 51–52 emphasis added)

What the Judgment Says

He (the Attorney General) submitted that the respondent (Ministry of Home Affairs) has taken a conscious and well-informed decision, not to make the note public.... (Ibid.: 6)

However, the note which was handed over to the Union of India in a sealed cover, was directed to be kept secret by the committee itself. This is evident from the fact that, on every page of it, the word "secret" was written. (Ibid.: 6)

After a great deal of study, an in-depth pondering over, and after weighing the factors, such as propriety, this Court opinions not a matter of choice, that *the objective in preparing a separate note and delivering it to the respondent (MHA) was more an effort to persuade the Union of India to desist from showing any inclination towards Option No. 5, i.e. formation of Telangana State*. In a way, it can be said that whatever positive was said in support of Option No. 5 was just neutralized through the note, even at the cost of several contradictions. (Ibid.: 34 emphasis added)

According to it [the note], most of the major infrastructure in the Telangana region in the fields of education, industries, etc. is owned by "Seemandhra people" and the formation of the State would be detrimental to such establishments. (Ibid.: 35)

Fissures in caste lines were also projected. The note suggests that Maoists will extend their activities to various districts of Telangana; spread Maoist violence, and that Maoists are trying to make a comeback through Telangana region. (Ibid.: 37)

The judgment sums it up thus,

> One can easily find the difference of approach of the Committee, as reflected in the report, on one hand, and on the note, on the other. (Ibid.: 39)

> *If there is any doubt about the hidden opposition of the Committee to the formation of Telangana, that stands removed with this note.* It suggests that, barring a minuscule exception, the rest of the print and electronic media are dominated by people from one region of the state and they are in a position to mould public opinion. The Committee opined that it is only the "beat journalist" from Telangana area that are creating media hype of Osmania University students agitation, self-immolations, etc. (Ibid.: 45, emphasis added)

> It is rather unfortunate that the Committee did not even make a mention of the fact that about 600 persons, mostly students, committed suicide during the agitation, spread over one year. (Ibid.: 52)

Finally, the court says,

> *The manoeuvre suggested by the Committee* in its secret supplementary note poses an open challenge, if not threat, to the very system of democracy. If the source of inputs that gave rise to this is the Government, it [the Government] owes an explanation to the citizens. If, on the other hand, the origin of the inputs is elsewhere, the Government must move in right earnest to pluck and eradicate such a foul source and thereby prove its respect for, and confidence in, the democracy. (Ibid.: 55, emphasis added)

It is interesting to recall that as early as 18 May 2003, the then union home minister P. Chidambaram, wrote in the *The Indian Express* referring to the Bibek Debroy-Lavash Bhandari Report, 'The report makes out a nearly uncontestable case for small states. With hindsight, it is possible to say that the divisions of Punjab and Maharashtra were wise decisions; otherwise would Haryana and

Gujarat have recorded such impressive development?' He went on to say, 'In my view, there is a strong case for the creation of Vidarbha (out of Maharashtra, population 9.67 crore) and Telangana (out of Andhra Pradesh, population 7.57 crore). Uttar Pradesh and Bihar should also be further divided' (Chidambaram 2003a).

Five months later, on 5 October 2003, Chidambaram wrote an article in the *Indian Express*, 'A Telangana State May Be Answer to Deal with Naxalite Menace' in which he said, 'Surprisingly, the Naxalite movement has survived in Andhra Pradesh. It has found sanctuary in the districts of Telangana and in the border districts of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. It is not a coincidence that these are the most backward, poor and neglected districts in these three states. Successive chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh have tried different measures to stamp out the movement but with little success' (Ibid.).

Praising Mr Naidu's 'good understanding of economic principles', Chidambaram also stated that he was a 'trier and doer'. But, 'despite his good intentions, the Telangana region remains backward. It is the story of the chicken and egg. On the one hand, the region remains backward and neglected because it is torn by strife caused mainly by the Naxalites. On the other hand, the region is hospitable to the Naxalites because it is backward and neglected' (ibid.).

'Someone—or something has to break this logjam', he wrote, adding, 'the answer does not lie in police action. Perhaps there may be an answer if the people of the region are empowered in a different way, and new opportunities are created for the disaffected sections to gain political power and a say in the governance of the region.' He concluded, 'Strange as it seems, the option of a new state of Telangana may turn out to be the answer to deal with the menace of Naxalite terrorism.' To prove his point, police data indicates that in 2003 there were 280 Naxalite-related fatalities. After the announcement of statehood for Telangana by Chidambaram on 9 December 2009, the year 2010 saw only 33 fatalities on account of Naxal violence and declining rapidly to reach 13 in 2013. (Source as in table 8.1.).

If Chidambaram retained the views cited above, he should have rubbished at once the conclusions of the chapter 8 of the

SKC written by Duggal, sent to him in a sealed cover which takes exactly the opposite position. While Chidambaram sees statehood as a solution to Telangana's poor governance, underdevelopment, backwardness and neglect as well as a counter to Naxalism, Duggal says that statehood would result in poverty, backwardness, unemployment, Naxalite terrorism and communal riots. Who is right—Chidambaram or Duggal? Is the decision a personal one of a few actors or a fulfilment of solemn promises to the 40 million people of Telangana?

Notes

1. The report reads as if it were written by many authors and the feeling of subjectivity is further enhanced by the committee putting forward 'six' options—four of which it said were unworkable! Thus, it would seem that those who were canvassing different 'solutions' were given scope to set them out while finally the committee came around to only two 'options'. It preferred continuation of the united states with a statutory regional council for Telangana, but at the same time saying it would meet 'total opposition' by Telangana leaders and groups. On the other hand, the formation of the Telangana state was considered to be the 'second best' option and 'separation is recommended only in case it is avoidable and if this decision can be reached amicably amongst all three regions'. The whole exercise—even without the secret chapter 8—indicates a lack of clarity and ends up as a compilation of various views (see SKC 2010: 456–58, 453–54).

nineteen

Polling the Impossible

The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) conducted a poll for a reputed news channel called the State of the Nation Survey (SoNS) 2011 (Lokniti 2011). It was supervised nationally by an eminent academician, Professor Yogendra Yadav, and published in the 12 August 2011 edition of the *Hindu*. It surprised everyone when only 48 per cent of the sample of Telangana respondents indicated support for a separate state.[1]

Polls are always tricky affairs, largely because of the apparently small sample size. However, this shortcoming can be compensated for by the sample design, which should ensure not only randomness but also that there is no bias in the selection of respondents. The next tricky bit is the compilation of the answers. In a country where many are not literate, the accuracy and integrity of recording the answers depends entirely on the interviewers. They need to be trained properly and, most of all, need to be honest and unbiased and not let their views become the views of the respondents. All pollsters know these facts and live with them and they, hopefully, take precautions to ensure the integrity of the poll.

The CSDS survey included questions regarding Telangana, the SKC and current electoral chances of political parties in Andhra Pradesh.

As far as the Telangana question was concerned, the poll reported that opinion in Telangana had moved in favour of statehood from 42 per cent in 2009 to 50 per cent in 2011; 71 per cent of the rest of the state were against division in 2009 and this figure rose to 90 per cent in 2011.

As far as the Telangana sample is concerned, what is curious is that the 2009 poll was reportedly taken in May, just five months after the election when every political party in the state, except the CPI-M and the MIM, was in favour of, and promised statehood for, Telangana.

The people of Andhra Pradesh cutting across regions, apparently factored this in when over 76 per cent of them voted for the Congress, TDP, TRS, PRP and others supporting statehood. In this context, the sample results seem odd. What is curious is that the 2011 figure should be so low, even in Telangana after the Government of India had agreed on 9 December 2009 to the Andhra Pradesh all-party recommendation for statehood for Telangana.

This perception is further reinforced by a clarification issued which says, 'Our survey clearly shows that within the Telangana region nearly two-thirds of those who have an opinion support a separate state. Since 2004, when the CSDS started asking this question in Andhra Pradesh, the support for a separate state has increased consistently within the Telangana region' (Lokniti 2011). The matter gets even more curious as the published figures say 50 per cent but this clarification says 66.66 per cent! This is only possible if you add 23 per cent 'No Opinion' to the 51 per cent wanting a united state. That would make it 74 per cent in favour.

The second question asked by CSDS (only in Rayalaseema) was on trifurcation into Andhra, Telangana and Rayalaseema. It had almost no takers in Rayalaseema—the proportion in favour fell from 3 per cent in 2009 to 1 per cent in 2011. The lack of support for statehood for Rayalaseema seems peculiar as many of its major leaders seem inclined to opt for it should Telangana materialise. If the leaders from Rayalaseema want a state of their own then there would have to be a preference reflected by the sample population of that region. In all the three years, 2004, 2009 and 2011, the percentage for trifurcation in the Telangana sample is larger than the Rayalaseema sample responses.

Another set of questions relates to the SKC and its six options, though this seems redundant if the first two questions were considered decisive. The results showed that only 13 per cent in Telangana opted for maintenance of the status quo and another 12

per cent for the other options—a total of 25 per cent. It would be reasonable to assume that statehood was a preference of 75 per cent of the remainder, except that 27 per cent had no opinion on the subject. Thus, the figure of 48 per cent for statehood is reconciled—add the 27 per cent and we have instead 75 per cent for statehood. So, now everything depends on whether 27 per cent of the Telangana sample really has no opinion whatsoever.

On the specific question of bifurcation, with Hyderabad as their capital, 48 per cent of the Telangana respondents were in favour. We then have 48 per cent, 50 per cent, 66.66 per cent and 75 per cent in Telangana in favour of separation! Oddly, only 5 per cent in Rayalaseema and none in Coastal Andhra were in favour of the Telangana Regional Council, which was the SKC's only solution for maintenance of the status quo.

When CSDS was asked by this author, they were kind enough to give him the sample break-up: of a total of 1,418 sample interviews, the sample size for Telangana was 532, for Coastal Andhra 567 and for Rayalaseema 319. The sample size for the SKC question was the same as the question on Telangana/United Andhra.

While Coastal Andhra and Telangana got almost equal weightage (as their population was of the same order of magnitude), Rayalaseema with half the population of each of the other two regions got 60 per cent higher weightage than it should have.

This may not matter very much as it can be adjusted later, except that in publishing the figures, Rayalaseema has been given equal weightage with the other regions. Thus, the 'All-Andhra Pradesh' figure turns out to be a simple average of figures for the three regions. Instead of 55 per cent of an 'All Andhra Pradesh' sample wanting to preserve the status quo, the true figure would be only 45 per cent if adjusted according to the population size that the sample represents.

Lastly, the set of questions that relates to voting preferences indicates that if an election were held now in Telangana, the TRS, with 36 per cent voter support, would wipe out the rest of the parties as the Congress would get only 18 per cent, and TDP 15 per cent, voter support. In the rest of the state, YSR Congress has 36 per cent voter support, while the Congress party has 32 per cent

and the TDP 24 per cent, indicating a triangular fight, the results of which are unpredictable.

The criticism of the choice of persons conducting the poll in the state is interesting. The CSDS itself says that some aspects of the conduct of the poll do lead to suspicion though it defends the conduct obliquely and still stands by the process and its results. It says, 'The State of the Nation Survey was coordinated in Andhra Pradesh by Mr Narasimha Rao (a fact duly reported in the *Hindu*) of the Nagarjuna University, Guntur.... Of late, in his personal capacity, he has been the honorary convener of the Joint Action Committee for United Andhra Pradesh. Since the survey was carried out by students from Nagarjuna University ... most of the investigators that went to Telangana were from Seemandhra though some field investigators did hail from Telangana region' (Lokniti 2011).

It is well known that since 2004, when CSDS ran the first Telangana survey questions, there was heightened passion for Telangana statehood leading to 630 youths committing suicide for it. Further, since late 2009 to date there has been agitation also in the rest of Andhra Pradesh.

The SKC travelled all over Telangana and also in the rest of the state. On the Telangana statehood issue it commented, 'This option implies accepting the full demands of a large majority of Telangana people for a separate state that will assuage their emotional feelings and sentiments as well as the perceived sense of discrimination and neglect' (SKC 2010: 450).

The committee's impression, gained during its extensive tours of the Telangana region, indicated that a very large number of people from Telangana were highly supportive of the demand for a separate state; an appreciable segment was found to be neutral; while some sections were not in favour of it (ibid.: 451–52).

The CSDS could not have been ignorant of happenings in the heart of India. Given the palpable level of passion and excitement and commitment, especially among academics and students, was it wise to repeat for this delicate and important issue the process adopted earlier for other less emotive surveys? That the CSDS was aware of the problem is confirmed by its clarification where it admits, '... our investigators were physically thrown out from two Telangana Assembly

segments (Mahbubabad and Ibrahimpatnam) and their work was disrupted elsewhere too by pro-Telangana activists' (Lokniti 2011).

However, CSDS displayed exemplary conduct after the poll when it declared in response to protests, 'Given the charged political context that prevails in the state, we should have anticipated that the affiliation of our coordinator and the composition of our team would lead to distrust (among those advocating a separate state). Presentation of the survey findings on Telangana without addressing these legitimate apprehensions was (possibly) an error of judgment' (ibid.). Had they left out the word in brackets, it would sum up the true position.

The lesson to be learnt is that polls are not always reflective of public opinion. However, following all the criticism, the CSDS appointed a committee to review its survey with respect to the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh portion. The committee consisted of Professor Pradeep Chibber (University of California), Professor K. Srinivasulu (Osmania University) and Professor K. C. Suri (Hyderabad University) (ibid.).

First, the key finding is that with regard to the Telangana sample, the final results did not include two of the sample districts (Ibrahimpatnam and Mahabubabad) as the 'investigators were not able to carry out their work' (ibid.). The report admits that people in these two districts were a major support base for Telangana and as such 'this increased the weightage of the sample from Hyderabad and its environs'. The Hyderabad and environs sample showed lower support perhaps due to the settler effect. It added, 'Ideally CSDS could have anticipated the consequences of this.' The consequences were that it showed lower support for a separate state in Telangana.

Second, the report considered, '... the complicated question wording and responses were perhaps too complex.' It added, '... a simpler question might have yielded different results. In fact, CSDS's own surveys (such as 2009 SoNS) show that where a differently worded question with similar intent was posed, the responses were different and support for a separate Telangana state was higher' (ibid.). The questions were tricky and different on this occasion.

Third, on the issue of 27 per cent in the Telangana sample ticked off in the 'Don't Know/No Opinion' category by the interviewers,

the report said, 'The Review Committee found that a significant proportion (one-third) of those who said "Don't Know/No Opinion" to the question of a separate state for Telangana expressed a political preference for the Telangana Rashtra Samiti if elections were to be held in Andhra Pradesh' (ibid.). It should be remembered that the respondents do not normally fill the form—the interviewers do—and there is no way a respondent can check what option has been ticked! And since most of the interviewers were Nagarjuna University students (very likely all from Coastal Andhra) working under the direction of the Honorary Convener of the JAC for a United Andhra Pradesh (known before the survey by CSDS), there is reason to doubt whether the responses were correctly filled in.

Since the TRS has only a single-point agenda of a separate state, which the people supporting it are aware of, a third of 27 per cent (being 9 per cent) should then be added to the 48 per cent who categorically stated their support for separate Telangana. The support figure would then be 57 per cent and adding an (unknown) element that would have come from the Mahabubabad and Ibrahimpatnam samples, a plurality of Telangana respondents sampled can be said to support separate statehood. The same poll then gives opposite results when dissected. Eternal vigilance is the price of credibility. But nonetheless CSDS should be congratulated for investigating and publicising the dissection of its survey.

Those depending on these polls should be aware of these aspects that have come to light after six months after publication of the poll. The only real poll will be the election of the champions of statehood for Telangana to the assembly and Parliament when the occasion arises.

Notes

1. For entire survey results, see http://www.lokniti.org/telangana_report.php? Lokniti, Assembly Election Study 2011, Telangana Report. http://www.lokniti.org/telangana_report.php, accessed on 23 January 2013.

twenty

Telangana's Cousins
In India and Abroad

Purvanchal, Bundelkhand, Awadh Pradesh and Paschim Pradesh

> *I have written a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urging him to grant clearance for the creation of two more states, Bundelkhand and Harit Pradesh, out of an unmanageable Uttar Pradesh.* (Rediff.com 2009)
>
> —Mayawati, chief minister, Uttar Pradesh on 11 December 2009 after the announcement by the Centre on 9 December 2009 of statehood for Telangana.

Mayawati may have found it difficult to administer a state with a population of 190 million. Were it an independent country, Uttar Pradesh (UP) would have been the sixth largest in the world in terms of its population .

In late 2009, after getting positive recommendations from major political parties in the state and a unanimous resolution of the CLP, the Congress Core Group and the union cabinet decided to create the state of Telangana and announced it in both Houses of Parliament.

The Congress game-plan sought to divide the state into three. This would split the 122 Congress MLAs who signed up for Y. S. Jagannmohan Reddy as chief minister and also secure Telangana from the TDP. It would confine Jagannmohan Reddy to Rayalaseema, and enable the Congress with the PRP (the merger was already worked out) to take on the TDP in Coastal Andhra.

But what went wrong with this neat scheme? The view in the state is that the TDP, realising the Congress game-plan, made a U-turn in 12 hours the day after it agreed with the decision, and instructed its cadres to launch an agitation. But the Congress would naturally disregard the TDP's interests and this is no explanation. It is also alleged that the flow of funds from real-estate speculators from Coastal Andhra to influential Congress leaders in Delhi stalled the onward movement for statehood for Telangana. However, this theory seems unreal as it is difficult for regional leaders in Andhra to counter the high command's decisions. Money power, may be influential in securing contracts, but is not the determining factor in public policy.

An alternative reason is suggested here. In 2007, the then chief minister of Uttar Pradesh Mayawati had written to the prime minister, asking him to consider the demand of the people of Bundelkhand and of western Uttar Pradesh for separate states. Asked if she would move a resolution in this regard in the state assembly, Mayawati stated, 'I will do so once the Centre gives its approval in principle' (ibid.) This issue seems to have been raised by Rahul Gandhi who had supported a Bundelkhand state (including five districts of Madhya Pradesh) and Ajit Singh of the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) who was campaigning for the state of Harit Pradesh in western Uttar Pradesh.

By taking up the proposal and suggesting further divisions, Mayawati raised the bid in this game. Mayawati once again wrote to the prime minister in January 2008 urging the division of the state. She said, 'If the Centre agrees, the State Government is ready to get a resolution adopted by the State Vidhan Sabha seeking division of Uttar Pradesh into three parts—Poorvanchal, districts of the western region and the Bundelkhand region' (*Times of India* 2008). Mayawati had included eastern Uttar Pradesh (Purvanchal) as well for separate statehood. Now the bid was raised even further. The critical bit came after the announcement of Telangana statehood by the centre on 9 December 2009.

By 2010, the momentum for division increased, with Amar Singh breaking away from the Samajwadi Party (SP) which opposed division of Uttar Pradesh and forming a 'National Front for New Small States' and undertaking *padyatras* (journeys by foot) in eastern Uttar Pradesh. When asked, he said, 'Reasons are the same that worked for the

formation of Uttarakhand and other smaller states. The per capita income is very low and people are migrating to other places to earn a living. Purvanchal generates 80 per cent of (total) power but the region lacks proper power supply. Industries and sugar mills are closed. A separate Purvanchal state is a must for the rapid development of the region and dignified living of the people' (*Times of India* 2010).

The political belief of the Congress has always been that it can rule the country single-handedly if it dominates the politics of UP. Hence its national strategy has always been dominated by that state, its Muslim and dalit vote banks and various short-term alliances with the regional parties. Moreover, the Congress has, on many occasions, resorted to immediate 'solutions' which have often become long-term problems beyond its ability to solve. The Bundelkhand issue was raised by Congress party vice-president Rahul Gandhi partly to destabilise Mayawati. But the astute politician that she is, she escalated it to greater levels, which forced the Congress to put the Bundelkhand issue on the backburner for a couple of years. The assembly elections of 2012 have seen the SP firmly ensconced in power. However, the issue has not gone away.

Vidarbha

The Vidarbha region of Maharashtra consists of six districts of the medieval Bhonsle Kingdom of Nagpur (annexed in 1853 by the British) and five districts of Berar (a province of the Nizam's Hyderabad state leased to the British in 1853). Both are known for their vast cotton-growing areas, and they formed part of the Central Provinces of British India. Vidarbha has two-thirds of Maharashtra's mineral resources, three-fourths of the forest resources and has surplus power. It covers 32 per cent of the state and has a population of 20 million, which is 21 per cent of the state's total population. It sends 10 MPs to the Lok Sabha and has 62 seats in the 288-member state assembly. Nagpur is its major city.

On 1 October 1938, the Central Provinces Legislature passed a unanimous resolution to create a separate state of Mahavidarbha. The movement was launched in earnest in 1947 when it was realised

that, with the end of the British rule, Berar province would legally revert to the Nizam of Hyderabad.

By August 1947, political leaders came to an agreement, commonly known as the Akola Pact, which contemplated a Maharashtra with two sub-provinces with separate legislatures and cabinets, etc. It was a constitutionally unworkable proposition and soon disowned by all parties. The Dar Commission in 1948 stated, 'We are satisfied that public opinion is still in its formative stage in Vidharbha and it does not know its own mind. In these circumstances, it will not be possible to form a province of Maharashtra with Vidharbha' (Shiva Rao vol. 4 1968: 453).

The 1953 'Nagpur Agreement', signed by Y. B. Chavan, Morarji Desai and other politicians, envisaged a merger with Bombay state based on the assurances and guarantees for Vidarbha and Marathwada. However, in 1955, the SRC recommended that Vidarbha remain a separate state as it was financially well-off and its people had a deep-rooted regional consciousness. Despite this, Vidarbha was merged with the bilingual Bombay state in 1956 and, since 1960, has remained part of Maharashtra.

The reason was simple. The Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS) was gaining popularity for its call for a state for all Marathi-speaking people, including Bombay city. In the 1957 general election, the SMS won 101 seats out of 133 in western Maharashtra, including 12 from Mumbai. The SMS was a combine of the communist party and the socialist party. For the Congress, Vidarbha, where it won 62 out of the 66 seats, was crucial in retaining its tenuous hold in the Bombay assembly.

The only way the Congress could retain power in Maharashtra was by annexing Vidarbha before the strength of its Gujarat wing departed with the formation of Gujarat. The Nagpur Agreement had established the guarantees for the regions. Its salient features were:

1. Vidarbha, Marathwada and Rest of Maharashtra (RoM) would be treated as separate regions for all type of development and administration.
2. Allocation of funds would be on the basis of population but special attention would be given to Marathwada.
3. The three regions would be given representation in proportion

to population in (a) composition of government; (b) admission to all educational institutions in vocational, scientific, professional or other specialised training; (c) the services of all grades under government or government-controlled enterprises.

4. The people of Vidarbha would have the advantages derived from Nagpur, as the capital of their state, awakard construction.

Thus, Vidarbha's history is similar to that of Telangana. Like Telangana the four districts of Marathwada were part of Hyderabad state. The inclusion of the Marathwada region of Hyderbad state would indicate that as early as 1953 the trifurcation of Hyderabad was on the agenda. Both mergers involved the linguistic angle, the Congress party interest and, above all, purported to level the cultural, economic and political differences which had existed for hundreds of years. Even the conditions of merger, the Gentlemen's Agreement on Telangana is similar to the Nagpur Agreement. But, unlike the former, the latter was enshrined in Article 371(2) of the Constitution in 1956.

But, again, it was only in 1994, 38 years later, that a Presidential Order was issued making, among other things, the governor responsible for supervision and allocation of Plan funds to Vidarbha and Marathwada—again unlike in Telangana. But providing budgets was one thing and spending them another. The backlog or gap between allocation and expenditure in the regions was great.

The Dandekar Committee on Regional Imbalance had given its recommendations in 1984, which were not accepted by the state government. Eleven years later, another 'Indicators and Backlogs Committee (IBC)' was set up in 1995 and submitted its report in 2000, five years later.

Commenting on this delay, the Planning Commission said, 'The delay in implementing the budgetary consequences of having willingly joined Vidharbha to Maharashtra in its very constitution as a State is by itself a measure of the inadequacy of the intentions of the Government of Maharashtra over the past more than a decade' (Planning Commission 2006: 15). In simple language, it means Vidarbha (like Marathwada) was let down, betrayed and robbed of its promised budgetary allocations.

The IBC arrived at the total sectoral backlog of Rs 14,007 crore as of 1 April 1994. Table 20.1 gives the break-up in crores of rupees.

TABLE 20.1 Total Sectoral Backlog, as of 1 April 1994

	Vidarbha	Marathwada	RoM	Total
Irrigation	4,083	2,401	934	7,418
Other sectors	2,541	1,604	2,444	6,589
Total	6,624	4,005	3,378	14,007

Source: Indicators and Backlog Committee.

From 1982 to 2002, the irrigation backlog grew from 38 per cent to 62 per cent for Vidarbha and from 23 per cent to 33 per cent for Marathwada, while for the RoM it declined from 39 per cent to 5 per cent. By 2007, this backlog was 70 per cent for Vidarbha, 30 per cent for Marathwada and 'nil' for RoM. The past neglect continued to get worse (ibid.: 73). The report states, 'Other regions of the State which were behind Vidharbha at the time of Independence in irrigation development have now marched ahead in the post-Independence period' (ibid.: 88). As far as power is concerned, for the backlog of energisation of pump sets, as of April 2005, was Vidarbha 215,099, for Marathawada 109,073, while RoM had an excess of 357,320 pump sets energised.

The Planning Commission further commented,

> The common refrain is that though majority of electric power is produced in Vidharbha and energy requirement of Vidharbha in particular for energisation of agricultural pumps is not fulfilled as compared to Western Maharashtra (RoM). (Ibid.: 94)

It went on,

> The reason for the enormous difference is not the water table level but the huge pendency of applications by farmers who have applied for electric connections. (Ibid.: 95)

The idea that an underdeveloped region without its own political control can progress harmoniously within a dominating political system has proven to be false. The Telangana Regional Council was a short-lived experiment, killed deliberately as it was

unacceptable to the ruling elite of the state. For Vidarbha, with all the good intentions of the rest of Maharashtra, that merger also has not worked and discontent is rife. Both mergers are different yet alike. As Leo Tolstoy wrote in *Anna Karenina*, 'Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way'.

Vidarbha and Telangana teach us the lesson that culture, politics and development are very local, and when such alliances do not work satisfactorily for over five decades, separation is better than to continue with that bitterness.

Saurashtra and Kutch

At independence, Sardar Patel persuaded all the 222 rulers in Saurashtra to form a Saurashtra state. Some of these states, about the size of jagirs elsewhere, were too small for future development. Junagadh had to be annexed as its Nawab opted for Pakistan. The princely border state of Kutch was put under central administration. mainland Gujarat, which had been directly administered by the British, and the princely state of Baroda were made part of Bombay state. A separate Gujarat state was not on the agenda then.

The SRC recommended the division of Bombay state into Maharashtra (with the addition of Hyderabad-Marathwada) and Gujarat (with the addition of Saurashtra and Kutch). However, Vidarbha was added to Bombay state altering the demography and politics against the Gujaratis; Saurashtra and Kutch were also added to Bombay state. But the Maharashtrians, who wanted a separate state, were not happy with this decision, and their agitation continued. The Maha Gujarat movement began and, by 1960, Bombay state was divided into Maharashtra and Gujarat (mainland Gujarat, Saurashtra and Kutch). In the new Gujarat, the Saurashtra politicians held power which helped Saurashtra swallow the bitter pill of lost statehood. However, population and politics would soon put the mainland Gujarati elite in control.

The Saurashtra peninsula had always been a separate entity. Even physically, it was cut off from the mainland by the sea link between the head of the Gulf of Kutch to the head of the Gulf of

Cambay. The 1812 earthquake closed that link and left behind a low depression with the Nal Lake as a reminder of past geological and geopolitical reality.

Kutch was almost an island, cut off from Sind by the Great Rann to its north, on its east from the mainland by the Little Rann, by the Gulf of Kutch on its south and the Arabian Sea to its west. It had its own history and culture. It was geographically a part of Sind and a part of the Indus River delta where a branch of the river, till the 1812 earthquake, flowed into the Great Rann.

The Sultans of Gujarat ruled only in the mainland with Saurashtra and Kutch paying tribute but otherwise autonomous in all matters. The trade and commerce of Saurashtra and that of Cambay were a vital part of the Mughal Empire. It was also here that the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca began and ended. The British played the same role and left the princes of Saurashtra and the rulers of Kutch more or less to themselves.

There has been extraordinary progress in all the Gujarat regions, except perhaps the tribal districts. Lately, even these have been doing well in terms of development. The gigantic Narmada project brings water to the entire mainland, and branch canals take its water to Saurashtra—and even to Kutch. The annual per capita income of Gujarat in 2010–11 was at Rs 64,000, which compares favourably with the all-India figure of Rs 46,000. The population below the poverty line (2004–05) is only 17 per cent compared to the all-India figure of 28 per cent. In rural areas, it is 19 per cent for Gujarat and 28 per cent for all-India. Gujarat's urban population (reportedly 50 per cent of the total of 5 crore) has only 13 per cent poor compared to the all-India 26 per cent. By 2010, the agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining sectors together employed only 2 per cent of the total workforce but these sectors have grown by a phenomenal 12.9 per cent per annum between 1999 and 2009. Industry gives employment to 41 per cent of the workforce and services make up the remainder. In 2000, Saurashtra had 66,166 small-scale units, while Kutch had 4,780, out of the state total of 2,51,088 (Government of Gujarat 2011).

Surat's diamond-cutting industry, the huge fertiliser, petrochemical and oil-refining sector and the rush of industrialists to get a foothold

in Gujarat is well known. The state is well on its way to achieve its full economic potential. Gujarat's diaspora, which is spread all over the world, is a resourceful and effective force for the all-round development of the state. The state has a vibrant agriculture, producing in 2008–09 cotton (7 million tonnes), wheat (3 million tonnes), sugarcane (15 million tonnes), groundnut (1.4 million tonnes) and milk (8 million tonnes). Saurashtra and Kutch have nearly 10 lakh hectares under irrigated cotton cultivation and 5 lakh hectares devoted to irrigated wheat. Groundnut cultivation and oil-milling is a critical national sector. Extensive cultivation and marketing of seedcotton for cotton-growers in Punjab and elsewhere is also an important activity. This increase in agricultural output is a result of the irrigated area increasing between 1999 and 2008 by 38 lakh hectares in the mainland and an equal 38 lakh hectares in Saurashtra and Kutch—with the tribal districts seeing an increase of 4.6 lakh hectares. However, most of Saurashtra and Kutch are irrigated by wells while the mainland has canal irrigation also (ibid.).

Gujarat has six major cities: Gandhinagar (the political capital), Ahmedabad, Vadodra, Surat in the mainland; and Bhavnagar and Rajkot in Saurashtra. It has 42 ports along the long coastline (including Kandla in Kutch) and 13 airports. It has a 2,200-kilometre integrated gas grid. Gujarat's installed capacity of power generation is 13,908 MW from 24 power stations within the state and even five outside it. Its 18,000 villages are supplied with 24-hour, three-phase power and a water grid connects 9,600 villages. There is no shortage of power. Despite all these extraordinary economic indicators, the statehood movements for Saurashtra and Kutch are neither dormant nor dead (ibid.).

The movement for restoration of Saurashtra state has seen mobilisations in 1966–67, 1970 and 1971. In 2001, the banner was raised again by trade and industry circles as a reaction to the poor allocation of earthquake relief and rehabilitation. In 2005, it revived again, this time led by the Saurashtra Oil Millers' Association (SOMA), which felt that the state government had neglected the region, its groundnut farmers and oil millers. In 2009 (partly triggered by the union government's decision to grant statehood to Telangana), the Saurashtra Sankalan Samiti returned to the issue

supported by 300 business, industrial and social associations of Saurashtra and Kutch.

The issues were about inadequate infrastructure, including lack of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and other complaints. A former minister complained, 'People from Saurashtra are often taunted with titles such as 'Kathiawadi' and 'via Viramgam' (*Ahmedabad Mirror* 2009). Kutch also claims that it contributed Rs 700 crore to state and Rs 1,500 crore to central revenues and did not get back enough in terms of development.

Saurashtra makes similar and larger claims. The BJP MP and the BJP Saurashtra-Kutch in-charge, Vijay Rupani, is quoted as saying, 'In Gujarat, one cannot miss balanced growth. The demand for separate statehood for Kutch never became a movement because people never found a need. Since the BJP has come to power, there has been an overall growth of the regions, be it Saurashtra or Kutch' (*Indian Express*).

Yet, if the Congress government in Delhi is to concede statehood for Telangana, Vidarbha and the four new states out of UP, can Saurashtra-Kutch, despite their development in recent times, be far behind? The demand for statehood is seldom based on economic deprivation—real or perceived.

Beyond the Border—Telangana's Cousin in Bahawalpur, Pakistan

Bahawalpur state in Pakistan and Hyderabad state in India have interesting parallels. Both the states were founded by Muslim dynasties in the early eighteenth century—Hyderabad in 1724 and Bahawalpur in 1727. Hyderabad's population was, of course, largely Hindu (85 per cent), while Bahawalpur's, largely Muslim (83 per cent). Both these states were annexed by the new nation-states of India and Pakistan—Hyderabad in 1948 and Bahawalpur in 1951.

Each of these feudal states, while resisting democratic forces, managed to build schools, colleges and even a university. Railways were laid and irrigation encouraged. They had their own administrative

and judicial system, their high court, legislative assemblies, accountant general's offices and public service commissions.

In the case of Hyderabad, it even had its own currency and army. Both states stood out as financially sound. Like Hyderabad, Bahawalpur had surpluses of Rs 19.17 crore in 1954–1955, greater than those of East Pakistan (Rs 3.27 crore), North-West Frontier Province (Rs 1.19 crore), Sindh (Rs 0.54 crore) and, of course, Punjab, which had a deficit of Rs 0.88 crore. The Telangana region of Hyderabad alone generated surpluses of Rs 51 lakh before it was merged with Andhra Pradesh.

When Bahawalpur was merged with other western provinces to make one unit, that is, West Pakistan in 1954—its surpluses helped stabilise West Pakistan and maintain financial comparability with East Pakistan. However, Bahawalpur does not seem to have gained much from the merger, which is no surprise. Much of the government land seems to have been allotted to officers of the armed forces and bureaucrats from outside Bahawalpur.

Considerable passions arose in Bahawalpur over the lack of consideration on irrigation matters. The Sutlej, which borders the former state, is reportedly dry, and much blame is placed on Punjab for this state of affairs. When it comes to allocating the waters of the Indus—it is usually divided between north Punjab and Sindh, and south Punjab (of which Bahawalpur is a part) gets step-motherly treatment. Another grouse is that of language. Seraiki, the language of south Punjab and Bahawalpur, is not quite Punjabi, and there seems to be a feeling of disrespect and discrimination towards it. All the ingredients for trouble were present at the time of the merger. These were aggravated when the West Pakistan unit was dissolved in 1970 and all the old provinces were restored, but Bahawalpur was not.

In the elections of 1970, the Bahawalpur movement (Mahaz) got five of the 12 national parliamentary seats and 10 seats in the Punjab assembly. The candidates supporting a separate province secured 80 per cent of the votes cast. But what with the separation of Bangladesh, this movement died down in the interest of preservation of Pakistan's shaky residual state.

About the same time, the Telangana agitation of 1969–70 also resulted in electoral majorities for the TPS in the general election

of 1971, but again the movement was suppressed by a combination of betrayal by local leaders, Congress party considerations and assurances of future fair play.

Now, even as the Telangana movement in India is gaining ground again, in Pakistan that for Bahawalpur has got going over the last two years. With the leadership of Muhammad Ali Durrani, the former federal information minister, all the four districts in Bahawalpur (Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar, Lodhran and Rahim Yar Khan) have passed resolutions in favour of a separate Bahawalpur province.

This has triggered a wider movement for a separate Seraiki province with the politically powerful Punjabi-speaking groups (Gujjars, Cheemas and Dogars) also backing either a revival of Bahawalpur province or a new all-inclusive Seraiki province of the southern Punjab. The most interesting part is that, unlike in the past, Punjabi settlers' leaders living in Bahawalpur provinces have supported restoration and also joined hands with the Seraiki speakers in the area.

Babar Awan, Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) leader and former law minister, promised at a press conference that the party would give '... a [piece of] good news to Seraiki-speaking people during Ramzan' (Pakistan Defence 2011). Many interpreted this to mean that the party, but not the government, was going to announce its support for a Seraiki province.

But the then prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, when addressing the National Assembly, said that he is in complete support of the formation of the Seraiki province. He refuted popular claims that the PPP was restricted to Sindhis and their family members only. He said that he was a Seraiki himself and the elected prime minister by the PPP, which is the biggest example of the respect the party gives to the Seraikis. Gilani further added that now was the perfect time to give identity to the Seraikis as per their demands. Nothing could be more ironic than a Seraiki prime minister ignoring the demand of the Seraikis for their own province (Awaz.tv 2012).

However, Durrani objects to Bahawalpur being clubbed with the Seraiki areas and demands a separate state and has no objection to one for Seraiki. In our context, this is like trying to club Rayalaseema with Telangana. More political machinations are to be expected there also.

The PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) have an overwhelming presence in the southern districts of Punjab with 36 seats compared to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz's (PML-N) 12. Comprising over a dozen districts, the region has around 50 national assembly constituencies. Political expediency seems to lend a hand where fairness apparently could not.

Evidently, the movement towards smaller political units is alive and kicking, both in Pakistan and in India. The parallels between Telangana and Bahawalpur/Seraiki are truly fascinating.

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Trifurcation and a New Governance Model

There is no state in the Indian union which is 'viable' for the simple reason that not a single state, regardless of its population or geographical size, can sustain itself without support and subventions from union revenues. So, what will be the financial status of the three regions of Andhra Pradesh when they become two, or even three, separate states? The balance of their own revenues and expenditures would give a major clue towards their potential for stability and progress.

The Andhra Pradesh government does not present its financial data separately for each region though such was its undertaking in 1956 for Telangana. However, on 21 March 2007, the finance minister (and later chief minister for the period September 2009–November 2010) K. Rosaiah, replying to a starred question in the state assembly, addressed the break-up of revenue and expenditure (in crores) over the previous four years (2003–07) for the three regions.

TABLE 21.1 Financial Viability of Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana

	Andhra			Rayalaseema			Telangana			HQ			Ex-State
Year	Rev	Exp	Balance	Rev	Exp	Balance	Rev	Exp	Balance	Rev	Exp	Balance	Rev
2003–04	2,796	3,848	-1,052	730	2,150	-1,420	5,565	5,158	407	5,095	706	4,389	3,220
2004–05	3,494	3,799	-305	867	2,411	-1,544	4,725	5,546	-821	8,311	893	7,418	3,285
2005–06	3,702	4,532	-830	1,004	2,684	-1,680	5,935	4,111	1,824	9,708	976	8,732	4,055
Average	3,331	4,060	-729	867	2,415	-1,548	5,408	4,938	470	7,705	858	6,846	3,519

Source: LAQ NO: 7406 Starred) of AP Legislative Assembly Session-9, answered on 21 March 2007, LAQ NO: 7406 Starred) of AP Legislative Assembly Session-9, answered on 21 March 2007

He did not quite comply with the spirit of the question, and a large chunk of the revenue and expenditure was attributed to a fourth category—'Headquarters'—without specifying what this entity represented. Presumably, it refers to the capital city of Hyderabad and its districts.

This was done despite the established practice stated in 1969 by the finance secretary that '... receipts at Headquarters will be credited to the Telangana region except in cases where they specifically relate to the Andhra region'. Policy or rather political decisions taken at one stressful time (the 1969 Telangana agitation) by one government are hardly remembered by another government in another stressful period (the Telangana agitation today). Yet, the point rests there and Rosaiah's response is less than candid and does not make sense unless, of course, the idea is to show that Hyderabad as a UT was a financially viable entity. Otherwise, the whole point of creating a Headquarters account seems suspicious as it is not an item that can be analysed in any other sensible way.

To complicate matters further, another line was added, '... revenues from other states'. This too was not allocated to any of the four categories. To make matters simple, we need to add it to the ambiguous category 'Headquarters' in order to relegate all ambiguity to one category. We have not considered the 2006–07 figures given by Rosaiah as they exclude the February and March data (when much of the revenue is received and expenditure incurred). It is not comparable to the complete 12-month data of the earlier years.

Interestingly, Telangana's revenues for 2004–05 drop by Rs 840 crore compared to the previous year while the two other regions and 'Headquarters' show a rise. That year saw Telangana incur a negative balance of Rs 821 crore, which it made up next year by a sharp rise in revenues. The balance shows an extraordinary increase to a positive Rs 1,824 crore (a turnaround of Rs 2,645 crore). This seems to indicate that some of the 2004–05 revenues have been shown in the next year. It also shows the poor state of financial book-keeping in the state or some jugglery with the figures.

Over the past three years, without the surplus from the Headquarters, the former Andhra state—the regions of Coastal

Andhra and Rayalaseema—are in continuous deficit, while Telangana has registered a surplus throughout. This is exactly the same relative financial situation as it existed in 1955–56 before the region was merged with Andhra. It is difficult to believe that even after diversion of Telangana surpluses and allocation of investment in favour of Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema, there has been no improvement in their relative position.

Be that as it may, 'Headquarters' income and expenditure has to be allocated to the three regions.

Two methods of allocation have been attempted here. One is to allocate it in the same ratio of population among Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana, that is, in the ratio of 40:20:40. The other is to allocate it in the ratio of the revenues attributed to each region in the year 2005–06 (the last full year available), i.e. in the ratio of 35:9:56. On both these bases, we have calculated the difference between revenue and expenditure to arrive at an idea of how much of the expenditure incurred in each region could be funded by its own revenues.

The results for the average of three years' (2003–06) balance between revenue and expenditure is given in Table 21.2. The allocation is based on two methods, as indicated above. It needs to be borne in mind that these figures exclude Central Plan funds and devolution from the Finance Commission.

TABLE 21.2 Balance between Revenue and Expenditure (Rs in Crores)

Region	HQ Allocation *40:20:40*	HQ Allocation *35:9:56*
Andhra	3,417	2,876
Rayalaseema	525	-571
Telangana	4,616	6,253
State	8,559	8,559

Source: Author's calculation based on Table 21.1.

It may be concluded that the table seems to indicate broadly the allocations of all the regions and that Telangana, as in the past, has the most viable finances as it generates large surpluses of revenues

over expenditure. These surpluses, when invested in Telangana, would then ensure a vibrant economy based on agriculture, irrigation (especially the much-neglected tank irrigation) and industry, and not just on real estate and services. Hyderabad metropolis will act as a growth hub and magnet for the development of the region Telangana.

Coastal Andhra, with its large educated and entrepreneurial population, the two massive river deltas of the Krishna and Godavari, and the gas fields on- and off-shore, has a viable future if it mobilises its taxation revenues and applies it to industry. Its main ports, Visakhapatnam, Kakinada and Krishnapatnam, will serve as hubs for the increasing foreign trade of the south-central region. Visakhapatnam will provide the much-needed access to central India and southern Orissa. Nellore, with its proximity to Chennai, has the great advantage of location for industry having access to the metropolis and its port. Coastal Andhra's agriculture is highly developed as the two deltas have provided extensive irrigation for 150 years and there is an accumulation of private capital that finds its application in diverse places which could be redirected to the region itself.

Matters are not as favourable for Rayalaseema, which will need central assistance to a greater extent than the other two regions if its finances are to be stabilised. It has, after all, only half the population of the two other regions and, while it is geographically large, it is relatively small in terms of productive workforce. However, it has extensive mineral resources, and the prime location of Anantapur, Chittoor and Kurnool districts within reach of the three great metropolises—Bengaluru, Chennai and Hyderabad—will ensure prosperity to those districts.

Cuddapah town, with its access to the K-C Canal and the Telugu Ganga, can easily become the capital and generate its own growth for the district. We see, therefore, that in terms of revenues and expenditures, trifurcation of the state hardly poses a problem for the two larger regions (Andhra and Telangana) and has good potential for the weaker one, Rayalaseema. No region is a completely unviable state, though some regions are more viable than others.

A New Governance Model for Telangana

Setting of Goals

Today, the demand is for administrative efficiency and probity and political convenience of the aspiring and demanding masses. The state must exist for the benefit of its entire people. It must be a national home—safe, secure and comfortable for all its citizens to live in. It cannot be dedicated to esoteric ideas that do not provide food nor educate children nor safeguard the health of the people and the environment. It must be fair and equitable to every one of its citizens.

To achieve this, we need both a political class and an administrative system that clearly set these goals and make the efforts needed to achieve them. It is imperative that the politicians as well as the bureaucracy should have shared values. But, and it is an important point, neither the shared values nor the capacity to implement them is easy to achieve.

Frankly, this takes much time and effort but the understanding and the will to do so seem to have been in short supply. Dedicated political personnel and administrators with trained minds are not easily available.

Training minds is the responsibility of our schools and universities. We tend to train men and women to pass examinations only but the real goal should be to empower young minds to think clearly, understand the history and culture of which they are a part, to examine problems, analyse data and information and to arrive at conclusions which they can implement. All the while they need to keep an open mind and prepare to change as the situation changes, yet hold on to moral values that cannot and should not change. The great historian Froude said, 'History does teach that right and wrong are real distinctions. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity.'

Unfortunately our education system is not turning out trained minds. Even officers of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), selected after an intensive examination process, are trained only to implement the wishes of their political masters. We desperately

need trained minds at the helm of affairs and at every critical level where decisions have to be taken.

Training individuals is one thing; putting them in the right places is another. For this we need to rethink the way we recruit our bureaucrats, teachers, doctors and other professionals, especially those in the administrative services. The armed services seem to do a better job of doing just this—training and placing the trained personnel—than the civilian services. There is a lot we can learn from this model. King Frederic II of Prussia, the founder of the German state, said, '... he who wants to serve the state, and indeed serves, has to leave himself entirely behind'. We need persons like that.

What Can Telangana Do Differently?

It is not enough to blame the problem on centre-state issues. There is so much that even a state can do, which is not being done. What is required above all is an application of mind and effort to solve problems that are simple and important to people—law and order, clean water, safe roads, good schools and hospitals. To do this generally across the country, states will have to be small and manageable, as Rajaji had envisaged.

If Telangana can, in this manner, show the way forward—then it will be an example for the rest of the country. It would not be worthy of the long-drawn struggle and the great sacrifice of human lives that has been made in its name to be just to be like other states. Otherwise, simply achieving a new state might mean nothing particularly worthwhile in terms of policies for the benefit of the people of the region.

The need for a separate state is to build a defensive barrier within the limits of the Constitution to assist people to develop themselves and create more potential for development. There is no better way for a people deprived of development both historically and recently to advance. Yet, what will be the governance pattern? Will it only repeat the old model, i.e. more development for the relatively developed and politically important districts?

The need of the hour is to develop the state quickly and uniformly across all districts. The allocation of funds and collection

of revenue is likely to be decided by power alignments even in a state with only 10 districts. The Telangana leadership should not discriminate against any district, but must take political and bureaucratic administration closer to the people.

However, the cabinet model as practised may need rethinking. The minister is supposed to formulate the policy and the bureaucrat to implement it. What happens in reality is that the bureaucrat is asked to make policies and the minister implements it in her or his own way after ensuring that the policy is favourable to the interests s/he represents. The tensions between the minister and bureaucrat, and between policy and implementation, make for poor and inefficient governance. The problem is apparently with the current cabinet structure. The competition by ministers and bureaucrats for 'good' posts is often only a euphemism for their intentions to derive illegal gains from administering a particular portfolio.

What does the Constitution say about the cabinet or, more formally, the Council of Ministers? Article 163 says, '(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion.' No more, no less. It does not say there should be a minister of Finance or Revenue or Tourism, etc. It, therefore, gives scope for the Council of Ministers (15 per cent of the assembly strength) to be reshaped by appointing ministers who are assigned to a district portfolio.

In other words, there can be a minister for Warangal, one for Nizamabad, etc. and at the state capital, there will be a chief minister who will have the sole responsibility for law and order and justice and can be assisted by three core ministers for finance, expenditure and administration. The rest of the portfolios can remain with the bureaucracy, and the district ministers, assisted by a devolved bureaucracy, will implement the policy decided by the cabinet. They will be responsible for all the functions of government within the district, subject to the overall guidance of the chief minister. They will have an annual district budget—revenue and expenditure and targets for achievement in all fields which then will be re-allocated on the basis of assembly constituencies. The district minister will be

an elected representative from the same district and a small district committee consisting of all the district MLAs will assist him or her regularly.

Perhaps a wider district council, including the Panchayat Raj elected representatives, can meet at longer intervals. This will ensure that the elected representatives will have full responsibility for managing the development and administration of the district and their own constituencies in direct view of their constituents who will be able to interact with them and secure the satisfaction of their needs.

The ministers and MLAs will be more interested in staying in their constituencies where 'action' will be concentrated rather than remaining in the state capital and around the chief minister's 'court'. Similarly, most of the IAS and state bureaucracy will be transferred to the districts to carry out the business of government in their respective domains and portfolios, rather than being concentrated at the state capital manoeuvring for better posts. They will campaign for posts in 'better' districts—but that is not something to worry about at this stage.

Cabinet meetings will be held once a month in the state capital to review progress and performance. Assembly sessions will go on as usual with the chief minister and core ministers answering all questions. The district ministers will offer inputs for specific district-level issues. In this schema, the assembly session will be businesslike with nothing much to agitate about. If opposition MLAs have any matter to take up for their constituencies, they will do it more effectively in their district committee.

The assembly will play a vital role only with the state-level policy and budget. This can be systematised by a more transparent policy-making process. Thus, policy will be largely considered by a State Planning and Policy Board consisting of ministers, bureaucrats and subject specialists. Once it is drafted and discussed at public hearings, it will be redrafted, taken to the cabinet, and then to the assembly for discussion and approval or rejection.

The main problem envisaged will be finding MLAs prepared to be chief minister and core ministers, as their constituencies will feel their absence and this may reflect in an adverse vote at the next election.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

The CWC decided on 30 July 2013 to request the Government of India to create the state of Telangana. Despite violent agitation in Seemandhra (as Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra are now known) and opposition from Seemandhra elected officials including the chief minister, all his Seemandhra ministerial colleagues and Seemandhra MPs and legislative assembly, the union cabinet approved the formation of the state on 3 October 2013. However, Hyderabad city, while being part of the new state, was to serve as a temporary capital for 'residuary Andhra Pradesh' (as Seemandhra will be known in legal parlance) till it builds its capital in its own territory. This has raised issues of how this can be managed and whether special rights needs to be given and unusual procedures such as union control over part of the city for certain subjects is necessary and if they are acceptable to Telangana. The central government has promised financial assistance to Seemandhra to build its capital and is prepared to consider other financial assistance to both successor states to ease the transition

With the final phase of de-merger of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh imminent, the emotional element must now be replaced by cold and hard thinking of the opportunities that such a reorganisation offers to both successor states. The process of separation also offers complications—especially when the majority area is unhappy and against it. Many issues—some imaginary—have been raised.

Finances

In 2012–13, the SOTR stood at Rs 51,441 crore of which Telangana generated Rs 29,307 and Seemandhra Rs 22,134 crores. Other non-SOTR receipts by the state such as grants from the Government of India, etc. brings the total revenue of the state to Rs 1,27,866 crores. Allocating non-SOTR revenues to the two successor states by their population proportions, Telangana revenues will be Rs 63,412 crores and Seemandhra revenues Rs 66,152 crores (Pingle 2013: 11). Figures for expenditure are not available but they are likely to have grown faster than revenues since 2006 because the state government

had gone on a spree of huge borrowing and spending to fund its many populist schemes and the now defunct new irrigation projects under Jalayagnam.

Fiscal consolidation may be necessary for both successor states in order to fund the transition and further development. The allocation of loans secured by the composite state will also impinge on the fiscal situation for each successor state as it is already doing now for Andhra Pradesh. A hard look needs to be taken at projects and schemes introduced by the state government which cost the exchequer heavily and diverted funds from basic development and productive capital formation. This situation for both successor states must lead to a drive for lean and efficient government. The legislative council serves no purpose and can be abolished as can a number of cabinet ministries and posts of special chief secretaries and DIGs.

Allocating Government Personnel

The general methodology for this purpose is set out by the Government of India as follows in the contexts of the Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand Acts (GoI current date).

It says, 'As per provisions of these three Acts, Central Government is vested with the authority for allocating services of personnel between the successor states in connection with the State Reorganization. Other than the employees of All-India Services, state government employees of state cadre, are allocated between the successor states by the State Re-organization Division in the Department of Personnel & Training' (GoI, Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, States Re-organisation Division. http://persmin.gov.in/DOPT_Wings_ATA_SR_srmaterial030508.asp#Introduction http://persmin.gov.in/DOPT_Wings_ATA_SR_srmaterial030508.asp, accessed on 1 January 2014).

Further, 'Allocation of All India Services between the successor states is done by their cadre controlling authorities, i.e. M/O of Personnel (AIS Division) for Indian Administrative Service (IAS), M/O Home Affairs for Indian Police Service (IPS) and M/O Environment and Forests for Indian Forest Service (IFS).

This will be based on state's demand of numbers of All India Officers' (ibid.).

For example, out of the 400-odd IAS officials in the AP cadre, Telangana can manage with about 50–70. More officers mean more expenditure and more confusion and conflict among them and delayed action. Similarly, out of the 210 IPS AP cadre officers, Telangana can do with less than 75. Thus, the argument for Telangana state would be that it needs a small government and cannot afford a large contingent of All-India service officers—maybe it can do without them altogether if it gets its act right. In fact, with forest areas declining, many Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officers are opting for general administration postings.

But as far as state officials are concerned, GoI says, 'The State Reorganization (SR) Division in the Department of Personnel & Training is entrusted with the responsibility of allocation of the state government employees of state cadre, who have all state transfer liability, other than All-India Services, between the successor states in accordance with State Reorganization Scheme. Employees serving in villages, tehsil, districts, divisions and regions—who are normally transferred within such areas and part of such territorial cadres and employees appointed for Projects or Undertakings are not covered by State Reorganisation scheme' (ibid.).

What is the criteria to be followed? 'The broad principle of allocation of State cadre employees which *inter alia* include allocation first by "option", followed by "domicile" (Home District) and lastly, by inclusion of "junior most" personnel in the reverse order of seniority. If the number of posts allocated to a successor States are more than the total number of "optees" and "domicile" (Home District), in order to fill up the balance posts, the employees lower down in the seniority position in the cadre are considered for allocation even against their options. Option once exercised by the employees is not reversible' (ibid.).

In the case of AP, it is clear that the proportion of government officials with domicile in Seemandhra will be greater than those domiciled in Telangana. Thus, it is possible that a lot more Seemandhra domiciled officials may opt for Telangana (with Hyderabad city being the attraction—not Adilabad) than are needed

in a Telangana state. The first preference, therefore, in this situation will be determined by the next criterion—domicile. As for domicile, tens of thousands of Seemandhra officials have been appointed to posts reserved for Telangana persons under the Presidential Order and GO 610. These obviously are to be re-allocated to Seemandhra regardless of their option as their appointment itself was irregular. Their transfer orders in a large number of cases have already been issued and are being contested in court.

As for domicile, it will be found that even those Seemandhra officials who were born in Telangana (or have MRO certificates to that effect) would have nominated their ancestral home in Seemandhra for the purpose of availing Leave Travel Concessions (LTC). This is another category of irregularity.

Political strategies will be used in this ordinarily technical matter. The Seemandhra officials may opt for Telangana on the basis that option is the primary criteria. This if successful will mean that all government officials in the combined state will be thrust on Telangana state and their burdens of salary, LTC, DA, HRA, and pensions will cripple Telangana. Apart from that, the Telangana administration will be run by Seemandhra officials notwithstanding the formation of a new state polity. Seemandhra state will recruit an entirely fresh administration and enjoy the whole exercise of distribution of jobs.

Telangana strategy would be based on capitalising on the discrimination in terms of job allocation that was shown over the 56 years. The argument should be that Telangana state does not need even the pro rata proportion of official strength to run the new state efficiently. It will then reduce the demand for official strength drastically and finally, make an advantage out of the disadvantages it has suffered.

Furthermore, devolving government to the districts will not only help governance but reduce the attraction of officials opting for Telangana for the sake of a posting in Hyderabad city.

So the State Reorganization (SR) Division in the Department of Personnel & Training, will have its task cut out in finalising the Reorganization Scheme. However, the two successor state governments will have a major say in how many officials they need

and screen the domicile basis critically. This process can take a long time and the grievance process may take even longer. There are 12 categories which can claim exception from the scheme guidelines.

Allocating River Waters

The Krishna and Godavari rivers rise in the Western Ghats and flow to the Bay of Bengal through the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Since the anicuts were built during the British rule a 100 years ago, they provided kharif irrigation to both the river deltas.

After Andhra Pradesh state was formed in 1956, the construction of Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir provided for rabi irrigation in the Krishna delta. Similarly, after the construction of Pochampad dam in 1969, the Godavari delta got rabi irrigation. The storage upstream also meant early irrigation for paddy seed beds, etc. for the deltas.

The Bachawat Commission, appointed by the Government of India, issued an award in 1976 (Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal 1976). The award gave 811 thousand million cubic feet (TMC) of Krishna river water to Andhra Pradesh and fixed Telangana's share of this at 298 TMC, Rayalaseema's at 145 TMC and Coastal Andhra's at 368 TMC. Coastal Andhra got the lion's share (despite the fact that the river flowed only a short distance in that region) in order to safeguard the delta.

In the case of Godavari, the Bachawat award set aside 1,480 TMC for Andhra Pradesh, of which Telangana's share was 900 TMC. Out of the Coastal Andhra share of 580 TMC, the award allocated 260 TMC specifically for the delta. These awards clearly set out the legitimate share of the three regions of Andhra Pradesh.

Bachawat was very careful about Telangana's share as he knew that it got less than it would have got if it were a separate state or part of Hyderabad state. He wrote,

> The state of Andhra Pradesh, no doubt, has been allocated enough water for historical reasons, but still Telangana part of the state of Andhra Pradesh stands in need of irrigation. The area which we are considering for irrigation formed part of Hyderabad state, and had

> there been no division of that state there were better chances for the residents of this area to get irrigation facilities in Mahabubnagar district. We are of the opinion that this area should not be deprived of the benefit of irrigation on account of the reorganisation of states. (Ibid.: 178 vol. 2)

In this context, what are the problems after Telangana attains statehood? The problems seem to be: (1) Andhra Pradesh has not got a big enough allocation in the Brajesh Misra award of surplus waters, (2) dams in Maharashtra and Karnataka are impounding waters in both rivers, reducing flows into Andhra Pradesh, (3) the state has made full use of the Krishna award though inter-regional shares seem to have been misallocated, and (4) the worst is that of the Jalayagnam scheme, 86 projects costing an estimated (at this time) Rs 1,86,000 crore, are a non-starter (*Hindu* 2013).

The Jalayagnam projects have no central clearances, and worse still, neither has the state any legitimate allocation of water in the rivers. All this is well known to irrigation engineers, politicians and anyone interested in reading the C&AG report and the Legislative Assembly Public Account Committee's report.

Moreover, there are no funds for completion. There is also no power to energise the lift irrigation projects which need additional power of 206 million units a day when the existing average power consumption (2009–10) was 161 million units a day. The Pranahita-Chevella lift project is thus a non-starter. The whole Jalayagnam scheme is a disaster and it will be impossible to allocate water that is not available and power that does not exist.

Polavaram irrigation project is an ambitious project which, if completed, would entail an additional utilisation of 200 TMC. The project is under dispute in the Supreme Court, with both Odisha and Chhattisgarh objecting to it. Nearly 276 tribal villages in Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Telangana will be submerged by it and this will displace 3,17,150 tribals. Once Telangana attains statehood, Polavaram will be restricted to the use of Coastal Andhra's existing 580 TMC of the Bachawat award.

Further, the project aims at diverting Godavari waters to the Krishna delta, and it is not clear whose water is being diverted.

Telangana's full use of its share will mean less water for the delta in the lean season, though much of it will flow into the sea even then.

Releases from common projects on the Krishna have to be managed fairly and efficiently during the scarce season. Rayalaseema will be at a disadvantage as its canal gravity offtakes from Srisailam require high reservoir levels, which cannot be sustained in scarcity. Power generation in summer and early kharif releases to Nagarjuna Sagar and Krishna Barrage canals will get priority. Pumping at Srisailam canal headworks may be a solution.

Seemandhra's main problem is the three deltas—Godavari, Krishna and Pennar. As for the Cauvery delta, it is inevitable that water for irrigation for these deltas will be reduced because over time they will get less water from Maharashtra, Karnataka and Telangana—as also upland areas of Seemandhra. Crop pattern changes are critical for the Krishna and Pennar deltas. It is better for the delta farmers to resort to water conservation, and switch from water- and labour-intensive rice and sugarcane cultivation to other crops with less demand on water and labour. Alternate irrigated crop pattern is also what Telangana needs if it is to expand its irrigated area by spreading existing irrigation water over a larger ayacut area.

Allocating State-wide Revenues Collected in Hyderabad

Regarding Hyderabad's imagined huge revenues, much confusion has been created. It is now clear from government figures that it generated only Rs 8,900 crores on value-added tax (VAT) in 2013. About Rs 3,000 crores of this is related to the sales of diesel, petrol, LPG and ATF by oil companies and AP Beverages Corporation throughout the state, which will be automatically transferred to each consuming the state (Pingle 2013).

Further, quite a few manufacturing units, though located outside Telangana but registered in Hyderabad and remitting VAT to the local authorities, may choose to transfer their registrations and pay taxes in the residuary state of Andhra Pradesh. This will further dent the Hyderabad revenue. Likewise, it can also be expected that owners of commercial transport vehicles who may shift their business

operations will pay motor vehicle taxes on all future transactions in the Andhra and Rayalaseema regions.

The collection of state-wide revenue in Hyderabad city is a very small (less than 3 per cent) portion of total state revenues and may even been offset by similar collection of all-state VAT, etc. in the 13 Seemandhra districts by businesses registered there and carrying on extensive trade in Telangana such as the HPCL refinery in Visakhapatnam which supplies oil to Hyderabad, Suryapet, etc. through a 571-mile pipeline (SKC 2010: 333).

Higher Education Issues

Higher education is anyway localised all over Andhra Pradesh catering to small areas surrounding our 10 or 12 universities. This, however, leaves open the admission on payment of fee to hundreds of private engineering, medical and arts and science colleges in Hyderabad. The three central universities are guided by their all-India recruitment and admission procedures.

In fact, the 'Gentleman's Agreement' (point 3) (SKC appendix 2010: 46) agreed that admission to colleges in Telangana should be restricted to Telangana students, or later they should have one-thirds of all admissions in the entire state, whichever is advantageous for the Telangana students (SKC 2010: 11). This was never done and it is unfair to give Seemandhra students in 2013 privileges that Telangana students did not enjoy since 1956 in their own homeland. As per the Presidential Order, 1975 (SKC appendix 2010: 103) following Article 371D, the distribution of seats between students of the three regions was based on their population proportions. Telangana was supposed to get 36 per cent of all university seats in the state. As the SKC report states: 'As a result, students in Telangana had access to only 36% of the seats in private colleges located in the Telangana region instead of 85% under the Presidential Order' (SKC 2010: 157). With the de-merger, Article 371D and the Presidential Order become redundant and all reservations cease to operate in Telangana state.

As per the SKC report, Hyderabad has only 17 government degree colleges and 36 aided colleges, with student bodies of 8,117

and 35,173 respectively (SKC 2010: 145). Further, the report states: 'The data received from the State Government shows that the combined amount released to government and aided colleges together is Rs 93 crores for Telangana, while it is Rs 224 crores for Coastal Andhra (with college going populations similar to that in Telangana) and Rs 91 crores in Rayalaseema (with population share being less than half of Telangana)' (figures for 2008–09) (SKC 2010: 161).

The SKC report (SKC appendix 2010: 159) reported the total number of (mostly private) professional colleges in Hyderabad (see Table 21.3):

TABLE 21.3 Total Number of Professional Colleges in Hyderabad

Colleges	Number	Students
Engineering	23	5626
Pharma	17	716
BEd.	23	2983
MBA	78	4102
MCA	68	3308
Law	11	1899

Source: SKC report.

Any reservation of sects for students from Seemandhra in educational institutions of the Telangana state in Hyderabad would thus be unacceptable.

Telangana needs vocational training centres in every district headquarters alongwith hostel facilities. One of the tasks for the institutes would be to carry out a survory to map art the agricultural land in Telangana & of its fertility and potential and to aid and advise the farmers to increase their productivity and profitability.

Development of Hyderabad

One of the biggest items on the agenda for the new Telangana government is to improve the condition of Hyderabad city and its

hinterland. While Hyderabad has seen a much lauded development in the last decade, the city has been turned into a messy slum. The roads, footpaths, traffic, underground and on ground drains, reliability of power supply and drinking water supply, and the quality of all municipal services are nowhere near metropolitan standards. Much needs to done before Hyderabad becomes livable. A strong development authority which can tax, spend and ensure proper municipal services is needed. Huge funding will be needed but a lessening of population pressure due to de-merger along with the decentralisation of government to Telangana districts and the move of the Seemandhra government from the city may help.

Agriculture

The first task in Telangana is the restoration of its tank irrigation which has been allowed to collapse. The second is the cultivation of fallow, unirrigated lands where major efforts need to be made to introduce mechanisation of ploughing and also orchard crops requiring minimal irrigation. The third task is to link all Telangana villages through a robust rural road network to district headquarters. The fourth item will take time but a complete survey of agricultural land, with its fertility and potential identified is needed and advice and help needs to be given to farmers to increase their productivity and profitability. The fifth requirement is the development of market centres at the district level with banking and insurance facilities. Above all there is a need to connect all villages to a 24-hour electrical supply as has been done in Gujarat and other states. These steps will initiate growth in Telangana and help meet the aspirations of the people.

Coal and Power

There are two other main critical elements needing careful handling. These involve the development of Singareni Collieries to increase coal production and to generate power based on pithead power plants. Singareni covers four districts of Telangana and its resources should be used to develop human resources and potential among

majority of Hindus in relative peace till, in the immediate period before independence, external forces (Communist, Congress and Arya Samajists) attempted to subvert his regime. The dawn of independence for the British Indian provinces raised the question of the Indian princely states and their future political status. For almost a year the Nizam caused them sleepless nights with his desire for Hyderabad's independence, and it took a lot of effort to annex his state. As a result of the Indian invasion, the matter of Hyderabad was also brought before the UNSC. Unlike Kashmir, the Hyderabad case achieved dormancy after annexation, but Pakistan ensured that it was kept on the agenda.

Many factors conspired to drive the move for Hyderabad's disintegration and the progressive eradication of its separate identity which was built up over 400 years. The extinguishment of identity is only now being reversed by the Telangana movement and, even here, the attempt to deny Hyderabad city to this new state seems like a continuation of this older policy. The people of Telangana in the course of the last 60 years have preserved and developed a cultural and political identity of their own—largely in contradistinction from the Andhra drive to impose a uniformity based on their own cultural and political identity. Unsophisticated and forced assimilation has never worked anywhere—even under dictatorial and totalitarian conditions. Under democratic ones it is well-nigh impossible.

The question that Telangana leaders have to answer is what is the future policy for Telangana? How is it to catch up and compensate for the injustices and discrimination of the past? How can it accelerate agricultural and rural development without lopsided urbanisation based on Hyderabad city? How can it make Hyderabad and the other towns liveable and graceful? How can it develop a model of democracy, in the context of the Constitution of India, to enable all its districts and peoples to share fairly and equitably in the development process? What are the mechanisms that will ensure that castes, sub-castes and religions are treated with balance and fairness? These are question that should be on the Telangana state's agenda and deserve application of mind and implementation of appropriate policies and programmes.

The book has not dealt with the questions raised above. The current crisis was enough to occupy all of one's time and energy. What is more, many may have rightly felt that there was no use discussing these issues when the means of solving them were not at hand. For them, statehood was a necessary condition—for many others, it was a sufficient condition—for progress and development of the region and its people. Now that statehood is imminent attention has again been diverted to Seemandhra people's agitation and the machinations of its political and economic elite. Yet, the need to plan the future is there and it has to be done. Things cannot go on as before with the same lack of fairness and equity. We cannot do to ourselves what was done to us by others. They had the excuse of self-interest—we cannot show lack of interest. The movement has always opposed unfair treatment to Telangana—by anyone and even by ourselves.

But the historical perspective of the movement and its tribulations surely may help to set the political issues in perspective. The hopes of the Telangana people have been raised. They feel everything will be solved with statehood. If only that were true! statehood is only a process for ensuring democratic accountability of the political and bureaucratic leadership to the aspirations of the people. It is a necessary first step—not a sufficient one. There are many more steps to traverse and the road is a long and difficult one. It needs trained minds at the helm of affairs. It needs concern for the well-being of the state and its people. It needs also awareness of possibilities and the potential of people who could make all the difference if they were fully involved in achieving the goals identified and approved. Much is uncertain: only statehood seems at hand.

Postscript

The Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill, 2013*

The union cabinet has endorsed the bill and sent it to the President to be sent onward to the Andhra Pradesh legislature for its 'expression of views' as required by Article 3 of the Constitution. The bill was sent on 12 December 2013, and at the time of writing this chapter the legislature was still discussing not so much the bill itself but the whole question of separation.

The bill has been carefully studied and there is a pressing need for clarifications and confirmation on various clauses. One can understand the rush to get it passed and the competing vested interests working on the matter.

The bill has also been examined in the context of other such Reorganization Acts and also in the light of related constitution amendments and judgments of the constitution bench of the Supreme Court. The bill has to be critically examined in the context of the delayed and high expectations of the people of Telangana combined with their fear that the Seemandhra lobby would de-rail the process in the same manner as they have distorted the equitable functioning of the united state. In this context, there is a need for full clarity on the clauses and their implications for the new Telangana state as well as for the residuary state of Andhra Pradesh (Seemandhra).

However, there are deep-rooted flaws embedded in the bill. While dividing the state, the bill seeks to preserve the unity of

* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andhra_Pradesh_Reorganization_Bill,_2013, accessed on 1 January 2014.

many sectors for common or central control. In the joy of winning statehood, there are concerns that Telangana politicians may miss the implications of these clauses in the bill in its present form.

First, the bill proposes a common high court. It is feared that in such a scenario, every Telangana government order, posting, transfer or land litigation will be challenged and eventually decided on regional grounds that will again have to be re-challenged in the Supreme Court for an equitable judgment. As is evident, the high court today has an overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers and officials from Seemandhra. In these circumstances, it has become just and necessary to constitute a separate high court for the newly formed state.

Currently, the high court of Andhra Pradesh is overwhelmingly and disproportionately staffed—from judges to peons—by people

Andhra Pradesh Judicial Officers/Employees

Designation	Telangana	Andhra
Judiciary		
High Court Judges	6	29
Jr Civil Judges	126	305
Sr Civil Judges	37	143
District Judges	29	180
High Court Staff		
Registrar General	0	1
Registrars	2	6
Joint Registrars	0	5
Deputy Registrars	1	8
Asst Registrars	6	30
Section Officers, etc.	10	102
Court Masters	30	104
Dy Section Officers	7	55
Asst Section Officers	9	81
Computer Operators	2	15
Assistants/Examiners	35	234
Typists/Copyists	15	104
Class IV employees	250	387

Source: Deccan Chronicle, DC|18 Dec 2013, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/131218/news-current-affairs/article/only-135-telangana-staff-judiciary, accessed on 1 January 2014.

from Seemandhra. The table gives section-wise details which were also read into the record of the assembly by Ravulu Chandrasekhar Reddy on 17 January 2014.

It is feared that the court may be influenced by regional biases that may seriously affect the credibility of its judgments. Lawyers have been attacking each other and police had been summoned on several occasions to keep peace. The judges are also been reported to be divided on the basis of regional sentiments and there are reports of lawyers seeking their cases be heard by specific judges to get their cases decided in their favour.

In this context a common high court means continuation of this distressing situation. The position that a high court of Seemandhra does not currently exist is not a sufficient reason for creating a common high court with jurisdiction over both the successor states. If that was the only reason, there should be no impediment in creating a high court of Telangana located at Hyderabad along with a separate high court of Seemandhra to be temporarily located also at Hyderabad or at Visakhapatnam and to be later relocated, as notified, by a presidential directive.

Second, the bill grants government employees the option of serving in either of the successor states. A vast majority of them are natives of Seemandhra and many have been appointed to posts in Telangana in violation of the Presidential Order and GO 610. Allowing the option would mean that the Telangana government will be run by the people of Seemandhra, who would have no affection for the state they serve. Instead, they should be assigned to serve in the state they originate from.

Third, the bill negates Telangana its upper riverine advantage by transferring control of the rivers to river boards, under central control. On the Godavari, this will not affect Telangana's barrage and lift projects. On the Krishna, however, Telangana will have to fight for every drop of water as the water allocation to Andhra Pradesh by the Bachawat Commission has been diverted to Seemandhra.

Fourth, the Andhra Pradesh Generation Company (APGenco) (the power generation company) assets are divided, but not the corporation itself. Thus, the allocation of power generated will be

controlled by power engineers from the Seemandhra region. It would be appropriate that APGenco be divided into two new corporations that should get plants based on their location, and employees based on the region of their origin. The Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) between the various state-owned power distribution companies (DISCOMs) and the Seemandhra private power plants which are producing expensive power should be maintained for all time. The Telangana demand limits their extension to three years.

Fifth, the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) (the bus transport company) must also be dissolved and two new corporations should inherit the assets in each successor state, and employees on the basis of the region of their origin. These principles must be extended to all existing state corporations, including the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) which holds vast lands in Telangana.

Sixth, the bill fortunately allocates SCCL to Telangana. However, it stipulates that Singareni's coal allocations to Seemandhra power plants are to continue forever. To freeze coal linkages of SCCL for all time is a bad commercial and public policy and contravenes existing powers under which SCCL operates. SCCL, whose 51 per cent equity shall be with the government of Telangana, after an appointed date, should be free to decide its own allocation. This clause in the existing bill, unless restricted to the period of transition to enable adjustment to be made, may affect its commercial and strategic policies and viability. The Telangana demand limits these to three years only

Seventh, and perhaps the most important, the Seemandhra assembly will be elected in June 2014 and will form a government. But no Telangana assembly will be elected and, therefore, there will not be a Telangana government. This is because the bill leaves the Telangana assembly constituencies to be notified by the election commission due to the plan to expand the Telangana assembly to 153 MLAs. The de-limitation of these constituencies will take nine months or more. That is why the bill provided only for a 'Provisional Telangana Legislative Assembly' of 119 existing members, whose term will expire in June. After that Telangana will be under President's Rule.

The Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill 2013 fixes the parliamentary constituencies for the successor states and assembly constituencies for the residuary Andhra Pradesh. Where the Telangana assembly is concerned, there is unequal treatment. While section 16 sets the total figure for Telangana assembly constituencies at 119, sections 17 and 18 of the bill provide only for a 'Provisional Telangana Legislative Assembly' consisting of the current 119 MLAs. It omits the list of the assembly constituencies in the Second Schedule (Table A), to be filled later by the Election Commission. The Election Commission, advised by five local MLAs, is to then restructure all Telangana assembly constituencies before the election of a permanent Telangana legislative assembly.

This is an attempt by some people in the Telangana Congress to increase the number of assembly seats to 153—two more in each parliamentary constituency. For the past one decade, Congressmen in the state have enjoyed power without acceptance of any responsibility for Telangana. The Telangana movement has struggled for a decade with hardly any elected official from the Congress fighting for it despite repeatedly promising to do so during the elections. Now, banking on Sonia Gandhi's firm and unshakable support for statehood, some latecomers want to jump on the Telangana bandwagon to get elected to these new electoral posts.

All parliamentary constituencies will remain intact; only the new assembly segments will be reduced. Thus, the smallest parliamentary seat, Adilabad (ST) with 11.31 lakh voters, will now have nine assembly segments with an average of 1.25 lakh voters each. The largest parliamentary constituency, Malkajgiri with 23.4 lakh voters, will have nine assembly segments averaging 2.60 lakh voters.

The last de-limitation commenced on 22 January 2007, and the final order was issued by the Election Commission on 26 November 2008. The proposed increase to 153 assembly constituencies would require an equally complicated, complete and detailed exercise with consultation with the public. If the order is challenged in the courts, then the process will drag on further. Meanwhile, the term of the provisional Telangana assembly will end and President's Rule will be imposed on the new state.

Politically, this means the Telangana state electorate will vote for Parliament before it votes for the assembly. The whole Telangana effect in favour of the Congress will be diluted by the passage of time. If the Lok Sabha election brings Narendra Modi and the BJP to power, the Telangana electorate is likely to be influenced by the national trend. This will damage the prospects of the Congress winning by handsome margins in the assembly elections. If TRS joins the Congress, it will also suffer. AI-MIM cannot support this venture either.

The only beneficiary in Telangana will be the TDP, which by then could have concluded an alliance with BJP in Seemandhra and emerged strong enough to extend that alliance to the Telangana assembly election. As many as 10 to 20 new seats will be won by TDP with support from 'settlers' opposed to Telangana statehood and all that it stands for. Instead of being wiped out in Telangana for its negative role on statehood, the TDP will re-emerge as a force once again.

So, the attempts by the Congress hopefuls in trying to get more unoccupied and uncontested seats will be evenly matched by the fear of those sitting Congress MLAs who will lose their seats due to the delay in conducting elections. It will also be matched by the fear of the TRS and MIM of seeing their support base eroded by a TDP-BJP alliance backed by a Centre ruled by the BJP. How are the Congress and TRS to face the electorate with this scheme and hope to win votes? What will be the attitude of TJAC towards all this?

Eighth, the bill prescribes a common governor for both Telangana and Seemandhra. Under President's Rule, Telangana negotiations with Seemandhra can be carried out by this half-a-governor. He will be directed by the union government and be accountable only to Parliament, not to the people of Telangana. This half-a-governor is empowered by the bill to allocate government accommodation in Hyderabad. In the absence of a Telangana assembly and a popular government, there is a distinct possibility that he, influenced by the powerful Seemandhra lobby, may allocate the assembly building to the Seemandhra assembly, the secretariat to Seemandhra ministers and the chief minister's official residence to the Seemandhra chief

minister. Seemandhra ministers and MLAs can have their usual accommodation and the elected officials from Telangana will have to vacate their residences when their term expires. All of this could actually happen in Telangana's own capital.

Ninth, and worst of all, the half-a-governor will preside over allocation of river waters, power, government officials and division of assets and liabilities, state corporations, etc. The Telangana secretariat, police, collectors and state corporations will be answerable only to him. He may even conclude negotiations over Polavaram and file Telangana's case before the Brijesh Kumar Tribunal for the allocation of Krishna river surplus waters. By 2015, all Telangana issues will be decided in the absence of a representative and popular Telangana government to the advantage of the Seemandhra state.

After the assembly elections, 153 Telangana MLAs, ministers and the chief minister may wonder why they have no money, no coal, no power, no water and no loyal employees. Is this what the Telangana state is to be—desolate, deprived, betrayed, bankrupt and without honour? Is Telangana is destined at birth to be a ruined state, all for an extra 34 MLAs? It will be worse than the prospect of a Rayala-Telangana (addition of two Rayalaseema districts of Kurnool and Ananthapur to the proposed Telangana state)—yet another proposal that attempted to dilute the Telangana governance structure.

Meanwhile, more than 630 youths have committed suicide for Telangana statehood. It would be an insult and crime towards those martyrs if the first result of statehood is to increase the number of elected officials. Increasing the number of MLAs is going to cause further deterioration of governance in the countryside, rather than improve it.

The smaller the electorate in any constituency, the more important will be the smaller vote banks. The contestants will have to be aligned to the vote banks and the winner will then not be well disposed to the vote bank that voted against him. All this will come in the way of inclusion of the entire electorate in the governance process and will create ill will from their inevitable exclusion. Telangana people, in their fight for statehood, have not been divided by religion, caste or class. This scheme raises the likelihood of a divided Telangana polity. This is not a recipe for

progress; it has the prognosis of a disaster. No friend, let alone a supporter of Telangana, will wish this situation on the new state. The only hope is that good sense will finally prevail and the union cabinet, or Parliament, will replace the 'Provisional Telangana Assembly' with a permanent one with 119 MLAs. Failing to do this, as has been seen, is a recipe for chaos.

Telangana has the potential to be a plentiful, prosperous, peaceful state, but not with bill as it stands now. The only recourse is for Parliament to (1) make changes in the bill that all Telangana MLAs have already asked for in writing, and (2) remove the 'provisional' part of the Telangana legislative assembly, retaining the 119 constituencies, and have its election in June. If Telangana politicians want 34 (or 51 or 68) more MLAs, they should decide that after the new assembly is elected, but not now, because they will fall into a trap set for the new state and its people. There is an old Greek saying, 'The strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must.' Telangana people have trusted too many, too much and for far too long. They must not be weak or suffer any longer.

This bill has a formidable legacy in that it has to conform to and also ensure that its methodology can be extended to the reorganisation of future states. The implications are serious as far as Telangana is concerned as this bill will be the founding charter of the new state. That is why the bill has been studied so critically and the conclusions drawn have been confirmed by legal luminaries.

It now remains for the Government of India, the ruling Congress party and main Opposition, the BJP, to ensure that Parliament enacts a just and equitable bill. Notwithstanding anything the legislature says or resolves, Parliament is supreme in the matter of reorganisation of states, and need not pay undue attention to what the state legislature demands. This has been established by law and in several cases decided in the past by the constitution bench of the Supreme Court. The process of reorganisation of states in India has been going on since 1948 and will continue in the future as per political exigencies. This bill is not just an event but a part of a continuing process of state's reorganisation in India. It should not be an exception to the rule.

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Index

Adilabad 32, 119–20, 124, 167, 203, 219–20, 226, 228, 277, 292
adivasis 126
Advani, L. K. 94, 100–101
Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act of 1917 119
agitation 4, 9, 52–3, 58, 64–5, 73, 77, 84, 86, 93, 97, 102–3, 105–6, 116–7, 127–9, 141, 154–5, 191, 193, 195–7, 202–6, 208–10, 213, 217, 219–27, 229–36, 242–3, 245, 251, 255, 260, 264, 268, 275, 287
  pro-Telangana 206, 217
  violent 154–5, 203–4, 208, 219, 222, 232, 236, 275
Agra 11
agriculture 29, 79–80, 159–60, 163, 175, 261–2, 270, 284
Aiyer, Sir Alladi Krishnaswami 35
Aiyer, Swaminathan A. 111
Ajmer-Mewar 15, 20
All-India Civil Service Cadre 140
All-India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (AI-MIM) 6, 43, 46, 49, 105, 107, 144–6, 151–8, 185, 188, 205–7, 217–8, 222–3, 228, 242, 249, 293
Ambedkar, Dr B. R. 18, 56, 57, 75–6, 128
  view on linguistic states 56
Ananthapur 8, 97, 114, 223, 270
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 15
Andhra Assembly Resolution 132, 186
Andhra Communist Party 38
Andhra Congress Action Committee 86
Andhra Dalit Mahasabha 128
Andhra High Court 35–6
Andhraites 38, 54, 114
Andhra Jana Sangh 144
Andhra Legislative Assembly 64
Andhra Pradesh (AP)
  bifurcation of 103
  Congress Legislature Party (CLP) 6, 105, 254
  creation of 33, 37, 54, 65, 113, 161
  demand for a state separate from Madras Province 52
  disputes over separation from Madras 40
  formation of 37, 40, 55, 66, 101, 116
  House Committee on Factional Violence in Rayalaseema 112

mass resignations 96, 188
politics of 91
process of separation 104
real-estate 7
separation from Madras 40
tank irrigation in 164
Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC) 36, 86, 103
Andhra Pradesh Generation Company (APGenco) 290
Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) 291
Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill 5, 288, 292
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) 291
Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation (LTR) 121
Andhra Province 36–7, 52, 53
formation of a separate 33, 37, 52
Andhra Provincial Assembly 38
Andhra Provincial Congress Party 39
Andhra Provincial Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party 36
Andhras 34, 53, 70, 107, 127, 145
Andhra separatist movement 85
Andhra Tenancy Protection Ordinance 65
annexation 3, 14, 72, 77, 286
Annual Report to the President on Schedule V Areas 122
antagonism 46, 76
caste 76
AP Congress Legislature Party (CLP) 6, 105, 254
AP Public Employment Order 132, 186
AP Public Service Commission 137
AP State Cooperative Bank 103
AP Tribal Area Regulation, III of 1359 121
aristocracy 82
feudal 82
Muslim 82
arson 92
Asaf Jah dynasty 11
Assam 15, 18, 113, 120
assembly election of 1972 85
Atraf-i-Balda 28, 43
Attorney-General of India 200
Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor 3, 11, 25, 148
invasion of 3
autonomy 3, 22
political 3
Awadh Pradesh 254
Awan, Babar 265
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam 39–40, 285

Bachawat Commission 279, 290
Backward Castes (BCs) 81, 87, 128, 163, 195
Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) 113, 130, 192
Bahawalpur 263–6
Bahmani Sultanate 3
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 102
Balagopal, K. 111
Bangladesh 22, 85, 264
creation of 22
Bangladesh War 85
Baroda 19, 260
Basavapunnaiah, M. 71
Battle of Plassey 12

Battle of Talikota 110
Bellary 97, 116
Bengal 12, 15, 56, 79, 279
Bengaluru 270
Benichou, Lucien D. 144, 146
Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State (1938–1948) 144
Berar 79, 256–7
Bernier, Francois 25
Bhagyanagar 25
Bhaktavastsalam, M. 35
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 6, 89, 100–101, 103, 105, 152, 154–5, 157, 185, 205–7, 217, 222–3, 228, 242, 263, 293, 295
Bhave, Vinoba 36
Bhopal 15, 20
Bibek Debroy-Lavash Bhandari Report 245
Bihar 15, 32, 59, 79, 89, 246, 285
Bilaspur 15
Bombay 11, 15, 19, 34, 48, 53–4, 58–9, 67, 69, 73, 79, 147–8, 257, 260
Bombay Legislative Assembly 53
Bombay Province 11
Bombay state 19, 59, 260
Boundary Commission 54
Brahmins 29, 65, 70, 77, 81, 87, 194
British Crown 12, 13
suzerainty of 12
British Indian provinces 15, 286
British Parliament 12, 147
British province 20
British Raj 34, 118, 120
British sovereign 3
paramountcy of 3
Bundelkhand 254–6
bureaucracy 82, 137, 141, 271, 273–4, 285
hereditary 82
state 274

Canara 11, 19
castes 29, 65, 71, 73, 75–6, 80, 85, 87–8, 91, 95–8, 106–7, 127–8, 194–6, 202, 208–10, 217, 230, 235, 244, 286
alignment 107
antagonism 76
balance 88
dynamics 91
equations 71, 75, 87–8
groups 80, 88, 106, 217
politics 75
representation of 87
upper 96, 194
Ceded Districts 110, 111, 145–6
Census of India 32, 43, 67–8
Census of 1951 67–8
Census of 1961 67–8
Census of 1991 32
Census of 2001 31, 43
Central Indian Agency 19
Central Provinces 20, 79, 256
Chandigarh 44, 224
Chandrasekhar Rao, K. 104–5
Chandra Shekhar 102
Channa Reddy, Dr Marri 78, 151
chauvinism 57
linguistic 57
Chavan, Y. B. 257
Chennai 270
Chenna Reddy, Dr Marri 92
Chhattisgarh 32, 89, 94, 100, 220, 226–7, 276, 280, 285
Chidambaram, P., Union Home Minister 105, 191, 201, 239, 245–7
Chittoor 70, 97, 223, 270

christianity 127
civil society 106, 187, 192
Coastal Andhra 4, 8, 30–31, 33, 39, 42–3, 49, 53, 62, 64, 77, 80, 84–6, 88, 92, 96–8, 103, 105–7, 113–7, 121, 127–30, 145–6, 152, 154–5, 164, 171, 176, 185, 187, 193–6, 213, 218, 224, 250, 253–5, 269–70, 275, 279–80, 283
  commercial market in 121
Commission on Linguistic Provinces 114
Committee for Consultations on the Situation in Andhra Pradesh 106, 191
Commons Select Committee on the East India Company 10
communal issues 205
communal riots 150–52, 157, 228, 247
communal unrest 207, 228
communism 69
communist party 6, 38, 64, 76, 82–3, 85, 101, 184–5, 257
Communist Party of India (CPI) 6, 56, 64–6, 69–71, 73, 77, 80, 83, 101, 105, 184–5, 226–7, 249
  decline of 83
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) 6, 83, 101, 105, 184–5, 226–7, 249
conflicts 9, 39, 46, 57, 107, 204–5, 221–, 229, 233, 277
  intra-Scheduled Caste 107
confusion 4, 7, 10, 23, 171, 239, 277, 281
Congress Core Committee 6
Congress election manifesto (1945–46) 53
Congress election manifesto of 1952 54
Congress high command 36, 69, 79, 84, 96, 103, 105, 234, 242
Congress party 7, 17, 38, 39, 47, 52, 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 94–6, 101–5, 150, 184, 215, 250, 258, 265, 285, 295
Congress-TRS combination 95
Congress Working Committee (CWC) 4, 34, 54, 70, 275
  Nagpur Session 52
Constituent Assembly Debates 18, 78, 127, 238
Constitution of Hyderabad 3, 14, 72
Constitution of India 3, 8, 14, 19, 72, 78, 88, 120, 286
  32nd Amendment 88, 132, 186
  Article 3 78, 288
  Article 244 120
  Article 371D 132, 186, 258, 282
  Draft Constitution 114, 116
  Part A states 8, 15–9
  Part B states 3, 8, 14–9, 121
  Part C states 15–8
  Part D states 15
  Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas 120
Coorg 15, 19
corruption 65, 285
counter-agitation 105
credibility 2, 102, 141, 253
Crown lands 7, 28
CSDS 248–53
CSDS survey 248
Cuddapah 111, 270
culpability 2, 141

dalits 127–8, 152, 187, 194–5, 256
  political representation of the 127

Dandekar Committee on Regional Imbalance 258
Daulatabad 25
Deccan 3, 10–11, 25–6, 110, 146, 199, 202
Deccan Chronicle 49
Deccan Post 199, 202
Deccan Times, The 146
deforestation 112
Delhi 2–3, 7–8, 11, 15, 33, 38, 44, 46–7, 58, 89, 147, 224, 255, 263
Delhi Sultanate 3
democracy 22, 56, 69, 78, 83, 150, 195, 200, 245, 286
Desai, Morarji 257
Desais 82
Deshmukhs 82
discrimination 79, 197, 209, 216, 230, 251, 264, 278, 286
Dominion of India 16–8, 72
Duggal, V. K. 239
Durrani, Muhammad Ali 265

East Godavari Agency Areas 118
East India Company 3, 10–12, 145
  expansion 12
East Pakistan 22, 264
East Punjab 15, 20, 58
Economic and Political Weekly 111
Economic Times, The 151
economy 44–5, 111, 153, 164, 169, 196, 270
  political 164, 169
  service based 45
education 88, 100, 103, 127, 192, 195, 197, 203, 216–7, 221, 223, 229, 232, 244, 271, 282
  higher 103, 282
  implications 229
  infrastructure 229
  tertiary 88
Eight-point Formula of the Prime Minister 132
Election Commission of India 6–8, 87, 101, 292
election manifesto 53–4, 104
employment 8, 45, 62, 65, 77, 85, 88, 100, 127, 133, 135, 141–2, 153, 186, 188, 192–3, 203–4, 216, 219–22, 226, 229–30, 232, 241, 261
  government 141
  guarantees 88
  meaningful 100
  opportunities 88, 203, 216, 219–21, 226, 229, 241
  protection of 188
  public 45, 142, 153, 193
  unskilled 230
exploitation 33, 115, 119, 163
extortions 92, 112
extremism 93, 227
  left-wing 227

factionalism 112
  politicisation of 112
festival 151
  Hindu 151
  Muslim 151
finance commission 269
fiscal imbalances 78
Five-year Plans 56
Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von 118

Gandhi, Indira 21, 84–6, 102, 213
  abolished the Privy Purses 21
  Emergency declared by 21
Gandhi, Sonia 6, 47, 94, 101, 104–5, 152, 215

Gangetic valley 12
general election 3, 15, 17, 37, 47, 62, 77, 80, 84, 100–101, 104, 184–6, 215, 257
of 1952 3, 15, 17, 37
of 1957 77, 79–80, 257
of 1971 84, 186
of 1999 100–101
of 2004 89, 95, 101, 184
of 2009 96, 104, 184–5
of 2014 47
general election (mid-term) of 1955 69, 78
caste equations 71, 75, 87–8
Gentleman's Agreement 83, 113, 132, 186, 197, 213, 282
Ghaffar, Kazi Abdul 147
Gilani, Yousaf Raza, prime minister 265
Girglani Commission 132–3, 142, 186, 214
report 133, 134
Girglani, J. M. 88, 121, 132–4, 136–9, 141–2, 186–7, 214
Girls Islamic Organisation (GIO) 188
Goa 44, 113
Golconda 3, 11, 25–6, 110
collapse of 3
Golconda Sultanate 3
Golkonda Patrika 78
Gopala Reddi, B. 35
Gopal Reddy, Bezwada 38, 71
Gorkhas 79
Goud, Madhu Yashki 151–2
Goudwannah 11
governance 2, 111, 132, 140–42, 189, 195, 201, 204–5, 210, 224, 231, 233, 246–7, 267, 271–3, 278, 287
constitutional 142
effective 210, 233
efficient 2
fair 2
model 267, 271, 287
state 132, 140
Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) 68, 88, 121, 159, 170, 187
Government of India Act 78, 83, 120
Government of India (GoI) 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 12–5, 18, 20–21, 27, 36, 49, 53, 72–3, 78, 83, 89, 96, 119–20, 130, 147, 152, 171, 185, 191–2, 208, 210, 212–5, 232, 239–40, 249, 275–9
attitude towards Hyderabad 14
Confronting the Princely States Problem 16
intention of forming the Telangana state 1
Grant, James 10
Of the Northern Circars, from a Political Survey of the Deccan 10
Gray, Hugh 85–6
Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) 43–4, 152–3, 221
expansion of 43, 153
master-plan violations 48
Greater Rayalaseema 97, 107, 116
Gujarat 58, 246, 257, 260–63, 284
Gujral, Inder Kumar 102
Guntur 36, 46, 69–70, 80, 97, 116, 218, 224, 251
Gurkha province 56
Gwalior 20

Haider Ali 110
Hamilton, Walter 25–6
Hanumanth Rao, V. 151
Harit Pradesh 254–5
Harsha Kumar, G. V. 128
Haryana 58, 245, 285
  formation of 58
High Court of Andhra Pradesh 289
Himachal Pradesh 15, 58–9, 113, 285
Hindoos 10–11
  Deccanee 11
Hindu Raj 149
Hindus 22, 27, 30–31, 41, 52, 145, 149–50, 156, 158, 206, 222
  fundamentalists 156, 228, 242
  immigration 31
  in-migration of 41
  population 28, 156, 228, 286
Hindu, The 36–7, 69–70, 79, 97, 107, 116, 146, 228, 248, 251, 280
Hyderabad 3, 7–8, 10–11, 13–5, 17, 19–20, 23, 25–34, 39–50, 52, 55–8, 60, 62, 65–70, 72–3, 77–8, 80, 82–4, 88, 92, 97, 100, 105–7, 110, 116, 118–21, 123, 135, 138, 144–58, 160, 167, 185, 189, 192, 194, 196–7, 201–9, 213–4, 218–30, 236, 241, 250, 252, 256–8, 260, 263–4, 268, 270, 275, 277–9, 281–6
  as a Union Territory 46, 107, 268
  as the Capital of Andhra Pradesh 40, 43
  demography of 30
  development of 283
  disintegration of 57, 73
  dismemberment of 39, 77–8
  migrants coming into 30
  position under the new Constitution 15
  post-independence 41
  real estate 7
  under the Nizams 25, 29
Hyderabad City, expansion of 88
Hyderabad District 68, 135
Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) 43–4, 218, 224
Hyderabad Municipality 29
Hyderabad state 3, 8, 10, 13–5, 19, 26, 29, 33, 39–40, 52, 55, 62, 65–7, 69, 70, 72–3, 77, 82–3, 110, 118–9, 144, 146–7, 160, 213, 256, 258, 263, 285
  communist insurgency of 1948–50 72
Hyderabad State Congress 39, 70, 77
Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act 1950 82
Hyderabad Town Group (HTG) 40, 42
Hyderabad Tribal Areas Regulation 119

identity 10, 17–8, 20, 21, 23, 47, 75, 92, 193–4, 216, 265, 285–6
  cultural 286
  linguistic 75
  political 23, 286
  preservation of the 18
  separate 20, 286
  specific 10, 23
  Telugu 92, 194
immigrants 31
immigration, Hindu 31
Imperial Gazetteer, The 26–30
  comments on development of Chadarghat 27

quality of the city's buildings 27
imperialism 186
inamdari 65, 69
independence movement 83
India 1–4, 6–23, 27, 30, 32, 36–7, 41, 45–7, 49, 52–7, 59, 64, 67–8, 70–72, 76–8, 83, 85, 87–8, 97, 101, 105–7, 111, 113–4, 119–20, 125, 130, 139–40, 145, 147, 150–52, 154, 160, 162–3, 184–5, 191–2, 200–201, 206, 208, 210, 212–4, 217, 232, 239–40, 244, 249, 251, 254–6, 261, 263, 265–6, 270, 275–7, 279, 282, 285–6
British rule 18, 83, 127, 176, 257, 279
successors in 13
Indian Army 13, 68, 72, 82, 84, 147–9
Indian Empire 11–3, 16, 22, 27
Indian Express, The 77, 128, 245–6, 263
Indian Independence Act 3, 12–3, 114, 147
Indian national movement 73
Indian National Trade Union Congress 78
Indian princely states 3, 286
Indian states 13, 15
Indicators and Backlogs Committee (IBC) 258
Indore 20
industrial growth 203, 221
information technology (I-T) 45
infrastructure 46, 48, 197, 203, 221, 229, 244, 263
injustice 7, 132
Instruments of Accession 14, 18–9, 21, 72
integrity 2, 12, 210, 248
invasion 3, 11, 13–4, 145, 147, 286
Indian 3, 14, 286
investments 45–7, 79, 97, 106, 159, 162, 164, 166, 169, 170, 172, 175–7, 186, 220–21, 269
activity 162
negotiable 79
private 162
real-estate sector 45
irrigation 8–9, 61, 81, 84, 87, 97, 106, 114, 116, 130, 134–6, 138, 159–77, 188, 193, 197, 216, 226, 229, 232, 259, 262–4, 270, 276, 279–81, 284
budget allocations 166
canal 160, 162, 164–5, 168–9, 173, 175–6, 262
development 160, 259
government-funded 162
kharif 279
lift 171, 229, 280
plans 177
projects 114, 116, 168, 171, 276, 280
rabi 279
sources of 161, 172
surface 160, 174–6, 188
tank 159, 161–4, 166–7, 170, 175–6, 193, 270, 284
type of 163, 166
water supply 8
well 161–2, 164, 166, 172–7
Irrigation and Command Area Development (I&CAD) 169
Islam 22
I-T industry 45

JAC 98, 106, 188, 217, 251, 253
jagirdars 82

Jah VII, Nizam Asaf 144, 145
Jai Andhra Movements 43, 85, 105, 128, 155, 213
Jalayagnam package 171
Jammu and Kashmir 7, 15
Janardhan Reddy, N. 92
Jayabharat Reddy, K. 133, 186
Jharkhand 89, 94, 100, 227, 276, 285
jobs 9, 53, 77, 84–5, 88, 100, 133, 137, 140–41, 188, 213, 216–8, 278
  government 84, 88, 100, 133, 140, 216–7
  opportunities 205, 216, 225, 229
  reservation of 85
  temporary 137
  white-collar 88
Junagadh 19, 260
Jung I, Sir Salar 28
justice 46, 88, 141, 200, 234, 273
Justice Bhargava Committee 132–3, 186
JVP Committee 37, 54
  report 36

Kakatiya dynasty 163
Kakatiya Kingdom 3, 10, 23, 29
  collapse of the 23
Kaleswara Rao, A. 39–40
Kammas 65, 69–71, 75–7, 81, 85, 87, 91, 94, 96–8, 106–7, 127, 194, 210, 235
Kapus 29, 65, 81, 87–8, 107, 194
Karimnagar 32, 104, 120–21, 124, 167, 187, 203, 215, 219–20, 226, 228
Karnataka 41, 53, 97, 116, 171, 279–81
Kashmir 7, 15, 17, 20, 73, 286
Kathiawar 19
Kerala 36, 53, 115
Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) 36
Keshava Rao, K. 103
Keshav, Payyavula 8
Khammam 32, 68, 118, 120–21, 124, 167, 187, 203, 219, 220, 226
Khan, A. K. 151
Kolar 97, 116
Kootubshahy 11
Koteswara Rao, Pinnamaneni 103
Krishanagiri 97, 116
Krishikar Lok Party (KLP) 64, 66, 71, 76
Krishnamachari, T. T. 35
Kulaks 71, 84–5, 128
Kumar Lalit Committee 132, 186
Kurnool 8, 31, 76, 78, 80, 97, 113, 116–7, 223–4, 270
Kutch 15, 58–9, 260–63

labour/labourer 29, 65, 69, 129, 130, 131, 135, 172, 193, 221, 281
  agricultural 69, 129, 130, 131
  landless 65, 69, 129, 131
  manual 135
Lanco Hills case 7
land 7, 20–21, 28, 33, 43, 45, 48, 60, 64–5, 69–72, 75, 82, 84–6, 97, 100, 105–6, 110, 118–26, 144–5, 160, 162, 166–7, 170, 175, 187–8, 204, 209, 218, 221–2, 223, 230, 241, 264, 283–4
  agitations 65
  agricultural 84, 118, 283–4
  allocation of 100, 119
  ancestral 125

ceiling 69, 84–5
cultivable 119
dry 69
government 122–3, 125, 264
grabbers 48
investments in 97, 106
irrigated 84, 160, 167, 170
ownership 118
productivity 175
profitable 209, 223
reform 65, 70–72, 82, 85
revenue 60, 69
rights 118–9, 187
rise in prices 100
taxation 160
tax-free 65
Telugu 144
transaction 145
transfers 118–20
tribal 118–9, 188
protection of 120–21
unirrigated 160
wet 69
Land Ceiling Act 84, 123
languages 9, 22, 29, 55, 59, 84, 119, 127, 240, 258, 264
Bengali 9, 43
English 127
Hindi 9, 22, 32, 58–9, 89, 104, 285
Kannada 19, 29, 52, 73, 78
Marathi 9, 29, 52, 257
Punjabi 58, 265
Tamil 9
Telugu 29, 32–3, 52, 84, 127, 145, 202
Urdu 9, 29, 32
Latchanna, Gouthu 64
liberalisation 100
Linguistic Provinces Commission 53
linguistic unity 22–3, 75
Lok Sabha 16, 59, 68, 85, 105, 151, 154, 215, 256
LTR 121–5

Madhya Bharat 15, 20, 79
Madhya Pradesh 15, 20, 32, 59, 79, 89, 220, 246, 255, 285
Madiga/Mala dispute 127
Madiga Reservation Porata Samiti (MRPS) 127
Madigas 107, 127–8, 187–8, 209, 230
Madras 8, 10–12, 15, 17, 19, 30, 33–40, 52–5, 64–5, 67–8, 73, 76, 111, 114–5, 145–6, 213
Madras Assembly 38
Madras Estates Abolition Act 65
Madras Legislative Council 35, 52
Madras Partition Committee 37
Madras Province 8, 37, 52, 64
Madras state 10, 30, 34, 40, 55, 67
Mahabubnagar 32, 120, 167, 226, 228, 230, 280
Maha Punjab Samiti 58
Maharashtra 30, 32, 53–4, 58, 220, 226, 245–6, 256–60, 279–81
Mahavidarbha 256
Majlis-e-Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM) 46, 144
submission to the SKC 155
Malabar 11, 19
Mala Mahanadu 128
Malas 107, 127–8, 187–8, 195
Malkajgiri 292
Malwa 20
Malwa Union 20
Manipur 15
Maoist issues 207
Maoists 207–8, 220, 222, 226–7, 232, 244, *see also* Naxals
Maratha Empire 3

Marathwada 19, 41, 78, 82, 257–60
Marx 49
mass movement 1, 98
Masulipatnam Journalists Association 146
matka (gambling) 112
Mayawati 102, 254–6
Medak 32, 148, 167, 219, 226, 228, 230
media 235, 243
  management 235
  print 202, 235–6, 243
Meer Allum 26
Meghalaya 120
Mehra, Ajay 95
Menon, K. Madhava 35
Merhat 11
Metropolitan Hyderabad and Its Region: A Strategy for Development 41
Mewar 20, 21
migration 9, 22, 30–33, 41–3, 68, 204, 221, 222, 229–30, 241
  Andhra 9
  forced 22
  regional 31
mining 112, 261
  illegal 112
Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI 1, 199, 202, 214, 240, 244
Mir Alam Tank 26
Mir Jumla 25
Mir Kasim 12
Misra, Brajesh 280
Misri, Maulana Abdulla 147
mistrust 2
Mizoram 120
Mohamedans 10, see also Muslims
moneylending 120
Movement for Peace and Justice (MPJ) 188
Mughal Court 11
Mughal Empire 3, 261
  dissolution of the 3
Mughal Province 3, 11
Mughals 3, 11, 25, 110, 261
Mughul Emperor 3
Mukherjee, Pranab, Union Finance Minister 101, 185, 215, 239
Mulki agitation 77
Mulki Rules 85, 88, 132, 186, 213–4
Mumbai 33, 191, 238, 257
  riots 191, 238
Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad 29, 152
Munro, Sir Thomas 110–11
Murthy Raju, Ch. V. P. 103
Muslim League 22, 266
  two-nation theory 22
Muslims 3, 7, 10, 22–3, 27–31, 41–3, 45–7, 49, 52, 72, 78, 82, 87, 107, 144–5, 147–56, 158, 163, 188, 195, 206, 217, 222, 228, 242, 256, 263, 266, 285
  aristocracy 82
  emigration to Pakistan 41
  festival 151
  fundamentalist 228
  grievances of 152
  Hyderabadi 149
  invaders 10, 23
  massacres of 82, 147
  mass emigration of 31
  middle-class 150
  migrated to Pakistan 30, 47
  out-migration 41
  population 27, 43, 153–4, 156
  power 3
  rule 147

SKC's secret note on 156
women 150
Mysore 15, 19, 30, 67, 73, 110
Mysore War, Fourth 110

Nagarjunasagar 61, 70, 168
Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir 279
Nagarjuna University 251, 253
Nageswara Rao, Vasantha 103
Nagi Reddy, T. 71
Nagpur 19, 52, 256–8
Nagpur Agreement 257–8
Naidu, Chandrababu 91, 94, 96, 170, 215
Nalgonda 32, 148, 167, 218, 224, 226, 228, 230
Nal Lake 261
Nameste Telangana 202
Narasimha Rao, P.V. 84, 85, 213
Narasimha Reddy, Justice L. 238
Narsing Rao, J.V. 78
Narsing Rao, M. 144
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) 129
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 100
National Front for New Small States 255
National Integration Council (NIC) 233–4
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 31–2
nation-building 17
nation-state 22
natural resources 111, 225
Naxalism 86, 89, 91, 151, 207, 209, 222, 227, 247
growth of 89
Naxalites 91–6, 201, 246–7
activity 94
ban on 94
terrorism 201, 246–7
Naxals 226–7, 246
NDTV 105–6
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India 18–21, 33–4, 36–40, 52–9, 71, 76, 79, 83, 86, 116, 147, 186, 190, 285
Fortnightly Letters to Chief Ministers 33
view on Hyderabad and Telangana 57
wrote on 2 August 1955 to the Chief Ministers 57
wrote to Chief Ministers 54–5, 58
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi 147
Nellore 8, 69, 107, 114, 270
New Indian Express, The 106–7, 151
Nizam 3, 7, 11, 13–5, 19, 25–9, 41, 47, 52, 72–3, 78–9, 82–3, 110, 118–21, 144–7, 152, 158, 160, 164, 176, 227, 256–7, 285
Nizamabad 32, 79, 83, 120, 151, 167, 219, 226, 228, 273
Nizamate of Hyderabad 3
accepted the Constitution of India 3
Nizamsagar 168
Nizam-ul-Mulk 11, 25
Nizam VII 25
non-tribals 118–25
Noorani, A. G. 72, 82, 147
Northern Circars 10–11, 145, 146
North-West Frontier Province 11, 264
NRIs 106, 193

Odisha 280

One Man Commission (OMC) 133, 142
Ongole 8, 107
opportunities 8, 33, 41, 78, 84, 88, 96, 102, 136–7, 192, 201, 203, 205, 207, 216, 219–22, 225–6, 229, 241, 246, 275
  economic 41, 96, 207, 222
  educational 8
  job 205, 216, 225, 229
  lack of 84
  loss of 78
  political 96
Oria 10, 11
Orissa 10, 15, 18, 32, 220, 270
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 88, 96, 187
Oudh 11
Outlook 95, 128
Owaisi, Akbaruddin 151–2, 154
Owaisi, Asaduddin 155, 157

paigahs 82
Pakistan 12–3, 17, 20, 22, 30, 41, 47, 82, 150, 160, 260, 263–6, 286
  Muslims migrated to 30, 47
  religious basis for 22
  statehood for 22
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 266
Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid 266
Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) 265–6
palegars 110
pamphlet 38
  Appeal to the People of Madras City and Others 38
Panabaka Lakshmi 128
Panchayati Raj institutions 166
Pandit Sundarlal Committee 72
Pandit Sundarlal Institute of Asian Studies, Ghaziabad 147
Parliament
  of Britain 12–3, 147
  of India 1, 4–5, 7–8, 56–7, 96, 101, 132, 154–5, 185, 187, 216, 253–4, 293, 295
parliamentary constituencies 292
Partition Committee 35–6, 37
Paschim Pradesh 254
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 14–5, 17, 19, 21, 37, 39, 54, 56, 116, 147, 260
Patiala 15, 20, 58
Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) 15, 20, 58
Patil, S. K. 69, 70
pattas 118, 122, 125
peace talks 94, 95
Peasants and Workers Party (PWP) 73, 77
People's Democratic Front (PDF) 77
People's War Group (PWG) 91–2, 95
  ban on the activities of the 92
Planning Commission 170, 192, 258–9
Pochampad 61, 84, 168, 279
policies 2, 7–8, 14–5, 18, 45, 55, 65, 92, 94, 96, 118, 153, 160, 166, 177, 192, 202, 211, 255, 272–4, 285–6
  defence 18
  fiscal 160
  foreign 18
  public 2, 14, 202, 211, 255
  revenue 160
  sensible 2
  state-level 274
poligars 110–11

political change 13
process of 13
political control 46, 259
political expediency 19
political game 22
political influence 21
political opinion 7
political parties 6, 65, 94, 96, 103, 105–7, 113, 139, 150, 187–9, 192, 207, 210, 212, 217, 220, 225, 228, 233, 236, 248, 254
political power 46, 91, 127, 146, 150, 201, 246
political representation 44, 127
political survey 10–11
politics 44, 66, 69, 72–3, 75–6, 78, 83, 87, 91, 106–7, 112, 141, 150, 152, 194–5, 216, 256, 260
caste 75
electoral 106
faction 78
population
density 118, 121
Hindu 28, 156, 228, 286
Muslim 27, 43, 153–4, 156
rural 130
tribal 118, 123, 125–6, 141
poverty 36, 154, 159, 195, 227, 247, 261
reduction 154, 195
power 91, 246
economic 91, 146
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 291
Prabhakar, Ponnam 8
Praja Party 36, 64
Praja Rajyam Party (PRP) 88, 105–6, 185, 249, 254
Praja Socialist Party (PSP) 58, 64–6, 69, 71
Prakasam, T. 34–8, 64, 70
Pranab Mukherjee Committee 101, 185, 215
Prasad, Dr Rajendra 15–6
Prasad, Yarlagadda Lakshmi 103
Presidential Order on Public Services 1975 88, 132–41, 186, 197, 214, 258, 278, 282, 290
abuse and violation of the 136, 138, 140
princely states 3, 13, 15–23, 72–3, 75, 147, 160, 286
characteristics of the 21
privy purses 21, 28, 47
Provisional Telangana Legislative Assembly 291–2
Punjab 7, 11, 15, 20, 58–9, 79, 197, 245, 262, 264–6
Purvanchal 254, 256

Queen's Proclamation of 1857 12
Queen Victoria 12
Qutb Shahi dynasty 25

race 22
Raghava Rao, Kadiyala 103
Raichur 97, 116
Rajagopalachari, C. 16, 38, 114
Rajagopal, Lagadapati 7, 46, 97
Rajah, P. S. Kumarswami 35
Rajaji 16–7, 37–40, 55, 73, 272, *see also* Rajagopalachari, C.
Rajasekhara Reddy, Y. S. (YSR) 47, 93–7, 103–5, 111, 116, 152, 170, 216, 250
democracy as mafia warfare 111
two-pronged approach 94
Rajasthan 15, 20, 59, 285
Rajeswara Rao, C. 71
*Rajpramukh*s 3, 15, 20, 121

Rajputana Agency 20
Rajya Sabha 38, 105, 151
Ramamohana Rao, Karnati 103
Rama Rao, N. T. (NTR) 87, 91–2
Ranga, N. G. 38, 64, 71, 76
Ranga Reddy district 28, 46–7
Ranga Reddy, K. V. 7, 28, 31–2, 43–4, 46–7, 78, 97, 167
Rao, B. Ramakrishna 70, 78
Rao, C. V. K. 71
Rao, Kala Venkata 35–6, 38
Rao, Kaleshwar 35
Rao, Katti Padma 128
Rao, K. S. 103
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 102
Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) 255
Ratnam, Kakani Venkata 85
raw materials 60
Rayalaseema 4, 8, 30–31, 33, 39, 42–3, 47, 49, 53, 64, 76, 80, 84, 86, 88, 91, 94–8, 106–7, 110–17, 127–30, 144–6, 151–2, 154–7, 163–5, 168–734, 185, 188, 193–4, 196, 201, 206, 208–9, 213, 218, 223–4, 242, 249–50, 254, 265, 267, 269–70, 275, 279, 281–3
  agitation for separation from Coastal Andhra 97, 117
  irrigation projects in 116
  Kamma power in 94
  position in the Andhra State 113
Rayalaseema Rashtra Samithi (RRS) 97, 116
Rayala-Telangana 8, 107, 156, 206, 218, 223
real-estate 7, 29, 45–7, 76, 106, 255, 270
  developers 106
  lobby 7
Reddi vs. Kamma 76
Reddi, Yadi 8
  suicide in New Delhi 8
Reddy, Ravulu Chandrasekhar 290
Reddys 65, 75–7, 87, 94, 97–8, 107, 194, 209, 230
Reddy, Sabita Indra 151
Reddy, Y. S. Jaganmohan 7, 8, 105, 152, 254
religion 22, 41
Report of Tribal Land Issues in the Telangana Area 121
Republican Constitution 16
Republic of India 3–4, 10, 13–4, 23, 285
reservations 85, 127–8, 133–5, 156, 195, 214, 216–7, 282–3
  provisions for 133
Rest of Maharashtra (RoM) 257, 259
revenue 36, 39, 42–3, 45, 48–9, 53, 60–61, 65, 69, 79–80, 110, 124, 160, 169, 186, 203, 221, 226, 236, 263, 267–70, 273, 275, 281–2
  deficits 36, 39, 53, 80
  excise 60
  government 53, 61, 79, 160
  infusion of 80
  land 45, 60, 69
  per capita 60
  policy 160
  sources of 60
  state 42–3, 61, 65, 203, 221, 282
  state-wide 282
  surplus 36, 160
rights
  property 82
  protected 125

tribal 121
violations of 121
water 169
riots 148, 150–52, 157, 191, 228, 238, 247
Mumbai 191, 238
rivalries 39, 71, 76, 80, 230
inter-regional 230
river 8, 18, 27, 60–61, 97, 121, 177, 187, 218, 261, 270, 279
Coum 34
Godavari 10–11, 60–61, 70, 80, 118, 121, 169–70, 176, 187, 220, 270, 279–81, 290
inter-regional shares 280
Krishna 8, 60, 61, 97, 171, 176, 279–81, 294
surplus waters 294
projects, inter-state 177
waters 279
issue 60
Rosaiah, K. 151–2, 267
RSS 149, 207, 228
RTI Act 236
Rupani, Vijay 263

sacrifices 4, 128
Sahni, Ajai 91–2
Samajwadi Party (SP) 255–6
*Samasthan*s 82
Samata 121
Samata judgment 121
Sambasiva Rao, Kavuri 97, 103
Sambasiva Rao, Rayapati 46, 97
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMS) 257
Sanjeeva Reddy, N. 35, 38, 64–5, 71, 76, 115
Sankar Rao, P. 152
sarf-e-khas 7, 28, 47
Saurashtra 15, 19, 58–9, 260–63
Saurashtra Sankalan Samithi 262
scepticism 2
Scheduled Castes (SCs) 80, 87, 96, 107, 120, 126, 128, 140, 187, 193, 195, 209, 230
attitude and interests of the 126
Scheduled Tribes (STs) 88, 120, 140, 187, 193
sectarian massacres 22
Secunderabad 26–7, 29, 60
security 91, 93–4, 154, 199, 206–7, 212, 218, 220, 222, 225, 232, 240
internal 199, 212, 218, 232
Seemandhra 4, 29, 43, 46–8, 50, 67–8, 98, 157–8, 201, 203–5, 207–8, 216–7, 219–20, 222–3, 225–6, 229, 231, 235–6, 243, 244, 251, 275, 277–8, 281–2, 284, 287–91, 293–4
real-estate lobby 29, 47
self-governance 205, 231
sewage disposal 49
Shah, Abdullah Qutb 25
Shah, Nadir 11
invasion and massacres in Delhi 11
Siasat Daily, The 151, 152, 157
Simon Commission Report 118, 120
Sind 11, 261
Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (SCCL) 203, 219
Singh, Ajit 255
Singh, Amar 255
Singh, Manmohan, Prime Minister of India 254
Singh, V. P., prime minister of India 102

Sitaram, Swami 33, 36, 37
fast unto death 37
Sittaramayya, Pattabhi 53, 54, 116
Sivaji, K. 128
Sivaji, Yalamanchili 103
Six-point Formula of the Prime Minister 132
Socialist Party 58, 64, 257
Somasundaram, Pappu 35
south India 55–6, 145, 162–3
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 263
Special Investigation Team (SIT) 151
Sri Bagh Agreement/Sri Bagh Pact 113–6
Sri Krishna Commission 184, 191, 193
findings of 191, 193
Sri Krishna Committee (SKC) 1, 7, 31, 43–6, 49, 92, 96–7, 100, 106–7, 113, 117, 126–32, 142, 153, 155–7, 160, 184–5, 191–2, 197–203, 205, 207–10, 212, 238, 240–41, 247–51, 282–3
dialogue process 106
Law & Order and Internal Security Implications 240
recommendations 49, 199
report 31, 43, 113, 153, 156, 199, 202, 282–3
analysis and critique of the 192
secret note on Muslims 156
submissions to 106
views on
agitation 203
coal and energy 241
communal violence 157
managing the media 243
RayalaTelangana Option 242
religious communities 242
TRS 243
Srikrishna, Justice B. N. 191
Srinivasulu, K. 252
Sriramulu, Potti 38–9, 116
Srisailam Reservoir 171
Standstill Agreement 13, 147
statehood 1–2, 4, 6, 22, 38, 40, 47, 49, 71, 89, 95–8, 101, 103–5, 113, 116–7, 131, 152, 156, 184, 187–9, 218, 224–5, 240, 246–51, 253–5, 260, 262–3, 280, 287
separate 1, 6, 184, 188–9, 253, 255, 263
State of Hyderabad 14, 23, 29, 58, 120, 160, 285
multilingual 23
State of the Nation Survey (SoNS) 248, 252
State Planning and Policy Board 274
states
identity of the 18
linguistic 22, 32, 52, 54, 56, 76, 285
formation of 52
State's Own Tax Revenues (SOTR) 48, 275
States' People 145
States Reorganization Commission (SRC) 17, 52, 57–63, 78–9, 104, 189, 238, 257, 260
Law and Order and Internal Security Implications 199
recommendations 57, 58, 189
report 57, 238
river waters 61
views on the issue of employment 62
Students Islamic Organisation (SIO) 188

Subba Reddy, B. V. 84, 86
Subba Reddy, Kuncham Venkata 97, 116
suicide 8, 98, 100, 105, 245, 251
  attacks 8
  ritual 98, 105
Sundarayya, Puchallapalli 71, 76
Sundarlal Committee 72, 147–9
  report 147
Sundarlal, Pandit 72, 147
Supreme Court of India 9, 21, 121, 127, 132, 186–7, 191, 213–4, 280, 288–9, 295
Surat 11, 261, 262
  diamond-cutting industry 261
Suri, K. C. 252
S. V. Ramamurthi Special Committee 65
swamplands 65
Swatantra Party 85

Tamil Nadu 32, 34, 36, 97, 116
Tamil Nadu Congress Committee (TNCC) 36
tax/taxation 42, 48, 159–60, 270, 281–2
  commercial 42
  land 160
Telangana agitation 84, 93, 103, 122, 206, 208–9, 213, 217, 220, 227, 229–30, 264, 268
Telangana Congress 39, 78, 101, 209, 215, 234, 292
Telangana movement 1, 6, 88, 96, 98, 100, 106–7, 128, 152, 193, 195–7, 265, 286
  caste and regional equations 208
  Joint Action Committee (JAC) 98, 188, 217, 251, 253
  logic of 195
  power groups 194
  rise of the 96
Telangana Praja Front (TPF) 207–8, 220, 227, 234, 243
Telangana Praja Samithi (TPS) 84, 154, 155, 186, 264
Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) 6, 47, 89, 95–6, 101, 103–5, 184–5, 208–9, 215–6, 219–20, 227, 233–4, 243, 249–50, 253
Telangana–Rayalaseema–Reddy alliance 91
Telangana Regional Committee (TRC) 197, 259
Telangana Regional Council 250, 259
Telangana state
  approved the formation of the state 4, 275
  biases against 7
  creation of a separate state of 128
  demand for a separate 77, 85, 86, 92, 96, 101, 196, 212
  de-merger of 189, 190, 275
  Force Majeure 13
  grassroot realities 7
  grievances of 187
  idea of a self-governing 4
  identity of 10, 23
  in the Modern Period 10
  Joint Session of Parliament for 101
  merger of Andhra with 8, 158
  middle class in 128
  process of 48
    state formation 48
  SRC's recommendation for 59
  statehood for 2, 6, 47, 49, 89, 95–7, 101, 105, 113, 117, 131, 156, 184, 187–8, 246, 249, 253–5, 263

constitutional implications of 198
issue of 194
removal of 193
reports 6, 194, 199
story of 4
struggle for the formation of 207, 220
supporters 93
topography and rainfall pattern in 143
unfair treatment to 247
unification with Andhra 62
unrest in 40
vote bank 39
Telangana combined movements 137
Telangana Tribal Land rights 121
Telanganites 9, 29, 193, 222, 224
Telugu 10–12
Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 6, 8, 43, 47, 87–9, 91–6, 100–101, 103–6, 117, 132, 140, 153, 184, 194, 209–10, 215, 220, 235, 242, 249–51, 254–5, 293
collapse of the 96
Telugus 78
Telugu sub-regions 47
Terms of Reference 184, 189, 239
terrorism 201, 246–7
Mumbai 201, 246–7
Thunder Nine 260
Times of India, The 7, 46, 76, 97, 104, 107, 131, 135, 201, 255–6
Tipu Sultan 110
TJAC 293
Torture 15, 19, 21
Torture Cocktail 15, 19
treaty obligations 12–3, 18, 21
breach of 18
Tribal Areas Regulation, 1956 119
tribals 118–20, 141, 187, 201–2, 260
interests 187
land 119, 188
protection of 120–21
population 118, 123, 125–6, 141
rights 120–21
violations of 121
special right for 120
villages 126, 260
Tripura 15, 120
TRS 6, 47, 89, 95, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 184, 185, 208, 209, 215, 216, 219, 220, 227, 233, 234, 243, 249, 250, 253, 293

Udaipur 21
UK 33
unfairness 9, 132
Union Territory (UT) 34, 46, 48–9, 106–7, 157, 203–4, 206–7, 218, 221–2, 224, 268
United Andhra 212, 250–51, 253
United Congress Front (UCF) 69–71, 75
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 14, 17, 20, 147, 266
The Hyderabad Question 20
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 6, 97, 101, 116, 215
United Provinces 11, 19, 79
United Provinces of Agra 11
USA 33
US Consulate Hyderabad 134
Usha Mehra Commission 127
Uttarakhand 94, 100, 113, 256, 276, 285
Uttaranchal 89, 100, *see also* Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 11, 15, 20, 32, 36, 79, 89, 100, 246, 254–5, 263, 285

Post Independence, the state of Andhra Pradesh was created by merging the Telangana region, a part of the princely state of Hyderabad, with the coastal region of Andhra and Rayalaseema—both parts of the erstwhile Madras state. With Madras, the major source of income of the state, allocated to Tamil Nadu, it was necessary to include the revenue-surplus Telangana to create a financially viable entity.

However, there had always been doubts about the long-term feasibility of such an arrangement. Jawaharlal Nehru had even considered the provision of a 'divorce' if the 'marriage' between the three regions did not turn out to be mutually beneficial.

Despite several agreements, laws and government orders safeguarding the interests of the people of Telangana, modern history records a sordid tale of exploitation, agitation, assurances and broken promises. The author shows how the Srikrishna Commission that was formed to look into the matter and impartially recommend a way forward 'subverted' the process and came forward with a pre-determined solution.

The author has painstakingly dissected the Telangana problem from its inception to the point where a separate state seems to be inevitable. He has identified the political reasons for the behaviour of the national leaders in making promises and later reneging on them, and shows how this betrayal has affected the people of the region.

Vocal and hard-hitting, this book will be valuable for students of political science and general readers interested in the movement.

Gautam Pingle was formerly Dean of Research and Consultancy, Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad.

Cover image: The Hindu archive
Cover design: OSDATA, Hyderabad

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ISBN 978 81 250 5474 0

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